

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

December 26, 1956

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: IO - Mr. Walmsley *knw*

SUBJECT: Mr. Hammarskjold's Emissaries to Egypt, and reported new Egyptian conditions for canal clearance (New York Times stories)

Mr. Wadsworth telephoned me at noon today, in response to my inquiry after your staff meeting, to report the gist of his conversation with Mr. Hammarskjold.

As to the dispatch to Egypt of Messrs. Cordier and Katzin, the Secretary General said according to Mr. Wadsworth, that he wanted to "tighten up" the multiple channels between himself on the one hand and General Burns, General Wheeler and civilian U.N. representatives in Egypt. Mr. Hammarskjold is reported to feel the need on the Egyptian end to coordinate between U.N. representatives and to reduce the number of channels to him.

As to the report of a spokesman of the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority about the delay in clearing the waterway, and with respect to evacuation of the Gaza strip by the Israelis, Mr. Hammarskjold told Mr. Wadsworth that he, the Secretary General, had no information of this kind from official Egyptian sources, that no new crisis has developed and that he is not worried. Mr. Wadsworth reported Mr. Hammarskjold as being on the contrary pleased so far with the cooperation he had been receiving from the Egyptians which he considers better than what he is receiving from perhaps one or two of the other parties directly concerned.

Mr. Hammarskjold, however, is said to be less than pleased with the slant of New York Times stories and especially with the editorial in this morning's issue. He showed Mr. Wadsworth a letter he had sent Arthur Sulzberger a few days ago suggesting that New York Times representatives check with the Secretary General's office to verify rumors and what he believes to be inspired stories on the canal and Israeli-Egyptian situations.

*Turn out
It's false story
wishing to discuss w/ Pres.*

IO:WNVWalmsley:jm

674.842/12.2656

NR 974.7301

(2)

DEC 26 1956

Return to
ND

2 TOP U. N. AIDES ON WAY TO EGYPT TO SPUR SUEZ JOB

**Cordier and Katzin Will Try
to Heal Rift on Salvage—
Wheeler More Optimistic**

By LINDESEY PARBOTT

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y., Dec. 25—Two ranking United Nations officials took off for Egypt today to look into problems involved in the clearance of the Suez Canal.

They are Andrew W. Cordier, executive assistant to Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, and Alfred G. Katzin, Deputy Assistant Secretary-General.

The two took off from New York International Airport, Idlewild, Queens, having after spent much of the day at a renewed conference with Mr. Hammarskjöld and with Dr. Ralph J. Bunche, Undersecretary General. Dr. Bunche is head of the advisory unit on canal problems set up within the United Nations by Mr. Hammarskjöld last month. Mr. Hammarskjöld had talked for some time yesterday with his two envoys and returned for the further conference at United Nations headquarters this morning.

No Word of Decisions

No announcement was made of decisions reached at the talks. It was believed, however, that they arose in part from the desire of Lieut. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler, United States Army, retired, who is in charge of the United Nations clearance project to press the work as rapidly as possible following the evacuation of the last British and French troops from the canal area.

It had been reported here that General Wheeler hoped to use a larger part of the French-British salvage fleet that was employed in clearing the Port Said harbor area. Thus far these vessels have not been sent south of El Cap, the limit of the British-French occupation. Problems have arisen regarding the em-

New York Times

ployment of their crews in operations farther south and of the crew's protection by the United Nations forces in Egypt.

Mr. Cordier and Mr. Katzin were scheduled to fly to Naples and to proceed from there to Cairo by military aircraft.

The two United Nations executives were expected to return here next Sunday. This opened the possibility that any report they might have to make on the canal clearance and on the compliance of the powers involved with the United Nations cease-fire and evacuation resolutions would be in time for the opening of the General Assembly session Jan. 2, after the Assembly's Christmas recess.

Work Linked to Gaza Issue

CAIRO, Dec. 25 (AP)—A spokesman for Egypt's Suez Canal Authority said today there would be no work on clearing the waterway of obstructions until the last Israeli forces left.

Asked if this meant the Gaza Strip, which Israel has said she intends to retain, the spokesman replied: "You can draw your own conclusions."

The spokesman said in reply to another question that the Egyptian Government might possibly change its mind later on the Gaza issue.

Wheeler Sees Early Start

By HOMER BIGART

Special to The New York Times

PORT SAID, Egypt, Dec. 25—Lieut. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler said today he hoped that by next week-end Egypt would permit him to send his salvage fleet down the canal.

General Wheeler, who is chief United Nations adviser on clearance of the canal, said he now had enough equipment to start work on critical wrecks.

He also said the Egyptians were removing mines from the canal.

The Egyptians have been telling General Wheeler that until the channel was clear of mines no ships could proceed beyond El Cap, twenty-two miles south of Port Said. Two German salvage ships and two German tugs have been waiting there since Friday.

General Wheeler is impatient to disperse his fleet along the canal at the site of critical obstacles. "The more points at which you can work the faster the job will go," he said.

Now his fleet is bottled up in Port Said harbor except for the

vessels at El Cap and one Dutch and one Danish salvage ship at Suez.

General Wheeler told newsmen that about half of the salvage vessels chartered by the United Nations had reached Egypt and that the last vessels chartered by the United Nations had reached Egypt and that the

last units would be here by Jan. 11.

The United Nations salvage fleet is being assembled from European "neutrals" displaying the flags of the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Belgium, Italy and West Germany. The United Nations has entered into a consortium with two salvage concerns, Emanuel Svitzer of Copenhagen, Denmark, and the Smith Company of Rotterdam, the Netherlands. These concerns have been asked to subcontract essential equipment from neutral countries.

At present General Wheeler cannot count on using the ten British and one French salvage ships still at Port Said. Although they are now flying the United Nations flag, Egypt balks at their employment in the Suez Canal.

The one French ship and two British ships have been permitted to resume salvage work in the harbor here. But they are under tight restrictions and have been cleared only for the specific jobs they were doing when the harbor was under British-French occupation.

General Wheeler said the fate of the British-French salvage fleet was still under negotiation between Mr. Hammarskjöld and the Egyptian Government.

"It is out of my hands," he said. "Naturally, I would like to get all the equipment I can lay hands on. But I would not want to use equipment objectionable to the Egyptians."

He said he could not do the job without British-French ships.

"I have enough stuff," he said. "I have fine technicians and excellent equipment and the spirit of the crews is good."

He said he had discouraged shore leave for the salvage crews because he wanted them to be ready to start work as soon as Egypt allowed ships down the canal.

Brigadier General Ladsun D. Womham, vice president of Ralph M. Parsons Company, Los Angeles, engineers, arrived to survey the maintenance shops at Port Fuad. The shops suffered some damage in the British-French attack.

AIR FOUCH
PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

674.84A/12-2756

FROM : AMCONGENERAL, JERUSALEM

93
DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

December 27, 1956

REF : None

71 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION NER-4 REC'D 1/11	DEPT. IN F O	DAMASCUS-1 BEIRUT-1 ROME-1 UO-1 Rn/R-2 OL-8 P-1 IO-4 EUR-5 E-4 ICA-10 UOP-1 CIA-17 USIA-10 OCB-1 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3 HAIFA-1 LONDON-1 PARIS-1
-----------------------------	----------------------------------	-----------------------	---

SUBJECT: Comments About Situation at Gaza

Some days ago I had a discussion with the manager of Barclays Bank in Israel, Mr. William SPARROWE, about the sub-branch of Barclays Bank at Gaza. Following the Israeli occupation of the Gaza strip supervision of the sub-branch was transferred from Barclays Bank Cairo to the head office in London. According to Mr. Sparrowe, two inspectors from the latter, Messrs. HANBURY and PENSTONE, made visits to Gaza during November to inspect the sub-branch. In a letter of November 23 to Mr. Sparrowe about this inspection Mr. Penstone has written substantially as follows:

Mr. BICHARA (clerk in charge of the sub-branch) was forced by the Israeli military to hand over two revolvers without being given any receipt. One of these was his own property and the other belonged to the bank. Two of the bank's staff had their private cars impounded also without receipts. Shortly after the first visit to Gaza of Mr. Hanbury and Mr. Penstone, which took place on November 8, all males over 18 years of age were assembled in the town square and forced to remain there continually from 8 A.M. to 4 P.M. During this time all houses were searched by troops. In connection with this search Mr. Bichara states that he lost some silk stockings, watches and a fountain pen together with other pieces of small jewelry. His assistant, Mr. BABBEK, claims to have lost cash and jewelry to the value of 70 Egyptian pounds.

The above appears to indicate two specific instances where it seems established that Israeli soldiers entered houses and looted.

In addition, Mr. Penstone reported that the 17-year old son of Mr. Bichara was seized by Israeli soldiers and placed against a wall. The soldiers then threatened to shoot him, arguing that he should have been in the town square with the other males over 18 years of age. After some difficulty the boy was able to establish that he was under the age limit and was released.

I discussed the foregoing matters at some length with one of the inspectors, Mr. Hanbury, several days ago. He said that while he understood there had been some looting by soldiers in the town one should keep in mind that soldiers everywhere were given to such practices when they have the opportunity. He thought that in general the Israeli Army maintained a rather high state of

WECole/hkm

REPORTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

FMC
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
674.84A/12-2756

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

discipline which would compare favorably with that prevailing among British or American troops, for instance, during war time. He had seen check posts established by the IDF along roads communicating with Gaza, where Israeli soldiers and vehicles were stopped and searched. Any loot found was confiscated and conscientious efforts were, he believed, being made to locate the owners of such property in order to return it. He added that both of the cars which were impounded as mentioned above have been returned to their owners.

Mr. Hanbury said that he thought some of the stories about violence and looting in the Gaza area arose from the circumstance that a day or two before the Israelis entered there the Egyptian forces had handed out rifles to young men and boys aged 16 or over. While the idea was that these people should participate informally in the defense of the Gaza strip, they had in fact become engaged in a certain amount of looting; and probably to some extent in the terrorizing of individuals among the local population. It was easy to confuse accounts of this matter with allegations about the misbehavior of Israeli troops.

Another cause of looting by refugees or local people could be found in their efforts to obtain any combustible materials for use in making fires for heating or cooking. In the course of this activity they had stolen or dismantled objects made of wood, evidently in the belief that supplies of kerosene would no longer be forthcoming or would be available only at exorbitant prices. This tendency had been aggravated by what Mr. Hanbury considered an unwise action on the part of the Israelis: that is they had fixed the exchange rate between the Israeli and Egyptian pound at 3.5 to 1. A realistic rate would have been 5 to 1. This action had caused the local people to take all sorts of measures to avoid exchanging their Egyptian currency for Israeli. The rate was more recently changed to 4 to 1. While that new rate represents an improvement, the change also put the idea into the heads of the locals that if they continued to hold their Egyptian currency it might appreciate still further in value.

Summing up his remarks Mr. Hanbury said that in his view the Israeli occupation had, despite some lapses, generally shown a reasonable regard for the local people and evidenced a rather high state of discipline maintained in the Israeli Army. He had gained the impression from the bank employees and others whom he and Mr. Penstone had talked to that the refugee population would prefer to have the Gaza strip returned to the Egyptians, so that the hoped-for destruction of Israel could proceed in accordance with their wishes. The local resident population (non-refugee) however generally hope the strip will be placed under United Nations administration. Failing that they would, he understood, prefer to have the Israelis remain.

According to a recent communication from Colonel BAYARD at Gaza, an Israeli official recently approached certain leading residents with offers to purchase land belonging to them in the strip, provided they would undertake to leave Gaza and emigrate elsewhere. No further action is considered likely

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Classification)

about this matter, at least for the time being, since fear of reprisals by other Arabs would doubtless inhibit serious consideration of such offers.

Turning to other aspects of Gaza matters, Father Patrick COYLE, Jerusalem representative of the Pontifical Mission for Palestine and an American citizen, recently told me that during the last week in November Monsignor Antonio VERGANI, Latin Patriarchal Vicar for Israel, visited Gaza in order to inspect the church and priests' house there. He found all in good condition. He was told, moreover, that at the time the Israeli forces entered the town the Arab Catholic congregation gathered in the church for safety. They were treated well by the Israelis, who apparently favored the Christians in this respect. Upon his return to Israel Msgr. Vergani was interviewed by local newspaper men. To these gentry he gave a favorable account, saying in effect that he found all in order and praising the Israelis' conduct and treatment of the Arabs. The statements were at once taken up by mass media in Israel and used by Kol Israel, etc., to refute certain unfavorable comments made a short time before by the Pope on the subject of the aggression against Egypt.

Clerical reactions to Monsignor Vergani's press statement were rather forceful. Monsignor Vergani's superior, Monsignor Alberto GORI, Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem, summoned him and reprimanded him bluntly. In addition Monsignor Angelo SACCHI, then in charge of the Apostolic Delegation (i.e. representative of the Vatican in the area) issued a statement disavowing any connection with Msgr. Vergani's remarks and pointing out that they did not represent the viewpoint of the Vatican.

Aside from the fact that Monsignor Vergani had in effect contradicted the Vatican position on the matter, it was feared that his remarks would further exacerbate the feelings of the Moslem Arabs in Gaza toward the Christians, already said to be inflamed by Israeli discrimination in favor of the latter. Msgr. Gori reportedly told Msgr. Vergani that his service in the Holy Land would be terminated if he made any more statements for the press. However, Father Patrick feels sure that his comments, if unfortunate, were made without any thought as to their unfavorable implications, and that the furore over his gaffe will soon subside.


William E. Cole
American Consul General

Copy sent Amman, Cairo, Tel Aviv

Department please pass Haifa, London, Paris, Rome,
Beirut, Damascus

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RMR
DCB
11/17/58
INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

~~AB~~
ACTION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

35
Action
NEA

Info
RMR

SS
G
SP
C
EUR
L
IO
P
UOP
ND
OLI

OCB
USIA
CIA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

FROM: TEL AVIV
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 784, DECEMBER 28

Control: 16655
Rec'd: DECEMBER 28, 1956
10:51 A.M.

SENT DEPARTMENT 784; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 136, CAIRO
149, DAMASCUS 90, BEIRUT 121.

TODAY'S PRESS REPORTS FEDAYEEN ATTACKS ON THREE VILLAGES
IN TEL MOND AREA DURING NIGHT DECEMBER 26-27. ONE HOUSE
DAMAGED BY TIME BOMB AND SHORT EXCHANGE OF SMALL ARMS FIRE
AND HAND GRENADES BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AFD ISRAELI BORDER GUARDS.
NO CASUALTIES. ALLEGED THAT TRACKS OF FOUR MEN LED TO JORDAN
BORDER AND THREE OF THESE IDENTICAL WITH THOSE FOUND AT TEL MOND
LAST WEEK WHEN HOUSE BLOWN UP WITH LOSS OF ONE LIFE. (EMBTel 750

LAWSON

RN

NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

1956 DEC 28 PM 3 12

THIS DOCUMENT IS TO BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES

374.84A/12-2856

674.84A/12-2856

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNCLASSIFIED

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
VERBATIM TEXT

14106

DEC 28 PM 8 09

DC/T

SENT TO: Amembassy, TEL AVIV 661

RPTD INFO: USUN, New York 474 POUCH Amembassy, BEIRUT ✓

Amembassy, CAIRO 211 Amembassy, PARIS ✓

VIA POUCH Amembassy, AMMAN ✓ Amembassy, LONDON ✓

" " Amembassy, DAMASCUS ✓

At earliest appropriate occasion
/please bring following to attention Prime Minister Ben Gurion, ~~re: [redacted]~~

~~that you are sending~~ under instructions

USG seriously disturbed over statements by officials of Israel Government to effect that in their opinion recent events in Middle East have made Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement invalid.

These statements indicate that Israel Government considers that either party to Agreement has right to determine unilaterally whether it must observe that Agreement or whether it may disregard it if ~~circumstances require~~.
USG cannot agree with this point of view which has dangerous implications ~~for~~ for peace and stability of area. ~~concerned~~.

Nowhere does Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement envisage unilateral abrogation or /amendment. On contrary, Article XII specifically provides that Agreement shall remain in force until peaceful settlement between Parties achieved. Only exception is that Parties may by mutual consent revise Agreement, or any of its provisions, other than Articles I and II. In absence of mutual agreement on revision, specific mechanism is provided for settlement of differences, through conference convoked by Secretary General in first instance, and in Security Council in second instance.

Dist.
Desired
(Office
Only)

Drafted *[initials]*
IO:UNP: [redacted] wpt 12/27/56

Telegraphic transcription and
classification approved by:

TO - W. N. Walmsley

Clearances:

[initials]

NE

16

Rev

G

[initials]

DEC 28 1956 P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

This document
is to be
placed in
Central
files
RM/R
Re
[redacted]

674.84A/12.2855

CS/F

674.84A/12.2856

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

General Armistice Agreements were called for by Security Council and concluded under auspices of Acting Mediator pursuant to decision of Security Council. Security Council later expressed its satisfaction with agreements as important step toward establishment of permanent peace. Until Security Council decides otherwise, or until Parties by mutual consent decide to amend Agreements, world community, and especially Parties directly concerned, must base actions on assumption that all provisions of Agreements binding. Any contrary assumption ^{is repeat not,} not in opinion USG, justified.

^{however}
USG feels that it is clearly in best interests of all signatories to General Armistice Agreements to uphold their integrity so as to facilitate transition toward Israel-Arab peace.

Dulles
WWS

" DULLES "

AIR POUCH

PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMCONGENERAL, JERUSALEM

95

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

December 28, 1956

DATE

REF : Congen Despatch 91, December 17, 1956

15 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.	BEIRUT-1 CAIRO-1
	NEA-4	IN RM/A-2 OLI-8 IO-4 P-1 USUN-1	DAMASCUS-1
	REC'D 1/11	OTHER O CIA-12 USIA-10 OSD-4 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-	

SUBJECT: Activities of the MACs during the Period 1 through 14 December 1956

Enclosed are copies of the substantive parts of the weekly reports prepared by the Mixed Armistice Commissions of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization which summarize their activities for the period 1 through 14 December 1956.

It may be noted (Enclosure 2) that on December 11 the "Palestinian police force on the Gaza Strip....." was disbanded, and a new police force evidently established by the occupying authorities.

William E. Cole
William E. Cole
American Consul General

2 Enclosures

1. Copy of Parts of MAC Weekly Reports for 1 through 7 December 1956
2. Copy of Parts of MAC Weekly Reports for 8 through 14 December 1956

Copy sent Amman, Tel Aviv

Department pass to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus

1957 JAN 14 PM 3 08

MESSAGE CENTER

674.84A/12-2856

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

WECole/hkm

REPORTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE DC/R CENTRAL FILES

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

COPY

The following is a summary of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions for the period 1 December to 7 December 1956.

EGYPTIAN - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

During the period under review Gaza remained relatively quiet. The Israeli police took limited action to curtail the cutting off of the wood lots. However, the refugees and town-people have continued to cut and remove trees on a reduced scale.

Israeli soldiers allegedly entered and looted three stores and were unsuccessful in their attempts to break into a fourth store. Israeli soldiers also allegedly entered three houses on the east side of Gaza and stole money, radios and jewelry. In each case the alleged robbery took place during the night.

The Israelis issued a proclamation to the effect that Israeli currency would be the official currency in Gaza. To date, most shop-keepers insist on Egyptian currency and refuse to accept Israeli currency.

UNTSO continues to furnish communications and clerical support to UNRWA.

Complaints and investigations

Nil.

HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The situation along the HJK-Israeli demarcation line remains tense although there is some relaxation compared with the past month.

UNMOs continue to patrol the Israeli side of the border at frequent intervals and report the gradual dissolution of administrative units, such as transport companies, which have been located in many areas since the beginning of the Sinai campaign. On 4 and 5 December the roads within a ten kilometres zone from the demarcation line were patrolled by UNMOs on the HJK side. No unusual activity was noticed.

A Sub-Committee meeting held on 3 December discussed missing persons, property and other problems incidental to the maintenance of the G.A.A.

The Jordanian Delegation submitted 31 complaints: 3 alleging firing across the demarcation line; 28 alleging overflights. There were no casualties.

The Israeli Delegation submitted no complaint.

Outstanding complaints: HJK-1,140; Israel-349; Total-1,489

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~RESTRICTED~~

(Classification)

ISRAEL - LEBANESE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The Israeli Delegation submitted 1 complaint alleging that on 6 December 1956 a tractor ran over a mine at MR 2041 2979, the driver was slightly wounded and the tractor severely damaged (a mixed investigation was requested and it was to be carried out on 7 December 1956.)

The Lebanese Delegation submitted no complaint.

ISRAEL - SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The period under review has been quiet but tension in Syria remained high as a result of various government announcements of possible aggression by almost everyone of Syria's neighbours.

By 7 December the Syrian authorities had not yet given an answer to the request made by the Chairman to inspect the defensive zone daily, although an answer was promised at the latest on that date.

By 7 December the Israeli Delegate had not yet given an answer to the Chairman's request for the guarantee that Banat Yacoub bridge and the western approach to the bridge were free of mines in so far as Israeli authorities were concerned despite several follow-ups to the original request.

No routine inspection was made in the central sector of the Demilitarized Zone on the site of the Jordan River Project.

The Israeli Delegation submitted 7 complaints: 1 alleging an overflight; 2 alleging shooting incidents; 1 alleging mine-laying activity; 1 alleging a mine incident; 2 alleging Syrian searchlights were directed towards Israeli territory. No investigation was requested for any of these complaints which referred to incidents alleged to have occurred between 21 and 29 November.

The Syrian Delegation submitted 2 complaints alleging overflights. No investigations requested.

Outstanding complaints: Israel-631; Syria-737; Total-1,368

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

~~RESTRICTED~~

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

COPY

The following is a summary of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions for the period 8 December to 14 December 1956.

EGYPTIAN - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The refugees have almost completed cutting off all of the trees in the Gaza area.

The Israelis closed off both the UNRWA Rafah Camp and the UNRWA Beach Camp at Gaza and screened the entire male personnel once again in an attempt to locate those soldiers who escaped detection during the previous screenings. Approximately 250 men were rounded up in the Rafah camp and approximately 300 in the beach camp. Both groups were taken to the prison established in Rimal school, Gaza, for further screening and interrogation.

On Tuesday, 11 December, the entire Palestinian police force on the Gaza Strip numbering 632 persons, including inspectors and constables, was disbanded. The police force had served from 2 November until 11 December without pay. They were ordered to turn in their uniforms. Approximately 93 police have been re-engaged by the Israelis and are now outfitted in brown Israeli police uniforms with blue berets. It is understood that the remainder of the Palestinian police have been informed that there is no further need for their service.

UNTSO continues to furnish communications and clerical support to UNRWA.

Complaints and investigations.

Nil.

HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The gradual relaxation in tenseness along the demarcation line continues, although much work is still being done on defensive positions in Jordan.

UNMOs continue to patrol the Israeli side of the demarcation line at frequent intervals and report that civilian and military activities are rapidly returning to the pre-Sinai normal.

Movement of UNMOs within HJK has been restricted.

The Senior Jordanian and Israeli delegates met in the Chairman's office for informal discussions on 10 December. The atmosphere was cordial, but nothing of importance was discussed.

A Sub-Committee meeting, held on 10 December, discussed missing persons, property and other problems incidental to the maintenance of the G.A.A.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Classification)

The Jordanian Delegation submitted 15 complaints, all alleging overflights which were not investigated. There were no casualties.

The Israeli Delegation submitted no complaint.

Outstanding complaints: HJK-1,155; Israel-349; Total-1,504

ISRAEL - LEBANESE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

No complaint has been submitted by either delegation.

ISRAEL - SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The period under review has been quiet. The tension which has existed since the end of October is gradually diminishing.

Daily patrols on both sides of the Demarcation Line have not so far revealed any massing of troops which would indicate aggressive intentions on the part of either party.

No routine inspection was made in the central sector of the Demilitarized Zone on the site of the Jordan River Project.

The Israeli Delegation submitted 2 complaints: 1 alleging mortar fire was opened from Syria towards Ein Gev in the Southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone; 1 alleging a Syrian anti-aircraft searchlight was directed towards Israeli territory. No investigations were requested for these complaints which referred to incidents alleged to have occurred on 4 and 5 December respectively and in which there were no casualties.

The Syrian Delegation submitted one complaint alleging an overflight.

Outstanding complaints: Israel-633; Syria-738; Total-1,371

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE


EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

December 28, 1956

IO - Mr. Davis

Please check the factual data in the attached New York TIMES editorial of December 26, 1956 which was sent to the Secretary under cover of Mr. Malmsley's memorandum of the same date.

If the factual data are correct, please call me and the word will be passed to the Secretary. If there are factual errors in the editorial, a memo should be prepared for the Secretary, enclosing the editorial, setting forth the factual errors and adding any necessary analysis or comment. This can be set up in the form of a memo to the Secretary from ^{to be} Joseph N. Greene, Jr. The latter course might be quicker.


G. E. Mouser
S/S-RO

Attachment: As stated above.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

December 28, 1956

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : IO - Mr. Walmsley

SUBJECT: Accuracy of New York Times Editorial of December 26

According to our information the attached editorial (TAB A) is factually correct, with the exception of the statements in the second and third paragraphs relating to (a) Nasser's alleged refusal to permit the clearance operation to begin until Israel has withdrawn from Sinai and (b) the Secretary General's dispatching of Cordier and Katzin to Cairo to clarify this situation.

We have had no official confirmation of press reports attributing to a spokesman of the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority (not to Nasser) the view that clearance should await a complete Israeli withdrawal. The Secretary General has told us he had no information to this effect from official Egyptian sources and that the trip of Cordier and Katzin was not related to this press report. At any rate, the current reports concerning the beginning of the Canal clearance operation would appear to dispose of any statement which may have been made by an Egyptian spokesman.

The reference in the fourth paragraph regarding the "rather complacent attitude" taken by the Department on this matter would appear to be contradicted by the editorial itself by virtue of the quotation cited in the penultimate paragraph.

My memorandum to you of December 26 (TAB B) contains a fuller account of the Secretary General's views on these matters.

Concurrences: *MBM* - Mr. Ludlow

IO:UNP:SDePalma:rs

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEC 26 1956

New York Times

IMPASSE AT SUEZ

The sinister drift of affairs in Egypt that has been evident for weeks now threatens to develop into a complete impasse as a result of President Nasser's attempt to raise his price for permitting the United Nations to clear from the Suez Canal the obstructions he placed there in violation of the Suez convention he had sworn to uphold.

Having snatched political victory from his military débâcle, and having obtained the complete British and French withdrawal from Egypt, which even under his own previous terms was to signal the start of the clearing operations, he now ordains that the United Nations must not start this job until Israel has also withdrawn from Sinai, and possibly from Gaza.

Obviously concerned over this development, Secretary General Hammarskjöld has dispatched two of his most important assistants—Messrs. Cordier and Katzin—to Cairo to clarify the situation and if possible to speed the clearing operations. It must be hoped that their efforts will succeed. Meanwhile, however, the assembled United Nations salvage fleet stands idle, waiting on President Nasser's gracious consent to proceed, and Europe and the whole free world are paying a terrific price for this senseless delay: in winter hardships, industrial shutdowns, increased transportation costs and, for the Arab states themselves, royalties on oil that cannot be transported.

It is obvious that developments have gone way beyond the squabble over the use of British and French salvage vessels, about which our State Department has been taking a rather complacent attitude. This squabble was merely one of the many pretexts by which President Nasser delayed the clearing operation. His insistence on a prior Israeli withdrawal may be merely another pretext to permit him to hold the world at ransom.

These developments are not wholly unexpected, and, unfortunately, it is to be feared that the well-meaning but politically ingenuous quarters which insisted on treating President Nasser as the innocent victim of aggression have merely encouraged him in his present course. Just the same, this course represents a further flagrant violation of the Suez convention and an equally flagrant defiance of the United Nations.

According to the United Nations

resolution of Nov. 2, effective steps to reopen the Suez Canal and to restore "secure freedom of navigation" through it were to start immediately upon the establishment of a cease-fire, which took place on Nov. 6. According to Mr. Hammarskjöld's own proposal, approved by the General Assembly, the United Nations police were to operate in an area roughly from the Suez Canal to the [Israeli] armistice lines, and not only help to maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops but also to "secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of Nov. 2." Of these terms the clearing of the canal is now the most important.

Furthermore, according to Ambassador Lodge's statement of Nov. 24, the clearing of the canal was to begin as soon as it is physically and technically possible, without waiting for completion of the withdrawal of foreign forces. This view was specifically endorsed by the State Department, which declared on Dec. 3 that "as the United Nations force replaces those of the United Kingdom and France, the clearance of the canal becomes imperative," and "every day of delay in restoring the canal to normal use is a breach of the 1888 treaty." The North Atlantic Council took the same stand on Dec. 14.

In his statement Ambassador Lodge also proclaimed the American standpoint that the whole matter is a collective responsibility of the General Assembly, and that no single government can dictate the terms for its solution. Should President Nasser persist in his stand it will be the duty of the General Assembly to face this collective responsibility, and it will be the duty of the United States to make good its words by taking the lead in organizing appropriate United Nations action to meet it.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

HIF
Department of State

ACTION COPY

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

39

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

Control: 118
Rec'd: JANUARY
8:36 AMNEA
Info

FROM: TEL AVIV

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS
G
SP
C
EUR
L
IO
R
O

NO: 786, DECEMBER 31, 3 PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 786 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 141, AMMAN 137,
DAMASCUS 91, BEIRUT 122, PARIS 134, LONDON 160, USUN 38.

BEN-GURION RECEIVED ME AT HIS JERUSALEM RESIDENCE AT 8:30 LAST NIGHT, ONLY TEN HOURS AFTER I RECEIVED DEPTTEL 661, WHICH ALTHOUGH CABLED DECEMBER 28 DID NOT (REPEAT NOT) REACH ME UNTIL MID-MORNING 30TH. DUE TO CONTINUED FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY ON TEL AVIV-JERUSALEM ROAD AT NIGHT, HE INSISTED I HAVE 10-MAN ARMED POLICE CONVOY. I DELIVERED DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON INVALIDATION ISRAEL-EGYPTIAN GAA FULLY IN A MEMOIRE TO WHICH HE SAID GOI WOULD REPLY FORMALLY. NINETY MINUTE SOLILOQUY ENSUED WHICH I SUCCEEDED IN INTERRUPTING ONLY INFREQUENTLY AND BRIEFLY.

HIS MAJOR POINTS FOLLOW: ONE ADDRESSED TO INVALIDATION GAA; OTHERS TO SECRETARY'S FRIDAY MEETING WITH MEIR AND EBAN WHICH HE ELATEDLY REGARDS AS HARBINGER IMPROVED US-ISRAEL UNDERSTANDING.

1. GOI FIRMLY HOLDS EGYPT'S EIGHT YEARS WILFUL, FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS VARIOUS GAA ARTICLES AS WELL AS SPECIFIC SC RESOLUTIONS INVALIDATES GAA. FOR INSTANCE, WHILE ONE ARTICLE NOVEMBER 2 RESOLUTION CALLS FOR EVACUATION OCCUPIED AREAS, ANOTHER PROCLAIMS RIGHT OF FREE TRANSIT SUEZ WHICH NASSER DEFINES IN ISRAEL'S CASE. HOWEVER, GOI DOES NOT (REPEAT NOT) CLAIM SUCH INVALIDATION ESTABLISHES JURIDICAL STATE OF BELLIGERENCY THUS IMPLYING, I GATHERED, GOI DOES NOT FEEL IT HAS SAME UNHAMPERED LIBERTY OF ACTION VIS-A-VIS EGYPT AS IF STATE OF WAR EXISTED BETWEEN THEM. (BEN-GURION DID NOT (REPEAT NOT) MAKE THIS POINT EXPLICITLY, BUT HERZOG AFTER CONSULTING HIM AT CONCLUSION OF OUR TALK, TOLD EMBASSY OFFICER WHO ACCOMPANIED ME HE HAD MEANT TO STRESS IT.

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

674.84A/12-3156

674.84A/12-3156

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 786, DECEMBER 31, 3 PM, FROM TEL AVIV

STRESS IT, ADDING PRIME MINISTER HOPED VERY MUCH SECRETARY WOULD HAVE IT IN MIND ALONG WITH THE OTHER PRINCIPAL POINTS OUR CONVERSATION WHEN SECRETARY SEES HAMMARSKJOLD IN MEETING GOI THINKS IS SCHEDULED FOR TODAY).

2. HE SAID REPEATEDLY AND EMPHATICALLY HE WAS DETERMINED GAZA WHICH HAD NEVER BEEN EGYPTIAN, SHOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) REVERT TO NASSER. IT WOULD BE "FATAL MISTAKE IF UN BECAUSE OF EXISTENCE POLITICAL ANOMALY WHICH HAD NO (REPEAT NO) MORAL VALIDITY WHATSOEVER" SHOULD INSIST ON RESTORING STATUS QUO ANTE BY RE-INSTATING EGYPTIAN CONTROL. EGYPTIANS CONTROLLED GAZA, HE SAID, ONLY BECAUSE AT MOMENT IN HISTORY WHEN ISRAELIS, HAVING EXPELLED EGYPTIAN ARMIES FROM ALL OTHER INVADDED AREAS, WERE ABOUT TO EXPEL THEM FROM GAZA AS WELL, US AMBASSADOR HAD COME TO HIM SAYING "THIS MUST STOP", AND ISRAELIS HAD COMPLIED. HE ALSO OBJECTED, ALTHOUGH LESS VEHEMENTLY, TO IDEA OF GAZA STRIP'S OCCUPATION BY UNEF WHICH HE SAID WOULD ONLY PROVIDE COVER FOR RENEWED EGYPTIAN FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY. HE THEN READ PARAGRAPH FROM MEIR-EBAN ACCOUNT THEIR CONVERSATION WITH SECRETARY REPORTING ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY SECRETARY THAT GAZA HAD NEVER BEEN EGYPTIAN AND PURPORTED STATEMENT BY SECRETARY TO EFFECT USG DID NOT (REPEAT NOT) KNOW EXACTLY WHAT WOULD BE EQUITABLE DISPOSITION, STRIP BEING NEITHER IN ISRAEL NOR (REPEAT NOR) IN EGYPT. BEN-GURION ADMITTEDLY REGARDED STATEMENT AS ONE OF MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN US-ISRAEL RELATIONS SINCE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER 9 LETTER. HE RETURNED AGAIN AND AGAIN TO HOUR AND ONE-HALF SECRETARY GAVE MEIR AND TO THEME OF "SECRETARY'S GENEROSITY WITH ALL CARES OF TROUBLED WORLD ON HIS SHOULDERS, IN GIVING TIME AND THOUGHT TO PROBLEMS TINY ISRAEL", AND SEVERAL TIMES REMARKED ON USG'S UNDERSTANDABLE DIFFICULTY FULLY APPRECIATING INTENSITY PROBLEMS AFFECTING ISRAEL.

3. IN REGARD TO QUESTION ULTIMATE DISPOSITION STRAITS OF TIRAN, HE WAS ALMOST AS PLEASED WITH SECRETARY'S AVOWAL (AGAIN AS REPORTED BY MEIR-EBAN) THAT HE IS "IMMUTABLY COMMITTED" TO FREEDOM OF TRANSIT INTERNATIONAL WATERS WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION. BEN-GURION DID NOT (REPEAT NOT) SUGGEST ISRAEL FORCES MUST STAY AT STRAITS, BUT HE DID INSIST THEY REMAIN UNTIL THERE ARE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- 786, DECEMBER 31, 3 PM, FROM TEL AVIV

EFFECTIVE GUARANTEES STRAITS ARE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY AVAILABLE TO ALL. NASSER HE SAID DOES NOT (REPEAT NOT) RESPECT INTERNATIONAL LAW, TREATIES, GA RESOLUTIONS OR SC RESOLUTIONS. IN BLOCKING SUEZ CANAL, FIRST TO ISRAEL AND THEN TO WORLD IN RECENT CRISIS, HE HAD DEFIED ALL OF THESE.

WHEN I ASKED HIM WHAT HE WOULD CONSIDER EFFECTIVE GUARANTEE, HE REPLIED AS EXAMPLE "US UNDERTAKING THAT IT WOULD MOVE AGAINST ANY ATTEMPT TO BLOCK EILAT AS WITH CASE OF FORMOSA". HE ADDED, "THEORETICALLY UN GUARANTEE SHOULD BE ENOUGH, STANDING ABOVE EVEN ONE BY US BUT UNFORTUNATELY IT DOES NOT".

STRAITS OF EILAT AREA HAD NEVER BEEN SETTLED IN ALL HISTORY FOR ANY PURPOSE BUT CONTROLLING STRAITS. (ONLY PERMANENT SETTLEMENT EVER ESTABLISHED THERE, HE SAID WITH BROAD GRIN, WAS SMALL JEWISH KINGDOM -- A BAND OF ROBBERS -- WHICH 1300 YEARS AGO HAD INHABITED ISLE OF TIRAN AND FROM THERE PREYED ON SHIPPING UNTIL DESTROYED BY BYZANTINES). NOTHING THERE EXCEPT WATERLESS DESERT. EGYPTIAN GARRISON HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR SOLE PURPOSE MANNING BATTERY DENYING STRAIT TO ISRAELI COMMERCE.

4. HE SAID HE WAS RELUCTANT TO SAY IT IN CONNECTION SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH SECRETARY GENERAL, "AND I WOULD OF COURSE NEVER SAY IT IN PUBLIC", BUT HE FELT HAMMARSKJOLD'S GOOD FAITH AND IMPARTIALITY WERE IN QUESTION. HE RECALLED MEETING WITH HAMMARSKJOLD LAST SPRING IN PRESENCE BURNS, VIGIER AND EIGHT GOI OFFICIALS. HE HAD ASKED WHY FIVE YEARS AFTER SC RESOLUTION OPPOSING EGYPT'S BLOCKADE OF CANAL TO ISRAEL, HAMMARSKJOLD ACQUIESCED IN EGYPT'S JUSTIFYING ITS DEFIANCE BY CLAIMING STATE OF WAR WITH ISRAEL. HAMMARSKJOLD HAD REPLIED "FOR NASSER TO CONCEDE NO (REPEAT NO) STATE OF WAR EXISTED WOULD BE FATAL TO HIS POSITION". I ASKED HIM SAID BEN-GURION, "ARE YOU REPRESENTING UN OR NASSER? YOU ARE HERE TO SEE AGREEMENTS ARE CARRIED OUT, NOT (REPEAT NOT) TO PROTECT NASSER'S POSITION". HE RECALLED STORMY OCCASION WHEN HAMMARSKJOLD FROM CAIRO SENT HIM MESSAGE THROUGH ME (CAIRO'S 249, APRIL 13 TO DEPARTMENT) SAYING SECRETARY GENERAL CONVINCED NASSER WANTED PEACE AND SECRETARY GENERAL FELT QUESTION WAR OR PEACE WAS IN ISRAEL'S HANDS, MAKING NO (REPEAT NO) SUGGESTION EGYPT HAD ANY RESPONSIBILITIES. "I REFUSED TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-4- 786, DECEMBER 31, 3 PM, FROM TEL AVIV

ACCEPT MESSAGE" HE SAID, "THEN I RECEIVED LONG CABLE IN WHICH HE EXCUSED HIMSELF WITH LOT OF SOPHISTRIES".

5. DEFENDING ISRAEL'S SINAI-GAZA CAMPAIGN, HE SAID, WHEN NATION IS CONVINCED ITS VERY EXISTENCE IS THREATENED AND ALL SOURCES OF HELP ARE IGNORING ITS PLIGHT, THEN IT ALONE CAN DECIDE WHAT COURSE TO TAKE. ISRAEL, CONVINCED DESTRUCTION EGYPTIAN BUILD-UP WAS MATTER OF LIFE OR DEATH, HAD ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY EGYPTIAN ARMY BEFORE IT DESTROYED ISRAEL. "I AM CONVINCED US UNDER SIMILAR CONDITIONS OF LIFE OR DEATH WOULD TAKE LIKE STEPS. EVEN PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, SINCERE AND STRONG ADVOCATE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, WOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) DISAGREE WITH THIS THESIS".

6. SUMMARIZING, BEN-GURION SAID HE CONSIDERED SECRETARY'S INTERVIEW WITH GOI REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW YORK AS GRACIOUS FIRST STEP WHICH HE HOPED WOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) BE LAST TOWARD DETENTE BEN-GURION SUGGESTED IN CONVERSATION I REPORTED EMBTEL 774. IF US COULD SEE TIRAN AND GAZA AS IMPERATIVES OF ISRAEL POSITION THERE WAS NO (REPEAT NO) OTHER ISSUE IN MID-EAST COMPLEX ON WHICH GOI WOULD NOT (REPEAT NOT) ENDEAVOR COORDINATE ITS POLICY WITH OURS.

LAWSON

TT

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

1957 JAN 5 10 22 AM
02020
For DCT use only

SENT TO: Amembassy TEL AVIV 675
RPTD INFO: Amembassy AMMAN 783
" CAIRO 2202
" LONDON 4629
" PARIS 2525
USUN NEW YORK 490

Tel Aviv's 786. Dept concerned that Ben Gurion may have erroneous impression of Secretary-Meir conversation of December 28. By this time you will have received Deptel 667 which contains account that conversation; memorandum being airpouched.

At early opportunity and in manner you deem most effective, it should be made clear to Ben Gurion that point which Secretary stressed throughout conversation was need for Israel to adopt and carry out long range policies aimed at winning Arab friendship. Secretary said it was of concern to us to learn in due course about Israel's plans for its long range future. It should be made clear to Ben Gurion that despite US friendship for Israel we feel our ability cooperate with Israel dependent on Israel's own policies which, we are convinced, must stem from Israel recognition of need seek peaceful relations with Arabs. Past Israel policies have in our view left great deal to be desired on this point.

There follow comments on points raised by Ben Gurion:

1. Armistice Agreements. Deptel 661 to Tel Aviv gives our views. We would add

DC/R

Anal 16

Rev

Cat

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

WILLIAM M. ROUNTREE

Drafted by:
NEA; NE; DC Bergus: crm

1/4/57

Clearances:

JAN 5 - 1957 A.M.

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

CONFIDENTIAL

674.84A/12-3156

CS/PG

674.84A/12-3156

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

would add that Nov 2 UNGA resolution, which US sponsored, enjoins parties to observe terms Armistice Agreements. We are doubtful that Israel's interests are served by insistence Israel-Egypt agreement no longer valid. Agreement contains no provision for unilateral termination. In any event, Israel assertion that while Israel-Egypt agreement invalid, state of belligerency does not exist between parties does not seem soundly based.

2. Gaza. Dec. 28 conversation Meir maintained that Gaza had never been Egyptian. Secretary replied that neither was it encompassed by Israel armistice line. Question of ultimate disposition of Gaza remains open. We continue support UNGA resolution November 2 which calls upon parties to withdraw forces behind Armistice lines. It seems to us presence of UNEF in Gaza charged with implementation of November 2 resolution could create possibility for practical solutions of problems which have arisen in past.

3. Straits of Tiran. Secretary stated belief Straits were international waterway but cited ^{this} as example of problem where we might agree with Israel on merits of case but found it difficult work out peaceful solution view past Israel policies and actions. Conditions for Israel passage through Straits would have to be worked out with UNSYG. We believe that full compliance with November 2 resolution and presence of UNEF in area at mouth of Gulf Aqaba could open way toward practical solution of this problem.

4. UNSYG. It should be made clear we strongly support UNSYG in his efforts obtain compliance Nov. 2 and other applicable UNGA resolutions.

5. Justification for

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

5. Justification for Attack on Egypt. In introducing Nov. 2 UNGA resolution Secretary said ~~■~~ were we to agree that existence of injustices which UN had so far been unable to cure meant that principle renunciation of force could no longer be respected, that whenever a nation felt it had been subjected to injustice it should have right resort to force to correct that injustice, we would be tearing UN charter to shreds and world would again be world of anarchy.

6. Future US-Israel cooperation. See Secretary's general remarks to Meir above. We feel primary imperative of Israel position is obtaining friendship neighboring Arab states. Recently Israeli policies have made this difficult objective even harder to attain.

Dulles
DULLES

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

32

Description Entry

Dec. 31, 1956

Soviet Charges of Western Aggressive Intent and Threats of Possible
Soviet Countermeasures

RM/R

FILE

Charges

One week has passed already since the armed forces of Britain, France, and obedient to the will of external forces -- Israel, without any reason attacked Egypt, bringing in their wake death and destruction. Inhuman bombardment by the British and French Air Forces against Egyptian airfields, ports, installations, towns, and inhabited localities is taking place. Anglo-French troops have landed on Egyptian territory. From the invaders' fire tremendous values created by the hands of the Egyptian people are perishing and the toll of human life is mounting every day.

An aggressive war against Egypt, against the Arab peoples whose sole fault is that they upheld their freedom and independence, is unfolding before the eyes of the entire world.

--Letter to US President Eisenhower from Soviet Premier Bulganin, November 5, 1956.

The Soviet Government has already expressed its definite condemnation of the armed aggression by Israel as well as by Britain and France against Egypt which was a direct and open violation of the Charter and principles of the United Nations.

The overwhelming majority of the states of the world have also condemned the act of aggression committed with regard to the Egyptian state at a special and extraordinary session of the General Assembly and has called on the Governments of Israel, Britain, and France to cease military operations for thwirth and withdraw the invading troops from the Egyptian territory.

All peace-loving mankind indignantly brands the criminal actions of the aggressors who have attacked the territorial entity, sovereignty, and independence of the Egyptian state. Disregarding this, the Government of Israel, acting as a tool of foreign imperialist powers, continues the foolhardy adventure, challenging all the peoples of the East who are waging a struggle against colonialism for their freedom and independence, all the peace-loving peoples of the world.

--Letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion from Soviet Premier Bulganin, November 5, 1956.

Threats

In what position would Britain have found herself had she been attacked by more powerful states possessing all types of modern weapons of destruction? Indeed, such countries, instead of sending

674.846/12-3156

②

microfilmed by RSMA

to the shores of Britain their naval or air forces, could have used other means, as, for instance, rocket equipment....We are full of determination to crush the aggressor and reestablish peace in the East by using force.

--Letter to UK Prime Minister Eden from Soviet Premier Bulganin, November 5, 1956.

Being vitally interested in the preservation of peace and in safeguarding calm in the Middle and Near East, the Soviet Government is at this moment taking measures with the aim of stopping the war and curbing the aggressors. We expect that the Government of Israel will come to its senses before it is too late and will halt its military operations against Egypt....We hope that the Government of Israel will duly understand and appreciate our warning.

--Letter to Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion from Soviet Premier Bulganin, November 5, 1956.

Charges

The measures taken by NATO countries at the initiative of the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain indicate that the policy of the Western powers and their allies is becoming subordinated to an ever greater extent to one aim -- all-out preparation of atomic war and production of weapons of mass destruction at a forced pace.

--Letter to UK Prime Minister Macmillan from Soviet Premier Bulganin, December 11, 1957.

Allow me, Mr. Chairman, to tell you frankly that all talk of the alleged defensive nature of these bases is fiction pure and simple. They are not and cannot be of such nature. I leave aside the fact that the West European countries on whose territories these bases are situated are in no danger of attack.

But even if we ignore this and look at the matter from a purely military point of view, we are bound to ask how these bases can afford protection from the modern rocket, for example: Their only designation is to serve as a springboard for aggression and to provide an opportunity of firing the first shot regardless of the subsequent fate of these bases, their surrounding territory, and the people inhabiting that territory.

--Letter to French Prime Minister Gaillard from Soviet Premier Bulganin, December 11, 1957.

Threats

The enormous and continually growing stockpiles of destructive weapons, in a climate of mutual distrust, suspicion, and widespread

nervous tension, has brought about a situation fraught with the danger of an explosion, which, under present conditions, would almost inevitably grow into disaster on an unmatched scale. The contentions given currency by certain Western military leaders about the possibility of "localizing" conflicts and of waging war "of local significance" are the fruit of a dangerous delusion at best, or an attempt to mislead nations and dull their vigilance at the worst.

Under present conditions, the stake the future on still more intensive competition in the manufacture of weapons of more and more new types, which evidently is the intention of NATO leaders, means to play with the fate of hundreds of millions of human beings.

I shall tell you without beating about the bush, Mr. Prime Minister, that it is difficult for us to understand what guides the government of a country such as Great Britain, which not only is highly vulnerable geographically, but, according to her official spokesmen, has no effective means to defend herself from modern weapons in implementing such a policy. In fact, there is none. Nor can there be any such defense.

--Letter to UK Prime Minister Macmillan from Soviet Premier Bulganin, December 11, 1957

On the other hand, it is obvious that no matter how much the NATO countries increase their armaments, they cannot alter the fact that with the creation of the intercontinental ballistic rockets, the United States of America, NATO's most powerful member, has lost the earlier advantages of its geographical situation and has become just as vulnerable militarily as its West European allies.

No wonder, therefore, that opinions are being expressed in Western European countries with increasing recurrence that the setting up of American nuclear and rocket weapons bases on their territories is mainly designed to push the possible battlegrounds away from the United States and to create a situation in which, if a new conflict arose, the retaliatory blows would be dealt first and foremost to the territories of European countries in which the military bases intended for attack are situated.... It is a matter of common knowledge that American military bases are also situated on French territory, including Bordeaux, Chaumont, Tulle, Chamblais, Lyon, and elsewhere. It is now planned to increase the number of such bases in France. What may be the aim of this? Can Frenchmen feel secure when atomic and hydrogen weapon stockpiles are set up near their homes to be disposed of, not by the French Government or the French command, but by foreign, in this case American, and possibly German generals? Where, under the circumstances, is the guarantee that these weapons will not be used against French

national interests and that the French people will not be visited by the calamities of an atomic war regardless of the will of the French Government?

Every day brings fresh proof of the mortal danger to which European NATO countries are exposed by having allowed establishment of foreign military bases on their territories.

--Letter to French Prime Minister Gaillard from Soviet Premier Bulganin, December 11, 1957.

Charges

If there is any need to talk of violation of the decisions we passed in Geneva, it should not be forgotten that it is not we that trampled upon the propositions in the directives of the heads of governments to their foreign ministers that force should not be resorted to or aggressors assisted. Is not the military attack on Egypt proof of this?

--Letter to US President Eisenhower from Soviet Premier Bulganin, January 9, 1958.

At the same time I would also like to state candidly that these statements of the peaceful aims of the NATO participants do not, in our opinion, tally with the decisions of the December session of the North Atlantic Pact Council which aim at a continuation of the policy of the "cold war" and an intensification of the arms race. It is, after all, with this in view that the decisions were made to place ballistic missiles at the disposal of the NATO armed forces command, create reserves of nuclear warheads, atomic bases, and rocket-launching ranges on the territories of the West European states....The Soviet people are in solidarity and sympathy with the people of these European countries who are increasingly expressing alarm over this terrible situation. The Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to this fact also for the reason that the flights of bombers with atomic and hydrogen bombs carried out over the European countries constitute actions which are aimed against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries. We are therefore particularly sensitive in our attitude to these dangerous and inhuman actions which may result in disaster for mankind.

--Letter to UK Prime Minister Macmillan from Soviet Premier Bulganin, January 9, 1958.

Threats

Those who shape the policy of countries cannot ignore one simple fact: if the arms race continues indefinitely, if the peoples are told that war is inevitable, war will not recede but be brought nearer. And I have no need to tell you, an outstanding military leader, what war would mean today. Science and technology today can manufacture a hydrogen bomb equal in destructive potential to 5 to 10 and more

million tons of TNT. Both American and Soviet scientists warn that such a bomb would devastate a territory within the radius of hundreds of kilometers, not counting the area of radioactive fallout, the frightful effect of which no man defies any comparison with what took place at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. What is more, the development of military techniques has made it possible to deliver these weapons, almost instantly, to any part of the world.

--Letter to US President Eisenhower from Soviet Premier Bulganin, January 9, 1958.

And who would not understand that, by creating bases for nuclear and rocket weapons on the territories of these NATO member countries, it is intended to convert these countries into a frontline of military operations, to place them under the first crushing blows which may follow as a reply to the aggressor's actions.... It is well known that science and engineering are now able to produce a hydrogen bomb equivalent to the explosive force of 5 million to 10 million tons or more of TNT. I shall permit myself, Mr. Prime Minister, to pose a question: What would the explosion of even a single hydrogen bomb on the territory of any West European country mean should events in Europe take a tragic turn? You know as well as we do that such an explosion would lead to the destruction of every living thing within a radius of hundreds of kilometers, not to mention the colossal material destruction.

--Letter to UK Prime Minister Macmillan from Soviet Premier Bulganin, January 9, 1958.

Charges

My message was meant to show the full extent of the danger that will face mankind unless the United States of America abandons its aggressive policy which is creating hotbeds of grave conflicts now in one, now in another area of the world, and which has brought about the present particularly tense situation in the Far East.

While admitting in your reply that a dangerous situation has developed in the Taiwan area, you are at the same time seeking to absolve the US Government of the responsibility for the tension in that area which is threatening peace. Moreover, to whitewash the aggressive actions of the United States, your message utterly distorts the actual state of affairs and draws a picture which has nothing in common with the realities.

Whoever takes a sober view of the existing situation, basing oneself on the real facts, is bound to admit that the only true source of tension in that part of the world resides in the fact that the United States has seized inalienable Chinese territory -- Taiwan and a number of other islands -- keeps under the protection of its guns

the Chiang Kai-shek clique, thrown out by the Chinese people, and encourages its sallies and provocations against People's China. The recent events are some of the manifestations of this general aggressive policy of the United States with respect to China....I addressed my message on the Taiwan events to the President of the United States and not to the Government of the CPR for the simple reason that it is not China that is interfering in the internal affairs of the United States of America, but the United States -- trampling underfoot all the rules of behavior of civilized nations -- has grossly interfered in China's affairs and is trying to have it all its own way by force of arms in another people's house, having thus created a great threat to peace in the Far East....The Government of the United States wants to keep this situation intact as one can see from your letter. What else can be meant by your remark to the effect that I did not address a letter to the CPR leaders calling them to moderation. Should we have agreed to your point of view, we would, in fact be contributing to the preparations for a war against China, our greatest friend and ally. It is enough to imagine this possibility for a moment to see how utterly absurd it is. How, Mr. President, can one expect us to lull the vigilance of our Chinese friends and abet the aggressive forces in their preparations for an attack on the CPR and thereby in their preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union? It is no use expecting us to do so.

--Letter to US President Eisenhower from Soviet Premier Khrushchev, September 19, 1958.

Threat

Such actions of the US Government, naturally, cannot reduce tension in this area, improve the general climate, or create the conditions for greater confidence. On the contrary, these actions tend to aggravate the situation and increase the danger of an outbreak of war involving the use of most destructive weapons. I must tell you outright, Mr. President, that atomic blackmail with regard to the CPR will intimidate neither us nor the CPR. Those who harbor plans of an atomic attack on the CPR should not forget that the other side too has atomic and hydrogen weapons and the appropriate means to deliver them, and if the CPR falls victim to such an attack, the aggressor will at once get a rebuff by the same means.

A war against China on the pretext of defending the security interests of the United States or on any other equally artificial pretext will give nothing to the United States. To touch off a war against People's China means to doom to certain death sons of the American people and to spark off the conflagration of a world war.

--Letter to US President Eisenhower from Soviet Premier Khrushchev, September 19, 1958.

Secy's Memos of Gov
32
RM/R
file

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE SECRETARY

January 2, 1957

248

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH MR. HAMMARSKJOLD
(Amb. Lodge also present)

Amb. Lodge's Apartment 42A
at the Waldorf

December 31, 1956 - 1:00-3:00 p. m.

322-57

Mr. Hammarskjold said that it was a day with some good news from him. He had gotten word that the clearing of the Canal was under full way and that a UN mission, ostensibly for UN social organizations, would be received in Budapest.

774.730

We discussed the Suez Canal matter and its financial aspects. I showed Mr. Hammarskjold a copy of a note I was prepared to send him pledging the US contribution and also an informal memorandum outlining certain understandings as to his policy with respect to getting a permanent settlement and also providing for repayment of the advances. Mr. Hammarskjold looked over both and thanked me for the prospective note with reference to advances. He made one or two minor suggestions as to the phraseology of the informal memorandum which I thought were acceptable and which I indicated in pencil.

We discussed the basic problem of the permanent settlement of the Suez which he thought could probably be worked out on an acceptable basis but probably not by direct negotiations between the Egyptians, the French and the British as the feeling was still too intense.

We discussed the Israeli ship problems as being probably the most difficult, i.e., (1) the passage of Israeli ships through the Canal, (2) the internationalizing of the Gulf of Aqaba, and (3) the status of Gaza. Mr. Hammarskjold said he had just had a talk this morning with Mrs. Meir and that she had been somewhat less belligerent than theretofore. I said perhaps this was a result of the talk she had had with me on Friday. He said he suspected that something like that might have happened.

Mr. Hammarskjold said that he saw as a solution for the Israeli ships through the Suez a possible World Court opinion which he thought, if it supported the Israeli contention, the Egyptians might then respect.

326676

CONFIDENTIAL

674.84A/1-257
674.84A/1-331

CONFIDENTIAL

He and they did not consider that the UN Council decision of 1950 was really a judicial construction of the 1888 Treaty.

With respect to the Gulf of Aqaba, Mr. Hammarskjold agreed that it was an international waterway and thought that perhaps a provisional solution might be found through some occupation by the UNEF if this was necessary as it might well be to prevent a renewed outbreak of fighting between the Israelis and the Egyptians.

With respect to Gaza, he was rather barren of any basis for solution except that he did not find it acceptable that the Israeli should stay on to administer the area. Perhaps again UNEF would have to be resorted to.

I outlined briefly the US thinking with reference to the Middle East. He was somewhat cautious in his response saying that he would need to know more detail and study the matter more carefully. He felt that some move by the US could be helpful if it did not lead to an open contest for power in the area between the US and the USSR. He felt that some of the Arabs were sensitive to receiving aid from the US lest it put them under political obligations. He thought that some multilateral form of aid would be best. He indicated that our action could create a better environment for the solution of the Palestine matter, but felt that until this matter could be solved, the possibilities of unrest and of Soviet activity would persist.

JFD
John Foster Dulles

S:JFD:pdh

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

00646

1957 JAN 3 PM 1
DC/1

SENT TO: USUN NEW YORK 481
Amembassy LONDON 4562
Amembassy PARIS 2495
Amembassy TEL AVIV 667
Amembassy CAIRO 2170
Amembassy JIDDA (VIA POUCH)
Amembassy BAGHDAD (VIA POUCH)
Amembassy AMMAN (VIA POUCH)
Amembassy BEIRUT (VIA POUCH)
Amembassy DAMASCUS (VIA POUCH)

Memo conversation not yet approved by Secretary.

During call on Secretary Dec. 28 Israel Foreign Minister said that by January 7 Israel forces would have evacuated more than half Sinai. Problems of Gaza and Sharm al Sheikh (position commanding entrance to Gulf of Aqaba) would then arise in Israel discussions with UNSYG. Israel did not wish annex either area. At same time Israel public opinion would not permit withdrawal from either until effective assurances could be obtained that:

- 1) International waterway of Aqaba would remain open and not subject to reinstatement Egyptian blockade
- 2) Egyptians would not be permitted return to Gaza to re-establish it as base for fedayeen operations.

Presence of UNEF in Gaza would not be adequate solution as UNEF would only provide shield behind which fedayeen could operate. If in any agreed solution for Gaza, which had never been Egyptian territory, Israel were asked to take it over Israel would assume responsibility for indigenous population plus share of refugees. Israel hoped US would agree to ask UNSYG not press for immediate withdrawal from these two areas. Israel also hoped we could avoid further UNGA resolution

Drafted by: NEA:NE:DCBergus:crm 12/29/56
Clearances: NEA: Mr. Rountree

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: S/S-Joseph N. Greene, Jr.

JAN 5 1957 PM

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

CONFIDENTIAL FILE
674.84A/1-357

USUN NEW YORK, LONDON, PARIS, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, JIDDA (VIA POUCH),
BAGHDAD (VIA POUCH), AMMAN (VIA POUCH), BEIRUT (VIA POUCH),
DAMASCUS (VIA POUCH)

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

UNGA resolution

calling for immediate withdrawal from these two points which Israel would have to violate. Israel wished to avoid conflict with US and had made its position clear so that US would not feel it taken by surprise.

Secretary made clear that our disapproval of UK, French, Israel action in Egypt had not been caused by fact that we not informed in advance. It was because we disapproved of nature of action taken. Hostilities had created emotionally charged atmosphere which made solutions of type Israelis were seeking very difficult. US could not come to agreement with Israel over matters being dealt with by UNSYG. We were supporting UNSYG in his efforts reopen Suez Canal and effect withdrawal of troops. US stood by its previous position that Israel was entitled to use of Suez Canal. We agreed that Gulf of Aqaba was international waterway but solution regarding its use would have to be worked out with UNSYG. Gaza was complex problem and US had no specific proposals. Agreed Gaza not Egyptian territory but neither was it encompassed by Israel Armistice line.

~~Secretary would be heading general discussions with UNSYG in New York Dec 31~~

DULLES

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

Millie says this is for
appropriate distribution.

jmr

Jewish War

Veterans OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

National Headquarters: 1712 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W., Washington 9, D. C. • COLUMBIA 6280

BERNARD WEITZER
National Legislative Director

January 3, 1956

Honorable John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

By direction of our National Commander, I am
glad to send you for your information, the attached
release which carries the complete text of a telegram
sent to the President regarding the Middle East pro-
blem.


With all good wishes,

Cordially yours,

Bernard Weitzer
Bernard Weitzer
National Legislative Director

BW/ebw
Enc.

SCP
ACTION
is assigned to



*Dep. ref. mail
on 1/3/56 to
Tel. sent President.
No further reply
required.*

*file
DC/State
NEA/NE*

674.84A/1-357 C/S AMK

674.84A/1-357

PC/R
anal 29
Rev
Dist

FILED
JAN 17 1956

FILED
JAN 17 1956

NEWS

NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS
Jewish War Veterans
of the

United States of America

1712 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. • Columbia 5-6280
Washington 9, D. C.

WARREN ABLEN
Director of Public Relations

BENJAMIN KAUFMAN
National Executive Director

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

William Carmen, of Newton, Massachusetts, National Commander of the Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A., dispatched the following telegram today to President Eisenhower.

"OUR COUNTRY'S STAND IN THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE RECENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AGAIN DEMONSTRATED AMERICAS GENUINE INTEREST IN ACHIEVING PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS THREATENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY. BECAUSE REPORTS FROM WASHINGTON AND MIDDLE EAST CAPITALS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT AMERICAN PRESTIGE STANDS HIGH IN MIDDLE EAST COUNTRIES, WE BELIEVE THIS IS AN APPROPRIATE MOMENT FOR A FRESH AND DRAMATIC APPROACH TO A SOLUTION OF LONG SMOLDERING MIDDLE EAST TENSIONS. WE BELIEVE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT BECAUSE OF THE IMMENSE RESPECT AND CONFIDENCE IN WHICH YOU ARE HELD BY THE PEOPLES OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED THAT YOU CAN BE A VITAL FACTOR IN THE MEDIATION OF THE CONTINUING DISPUTE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL. WE STRONGLY URGE, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT YOU INVITE PREMIER DAVID BEN GURION OF ISRAEL AND PRESIDENT GAMAL ABDEL NASSER OF EGYPT TO MEET CONCURRENTLY WITH YOU IN WASHINGTON WITH A VIEW TOWARDS THOROUGH EXPLORATION OF ANY AND ALL ROADS THAT CAN LEAD TO PERMANENT PEACE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THESE TWO KEY STATES OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HAS FREQUENTLY DECLARED ITS READINESS TO ENTER INTO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT, WHICH HAS RECENTLY AVOWED ITS GRATITUDE FOR THE UNITED STATES POSITION IN THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HAS MANY TIMES PROFESSED ITS PEACEFUL INTENTIONS, WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE ITS GOOD INTENTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE RESPECTFULLY INVITE YOUR CONSIDERATION, MR. PRESIDENT, OF THIS MOST URGENT MATTER."

The Jewish War Veterans of the U.S.A. is the oldest active war veterans organization in this country.

12-28-56

#

INCOMING TELEGRAM) Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

47
Action
NEA
Info
RMR
SS
G
SP
C
EUR
L
IC
R
O

Control: 2721
Rec'd: January 5, 1957
4:27 pm

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 801, January 4, 7 pm

SECRET DEPARTMENT 801 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 142, AMMAN 138, DAMASCUS 92, BEIRUT 134*, PARIS 137, LONDON 162, USUN 29, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

Yakov Herzog and his principal assistant, Pinhas Eliav, called Embassy political officer to Jerusalem today to hear elaboration case for United States undertaking to assure unimpeded transit Gulf of Aqaba which Ben Gurion broached to me December 30 (EMBTEL 786).

According to them, Passage through Straits is one legitimate gain Gaza-Sinai campaign which Israel public will not see relinquished without violent protest. Even more than demilitarization of Gaza strip, it stands as definite improvement over their lot ante bellum, holding out hope of accelerated economic development, increased access to world commerce and natural route to establishment profitable relations with Africa and Asia counter-balancing to some extent Arab boycott. Its possession compensates in large part for continued denial of transit of Suez which they still very earnestly want but have minimum expectation of obtaining in present framework of negotiation with Egypt United States and UN.

They told political officer they thought it significant Egypt to this point has been singularly quiet about asserting any right to renewed occupancy Sharm e Sheikh at Gulf's mouth. They profess to interpret this silence to mean that even Egyptians have not affronted to lay territorial claim to Gulf.

They warned that continued silence of west and UN on freedom of transit will embolden Egypt to make claim rather than to let it go by default. In circumstances they urge United States take advantage Egypt's apparent state of indecision to make public statement to effect United States is pleased to see increasing traffic of truly international complexion through Straits and would view with displeasure any effort to impede this developing traffic.

Political officer asked Ministry officials if they felt there was heavy

was heavy

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED.

Confidential File

674.34A/1-457

This must be returned to

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 801, January 4, 7 pm, from Tel Aviv

was heavy pressure on them to leave Straits and they replied negatively but said in view of Arabs voracious appetites, they thought it was dangerous to let questions slide indefinitely.

Comment: It is Embassy's view that freedom of passage through Akaba has required tremendous political importance here that even Ben Gurion might not survive storm that would break with IDF withdrawal unless he were able to make convincing case that he had effective guarantees Straits would remain open to Israel commerce.

LAWSON

AB:CC/18

*Confirmed as 124.

APR 12 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

02095

1957 JAN 5 PM 3 50

DC/T

For DCIT use only.

SENT TO: Amembassy Moscow 809

Origin

Info:

(Code Room please repeat Deptel 481 to USUN, New York, 1/3/57)

674.84a
XR-320.5786
Dulles
(b) DULLES

This Document Must Be Returned to
R/R
General
Files
674.84A/1-557

CS/JC

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)

SS 2
NEA 5

Subject: Israel Foreign Minister's Interview with Secretary

Drafted by: NEA:ERBalmer 1/4/57

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by: NE:SRockwell

Clearances:

S/S-CR

JAN 4 - 1957 P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

*Det
List*

674.84a/1-557

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

TO: The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM: NEA - William M. Rountree
SUBJECT: Request of Jewish Leaders to Call

January 7, 1957

Discussion:

Dr. Nahum Goldmann, President of the Jewish Agency, has asked that an appointment be arranged with you during the week of January 7-11 for three or four representatives of his "Presidents' Club" (a group of presidents of seventeen major Jewish organizations in this country). The callers would include Mr. Philip Klutznick, President of B'nai B'rith, Rabbi Maurice Eisendrath of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, Dr. Goldmann, and one other.

In discussing this call with NE, Dr. Goldman indicated that it was being made at the initiative of the Israel Government, which is seeking political support for its refusal to withdraw its forces from Gaza and the Aqaba Straits. Dr. Goldmann expressed the hope that while you might recognize the fact that Israel had legitimate interests in passage through the Aqaba Straits, and prevention of fedayeen activity from Gaza, you would also make it clear that Israel would have to comply with the November 2 UNGA resolution. Dr. Goldmann felt that if you were to say this clearly to American Jewish leaders, they could bring constructive pressure to bear on Prime Minister Ben Gurion. Dr. Goldmann makes no secret of the fact that he differs with Ben Gurion on many issues including the Israel attack on Egypt.

It might be useful for us to take this opportunity to point out to Jewish leaders that the Israel attack on Egypt has made it more, rather than less, difficult for the U. S. to work with Israel, that the UNGA resolution of November 2 must be implemented by Israel, and that Israel will have to work out the practical problems created by withdrawal of its forces with the UN Secretary General.

Recommendation:

That you agree to see a group of Jewish leaders for thirty minutes within the course of the next week or two. I would accompany the group on this call. A briefing memorandum will be prepared.

NEA:NE:DCBergus:mgw
1-5-57

Approved

Time 3:00 Date

Disapproved

FEB 25 1957

84
ECB
H-298
NE
SWT
RMR
C
Files
Central
This document is returned to
074.34A/1-757

CONFIDENTIAL

0310

674842/1-757

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

Action
NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

O

OLI

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 809, JANUARY 8, 3 PM

Control: 4584
Rec'd: JANUARY
7:57 AM

1957 JAN 10 AM 7-04

MESSAGE CENTER
NEASENT DEPARTMENT 809 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 144 AMMAN 140,
DAMASCUS 94, BEIRUT 126, PARIS 139, LONDON 164, JIDDA 6, USUN 31.

EYTAN, SECRETARY GENERAL OF FOREIGN MINISTRY, SOUGHT ME OUT AT A LARGE SOCIAL GATHERING SATURDAY NIGHT TO DISCUSS ALL-IMPORTANT ASSURANCE TO GOI OF CONTINUED FREE TRANSIT STRAITS OF TURAN. RECOGNIZING UN RESPONSIBILITY IN MATTER HE SOUGHT URGENTLY FOR CONCURRENT EFFECTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO SOLUTION OF PROBLEM BY US THROUGH ITS PARTICIPATION IN FORMULATION OF POLICY AND ULTIMATE DECLARATION STRAITS TO BE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY. AS INDICATED BY NUMBERED PARAGRAPH 3 OF EMBTEL 786 AND EMBTEL 801, POSSIBLE US ROLE IN SUCH DECLARATION IS PRIMARY PREOCCUPATION OF GOI AT PRESENT. AS ISRAEL SEES PROBLEM, US EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IS INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT.

EGYPT, HE POINTED OUT, AT PRESENT IS MAKING NO (REPEAT NO) EFFORT TO REASSERT RIGHT TO CONTROL OF STRAITS SO THAT PROBLEM APPEARS TO EYTAN AS BEING ONE OF QUICKLY FINDING FORMULA THAT CAN BE EXPRESSED AND ACCEPTED BY EGYPT WITHOUT LOSS OF FACE. SUCH FORMULA MAY BE CONTAINED IN EGYPTIAN AIDE MEMOIRE DELIVERED TO CAFFREY IN CAIRO JANUARY 30, 1950 (SEE CAIRO'S 10, JANUARY 30, 1950 TO DEPARTMENT REPEATED TEL AVIV 17) IN THE AIDE MEMOIRE EGYPT STATED, IN PART WITH REGARD TO ITS OCCUPATION OF THE SANAFIR ISLANDS, "THIS OCCUPATION, BEING IN NO (REPEAT NO) SENSE INTENDED TO INTERFERE IN ANY WAY WHATEVER WITH INNOCENT PASSAGE THROUGH THE STRETCH OF SEA SEPARATING THESE TWO ISLANDS FROM THE SINAI COAST OF EGYPT, IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT THIS PASSAGE, THE ONLY PRACTICAL ONE, WILL REMAIN FREE, AS IN THE PAST; WHICH IS IN CONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE AND WITH THE RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ...".

674.84A/1-357 HBS

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 809, JANUARY 8, 3 PM FROM TEL AVIV

EYTAN SAID HE THOUGHT US WOULD MAKE VERY VALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO SOLUTION OF PROBLEM IF IT WOULD ACTIVELY UTILIZE THE EXISTENCE OF THIS COMMITMENT BY EGYPT TO INFLUENCE EGYPT AND UN IN ESTABLISHING FIRMLY FREEDOM OF TRANSIT OF STRAITS BY ISRAEL. INASMUCH AS US WAS RECIPIENT OF AIDE MEMOIRE, COPY OF WHICH WAS DELIVERED TO GOI BY USG, IT PROVIDES SUITABLE PEG FOR DIRECT US INVOLVEMENT, EYTAN ARGUED, AND OFFERS EFFECTIVE APPROACH TO PROBLEM WITH MINIMUM RISK OF INVOLVING EGYPTIAN FACE TO EXTENT PROVOKING THEM TO ACTIVE OPPOSITION.

I WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S COMMENT.

LAWSON

TT:JS

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 15 1967

INCOMING TELEGRAM...

Department of State

ACTION COPY

This Document must be Returned
to RM/R Central Files

CONFIDENTIAL

35

Action
NEA

Control: 4284

Rec'd: January 8, 1957
8:56 p.m.Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

R

O

NO: 812, January 8, 2 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 812; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 142, DAMASCUS 95,
JIDDA 7, NEW YORK 32, LONDON 165, PARIS 140, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

Re DEPTTEL 675.

I saw Ben Gurion at his Jerusalem office Monday afternoon and made points contained reference telegram. His response was largely repetition arguments advanced in reply our aide memoire last week (EMBTTEL 786) but in addition, he made spirited defense of moral basis for Israel's attack on Egyptian Army and emphatically reiterated determination to resist Nasser's return Gaza or Straits of Tiran.

He said several times he could concede that UN's condemnation of attack might be "formally or legalistically correct", but "morally it was very wrong". Addressing himself to quotation from Secretary's speech (penultimate paragraph reference telegram), he said US role was especially wrong. "If your people had been in same position, your government would not have argued this way but would have acted." He said he could understand hostile vote of representatives of colored nations who voted from racial solidarity or ignorance of situation, but he thought performance of politically mature nations in GA was morally defenseless. He then repeated that Israel's circumstances of being target of Nasser's huge military build up in Sinai and kinged by Syrians and Jordanians avowedly bent on Israel's annihilation left him no choice but to act with advantage attack gave rather than wait and suffer destruction. UN would have been no more able to avert this murderous attack than 8 years ago at birth of state. He recognized US could apply sanctions (apparently implying Israel under sanctions now) saying "but that is matter for your judgment and whenever we believe we are right, as with our Sinai campaign, we are prepared to suffer for it and not submit to injustice".

Re Egypt-Israel armistice agreements: Ben Gurion wondered about great concern now expressed for their perpetuation. "What is their sanctity when Nasser violated them every day from Gaza Strip". As for invocation Article XII as suitable instrument for revision or modification, he recalled Israel's experience with Jordan when GAI had requested such meeting to modify Israel-Jordan GAA and Secretary

General

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

674.84A/1-857

CAA

CONFIDENTIAL

674.84A/1-857

CONFIDENTIAL

811, January 8, 2 p.m. from: Tel Aviv

General himself had stalemated suggestion (cf. Page 73, UN Yearbook 1954). He said he could see no reason for re-establishment of GAA except to provide basis for Nasser's return to Gaza. He repeated again that in GOI's view, the armistice agreement could not be resuscitated. (He made no further reference to view state of belligerence did not exist even if GAA invalid).

Re Gaza Strip: He could not permit Nasser's return to Gaza because it would mean resumption Fedayeen activity. As to UNEF, he asked two questions: "How long would it remain in Gaza? How did it propose to prevent renewed Fedayeen activity?" UNEF could not, he felt, "effectively control the movement of Fedayeen from Gaza into Israel and our border settlers should be able to work in their fields without fear of attack. I pointed out while Gaza might not be Egyptian, neither was it Israeli. He agreed but said that UNEF was not solution. He hinted vaguely he would like to see Israel police control maintained over Gaza under UN supervision if presence of UN would be useful in satisfying world opinion that Arabs were not at mercy of or had to rely on good will of Israel. He did not develop this suggestion further, however.

Re Straits of Tiran: Ben Gurion said GOI had no interest in desert wastelands bordering lower end Gulf of Aqaba, and had no territorial ambitions anywhere in Sinai, but "we do have to have this waterway. Furthermore, we have it not as need but as right. We will not again submit to blockade. No more will we be subject to Nasser's whims or charity. If he tries to re-establish blockade, then we shall have to start shooting."

He repeated several times he thought that if only he could sit down with President or Secretary for half hour, he could convince them of moral justice of Israel's actions. (He quickly made it clear, however, he had no intention visiting US). He suggested he might write to them. I pointed out that not only had Embassy reported his position fully but his views must also have been fully conveyed by Meir and Eban in their contacts with Secretary, Department, and USUN. However, if he felt personal letter would help, he should feel free to write one.

Although some of his statements were strong, they were expressed dispassionately in unexcited tones.

LAWSON

VH:JCK/6

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL

53-D
Action

IO
Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

NEA

ARA

FE

L

R

O

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 458, JANUARY 9, 5 PM

NIACT

RE PALESTINE - GAZA AND AQABA

SITUATION ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL RAPIDLY COMING TO HEAD. RIFAI (JORDAN) AND ZEINEDDINE (SYRIA) INFORMED US LAST NIGHT ARABS HAD AGREED REQUEST GA PLENARY CONSIDERATION WITHDRAWAL QUESTION BE HELD FRIDAY. THEY INTENDED SEEK ASIAN SUPPORT IN MEETING TODAY. RIFAI SAID THEY HAD PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF RESOLUTION CONDEMNING ISRAEL'S FAILURE WITHDRAW IN ACCORDANCE GA RESOLUTIONS AND CALLING FOR SANCTIONS.

IN DISCUSSIONS WITH CORDIER THIS MORNING, HE REPORTED ARABS HAVE NOW ASKED FOR MEETING TO BE HELD FRIDAY BUT SECRETARIAT WOULD NOT SCHEDULE MEETING BEFORE MIDDLE NEXT WEEK. HE SAID IT WAS HOPED IN SECRETARIAT THIS WOULD BRING SOME PRESSURE TO BEAR ON ISRAELIS AND AT SAME TIME GIVE THEM CHANCE DO SOMETHING ON WITHDRAWAL. HAMMARSKJOLD ALSO INTENDS ISSUE REPORT ON WITHDRAWALS WITHIN DAY OR TWO.

MEANWHILE HOWEVER, MRS. MEIR HAS HELD SERIES MEETINGS WITH ARABS, ASIANS AND LATIN AMERICANS INDICATING FIRM DECISION ISRAEL NOT WITHDRAW UNLESS THEIR CONDITIONS MET ON FREEDOM TRANSIT THROUGH CANAL AND INTO ELATH, AS WELL AS GUARANTEES EGYPTIANS WOULD NOT REOCCUPY GAZA.

LAST NIGHT AT DINNER DIXON AND SPENDER PRESSED ME FOR AMERICAN VIEWS THIS PROBLEM. THEY ADVOCATED SUPPORT FOR ISRAELI THESIS. DIXON SAID IF WE DID NOT OBTAIN CHANGE IN SITUATION IN AQABA AND GAZA WE WOULD BE "WORSE OFF" THAN BEFORE OCTOBER 29 (BRITISH CONTINUE TALK AS IF THERE HAD BEEN CHANCE OF BETTERING POSITION IN NEAR EAST BY MILITARY ACTION THEY AND ISRAELIS UNDERSTOOD).


DIXON

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

Control: 5053
Rec'd: JANUARY 9, 1957



674.84A/1-957

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

CONFIDENTIAL

REF ID: A66122

-2- DELGA 458, JANUARY 9, 5 PM, FROM NEW YORK.

DIXON REQUESTED WE BEGIN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO DELS ON HANDLING THIS PROBLEM.

DIXON ALSO SAID UK GOVERNMENT POSITION IS A ROUTE SHOULD BE DEVELOPED AS ALTERNATE TO SUEZ WHICH WOULD INVOLVE TRANSSHIPMENT OF GOODS FROM ELATH TO UNNAMED ISRAELI PORT IN MEDITERRANEAN. THEY WOULD THEN NO LONGER BE AT MERCY OF NASSER.

IT SEEMS TO ME IF HAMMARSKJOLD CAN WORK OUT PROMPTLY ARRANGEMENTS FOR UNEF'S OCCUPYING GAZA AND STRAITS OF TIRAN (AUTHORITY FOR WHICH WE BELIEVE HE ALREADY HAS), THIS WOULD GET ISRAELIS OUT OF POSITIONS THEY ARE OCCUPYING IN VIOLATION GA RESOLUTIONS AND AVOID UNDESIRABLE GA DEBATE, AT SAME TIME KEEPING UNEF AS BUFFER BETWEEN ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS AND ASSISTING IN SETTLING STATUS AQABA AND GAZA. FOR ISRAELIS, BRITISH OR FRENCH, HOWEVER, TO ADVOCATE THIS IN GA WOULD, I FEEL SURE, STIFFEN ARAB-ASIANS' RESISTANCE. JAMALI (IRAQ) EXPRESSED VIEW LAST NIGHT THAT US POSITION ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE CRITICAL FACTOR IN ARAB ATTITUDE TOWARDS PRESIDENT'S PLAN.

I PROPOSE DISCUSS FEASIBILITY HAMMARSKJOLD'S TAKING PROMPT INITIATIVE WITH ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE SHOULD BE READY MAKE US POSITION CLEAR AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE AND NOT LEAVE INITIATIVE EITHER TO ISRAELIS, BRITISH, OR ARABS.

DEPARTMENT'S COMMENTS REQUESTED URGENTLY.

LODGE

RBW

NOTE: Advance copy to Mr. Gamon (UNF) 1/9/57 6:30 p. m CWO-FED

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 5122
Rec'd: JANUARY 9, 1957
7:57 PM



Handwritten: This document must be returned to the RM/R central files

674.84A/1-957

58-51
Action IO

FROM: NEW YORK

Info RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: DELGA 460, JANUARY 9, 8 PM

G

SP

C

EUR

NI ACT

NEA

L

RE PALESTINE - GAZA AND TIRAN

UOP

O

OLI

LALL (INDIA) SHOWED WADSWORTH TEXT PROPOSED RESOLUTION ON ISRAELI TROOP WITHDRAWAL WHICH HE SAID ARABS WERE STRONGLY PRESSING MEMBERS ASAF GROUP TO CO-SPONSOR. LALL PERSONALLY THOUGHT SUCH MOVE WOULD ONLY PRODUCE MOST ACrimonious AND UNHELPFUL DEBATE, BUT COULD NOT BE STOPPED IN ABSENCE SOME DEFINITE ASSURANCES BY ISRAEL. HE STRONGLY URGED US GET ISRAEL TO SEND COMMUNICATION TO SYG, BY FRIDAY IF POSSIBLE AND NOT LATER THAN MONDAY, WHICH WOULD: (1) INDICATE ISRAELI INTENTION PROCEED WITH WITHDRAWALS; (2) LIST DEVELOPMENTS HARMFUL ISRAEL WHICH THEY FEAR MAY OCCUR (CONTINUANCE FEDAYEEN RAIDS, ETC); (3) STATE THEY WILL SEEK IMMEDIATE ACTION IN GA SHOULD ANY OF THESE POSSIBILITIES MATERIALIZE.

OCB

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

KIDRON (ISRAEL) INFORMED US TODAY MEIR WILL BE ATTENDING CABINET MEETING TOMORROW TO CONSIDER ISRAELI POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL. KIDRON SAID MEANWHILE REPORT ON PRESENT STAGE OF WITHDRAWALS WOULD BE MADE TO HAMMARSKJOLD. IN CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD SEEM TO US IMPORTANT DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS BE CONVEYED ONCE MORE AT HIGHEST LEVEL TO ISRAELI GOVERNMENT PRIOR CABINET DECISION.

LODGE

CC

NOTE: Mr. DePalma (UNP) informed 1/9/9p.m. EH

JAN 28 1959

FILED

PA

674.84A/1-957

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED.

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

05326

1957 JAN 11 PM 6 57

SENT TO: USUN NEW YORK

507

NIACT

Origin

Re Israeli Withdrawal, DELGA 458 and DELGA 460

Info:

We believe time has come give SYG our views as to measures required bring about withdrawal Israeli forces and extent to which US will support him in carrying out these measures. You should accordingly pass on following suggestions soonest unless you perceive objections:

1. We are concerned that impending GA debate on Israel's delay in withdrawing forces may serve to harden Israeli and Arab positions and make more difficult full implementation UN resolutions relating to withdrawals and role of UNEF.

2. We suggest accordingly SYG consider following measures:

A. Bulk of UNEF forces will move to strategic positions along Israel-Egypt armistice lines as Israeli forces withdraw behind lines.

B. UNEF forces in strength to be determined by Gen Burns will be stationed in Gaza strip and no Egyptian military or para-military forces will enter strip. Egypt will assume provisional civilian administration of strip under arrangements to be worked out with Gen Burns on understanding no inter-

ference will be permitted with UNEF's security functions in strip as these functions are determined by Gen Burns.

C. UNEF forces in strength to be determined by Gen Burns will be stationed along coast in Sharmalsheikh area and if necessary on offshore islands

Drafted by:

IO:UNP:SDepAlma:rs

1/10/57

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

IO

NEA

L

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

JAN 11 1957 P.M.

674.84A/1-957
CS/PG

674.84A/1-957
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

and no Egyptian military forces would return at this time. Thus as practical matter there will be no challenge to passage vessels through Strait of Tiran.

D. Negotiations on final Suez settlement will be pursued as matter greatest urgency and on basis Convention 1888 and agreed six principles which will guarantee all users, including Israel, right of free passage.

E. UNEF's functions along Israel-Egypt armistice lines will be exercised on understanding parties will scrupulously observe provisions of Israeli-Egyptian Armistice Agreement. (We assume functions of UNTSO along Israel-Egypt armistice lines will not conflict with UNEF's role and that appropriate liaison arrangements will be worked out.)


F. Israel should make clear to SYG its withdrawal plans in relation above phased take-over UNEF forces and should authorize SYG make these plans known in time head off proposed Arab-Asian action.

3. You may also inform SYG that after above measures taken we prepared at appropriate time state US belief Gulf Aqaba international waterway and freedom of passage should be assured.

~~XX~~

You should also inform SYG we would not support sanctions against Israel so long as Egypt also continues in default UN resolutions.

We would appreciate SYG's comments soonest.


DULLES

AIR POUCH

PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : AMCONGENERAL, JERUSALEM

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF : Congen Despatch 95, December 28, 1956

DESP. NO.

January 9, 1957

DATE

For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	REC'D	IN F O
71	NEA 4	R-M/R-A 011-8 IO-4 P.1 USUN-1 BEIRUT-1
11/16		CIA-12 USIA-10 OSD-4 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR

SUBJECT: Activities of the MACs during the Period 15 through 28 December 1956

Copies are enclosed of the substantive parts of the weekly reports prepared by the Mixed Armistice Commissions of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization which summarize their activities for the period 15 through 28 December 1956.

William E. Cole
William E. Cole
American Consul General

2 Enclosures

1. Copy of Parts of MAC Weekly Reports for 15 through 21 December 1956
2. Copy of Parts of MAC Weekly Reports for 22 through 28 December 1956

Copy sent Amman, Tel Aviv

Department pass to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus

1957 JAN 18 AM 11 05

MESSAGE CENTER

674.84A/1-957

HBS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

HKMiller/hkm

REPORTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE CENTRAL FILES

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

COPY

The following is a summary of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions for the period 15 December to 21 December 1956.

EGYPTIAN - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

During the first part of the period under review, the general situation remained relatively tranquil. The Israeli authorities increased their efforts to force merchants to accept only Israeli currency, but without too much success.

Commencing on 19 December, a group of Israeli soldiers, estimated to be between 6 and 8 in number, broke into several homes in the UNRWA Beach Camp. The Arab men in the homes were forced into the street under threat of guns and, in at least four cases, women were alleged to have been raped. In some instances money was stolen from the occupants of the homes. These instances occurred nightly from the above mentioned date and mainly between 8 and 12 p.m. local time.

Complaints and investigations

Nil.

HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

Tension continued to decrease along the Demarcation Line.

Patrols within Israel did not indicate any particular military preparations. Movement of UNMOs within HJK continued to be restricted.

The Israelis have approached the Jordanians informally twice in an effort to arrange a local commanders meeting to discuss incidents (alleged Fedayeen). The Jordanians refuse to meet unless such "incidents" are investigated by UNMOs, but have indicated some willingness to meet at the local commanders' level provided Israel resumes its participation in the MAC.

The Assistant Chief of Staff and the Chairman had conversations with the Brigade and Area Commanders at Nablus on 18 December. It was agreed that an UNMO would be stationed daily at some place from where many overflights have been reported, in an endeavour to identify and report on such overflights.

A Sub-Committee meeting, held on 17 December, discussed missing persons, property and other problems incidental to the maintenance of the G.A.A.

The Jordanian Delegation submitted 8 complaints, all alleging overflights, which were not investigated. There were no casualties.

The Israeli Delegation submitted no complaint.

Outstanding complaints: HJK-1,163; Israel-349; Total-1,512

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Classification)

ISRAEL - LEBANESE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The period under review has been quiet.

The case of the 32 Arabs from El Aramshe who infiltrated into Lebanon on 16 October is still pending. The Senior Israeli Delegate was urged during a MAC meeting held on 4 December to give an answer before 11 December as to whether or not these infiltrators would be accepted by Israel; so far, no answer has been received. The Lebanese Delegate is prepared to boycott further MAC meetings if no satisfactory solution in compliance with para. 3 of the agreement dated March 1952 can be reached.

No complaint has been submitted either by the Lebanese Delegation or by the Israeli Delegation.

ISRAEL - SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The period under review has been quiet. As indicated in previous report, the tension which has existed in the last few weeks is gradually diminishing.

The Israeli Delegation submitted a verbal complaint to the effect that three Syrians allegedly crossed into Israel and stole 32 head of cattle belonging to the settlement of Conen. No UN investigation was requested. Syrian authorities were requested to investigate the matter but have not so far submitted results to the Chairman.

The Israeli Delegation has not yet given any satisfactory answer concerning the Banat Yacoub bridge on the river Jordan and its clearance from mines. In this respect, the observers were able this week to ascertain, with the authorization of the Syrian military authorities, that the eastern approach to the bridge is free of mines.

Regular patrolling on both sides of the Israeli-Syrian Demarcation Line has not revealed any movements of troops which would indicate massing of troops for offensive purposes by either party.

No routine inspection was made in the central sector of the Demilitarized Zone on the site of the Jordan River Project.

The Israeli Delegation, in addition to the verbal complaint mentioned in a preceding paragraph, submitted 2 written complaints: 1 alleging that, on 9 December, rifle shots were fired from Syrian position of Darbasyeh at civilians in Israel; 1 alleging an overflight.

The Syrian Delegation submitted 2 written complaints, both alleging overflights.

Outstanding complaints: Israel-635; Syria-740; Total-1,375

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

COPY

The following is a summary of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions for the period 22 December to 28 December 1956.

EGYPTIAN - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The same general type of incidents mentioned in the preceding report covering the period 15 to 21 December 1956, occurred again on the nights of 22, 25 and 27 December 1956 respectively. On 26 and 27 December 1956, several hundred persons moved their personal effects from the camp to other places for safe keeping.

Eight bus-loads of prisoners, estimated at approximately 300, alleged to be soldiers who were discovered during the last screening of the refugee camps, were taken from the UNRWA Rimal school prison camp on 28 December 1956. Destination unknown.

The curfew has been shortened and is now in force from 9:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. local time daily.

UNTSO continues to furnish communications and clerical support to UNRWA.

Complaints and investigations

Nil.

HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The situation remained quiet, with HJK apparently making every effort to keep it so during the Christmas season.

Increasingly active steps will be taken to identify aircraft overflying HJK. It should be noted that the number of Jordanian complaints alleging overflights has markedly decreased, (190 for the month of November - 69 for the month of December).

The outstations of Nablus, Hebron and Latrun continued to be manned by UNMOs. Other places were visited.

A Sub-Committee meeting, held on 23 December, discussed missing persons, property and other problems incidental to the maintenance of the G.A.A.

The Jordanian Delegation submitted 7 complaints, all alleging overflights, which were not investigated. There were no casualties.

The Israeli Delegation submitted no complaint.

Outstanding complaints: HJK-1,170; Israel-349; Total-1,519

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

ISRAEL - LEBANESE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The period under review has been quiet.

On 26 December 1956, at Naqoura, two infiltrators from the El Aramshe tribe were interrogated by the Senior Israeli Delegate and one Israeli Police officer. Thereupon their return to Israel was accepted by the Senior Israeli Delegate, but not accepted by the Lebanese representative who stated that the case involved 30 other infiltrators who should also return to Israel. Finally no crossing was arranged and the case of the 32 infiltrators is still under discussion. The Lebanese Delegation will not attend any further regular meetings until they are returned to Israel in compliance with Article 3 of the Agreement signed on 25 March 1952 by both delegations.

The Israeli Delegation submitted 1 complaint alleging that, on 23 December 1956 at 1445Z four persons coming from Lebanon penetrated into Israel and opened rifle and submachine gun fire on three farmers at MR 1708 2775, causing neither casualties nor damage. An investigation was requested.

The Lebanese Delegation submitted 1 complaint alleging two overflights.

ISRAEL - SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The period under review has been quiet.

The Israeli Delegation has not yet given guarantees that Banat Yacoub bridge is clear of mines and open to UN traffic.

No inspection was made in the central sector of the Demilitarized Zone on the site of the Jordan River Project.

The Israeli Delegation submitted no complaint.

The Syrian Delegation submitted 3 complaints: 1 alleging an overflight (investigation not requested); 1 alleging illegal ploughing of Arab lands in the Southern Sector of the Demilitarized Zone by Israelis (investigation requested); 1 alleging a donkey belonging to an Arab inhabitant of the Southern Sector of the Demilitarized Zone was stolen by Israeli soldiers (investigation requested).

Outstanding complaints: Israel-635; Syria-743; Total-1,378

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

5825

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 10, 1957

SUBJECT: ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AND GAZA STRIP

PARTICIPANTS: Shimshon Arad, First Secretary, Embassy of Israel
UNP - Samuel DePalma
UNP - David L. Gamon

COPIES TO: RM/R
USUN
NEA
L
IO
UNP
OLI

Amembassy Tel Aviv

Mr. Arad called at his own request. After commenting that it had been a long time since he had had an opportunity to discuss matters with Mr. DePalma, he said he wished to make a brief review of recent events.

He said that negotiations with the Secretary General on the "Sinai adventure" were reaching their final stages. The day before yesterday the Israel Government notified the Secretary General that Israeli forces would be withdrawn an additional 25 kilometers. (He explained this as in addition to the withdrawal contemplated under Phase One of the Israeli plan, which already has been completed.) He added that the Israeli Government has requested the Secretary General to ask General Burns to get in touch with General Dayan on the implementation of this 25-kilometer withdrawal and that the Israeli Government is awaiting further discussions with the Secretary General regarding the Straits and Gaza.

Mr. Arad noted the restiveness current in New York regarding the pace of Israeli withdrawals. He asked if there was any way in which the United States could feel that the November 2 resolution could be interpreted more liberally by the Secretary General so as to provide for the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces within a context that would give Israel the assurances on Gaza and the Straits of Tiran which she deems to be necessary.

Mr. DePalma

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RM/R
Central
Files

574.84A/1-1057

C3/F

RECEIVED
OFFICIAL USE

JAN 13 1957

674.84A/1-1057

Mr. DePalma replied that there is a limit to what can be done in interpreting a resolution. However, he said, we are thinking hard about this very problem. He asked Mr. Arad what Israel wants of the United States.

Mr. Arad commented that the basic question is how effectively can free passage through the Straits of Tiran be safeguarded; how effective, in fact, can UNEF be; what would happen if Egypt should request UNEF to move out of the area? He added that his personal belief is that, if necessary, Israel would force her way through the Straits of Tiran, should Egypt ever block her way there again. In answer to Mr. DePalma's further question as to what Israel wanted of the United States, he said an announcement by the United States regarding free passage through the Straits would be of help.

Mr. DePalma concurred that there would be an obvious gap between the placing of UNEF in these areas and their future disposition. There would be many questions which would arise such as how much a "guarantee" would be necessary, what would be its most effective timing, etc. He added, however, that he would be glad to pass Mr. Arad's ideas on immediately.

Mr. Arad said that the same considerations apply to the Gaza Strip. He noted that the Secretary General in his last talks with the Israelis had not raised the question of the future of Gaza. He asked what the United States would do if the Afro-Asian group went ahead with its draft resolution. Mr. DePalma said that is precisely what the Department now is considering. He said that it is obvious that something must be done and done fast. The persons who are proposing the resolution are applying pressure tactics; nevertheless, their intention is a real one.

Mr. DePalma then asked Mr. Arad to clarify his thinking regarding pronouncements made by Israeli Government officials on Gaza. Mr. Arad said that these pronouncements were consistent in that they expressed an Israeli disinclination to retain the Gaza Strip. (The one exception, he explained, was a statement made by Prime Minister Ben Gurion in the Knesset in response to a question put to him.) Mr. DePalma thanked Mr. Arad for helping him clear his thinking on the matter.

IO:UNP:DLGamon:lmr

TR

JP

A-573

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 10, 1957

SUBJECT:

Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza and the Straits of Aqaba

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. George Meany, A.F. of L. - C.I.O.

The Secretary
NE - Fraser Wilkins

COPIES TO: S(2 cc), WIA(cc), NE(3 cc), C(cc), C(cc), P(cc), OLI(2), Tel Aviv

Mr. Meany called on the Secretary this morning. He said that, although progress was being made on various matters relating to the recent hostilities in Egypt, his people were very much disturbed regarding the attitude of Nasser. He said that he had talked with the Israeli Foreign Minister and others and that the Israelis very much feared that after they had withdrawn from Gaza and the area of the Straits of Aqaba, the Egyptians would return and there would be a resumption of fedayeen attacks and Israeli shipping through the Straits of Aqaba would again be stopped. Mr. Meany added that he understood that at the time the Israelis agreed to withdraw behind the Armistice lines there had been some sort of assurances, either by the United Nations or perhaps by Mr. Lodge during the course of debate that if the Israelis withdrew, the use of the Straits of Aqaba and also of the Suez Canal would not be blocked. Mr. Meany also added that he was convinced that the Israelis would again go to war if after withdrawal the Egyptians returned to Gaza and the Straits of Aqaba and prevented Israel's use of the Straits of Aqaba.

The Secretary said that he did not believe the United Nations had given any form of assurances or made any statements or had indicated any provision in General Assembly resolutions with respect to the use of the Straits of Aqaba. He said that as he recalled the General Assembly Resolution of November 2 it provided for a cease-fire, a withdrawal of forces and related matters but did not touch upon the Straits of Aqaba. He understood that some of the Arab/Asian delegates in New York were even now considering the introduction of the resolution which would call again upon Israel to withdraw behind the armistice line and would contain a provision for sanctions. We are considering the matter and would see what was possible in the circumstances.

He added

CONFIDENTIAL674.844/1-1057
CONFIDENTIAL FILE
CS/W
JAN 18 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

He added that we had always been sympathetic to Israel's use of the Suez Canal and the Straits of Aqaba. We considered them to be international waters. The Secretary said that he had expressed this view in talks with Mrs. Meir, the Israeli Foreign Minister, but that the United States had not publicly stated its position with respect to the Straits of Aqaba.

5/11
NEA:NE:Wilkins:crc

1/10-11/57

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

674.84A/1-1157

CAA

CONFIDENTIAL

38-H

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

P

UOP

O

OLI

IOP

OCB

CIA

OSD

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 837, January 11, 7 p.m.

Control:

7006

Rec'd:

January 12, 1957
7:58 a.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 837; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 170, PARIS 146,
CAIRO 149, BEIRUT 130, DAMASCUS 98, AMMAN 145, USUN UNNUMBERED.

NOFORN

British Ambassador Nicholls who called on Ben Gurion (EMBTel 832) morning same day I saw Prime Minister (EMBTel 812) said extended conversation developed and to large extent followed line Ben Gurion talk with me.

Without putting up such spirited defense of Israel's moral grounds for Sinai action or being quite as voluble re Egypt-Israel armistice agreements Ben Gurion pressed very hard reasons for GOI attitude toward withdrawal from Sinai until there were some firm assurances on Gulf of Aqaba and Gaza problems. Aside from that his attitude expressed in almost same terms and phrases as used with me. Nicholls predicted to Ben Gurion Israel would be unable to enlist sufficient United Nations member support to prevent censure resolution against Israel. He counselled him to consider carefully unfavorable effects on world opinion of an Israeli refusal to withdraw in accordance with United Nations resolution and possible penalties involved. He thought his counsel may have caused Ben Gurion consider situation more seriously than he had.

Re Aqaba he suggested to Ben Gurion Israel concentrate on lining up firm support with United Nations for her moral and legal rights in Gulf of Aqaba and work for public statement within United Nations which insists on an internationalized Straits and backed by these supporters. This he said should give Israel ample assurance of continued freedom of transit. Ben Gurion listened by apparently gave no clear reaction. Nicholls sensed Prime Minister "was shaken" and would now study all means avoiding direct clash with United Nations resolution.

Re Gaza and GOI thinking that problem Ben Gurion went beyond "hinting stage" with Nicholls suggesting clearly possible plan

where by

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.MESSAGE CENTER
NEA
1957 JAN 14 AM 11/15OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF STATE
1-11-57

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 837, January 11, 7 p.m. from Tel Aviv

where by Israel would police and administer Gaza under United Nations supervision; resisted strongly idea United Nations alone could control Fedayeen operations from Gaza or attacks on Israel settlers on Gaza border. He went into his opposition to concept of sole UNEF occupancy of Gaza at much greater length with Nicholls than with me.

Comment: I received no impression during my talk with Ben Gurion he thought he would not resist United Nations withdrawal resolution in absence of assurances required but neither did he reveal belligerent attitude. It seems likely some GOI has not yet decided on final firm policy on complete withdrawal and decision may await results of Ben Gurion's present talks with Meir and discussions in up-coming Cabinet meeting Sunday. There has been much evidence of rapidly growing public support as well as strong and almost complete editorial support for GOI policy of no complete withdrawal in absence of assurances. From sources believed be in position to know I hear the consensus of opinion in all parties except Communists is against immediate and complete withdrawal. And one senses in many quarters resignation to accept penalties if they must come. This illustrated dramatically by editorial (EMBTel 836) in today's issue HAARETZ (independent). Thus Cabinet decision along that line would not come as surprise.

LAWSON

BB:MJH/6

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

ACTION COPY

47-B

Action

IO

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

NEA

ARA

FE

L

E

P

UOP

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 482, JANUARY 11, 8 PM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Control: 6826

Rec'd:

JANUARY 11, 1957
11:24 PM

PRIORITY

RE PALESTINE-SUEZ-ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

LALL (INDIA) SHOWED USGADEL OFFICER COPY OF RES DRAFTED BY AFRO-ASIAN DRAFTING SUB-GROUP RE NON-COMPLIANCE OF ISRAELIS WITH GA RESOLUTIONS. THERE ARE THREE MAIN ELEMENTS:

- CONDEMNATION OF NON-COMPLIANCE OF ISRAELIS;
- A CALL FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL WITHIN FIVE DAYS;
- A REQUEST MEMBERS WITHHOLD ASSISTANCE TO ISRAELIS DURING PERIOD OF NON-COMPLIANCE ALONG LINES PROVISION INCLUDED US DRAFT RESOLUTION INTRODUCED IN SC. 513710 Oct 30

LALL URGED ONCE AGAIN US TRY TO PERSUADE ISRAELIS MAKE POSITIVE REPORT TO SYG INDICATING IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. THIS WOULD PERMIT SYG MAKE POSITIVE REPORT AND, IN LALL'S VIEW, TAKE STEAM OUT OF PRESENT AFRO-ASIAN MOVE. LALL SAID SUB-GROUP HAS NOT SHOWN RES TO ENTIRE AFRO-ASIAN GROUP AND WILL NOT DO SO UNTIL SYG HAS MADE HIS REPORT TUESDAY. LOUTFI (EGYPT) SUBSEQUENTLY SHOWED DRAFT TO BARCO AND CONFIRMED INTENTION WAIT ON SYGS REPORT BEFORE TAKING ACTION.

IN RESPONSE QUERY RE ISRAELI DESIRE FOR ASSURANCES RE GAZA AND GULF OF AQABA, LALL MAINTAINED THERE WOULD BE GOOD DEAL OF SYMPATHY FOR THIS VIEW ONCE ISRAELIS HAD COMPLIED FULLY WITH RESOLUTIONS.

LODGE

CV
PERMANENT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

674.84A/1-1157

PA

674.84A/1-1157

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

43-B

Action
IO

Info
RMR

SS
G
SP
C
EUR
NEA
L
R
O

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 490, JANUARY 11, 7 PM

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 6931

Rec'd: JANUARY 12, 1957
2:50 AM

MESSAGE CENTER

PRIORITY

FOR SECRETARY AND WILCOX FROM LODGE

RE ISRAELI NON-COMPLIANCE

HAMMARSKJOLD GAVE ME DETAILED REPORT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAEL RE THEIR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH GA RESOLUTIONS. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE HAD DIFFICULT AND UNPLEASANT DISCUSSIONS AND, UP TO THIS LAST WEEK, ISRAELIS HAD BEEN INTRANSIGENT. HE EXPRESSED VIEW, HOWEVER, THAT AS RESULT COOL REACTION MEIR RECEIVED FROM VARIOUS GROUPS SHE ADDRESSED HERE AT GA, ISRAELI ATTITUDE HAD SOFTENED SOMEWHAT. HE EXPECTS PRACTICALLY ALL ISRAELI FORCES WILL BE OUT OF SINAI (LEAVING ASIDE GAZA AND TIRAN) BY JAN 15. HE EXPECTS REPORT FROM ISRAELIS MONDAY. HAMMARSKJOLD THEN MADE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC POINTS:

1. STRAITS OF TIRAN: HAMMARSKJOLD SAID FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IS AIM, BUT QUESTION IS HOW TO ARRIVE AT THIS. ISRAELIS HAVE ASKED UNEF BE PUT IN TIRAN AND GUARANTEES GIVEN THERE WILL BE FREE ACCESS TO AQABA. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE CANNOT SEEK FORMAL AGREEMENT FROM EGYPTIANS UNEF BE PLACED IN TIRAN BECAUSE, DUE TO GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF TIRAN AND WITH ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL THERE WOULD BE NO QUESTION SEPARATING ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN FORCES. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID IN ADDITION HE CANNOT ASK EGYPTIANS AGREE THERE WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH FREEDOM OF PASSAGE AT PRESENT SINCE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THEY ARE INTERFERING OR INTEND TO PREVENT SUCH PASSAGE. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THERE MAY BE A TIME WHEN IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO POSITION UNEF IN TIRAN, BUT HE CANNOT SEEK SUCH ASSURANCE WHILE ISRAELIS ARE NOT COMPLYING ON COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL.

2. FEYDAYEEN RAIDS

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES

674. 34A/1-1157

RMC

674.844/1-1157

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DELGA 490, JANUARY 11, 7 PM, FROM NEW YORK

2. FEDAYEEN RAIDS: HAMMARSKJOLD REFERRED TO THREE LETTERS OF COMPLAINT WHICH HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED BY ISRAELIS AND TO NUMBER OF INCIDENTS PRESUMED TO HAVE OCCURRED ALONG ISRAELI-JORDAN BORDER. HAMMARSKJOLD EMPHASIZED UNTSO HAS BEEN BARRED FROM INVESTIGATING AND THEREFORE HE HAS BEEN UNABLE CONFIRM INCIDENTS ALLEGED BY ISRAELIS. ISRAELIS WANT FORMAL ASSURANCES FROM EGYPT THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER FEDAYEEN RAIDS. HE BELIEVES HE COULD SEEK SUCH AN ASSURANCE FROM EGYPTIANS UNDER TWO CONDITIONS: (A) IF HE HAS BEEN ABLE CONFIRM CASES CITED BY ISRAELIS; (B) IF ISRAELIS MAKE FULL WITHDRAWAL. HE SAID HE HAS TOLD EGYPTIANS CONTINUANCE FEDAYEEN RAIDS IS FOOLISH AND POLITICALLY UNWISE FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW SINCE THEY UNDERMINE ARAB CAUSE. HE BELIEVES HE HAS INFLUENCED ARABS IN THIS REGARD SINCE ARABS HAVE PUT BRAKE ON FEDAYEEN RAIDS. THIS IS EVIDENCED BY FACT, HAMMARSKJOLD SAID, EVEN ISRAELIS ARE HAVING DIFFICULTY CITING INCIDENTS.

3. GAZA: ISRAELIS HAVE INSISTED ON ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION AND REFUGEES BEING TAKEN CARE OF BY UNRWA. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE WISHED LEAVE ASIDE THIS POINT FOR PRESENT SINCE SO MANY COMPLICATIONS ARE INVOLVED.

4. REMILITARIZATION OF SINAI (INCLUDING TIRAN): ISRAELIS WANT GUARANTEES AGAINST EGYPTIAN MILITARY MOVES BACK INTO SINAI. IN SYG'S VIEW, NO DECISION OF GA PERMITS HIM DO THIS IN VIEW FACT THIS IS SOVEREIGN EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. HE HAS EMPHASIZED TO EGYPTIANS THEY SHOULD NOT TAKE ANY STEPS BRING THEIR FORCES BACK INTO SINAI WITHOUT CONSULTING HIM. HE HAS USED ARGUMENT IT WOULD BE POLITICAL MISTAKE FROM EGYPTIAN POINT OF VIEW, AND EGYPTIAN POLITICAL POSITION WOULD BE WEAKENED SHOULD SUCH MOVES BE MADE. THUS FAR, HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THIS ARGUMENT HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL WITH EGYPTIANS. EGYPTIANS RECENTLY ASKED HIM WHETHER THEY COULD RE-ESTABLISH CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AT EL ARISH AND BRING IN TOKEN FORCE. SYG HAS AGREED THEY CAN TAKE OVER CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND BRING IN A WORK COMPANY AS WELL. HAMMARSKJOLD UNDERSCORED HE CANNOT GIVE ISRAELIS FORMAL ASSURANCE ON THIS QUESTION. THERE IS A DE FACTO AGREEMENT BETWEEN HIMSELF AND EGYPTIANS, WHICH IS FUNCTIONING QUITE WELL.

HE SAYS,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- DELGA 490, JANUARY 11, 7 PM, FROM NEW YORK

HE SAYS, SINCE EGYPTIANS HAVE NOT BROUGHT FORCES BACK INTO SINAI. ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON FORMAL ASSURANCES COULD PUSH EGYPTIANS TO MOVE INTO SINAI. HE COULD NOT REALLY TELL ISRAELIS ACTUAL SITUATION. BECAUSE IF HE DID, IT WOULD BE IN JERUSALEM POST WITH DEMANDS FOR EVEN GREATER FORBEARANCE ON EGYPTIAN PART, AND THEN EGYPTIANS WOULD REACT BY MOVING IN FORCE.

HAMMARSKJOLD ADDED FACT THAT ISRAEL HAS NEVER PERMITTED OBSERVERS TO MOVE FREELY IN ISRAEL MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR ISRAELIS OR FOR THOSE WHO CONDONE ISRAELI ATTITUDE OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT NOW TO CONTEND THAT NO EGYPTIAN FORCES SHOULD MOVE AROUND IN SINAI, NOTABLY IN TIRAN.

PARENTHETICALLY, SYG MENTIONED HE HAD ALSO SUCCEEDED ON DE FACTO BASIS IN WORKING OUT AGREEMENT ON AN EXCHANGE OF ISRAELI AND EGYPTIAN PRISONERS. HE CITED THIS AS ANOTHER EVIDENCE WHAT CAN BE DONE QUIETLY AND WITHOUT PUBLIC FORMAL ASSURANCES.

5. SUEZ: SYG SAID THERE IS NO INDICATION OF EGYPTIAN INTENTION INTERFERE WITH FRENCH-BRITISH TRAFFIC. THEY HAVE NOT CONNECTED PROBLEM FREEDOM PASSAGE SUEZ WITH ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS, AS NEWSPAPERS HAVE STATED. HE SAID ISRAELIS VIEW QUESTION OF FREEDOM OF ISRAELI SHIPPING AS PART OF SUEZ CANAL SETTLEMENT PROBLEM WHEREAS ARABS VIEW IT AS PART OF PALESTINE SETTLEMENT PROBLEM. HE PERSONALLY BELIEVED QUESTION ISRAELI FREEDOM OF TRANSIT THROUGH SUEZ WOULD HAVE BE SETTLED OUTSIDE ANY AGREEMENT ON CANAL ADMINISTRATION. HE SAID IF OPERATION BY SUEZ CANAL COMPANY AND BRITISH OCCUPATION CANAL ZONE HAD NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL OPENING CANAL TO ISRAEL, IT WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT A PROBLEM SIMPLY OF HOW CANAL WAS TO BE ADMINISTERED.

SUMMARIZING, HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE DOUBTED THAT EGYPTIANS WOULD ACTUALLY INTERFERE WITH PASSAGE IN STRAITS OF TIRAN. HE EXPRESSED VIEW EGYPT WILL NOT MILITARILY REOCCUPY SINAI WITHOUT CONSULTING SYG. HE STRESSED THERE IS POSSIBILITY DO SOMETHING CONCRETELY WITH RESPECT STOPPING FEDAYEEN RAIDS ONLY AFTER FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE ALSO BELIEVES IF THERE WERE HOSTILITIES IN TIRAN OR IF EGYPTIANS INTERFERE WITH PASSAGE OF ANY SHIPS,

INCLUDING ISRAELI,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-4- DELGA 490, JANUARY 11, 7 PM, FROM NEW YORK

INCLUDING ISRAELI, HE FEELS HE HAS RIGHT TO POSITION UNEF THERE, AND WOULD DO SO, BUT WITHOUT ANY FURTHER ACTION BY THE GA. 7

COMMENT: IN VIEW OF GREAT DIFFICULTY OF GETTING A 2/3 VOTE IN GA THIS IS IMPORTANT.

6. ISRAELI REPORT TO SYG: HAMMARSKJOLD SAID MEIR DISCUSSING QUESTION OF COMPLIANCE WITH CABINET ON SUNDAY AND EXPECTS REPORT FROM ISRAELIS BY MONDAY. HE SEES TWO ALTERNATIVES FOR ISRAELIS: (A) REPORT WOULD SAY THEY DO NOT INTEND COMPLY UNLESS ASSURANCES ARE GIVEN; OR (B) REPORT WOULD STATE ISRAELIS INTENTION COMPLY AND AT SAME TIME BRING TO ATTENTION UN ISRAELI CONCERN RE ABOVE ISSUES RAISED BY THEM WITH SYG. SYG SECOND ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE ONE TAKEN BY ISRAELIS ALTHOUGH HE IS INCLINED BELIEVE THIS IS WISHFUL THINKING. 7

HAMMARSKJOLD BELIEVES THAT IF ISRAELIS ARE ABLE MAKE REPORT SHOWING INTENTION OF FULL COMPLIANCE AND AT SAME TIME EXPRESSING CONCERN.

RE SPECIFIC ISSUES, GA CAN TURN TO MORE CONSTRUCTIVE CONSIDERATION THESE ISSUES. HAMMARSKJOLD INDICATED IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES GA COULD CONSIDER RES ENDORSING FREEDOM OF PASSAGE IN STRAITS OF TIRAN. IN RESPONSE MY QUESTION AS TO WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE GET 2/3 VOTE ON SUCH A RES, HAMMARSKJOLD FIRST SAID HE THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, HE SAID HE "WOULD NOT EXCLUDE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING 2/3 VOTE ON SUCH A RES". HE REPEATED THIS WAS PROBABLY WISHFUL THINKING SINCE HE DID NOT BELIEVE ISRAELIS WOULD MAKE CONSTRUCTIVE REPORT WHICH WOULD PERMIT GA CONSIDER SUCH AN APPROACH.

HAMMARSKJOLD THEN EMPHASIZED AGAIN THAT IF ISRAELIS WITHDRAW FORTHWITH THERE WILL BE SUPPORT FOR DOING SOMETHING ABOUT PROBLEM IN GULF OF TIRAN, AND IT WOULD LIKEWISE IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE GENERALLY. IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE WOULD ALSO BE CONDUCTIVE QUIET EFFORTS ON HIS PART GET ASSURANCES ON ENDING FEDAYEEN RAIDS. HE DESCRIBED ISRAELI APPROACH AS ONE THEY HAVE FOLLOWED FROM BEGINNING THEIR TROUBLES WITH ARABS WITH COMPLETE LACK OF SUCCESS IN ATTAINING THEIR AIMS.

THIS CONVERSATION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-5- DELGA 490, JANUARY 11, 7 PM, FROM NEW YORK

THIS CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE AND ABOVE REPORT DICTATED BEFORE RECEIPT DEPTEL 507. DEPT WILL NOTE FROM THIS REPORT HAMMARSKJOLD HAS ALREADY TAKEN POSITION ON PARA C (DEPTEL 507) WITH RESPECT STATIONING UNEF AT THIS TIME IN TIRAN STRAITS, AND HAS INDICATED RE PARA D, FREEDOM OF TRANSIT FOR ISRAEL SHOULD BE WORKED OUT SEPARATE FROM A SUEZ SETTLEMENT.

AFTER CONSIDERING FOREGOING REPORT. DOES DEPT DESIRE ME TO GIVE HAMMARSKJOLD AT THIS TIME VIEWS CONTAINED IN DEPTEL 507 IN EVERY RESPECT?

LODGE

CV

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

05833

1957 JAN 12 PM 1 10

DC/T

SENT TO: USUN, NEW YORK

NIACT

511

Origin

Info:

Re Israeli Non-Compliance, DELGA 490.

Confirming ^{Lodge-Wilcox} ~~Re: [unclear]~~ telephone conversation, please convey ^{674.84A} views contained DEPTTEL 507 to SYG. ^{X 12 320.5780}

Re Straits Tiran, we believe SYG's basis for stationing UNEF along coastal area is precisely fact that unless he does Egyptian and Israeli forces (i. Israeli Naval Units now in Gulf Aqaba) will confront each other and hostile actions likely ensue and thus endanger cease-fire which UNEF under GA resolutions authorized secure and maintain.

We agree not practicable seek assurances from Egypt re free passage through Strait until after Israeli withdrawal. But we do not agree that Egyptian military reoccupation coastal area might take place in hope Egypt will not interfere freedom passage. Egyptian record affords no basis such hope and once Egyptian military forces in occupation we foresee great difficulties in later positioning UNEF there.

As indicated para 3 DEPTTEL 507 we prepared at appropriate time after Israeli withdrawal state US belief Gulf international waterway and freedom passage should be assured. We believe would be most unwise subject this issue which we believe covered by established international law, to political decision GA in present ^{674.84A} atmosphere.

Drafted by: ^{top} IC: UNF/SD/DePalma:kg/angw

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

IC: Francis O. Wilcox

Clearances:

NE-Mr. Rockwell

L/NA - Mr. Meeker (in substance)

G - Mr. Murphy

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS PROHIBITED.

674.84A/1-1157 CS/F

CONFIDENTIAL

674.84A/1-1157

Air Pouch
PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : Amconsul, Haifa

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

REF : Haifa Despatch #32 of December 21, 1956

DESP. NO.

January 11, 1957

DATE

67 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT
	REC'D	OFFER
NEA-4, EUR-7, OL-1-8, EUR-5, P-1 4/2 P-1, 4/6 1/8 CIA-12, USIA-10, CUB-2		

SUBJECT: Kafr Kassem Protest Strike Fails in Galilee

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL FILES

674.84A/1-1157

HCS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Communist efforts to incite a sympathy strike in Galilee for the victims of the Kafr Kassem incident failed over the weekend of January 5th. A carefully staged meeting to plan the strike had been held in the house of Arab lawyer, Elias KOUSSA, in Haifa on December 27, 1956 to organize a protest against the military trials of the border police involved in the Kafr Kassem incident. Announcement of the meeting was prepared and printed on the Communist press of Haifa listing a group of some thirty-three Communists and non-Communists alike who called for the strike. It has since been learned, however, that a number of the prominent non-Communists listed in the announcement had not in fact been present at the meeting. Among the latter were the Moslem religious Kadi of Acre, Sheikh Musa TABARI and Khalil KHOURY, member of the Nazareth Municipality. The announcement had requested all Arabs in Israel to consider Sunday, January 6th as a day of general strike and of prayer for the dead. It was stated further that there would be a general prayer meeting at 12 noon at the Jazzar Mosque in Acre. The attempted strike was deflated in large part by Musa Tabari on the "advise" of the Moslem Public Committee of Haifa whose members are considered to be loyal to Haifa's mayor. On Friday afternoon, January 4th, a hurried announcement was printed for the Islamic Committee of Acre stating that prayers in memory of the dead of Kafr Kassem had already taken place that day since it was the regular Moslem day of prayer and that the Mosque would be closed on Sunday. A second announcement was circulated on Saturday over the names of the Kadi, the Imnam and the religious secretaries accusing the Communist Party of intending to hold a political rally at the Jazzar Mosque, denying attendance at the meeting in Koussa's home and proclaiming that Communists would never be allowed to meet at the Mosque in Acre.

On the appointed day in both Nazareth and Acre no disturbances took place and there was little evidence of strike activity. In

ERCowles:mpm
REPORTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

1957 JAN 22

MESSAGE
NEA

Page 2 of
Des. No. 34
From Haifa

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Classification)

Page _____ of
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

Nazareth a brief mourning parade took place attended for the most part by the police cadets from the Shafr Amr police school who were disbursed in force throughout Nazareth. Newspaper reports indicate that only about 100 persons showed up in Acre for a Communist protest meeting while in both towns the only shops to close were those owned by Christians, and these are normally closed on Sundays anyway.

Leonard R. Cowles
American Consul

cc:Amembassy, Tel Aviv

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

17

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

January 11, 1957

S/S. mc

THE SECRETARY

Attached for your approval is the redraft of the telegram on Israeli withdrawal discussed at the meeting in your office yesterday. The new draft incorporates a change in paragraphs 2B and C about the strength of UNEF forces; it now provides that these are to be in a strength to be determined by General Burns. It was my understanding that at the meeting you thought the strength should be agreed between the SYG and General Burns.

The end of the telegram, particularly paragraphs 2F and 3 have been redrafted in the light of the discussion yesterday and language has been added to indicate that we would not support the sanctions against Israel as long as Egypt is in "default" of UN resolutions. This is somewhat more limited language than ~~that~~ discussed yesterday along the lines that we would not apply sanctions against one party in the dispute who might be in violation of UN resolutions as long as both parties are in violation.

Joseph N. Greene, Jr.

DC/K
Anal <u>68</u>
Rev _____
Cat _____

MAR 6 - 1957

FILED

074.844/1-1157

C/S/J

674.844

1-1157

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

**This Document must be Returned
to the RM/P Central Files**

UNCLASSIFIED

Action
NEA

Info

RMR

32

G

51

C

EUR.

L

I

UMSA

E

P

UOP

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

DCI

ICA

Control: 6986
Rec'd: JANUARY 12, 1957
7:09 AM

1957

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 836, JANUARY 12

SENT DEPARTMENT 836, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 169, PARIS 145, CAIRO 148, BEIRUT 129, DAMASCUS 97, AMMAN 144, NEW YORK 33.

HAARETZ (INDEPENDENT) IN JANUARY 11 EDITORIAL TAKES FIRM POSITION AGAINST WITHDRAWAL FROM TIRAN STRAITS OR GAZA WITHOUT ADEQUATE GUARANTEES. IT SAID ISRAEL SHOULD BE PREPARED TO FACE UP TO CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH STAND, INCLUDING IF NECESSARY SACRIFICE OF US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. ELEMENTS ISRAEL PRESS EXCEPTING COMMUNISTS, ARE TAKING SIMILAR POSITIONS. HAARETZ EXCERPTS FOLLOW

"WELL INFORMED CIRCLES EXPECT SERIOUS CRISIS IN ISRAEL-US RELATIONS. THEY BASE THEIR FORECAST ON APPRAISAL OF REPERCUSSIONS OF ISRAEL'S REFUSAL TO VACATE GAZA STRIP AND TIRAN STRAITS WITHOUT GUARANTEES. US INSISTS ON REALIZATION OF THAT PART OF UN RESOLUTIONS IN SINAI DEMANDING WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES BEHIND ARMISTICE LINES, WHILE SHUTTING ITS EYES TO THOSE PARTS OF RESOLUTION DEMANDING, SAY, FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN CANAL. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT PARTIES ARE NOT PREPARED TO SHIFT FROM THEIR POSITIONS WHICH ARE SO SHARPLY CONTRADICTORY THAT GAP BETWEEN THEM SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE TO BRIDGE.

IT IS RATHER OPTIMISTIC TO EXPECT CRISIS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND US ONLY. UN MAY IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON ISRAEL, WHICH ISRAEL WILL NOT BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND OWING TO THEIR "GENERALITY." IT IS AGAINST SUCH A RESOLUTION THAT ISRAEL IS TRYING TO ENLIST SUPPORT OF SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF UN MEMBER STATES TO PREVENT TWO THIRDS RESOLUTION AGAINST ISRAEL. IN ABSENCE OF SUCH MAJORITY RESOLUTION, UN WILL NOT BE ABLE TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS ON ISRAEL AND ISRAEL WILL FIND HERSELF FACE TO FACE WITH US, WHICH IS MOST LIKELY MAIN FORCE BEHIND HAMMARSKJOLD WANTED TO IMPOSE ON ISRAEL WHAT UN CANNOT.

CIRCLES EXPECTING THIS CRISIS ADD THAT IT WILL MAINLY

PERMANENT

UNCLASSIFIED

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken. **COPY IS PROHIBITED.**

**"UNLESS 'UNCLASSIFIED'
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.**

674.84A/1-1257

C.A.A

6/4.8-1-1257

UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 836, JANUARY 12, FROM TEL AVIV

ASSUME FORM OF ECONOMIC PRESSURE BY US. THIS PRESSURE WILL BE EXPRESSED IN PRECLUSION OF ECONOMIC AID AND GRANTS AND NONSALE OF AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES. THEY ALSO VISUALIZE POSSIBILITY OF US OBSTRUCTING ISRAEL PURCHASE IN AMERICAN AND OTHER MARKETS AND WILL HAMPER ISRAEL'S EFFORTS IN OBTAINING CREDIT FROM BANKS UNDER US INFLUENCE.

ONLY BLIND WILL DENY ADVANTAGE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STABILIZATION. WORLD HAS BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO REGARD ISRAEL AS "PENSIONNAIRE" OF US, A PEOPLE WITHOUT WILL AND SELF-RESPECT, PUPPET HAVING TO DANCE TO THE TUNE OF US PIPER. THIS MAY WELL BE ONE OF MAJOR CAUSES FOR OBSTACLES AND DIFFICULTIES IN ISRAEL'S EFFORTS TO BREAK THROUGH HER ISOLATION. IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA AND PERHAPS ALSO OF SOVIET BLOC, WILL SEE ISRAEL DIFFERENT LIGHT WHEN SHE IS PREPARED TO SACRIFICE ECONOMIC AID TO MAINTAIN INTERESTS OF ECONOMY AND SECURITY CONCERNING THE HOLDING OF GAZA STRIP AND TIRAN STRAITS. POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, IF FOUNDED ON READINESS FOR SACRIFICES OF ALL KINDS, MAY INCREASE ISRAEL'S PRESTIGE IN INTERNATIONAL ARENA - NOT TO MENTION US.

LAWSON

JS

UNCLASSIFIED

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

This Document must be Returned
to RM/R Central Files

674.84A/1-1257

CAA

CONFIDENTIAL

35-H

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

IO

USUN

P

UOP

O

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 839, JANUARY 12, 2 PM

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 839 REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT AMMAN 146,
BEIRUT 131, CAIRO 150, DAMASCUS 99, LONDON 171.

DEPARTMENT TELEGRAM 689.

RECONNAISSANCE OF JORDAN BORDER BY UNITED STATES ARMY ATTACHE 3 DAYS AGO WHICH WOULD HAVE COINCIDED WITH JORDANIAN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS ON WHICH UNITED NATIONS COMPLAINT BASED REVEALED NO IDF CONCENTRATION THERE. SIMILAR OBSERVATION MADE BY BRITISH MILITARY ATTACHE JANUARY 10. NO UNUSUAL IDF ACTIVITY OBSERVED ELSEWHERE AND IDF STRENGTH BELIEVED AT LOW PEACE TIME LEVEL OF 55,000 WITH ONLY CALL-UPS BEING THOSE WHO HAVE NOT HAD ACTIVE DUTY IN PAST 6 MONTHS. IF ANY LARGE SCALE MILITARY OPERATION PLANNED IDF WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY INCREASE STRENGTH TO BACK UP OPERATION. IDF VERY LIBERAL IN GRANTING SABBATH LEAVES THIS WEEKEND. UNUSUALLY HEAVY RAINS DURING PAST FEW DAYS AND STILL CONTINUING WOULD MAKE MILITARY MOVEMENT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT. ANY SUBSTANTIAL ACTIVITY ON PART OF IDF WOULD REQUIRE BOTH CALL-UP AND TROOP MOVEMENT WHICH WOULD BE EASILY OBSERVABLE. SUCH WOULD BE NECESSARY BECAUSE IDF KNOWN JORDANIAN TROOPS NOW STATIONED ON BORDER ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY WELL TRAINED ARAB LEGION NOT WEAKER NATIONAL GUARD PREVIOUSLY THERE.

EMBASSY BELIEVES GOI HAS NO INTENTION EMBARKING ON MILITARY ADVENTURE THIS TIME. IT FULLY AWARE OF ISOLATION RESULTING FROM SANI CAMPAIGN AND NOW BENDING ALL EFFORTS ACHIEVE ITS MINIMUM SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (EMBASSY TELEGRAM 812 AND PREVIOUS) BY POLITICAL MEANS.

Control: 7076
Rec'd: JANUARY 12, 1957
10:21 AMMESSAGE CENTER
NEA
JAN 12 1957
10:21 AM

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 839, JANUARY 12, 2 PM FROM TEL AVIV

FURTHER RECONNAISSANCE JORDAN BORDER NOW BEING MADE BY UNITED STATES ATTACHES. RESULTS WILL BE CABLED NIACT.

LAWSON

VMM

CONFIDENTIAL

16
INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

674.84a/1-1257

CONFIDENTIAL

35-H

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

P

UOP

O

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv
TO: Secretary of State

NO: 840, January 12, 2 p.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 840; REPEATED INFORMATION NIACT AMMAN 147,
BEIRUT 132, CAIRO 151, DAMASCUS 100, LONDON 172.

Re EMBTEL 839.

Further reconnaissance Jordan border negative results.

LAWSON

LMS:VMM/12

Control: 7037
Rec'd: January 12, 1957
9:10 a.m.

COPY

674.84A/1-1257

HBS

This copy has been designated
the RECORD COPY. It must be
returned to RM/R for filing.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

JUN 26 1957

674.84a/1-1257

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

IO

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

NEA

L

E

R

O

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 496, JANUARY 12 6 PM

Control: 7218

Rec'd: JANUARY 12, 1957



PRIORITY.

REFERENCE ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS. DEPTELS 507, 511

LODGE ORALLY AND IN AN INFORMAL MEMORANDUM CONVEYED SUBSTANCE OF DEPTELS 507 AND 511 TO HAMMARSKJOLD SATURDAY AFTERNOON.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID IT WAS A "TWLL ORDER". AND HE WOULD HAVE TO STUDY OUR VIEWS BEFORE RESPONDING TO OUR SUGGESTIONS. HE WAS SURE OF ONE THING. HE SAID, THAT WHAT WE ASK TO BE DONE CAN NOT BE DONE IN TIME TO HEAD OFF PROPOSED ARAB-ASIAN ACTION. ARABS HAVE ALREADY ASKED INFORMALLY FOR MEETING, AND HE DOUBTED MEETING WOULD BE AVOIDED.

HAMMARSKJOLD THEN SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE SOME GENERAL POINTS. HE SAID IT WAS VERY EASY TO BE FORCEFUL AND "WRECK THE WHOLE SHOW", BUT IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO PLAY IT QUIETLY AS HE DID DURING HIS NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE FREEING OF AMERICAN PRISONERS IN CHINA.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE IS IN PROCESS SHARPENING ISSUES WITH FAWZI, HE HAS PUSHED FAWZI HARD. AND BEFORE FAWZI HAS EXERCISED HIS INFLUENCE IN CAIRO. HE SAID THAT EGYPTIANS ARE TAKING EXTREMELY HARD POSITION ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. EGYPTIANS ARE MAINTAINING THEY CANNOT NEGOTIATE CANAL SETTLEMENTS UNTIL ISRAELI ARE OUT OF SINAI. EGYPTIANS SEE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AS CORRECTION OF A LEGAL SITUATION. MOREOVER, THEY DO NOT BELIEVE SETTLEMENT QUESTION IS COMPARABLE TO QUESTION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THEY MAINTAIN CANAL SETTLEMENT IS NOT AN-ISOLATED ISSUE. THEY LINK CANAL SETTLEMENT. THOUGH NOT AS PRECONDITION, WITH THE QUESTION OF LIFTING OF EMBARGO ON ITS ASSETS AND THE QUESTION OF WAR DAMAGES. HAMMARSKJOLD SEES THE UNFREEZING OF ASSETS AS A CONSEQUENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED

674.84A/1-1257

PA

674.84A/1-1257

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DELGA 496, JANUARY 12 6 PM FROM NEW YORK

CONSEQUENCE OF SETTLEMENT.) HAMMARSKJOLD STRESSED THAT EGYPTIANS WANT ASSURANCE THAT QUESTION OF UNFREEZING ASSETS AND WAR DAMAGES BE INCLUDED AS PART OF BASIC SETTLEMENT SUEZ PROBLEM.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE ASKED EGYPTIANS WHETHER HE SHOULD INTERPRET THEIR INITIATIVE IN GA RE WAR DAMAGES AS DESIRE ON THEIR PART TO HAVE SYG TAKE INITIATIVE IN GETTING FOUR PARTIES TOGETHER TO DISCUSS MATTER. FAWZI HAS REFUSED TO FORMALIZE THIS REQUEST BECAUSE THIS IN EFFECT WOULD MEAN WRITING OFF THE RESOLUTION ON WAR DAMAGES ALREADY SUBMITTED, THOUGH NOT PRESSED, IN GA. FAWZI HAS CONFIRMED ORALLY, HOWEVER, TO HAMMARSKJOLD EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO DROP GA ACTION IF SYG CAN MAKE PROGRESS ON WAR DAMAGES ISSUES.

DURING COURSE CONVERSATION, HAMMARSKJOLD EMPHASIZED DELICACY AND COMPLEXITY OF NEGOTIATIONS HE IS PURSUING. HE WOULD THINK OVER POINTS RAISED IN DEPTELS 507 AND 511 AND LET US KNOW.

LODGE

SGC

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

SECRET

32-36

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

USUN

E

R

O

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 843, January 14, 5 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 843, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 173, PARIS 147,
USUN 35, CAIRO 152, BEIRUT 133, DAMASCUS 101, AMMAN 48,
JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED.

NOFORN

As anticipated in EMBTEL 837, Israel's security requirements for Gaza Strip and Tiran Straits were principal preoccupation Sunday's Cabinet session though tight secrecy was clamped on conclusion. Foreign Ministry official told Embassy government had decided to "make its position very clear but move with great caution" (Embassy officer questioned him closely as to import his description of decision and obtained impression GOI means to hold deterrment by to minimum kegeschse* but attempt to put least possible strain on its important relationships, particularly US). He added on highly confidential off-the-record basis that government is prepared to tell Hammarskjold IDF will withdraw behind international frontier immediately except for Gaza Strip and Sharm E-Sheikh. He thought it likely as next step that in day or two GOI for first time would produce concrete proposals as to how "effective" guarantees sought by Israel could be realized.

This is consistent with today's JERUSALEM POST report that "Cabinet discussed what consequences might follow if such decision (to remain in Sharm E-Sheikh pending receipt of guarantees) were made. There is also reason to believe government decided to leave itself "room for maneuvering" and demurred from adopting any position from which it could not, under any circumstance, consider new moves". POST said meeting was "difficult" but that there were no major disagreements or splits.

ACHDUT AVODA S LAMERHAV on other hand said that decision to resist had been definitely taken. It said, "despite news blackout on Cabinet session, well informed circles assume government was unanimous in deciding to withstand pressure on two points considered

SECRET

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

FM 674.84A/1-1457

NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

1957 JAN 16 PM 4 11

Control: 9050

Rec'd: January 16 1957 7:00 a.m.

DB

VOID COPY ATTACHED

VOID COPY ATTACHED

SECRET

SECRET

-2- 843, January 14, 5 p.m. from: Tel Aviv

points considered of primary importance for safety and development of state: Free navigation Eilat Gulf and preventing Gaza strip again becoming aggression base.

KHISIS interpreted to mean "Israel will not evacuate Sharm E-Sheikh before guarantees are received for free navigation there and that she will oppose both return Egyptians to Gaza strip and UN administration of the strip".

Foreign Ministry official mentioned above and there was no real purpose in attempting to penetrate Cabinet's secrecy because decision taken would become public property within very few days, either at Meir's next interview with Hammarskjold which GOI apparently anticipates must, by Hammarskjold's choice, follow very shortly here return to New York today, or as disclosed in UN consideration Afro-Asia demand for sanctions against Israel if she fails to evacuate immediately.

Comment: In Embassy's view, GOI may well resist to limit its political strength demands Israel should withdraw from these two critical points in absence effective guarantees. US economic sanctions of kind envisaged by Under Secretary in comments he made to Shiloah when supplying him with copy President's November letter might prevail on Ben Gurion to withdraw GS dau* has some reservations as to whether these would be enough especially with regard to Tiran Straits, unless Ben Gurion thinks present disposition Israeli Navy in Gulf is sufficient to thwart any Egyptian effort to recover by other than major show of force. It will be recalled that in his latest conversation with me, Ben Gurion said if Nasser tries to re-establish blockade "we will have to start shooting" (EMBTel 812).

Israel public is well-conditioned to receive initial impact of such decision. All press, except Communists, is incessantly proclaiming necessity of holding fast unless guarantees are received, and is trying to persuade public that any resultant penalties must be borne. No dissenting voice has been raised.

LAWSON

JAK:DB:14

*As received. Correction to follow.

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

32-36

SECRET

CORRECTION ISSUED:
1/18/57 1:40 p.m. MSAction
NEA

Control: 9050

Rec'd: January 16, 1957
7 a.m.Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv -- CORRECTED COPY

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 843, January 14, 5 p.m.

G

SP

C

PRIORITY

EUR

L

IO

USUN

E

R

O

SENT DEPARTMENT 843; REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 173, PARIS 147,
USUN 35, CAIRO 152, BEIRUT 133, DAMASCUS 101, AMMAN 48,
JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED

NOFORN

As anticipated in EMBTEL 837, Israel's security requirements for Gaza Strip and Tiran Straits were principal preoccupation Sunday's Cabinet session though tight secrecy was clamped on conclusion. Foreign Ministry official told Embassy government had decided to "make its position very clear but move with great caution" (Embassy officer questioned him closely as to import his description of decision and obtained impression GOI means to hold determinedly to minimum requirements but attempt to put least possible strain on its important relationships, particularly US). He added on highly confidential off-the-record basis that government is prepared to tell Hammarskjold IDF will withdraw behind international frontier immediately except for Gaza Strip and Sharm E-Sheikh. He thought it likely as next step that in day or two GOI for first time would produce concrete proposals as to how "effective" guarantees sought by Israel could be realized.

This is consistent with today's JERUSALEM POST report that "Cabinet discussed what consequences might follow if such decision (to remain in Sharm E-Sheikh pending receipt of guarantees) were made. There is also reason to believe government decided to leave itself "room for maneuvering" and demurred from adopting any position from which it could not, under any circumstance, consider new moves". POST said meeting was "difficult" but that there were no major disagreements or splits.

ACHDUT AVODA S LAMERHAV on other hand said that decision to resist had been definitely taken. It said, "despite news blackout on Cabinet session, well informed circles assume government was unanimous in deciding to withstand pressure on two points considered

Correction made
by RM/R

SECRET

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

This document must be returned
to the RM/R Central File

674.34A/1-1457

SECRET FILE

SECRET

-2- 843, January 14, 5 p.m. from Tel Aviv

points considered of primary importance for safety and development of state: Free navigation Eilat Gulf and preventing Gaza strip again becoming aggression base.

KHISIS interpreted to mean "Israel will not evacuate Sharm E-Sheikh before guarantees are received for free navigation there and that she will oppose both return Egyptians to Gaza strip and UN administration of the strip."

Foreign Ministry official mentioned above said there was no real purpose in attempting to penetrate Cabinet's secrecy because decision taken would become public property within very few days, either at Meir's next interview with Hammarskjold which GOI apparently anticipates must, by Hammarskjold's choice, follow very shortly here return to New York today, or as disclosed in UN consideration Afro-Asia demand for sanctions against Israel if she fails to evacuate immediately.

Comment: In Embassy's view, GOI may well resist to limit its political strength demands Israel should withdraw from these two critical points in absence effective guarantees. US economic sanctions of kind envisaged by Under Secretary in comments he made to Shiloah when supplying him with copy President's November letter might prevail on Ben Gurion to withdraw but Embassy has some reservations as to whether these would be enough especially with regard to Tiran Straits, unless Ben Gurion thinks present disposition Israeli Navy in Gulf is sufficient to thwart any Egyptian effort to recover by other than major show of force. It will be recalled that in his latest conversation with me, Ben Gurion said if Nasser tries to re-establish blockade "we will have to start shooting." (EMBTel 812).

Israel public is well-conditioned to receive initial impact of such decision. All press, except Communists, is incessantly proclaiming necessity of holding fast unless guarantees are received, and is trying to persuade public that any resultant penalties must be borne. No dissenting voice has been raised.

LAWSON

JAK:RAP/7

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

47

Action
IOInfo
RMRSS
G
SP
C
EUR
NEA
L
E
R
OBUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION
CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE CENTER

Control: 8041

Rec'd: JANUARY 14, 1957
11:06 PM

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 502, JANUARY 14, 9 PM

PRIORITY

RE: PALESTINE: ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

EBAN (ISRAEL) CALLED AT HIS REQUEST, PRIOR TO SEEING SYG THIS AFTERNOON, TO REPORT ON STATUS OF WITHDRAWALS FROM SINAI. EBAN SAID BY 22ND JAN ISRAELI FORCES WILL BE ENTIRELY OUT OF SINAI, AND "UNEF WILL BE UP TO EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI FRONTIER", EXCEPT FOR SHARM EL SHEIKH. WITH REGARD TO IT AND GAZA, ISRAEL IS PREPARED DISCUSS WITH SYG A SETTLEMENT ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS THOSE TWO AREAS.

OF THESE TWO REMAINING PROBLEMS, ISRAEL WISHED DEFER QUESTION GAZA FOR TIME BEING SINCE IT TOO INTRICATE MATTER, INVOLVING POPULATION OF 300,000 WHEREAS SHARM EL SHEIKH HAD NO PEOPLE AND INVOLVED ONLY JURIDICAL PROBLEMS.

REGARDING SHARM EL SHEIKH, EBAN SAID MANY DELEGATIONS HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST AND CONCERN FOR PROBLEMS INVOLVED THERE, PARTICULARLY "SHIVERING EUROPEANS" WHOSE "ONLY JUGULAR VEIN" LIES IN HANDS NASSER. NOW "SECOND LUNG" IS BECOMING REALITY, IN THAT EIGHT INCH PIPELINE WILL BE OPEN FROM AQABA TO BEERSHEBA IN MATTER OF DAYS, AND THROUGH TO MEDITERRANEAN AT ASCALON IN MATTER OF WEEKS; SIXTEEN INCH LINE NOW BEING DISCUSSED AND 32-INCH ONE IS ULTIMATE "VISION", WHICH WOULD CARRY 20 MILLION TONS OIL ANNUALLY. THIS DEVELOPMENT WILL BE PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL RELIEF TO EUROPEANS, ACCORDING TO EBAN, SINCE IT GIVES ALTERNATIVE TO SUEZ, NO ONE STATE THEREAFTER HAVING MONOPOLY, AND PRINCIPAL SOURCE TENSION BETWEEN ARABS AND WEST THEREBY REMOVED. ISRAEL HE SAID, IS DETERMINED NOT REPEAT MISTAKE OF 1954, AND WILL NOT WITHDRAW UNTIL THERE ARE ADEQUATE ASSURANCES WHICH PROTECT GENUINE INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS.

EBAN SAID

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES

074.34A/1-1457 R1074.844/1-1457

Confidential File

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DELGA 502, JANUARY 14, 9 PM, FROM NEW YORK

EBAN SAID PRESENCE OF UNEF WILL ENABLE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT RESUMPTION OF ARAB BLOCKADE WHICH LATTER RADIO CAIRO ALREADY THREATENING TODAY IN ITS BROADCASTS.

AS FOR WAY IN WHICH SOLVE AQABA PROBLEM, EBAN NOTED SECRETARY HAD AGREED AS TO INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF GULF OF AQABA, AND ALSO AGREED WAYS AND MEANS SHOULD BE SOUGHT TO TRY TO ASSURE THIS. HE PLANS GIVE SHORT WRITTEN STATEMENT TO SYG THIS AFTERNOON INDICATING FURTHER INTENTIONS ON WITHDRAWAL AND STATING WILLINGNESS DISCUSS ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM REMAINING AREAS. STATEMENT WOULD NOT PUT CONDITIONS BUT OUTLINE PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH REMAINING AREAS.

IN RESPONSE EBAN'S QUESTION AS TO WHAT MIGHT BE DONE, I TOLD HIM IT WOULD BE HARD GET TWO-THIRDS VOTE UNLESS IT WAS FOR A REPORT BY SYG, WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE WAY OUT FOR THEM. EBAN AGREED BUT SAID HAMMARSKJOLD LEERY OF TAKING STAND ON "CONTROVERSIAL ISSUE". EBAN WOULD POINT OUT TO SYG THERE ARE PRECEDENTS IN THIS VERY MATTER FOR SYG'S DOING SO, AND THERE IS PLENTY OF AUTHORITY WITHIN JURISPRUDENCE ALREADY EXISTING.

EBAN THEN GAVE ME DRAFT (CONTAINED DELGA 503) AS BASIS FOR REPORT WHICH THEY HOPE SYG MIGHT ISSUE FOR GA APPROVAL AND WHICH WOULD BRING ABOUT SOLUTION THEY SEEK. GIST WOULD BE THAT UNEF HAS, AS PART OF ITS AUTHORITY, TO PREVENT RESUMPTION HOSTILITIES AND FURTHER BELLIGERENT ACTS. IT SHOULD THEREFORE BE STATIONED IN SHARM EL SHEIKH "UNTIL ANOTHER EFFECTIVE MEANS IS AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED FOR ENSURING PERMANENT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND THE ABSENCE OF BELLIGERENT ACTS IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE GULF OF AQABA. SUCH EFFECTIVE MEANS MAY BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN FOUND WHEN A PEACE SETTLEMENT IS ACHIEVED; OR WHEN SECURE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IS GUARANTEED BY INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS." (E.G., HE SAID, BETWEEN INTERESTED MARITIME POWERS; BY USERS OF GULF, BY LITTORAL POWERS, OR EVEN BY US GUARANTEE ALONE. THERE WOULD EVEN BE POSSIBILITY OF AGREEMENT TO DEMILITARIZE SINAI.)

EBAN IS NOT GIVING PAPER TO SYG. HE EXPRESSED HOPE US WOULD SUGGEST SYG ADOPT PAPER AS HIS OWN AND SEEK CONVINCE HIM OF MERITS THIS SOLUTION. RAFAEL DOUBTED ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT ANY LESS SPECIFIC LANGUAGE. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION REVEALED ISRAEL HOPES OFFER FURTHER PLAN ON GAZA, BUT ONLY LATER. THEY FEEL IF GA

WILL ADOPT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- DELGA 502, JANUARY 14, 9 PM, FROM NEW YORK

WILL ADOPT THIS EXTENSION OF UNEF'S FUNCTIONS, INCLUDING DURATION, IT WILL BE EASIER GET GA APPROVAL FOR SOMETHING SIMILAR INVOLVING UNEF IN GAZA. WE POINTED OUT THAT IF SYG INCLUDED ABOVE SUGGESTED PARAGRAPHS IN HIS REPORT, THIS TOGETHER WITH NO ACTION ON GAZA, COULD WELL PRODUCE SUFFICIENT OBJECTIONS IN DEBATE TO PREVENT ANYTHING BEING ACCOMPLISHED. RAFAEL ARGUED STRONGLY FOR LINE THAT IT WOULD BE EASIER TACKLE GAZA LATER, BUT EBAN SAW SOME MERIT IN OUR ARGUMENT THAT IN CONTEXT IMMINENT GA DEBATE ON WITHDRAWAL, THEY MIGHT GET FURTHER IF THEY ALSO HAD SOMETHING TO OFFER ON GAZA. HE IMPLIED THEY WOULD HAVE SOMETHING LATER ON THIS WEEK, AND HOPED IN ANY EVENT DEBATE IN GA COULD BE HELD OFF AS LONG AS POSSIBLE.

I SAID WE WOULD STUDY HIS IDEAS CAREFULLY.

IT IS CLEAR THAT ISRAELIS KNOW THEY WILL NOT BE ABLE CONVINCE HAMMARSKJOLD TO ADD THIS LANGUAGE TO HIS REPORT AND THAT THEY HOPE US WOULD PUT FORWARD AND CONVINCE HIM. THIS WAS CONFIRMED BY SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS WITH KIDRON WHO SAID THAT WHAT HAMMARSKJOLD NOW NEEDS IS FORMULA OR FORM OF WORDS. KIDRON SAID HE FELT SYG WAS SHYING OFF FROM ACCEPTING RESPONSIBILITY OF PROPOSING MEANS FOR RESOLVING THESE ISSUES. KIDRON POINTED TO URGENCY OUR PRESENTING SYG WITH FORM OF WORDS SINCE HE PLANS ISSUE REPORT ON WEDNESDAY.

PLEASE INSTRUCT.

LODGE

PLH

CONFIDENTIAL

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation

674,84A/1-1457Tel Delga 503

Date

1/14/57

From

New York

To

SecState

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:




Security-Classified Information



Otherwise Restricted Information

State
Authority1/4/89
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE



CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 14, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal; Fedayeen Raids; Cairo Press Attack on United States; Egypt's Claim for Damages; United States Economic Measures Against Egypt; Tri-Partite Declaration.

PARTICIPANTS: Dr. Ahmed Hussein, the Egyptian Ambassador
William M. Rountree, NEA
Ambassador Raymond A. Hare
Maurice S. Rice, NE

COPIES TO: NEA (3cc) S/S (2cc) ✓
NE (2cc) AmEmbassy, Cairo (2cc) ✓
OLI (1cc)
IO (2cc)
E (1cc) ✓
G (1cc) ✓

37R

9

JAN 18 1957

Israeli Withdrawal - Ambassador Hussein, who called at his request, said that after discussions with "Cairo" and Foreign Minister Fawzi in New York, he had been instructed to state that while the Egyptian Government is aware that the United States Government is trying to get Israel to withdraw its forces from Egypt it now asks that more pressure be exerted because Israel is displaying increasing reluctance to do so. The continued presence of the Israelis in Egypt creates a tense situation which makes discussion and negotiation difficult. Israel is exaggerating the fedayeen activities and is making damaging propaganda. Mr. Rountree said the United States position continues to be that the Israelis should withdraw and expressed the hope that the movement can proceed more rapidly.

Fedayeen Raids - Ambassador Hare, who joined the group at this point, said that during a conversation last Wednesday, President Nasser had stated that he had told Egyptian officials and the Jordanians that fedayeen activities were harmful. Mr. Rountree said that it was in Egypt's interest that the raids be stopped because they jeopardize Egypt's case. Ambassador Hussein said that he had urged Nasser eight days ago to use his friendly influence on the other Arab states to cease the raids.

Cairo Press Attack on United States - Ambassador Hare then mentioned a news item he had just seen which reported anti-American attacks in the Cairo press, apparently sparked by remarks which the Secretary allegedly had made about Egypt's economy. Mr. Rountree stated that on Friday the Secretary commented on the damage to the economies of several Near East countries including Egypt--resulting from recent developments, but that he had not singled out Egypt on any specific point.

CONFIDENTIAL

GPO 912677

674.84A/1-1457
JAN 18 1957
CONFIDENTIAL
FILED
JAN 18 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Egypt's Claim For Damages - Ambassador Hussein then said that Egypt hopes the United States will support its claim for damages suffered during the hostilities. Mr. Rountree said that the United States had not taken a position on this problem which could raise the question of damages suffered by both sides. Ambassador Hussein then inquired as to whether the United States might not agree to the formation of a neutral committee to study the claims of both sides. Mr. Rountree replied that while such a step might be possible, the United States had not arrived at a position on the question.

United States Economic Measures Against Egypt - Ambassador Hussein stated that the Government of Egypt hopes the United States will change its attitude on the economic measures it has taken against Egypt and suggested that a "second look" at the situation might call for a new position. Mr. Rountree replied that the United States acted after Egypt's seizure of the Canal and that we do not feel the measures can be reversed so long as the original problem remains. It is in Egypt's interest to help solve the controversy over the Suez Canal. Now that the Canal clearance is proceeding, the next step must be to find some basis for agreement on how the Canal can be operated. Ambassador Hussein said his personal view was that it would be regrettable if the impression were given or exploited that the United States is putting economic pressure on Egypt and asked for a reconsideration of the United States policy in connection with the President's new plan for the Near East. Mr. Rountree agreed that we do not want to give such an impression. However, we are disturbed over the Suez Canal problem. We were encouraged to believe that Egypt desires that it be solved and we know the other interested countries share that desire. We hope negotiations toward that end will be pursued promptly. Ambassador Hussein said he shared Dr. Fawzi's opinion that the sooner the Israelis complete their withdrawal, the sooner Egypt can concentrate on the Suez problem. In connection with the President's new plan, a fresh approach to Egypt would seem appropriate, Ambassador Hussein repeated. Mr. Rountree said the new plan does not involve imposing pressures in the Near East but seeks to cooperate with the countries in solving their problems. No government is more desirous of cooperating with Egypt than the United States but Egypt must help show its willingness to cooperate.

Tri-Partite Declaration - Ambassador Hussein then asked how the new Near East plan affects the Tri-Partite Declaration. Mr. Rountree explained that the new policy does not envisage intervention in cases of local aggression and that our attitude toward aggression which does not involve Communist aggression remains unchanged. The Declaration was not a treaty or an agreement but three unilateral statements by the United States, the United Kingdom and France. We invoked the Declaration when Israel attacked Egypt, at the same time asking the United Kingdom and France to join us. That they declined has not affected our stated attitude under the Declaration. The United Kingdom and France have not made clear their present position on the Declaration.

NEA:NE:MSRice:bjk 1/15/57

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 14, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Request for U.S. Views on Free Passage
Through Strait of Tiran

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Zev Argaman, Minister Counselor, Embassy of Israel

Mr. Francis O. Wilcox, Assistant Secretary
Mr. James Ludlow, NEA
Mr. Samuel DePalma, UNP

COPIES TO: RM/R ✓
USUN
NEA
L
IO
UNP
OLI

Mr. Argaman called at his request to say that Ambassador Eban expected to see the Secretary General shortly concerning further Israeli withdrawals and that before he did so he wished to be informed as to whether we had reached any conclusion concerning the Israeli position with regard to free passage through the Strait of Tiran.

Mr. Wilcox indicated that he was not in a position to convey any definite U.S. views on this matter but that the Department had informed Ambassador Lodge of the representations made by the Israeli Embassy here and that Ambassador Lodge had discussed the general question of Israeli withdrawals with the Secretary General last Saturday. He added that he had not seen any report as to the Secretary General's reaction.

Mr. Argaman said that he would advise Ambassador Eban to consult with Ambassador Lodge before he sees the Secretary General. He also reported that he had received official information from his government with respect to the reported Saudi Arabian firing upon an Israeli ship near the Strait of Tiran. His information was to the effect that the Israeli vessel had not initiated the firing, nor had it fired in return.

IO:UNP:SDePalma:rs

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

This Document Must Be Returned to
RM/R
Central
Files

674.84A/1-1457

674.84A/1-1457
CS/R

FILED
MAR 8 - 1957

475 Avenue
Central
Files
February 18 1957

My dear Mr. [illegible]

I respectfully urge our
Government to include the
Egyptian Jews in our refugee
program.

Sincerely,
Florence Weiner

574.84A/1-1457

PUBLIC SERVICES DIV.
PCB

1957 JAN 17 4 37 PM '57

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEB 18 1957

FILED

Sub

674.84A/1-1457
CS/R

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL

47

Action IO *UNA / G am on*

JAN 15 1957

Control: 8834

Rec'd:

JANUARY 15, 1957
11:07 PM

Info

FROM: USUN NEW YORK

MESSAGE CENTER

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: DELGA 511, JANUARY 15, 7 PM

G

SP

C

EUR

NEA

LE

R

O

PRIORITY

VERBATIM TEXT

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

DCL

FAWZI (EGYPT) SAW ME AND ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON FOLLOWING RESOLUTION WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE TABLED AT OUTSET OF PLENARY MEETING ON THURSDAY. FAWZI SAID HE HAD AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TIME KEEPING CAIRO QUIET ON THIS MATTER IN VIEW OF FACT THAT DESTRUCTION IS CONTINUING IN SINAI, AS WELL AS KILLING OF EGYPTIAN PEOPLE. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THERE WOULD BE BROAD SUPPORT ON THE GA RESOLUTION, INCLUDING US.

QUOTE

THE GA,

RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 997 (ES-1) OF 2 NOV. 1956, 998 (ES-1) OF 4 NOV. 1956, 999 (ES-1) OF 4 NOV. 1956, 1002 (ES-1) OF 7 NOV. 1956, AND A/RES/410 OF 24 NOV. 1956.

NOTING WITH GRAVE REGRET AND CONCERN THE FAILURE OF ISRAEL TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED RESOLUTIONS,

1. CONDEMNS THE NON-COMPLIANCE OF ISRAEL WITH THE SAID RESOLUTIONS,

2. CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES BEHIND THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES (WITHIN FIVE DAYS),

3. CALLS UPON ALL MEMBERS TO REFRAIN FROM GIVING ANY MILITARY, ECONOMIC OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL IN THE LIGHT OF THE

PROVISIONS

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

674.84A/1-1557

PA

MAY 28 1959

FILED

This document must be returned to the RM/R central files

674.84A/1-1557

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DELGA 511, JANUARY 15, 7 PM FROM USUN, NEW YORK

PROVISIONS OF THE AFOREMENTIONED RESOLUTIONS,

4. REQUESTS THE SYG TO REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. UNQTE

WITH RESPECT TO SUEZ CANAL ISSUE, HE SAID THEY WERE READY TO TALK ABOUT IT BUT NOT WHILE EGYPTIAN TERRITORY WAS OCCUPIED, EGYPTIAN PEOPLE KILLED AND INSTALLATIONS DESTROYED. THERE WERE TWO OTHER QUESTIONS LINKED WITH THIS MATTER; NAMELY, COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES TO EGYPT AS WELL AS ENDING OF ECONOMIC MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST EGYPT. HE STRESSED THAT HIS OVER-ALL OBJECTIVE WAS TO CONVERT AREA FROM STRIFE TO CONSTRUCTIVE PEACE.

I CAUTIONED FAWZI NOT TO HURRY MATTER WITH RESPECT TO RES AND EMPHASIZED DESIRABILITY GIVE SYG AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT SOMETHING ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS. FAWZI SAID THAT HE HAD DELAYED THIS MATTER FOR OVER TWO WEEKS AND THAT HE DID NOT FEEL FURTHER DELAY WAS POSSIBLE.

HE STRESSED THAT ASSEMBLY SHOULD NOT ACCEPT CONDITIONS FROM ISRAEL FOR COMPLIANCE WITH GA RESOLUTIONS. HE SAID ISRAELIS SHOULD WITHDRAW, AND THIS WOULD NOT PREVENT THEM FROM BRINGING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE ASSEMBLY OTHER MATTERS WHICH INTEREST THEM (I.E., STRAITS OF TIRAN, AQABA). FAWZI INDICATED EGYPT COULD WAIT, AS THEY HAD SO FAR, WITH RESPECT TO COMPENSATION QUESTION AND THAT THEY PLANNED ON LETTING THEIR RESOLUTION LIE DORMANT FOR AWHILE. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY, HE SAID HE EXPECTED TO HAVE SUPPORT OF GA FOR ABOVE RES. HE SAID IF THERE WAS ANYTHING IN RES WHICH US THOUGHT WAS WRONG OR TOO MUCH TO ASK, HE WANTED TO KNOW, SINCE HE FELT EGYPT WOULD LOSE IN LONG RUN IF IT WAS NOT REALISTIC. HE IMPLIED THERE WAS NO SUCH DEFECT IN TEXT. FAWZI LEFT IT OPEN AS TO WHETHER THEY WOULD PRESS TO A VOTE THE RES ON THURSDAY, SUGGESTING VOTE MIGHT BE PUT OFF IF SOMETHING WAS ON POINT OF BEING WORKED OUT.

WE POINTED OUT THAT IN VIEW OF INTEREST OF MARITIME NATIONS IN ASSURING FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH GULF OF AQABA, IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT RES IN PRESENT FORM MIGHT FAIL OF ADOPTION, AND IN THIS EVEN EGYPT'S CAUSE WOULD BE WEAKENED AND ISRAELI POSITION STRENGTHENED. IN RESPONSE TO OUR SUGGESTION THAT

SUBMISSION

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- DELGA 511, JANUARY 15, 7 PM FROM USUN NEW YORK

SUBMISSION OF RES BE DELAYED WHILE PERMITTING DEBATE, FAWZI AFFIRMED THAT HE INTENDED TO SUBMIT RES AT OPENING MEETING.

IN ADDITION TO INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW WE WOULD VOTE ON ABOVE RES, I REQUEST DEPARTMENT PROVIDE ME WITH STATEMENT I COULD MAKE IN ASSEMBLY ON THURSDAY.

I BELIEVE EGYPTIAN RES IS DANGEROUS AS WELL AS ACUTELY EMBARRASSING. AM CONSIDERING DEVICES TO GAIN TIME, NOTABLY REFERENCE OF SYG'S REPORT TO ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR REPORT. BELIEVE UNDER ~~PRESENT~~ ^{POSSIBLE} CIRCUMSTANCES TWO-THIRDS VOTE POSSIBLE FOR LANGUAGE WHICH WILL ESTABLISH UNEF'S STATUS IN TIRAN AND OTHER AREAS. HOPE DEPARTMENT WILL GIVE ME THEIR IDEAS AND ANY INDUCEMENTS I CAN HOLD OUT TO EGYPTIANS AND ISRAELIS.

THIS CAN BE A VERY ROUGH RIDE.

LODGE

LR

Severed by DELGA 517 7/16

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 15, 1957

SECRET

SUBJECT: Withdrawal of Israeli Forces and Future Utilization of

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE FM/R CENTRAL FILE

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Heeney, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Maybee, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Phleger, L
Mr. Wilkins, NEA
Mr. Nugent, BNA

COPIES TO: NEA (3)
EUR
BNA (2)
L - Mr. Phleger
UNP (3)
US Embassy, Ottawa

320.5780
Ambassador Heeney referred to Mr. Pearson's remarks on UNEF yesterday in the Canadian House of Commons and outlined for possible comment by Mr. Phleger certain of Mr. Pearson's thoughts concerning: (A) the withdrawal of Israeli forces from areas occupied by them last November and (B) the future utilization of UNEF. It was evident from the Ambassador's remarks that the two subjects were regarded as having a very close relationship.

(A) Mr. Pearson has in mind the feasibility of quick and severe pressure on the Israelis to get them to return to their borders. At the same time his Government recognizes certain merits in present Israeli objectives having to do with the Gaza strip and free Canal navigation. It seems impracticable to refuse to discuss Israeli objectives until after their troop withdrawal. On the other hand, it may be possible to accomplish some of Israelis valid aims, in the course of troop withdrawal, while Egypt still feels the pressure to cooperate.

SV
Meanwhile, there are indications that the Arab-Asian interests will introduce a resolution in UNGA to accelerate Israeli withdrawal. The question arises how to deal with this resolution when proposed. The Ambassador said he believed that Mr. Pearson, while fully recognizing that the UN could not be less insistent with the Israelis than with the British and French in this regard, was thinking in terms of meeting such a resolution with an amendment that would also point up such matters as the need for navigation freedom and frontier stabilization. In this way, the resolution would be saved from one-sidedness without weakening its basic purpose.

SECRET

Mr. Phleger
1957

674.8400 1-1557

SECRET

-2-

Mr. Phleger said we had been exploring much the same ground as the Canadians and had come to very much the same tentative conclusions. We would prefer not to have an UNGA resolution on Israeli withdrawals but, if one was inevitable, we should try to keep it from being one-sided. In this regard, Mr. Phleger noted that the first cease-fire resolution calls upon all parties, including Egypt, to observe certain principles. Later the UNEF resolution specified that UNEF should supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the earlier Armistice Agreements. Hence, in calling upon Israel to live up to earlier resolutions, the obligations inherent in them would also apply to Egypt with equal force. Pressing this sort of reasoning upon the sponsors might give them second thoughts. Mr. Phleger doubted, however, that they could be persuaded to accept any qualification of the Israeli withdrawal.

(B) In Mr. Pearson's view, there must be no return to sporadic strife while a Middle East settlement is coming to fruition. The UN must persist in its stabilizing role. Borders must be secured and freedom of Canal navigation established, etc. It is quite probable that to accomplish all this, the continuing presence of UNEF will be required. It might be found advisable, for example, to have UNEF occupy the Gaza strip. In any case, time has come for UNEF to end its transition phase and adopt a more permanent role. The Ambassador said Mr. Pearson would be dining with the Secretary General this evening and would sound him out in this regard.

Mr. Phleger suggested this matter also be discussed with Mr. Lodge. It could then be explored with various delegates, particularly Mr. Malik of Lebanon. He agreed with the Ambassador that UNEF might have difficulty entering its new role solely under existing authorization. There might be criticism concerning the unwarranted extension of UNEF. Furthermore, in the absence of some more definite understanding, the Israelis might interpret an expansion of the UNEF function as a guarantee of certain results contingent upon Israeli withdrawal from critical areas. Mr. Phleger said our thoughts were close to Mr. Pearson's and that it was a question of selecting the most appropriate methods. However, no U.S. decision had been

made and no other major consideration.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

31

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

Control: 9193
Rec'd: JANUARY 16, 1957
10:39 AM

NEA

FROM: TEL AVIV

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 855, JANUARY 16, 9AM

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

USUN

UMSA

E

P

UOP

O

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

DCL

ICA

ALL LOCAL PAPERS TODAY FRONT PAGE RELEASE NELSON AND LABOUISSSE REPORTS ON ISRAEL TAKE OVER AND ADMINISTRATION GAZA AREA. GIST STORIES HEADLINED "GAZA WELL RUN SAYS UNITED NATIONS" AND NELSON REPORT QUOTED FREELY TO SHOW ISRAELI PROGRAM IN GAZA DESIGNED "STABILIZE" LIFE IN STRIP AND RESTORE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES AS WELL AS CARE FOR REFUGEES IN AREA. ACCORDING TO JERUSALEM POST NELSON REPORT "TOTALLY DISCREDITS EGYPTIAN ALLEGATIONS" ISRAEL PERSECUTED ARABS IN GAZA AREA " IN ANY WAY." LABOUISSSE REPORT BRIEFLY DESCRIBED AS TELLING OF "HEAVY LOOTING OF UNWRA SUPPLIES BY ARAB REFUGEES RIOTS AND OTHER DISTURBANCES AND DISCIPLINARY MEASURES TAKEN BY IDF".

ALL PAPERS ALSO CARRY FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT MADE LAST NIGHT REGRETTING LABOUISSSE ASSERTION 452 CIVILIANS KILLED BY IDF IN TAKEOVER OF GAZA STRIP AND DESCRIBING THIS FIGURE AS LENDING ITSELF TO "TENDENTIOUS INTERPRETATION." ACCORDING FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN THIS TOTAL COVERAGE MILITARY LOSSES FROM NATIONAL GUARD UNITS AND FEDAYEEN AS WELL AS PERSONS STILL ALIVE WHO FLED TO JORDAN.

FURTHER PRESS COMMENT ON REPORTS INCLUDES LAMERHAV (ACHDUT AVODA) ASSERTION LABOUISSSE REPORT "CONCEIVED UNDER HAMMARSKJOLD'S PERSONAL INSPIRATION " AND HADOKECBTS GENERAL ZIONIST (STATEMENT LABOUISSSE "ONE OF HAMMARSKJOLD'S AIDES" TRYING TO SHOW ISRAEL IS RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL MIDDLE EAST DIFFICULTIES AND CATEGORIZING HIS ATTITUDE AS SIMILAR TO "MOST RABID ARAB PROPAGANDI".

ALL PAPERS SAID NELSON REPORT SUBMITTED DECEMBER 3 BUT WITHHELD UNTIL JANUARY 14 BY HAMMARSKJOLD IN ORDER RELEASE LABOUISSSE REPORT AT SAME TIME. EMBASSY OFFICER REMINDED BY A FOREIGN

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT
RECORD/COPYUNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

MESSAGE CENTER
NEA
1957 JAN 16 PM

674.84A/1-1657

CAA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 855, JANUARY 16, 9 AM FROM TEL AVIV

MINISTRY OFFICIAL THAT NEARLY MONTH AGO LATTER HAD SAID NELSON HAD FILED REPORT FAVORABLE TO ISRAEL WITH HAMMARSKJOLD WHO REFUSING RELEASE IT UNTIL LABOUISSSE REPORT WITH LESS FAVORABLE PICTURE COULD BE RELEASED SIMULTANEOUSLY. OFFICIAL SAID MINISTRY INCENSED WITH THIS TACTIC WHICH MINISTRY FELT HAMMARSKJOLD USING NOT TO PRESENT BALANCED PICTURE BUT TO PREVENT OR DILUTE FAVORABLE IMPRESSION NELSON REPORT ALONE WOULD HAVE CREATED.

LAWSON

DT

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

CONFIDENTIAL

32

Action

Control: 9752
Rec'd: January 17, 1957
6:11 a.m.

NEA FROM: Tel Aviv

Info RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 858, January 16, 6 p.m.

G SENT DEPARTMENT 858; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 150, DAMASCUS 104,
SP JIDDA 8, LONDON 176, PARIS 148, USUN 36, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED

C NOFORN

L Canadian Ambassador, who resident in Athens (and thus bringing
IO fresh approach to Israeli situation), made following summarized
PR comment to me today after making farewell calls on Ben Gurion and
O Sharett yesterday:

CIA

1. He was impressed with Ben Gurion's unemotional and confident manner throughout discussion of Aqaba and Gaza withdrawal (EMBTTEL 812); most of 40 minute talk devoted to Aqaba and moral justification for Sinai campaign, with underscoring Israel's determination to defend militarily any attack on Israeli ships transiting Aqaba or any attempt Egypt reimpose blockade of Aqaba.

2. Ambassador, influenced by seriousness and strength Ben Gurion's statements on subject Israel's vital security problems involved in Sinai withdrawals without more assurances than now in hand, believes GOI has decided to refuse complete withdrawal for moment at least -- he felt Ben Gurion willing to risk penalties of which he fully aware.

3. Attaches some significance to last minute cancellation long-planned trip of Sharett to US which scheduled for next few days. He thought it might indicate something of highly critical character assigned to next few weeks by GOI.

LAWSON

MS:RAP/7

674.84A/1-1657

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 20 1957

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ACTION COPY

53
Action

IO
Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

NEA

L

P

UOP

O

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FROM: DAMASCUS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1710, JANUARY 16

SENT DEPARTMENT 1710; REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 107,
CAIRO 198/

PASS USUN

FOREIGN OFFICE CIRCULAR NOTE TO ALL ACCREDITED MISSIONS
DAMASCUS DATED JANUARY 14 RECEIVED JANUARY 16 STATES "ISRAELI
ATTEMPTS HANDICAP EXECUTION UNGA RESOLUTIONS" PROVIDING FOR
IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL BEHIND ARMISTICE LINES AROUSING DOUBT UN
ABILITY PREVENT AGGRESSION AND ELIMINATE ITS CONSEQUENCES.
CHARGES ISRAEL ALSO PURSUING POLICY MURDER AND ANNIHILATION IN
SINAI AND GAZA STRIP REMINISCENT NAZI BARBARISM.

STATES SUCH ACTS ORGANIZED INTENTIONALLY FOR BENEFIT "GREEDY
ZIONISM AND IMPERIALISM WHICH BEGINNING FEEL LOSS INFLUENCE IN
WORLD".

ADDRESSEE GOVERNMENTS REQUESTED ACT PROMPTLY IN UN AND
THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS TO END THIS "BARBARIC PLAN" WHICH
DAILY INCREASING FERMENTATION ARAB PUBLIC OPINION TO EXTENT ARAB
GOVERNMENTS CANNOT "STAND BY WITH HANDS FOLDED".

MOOSE

BAG

NOTE: PASSED USUN 1/16/57.



PERMANENT
RECORD COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

This Document must be returned
to the Radio Center Files

674.84A/1-1653

DMS

674.84A/1-1653

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL

31

Action
IO

UMP/Gerson

Info
RMR

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

SS
G
SP
C
EUR
NEA
L
E
R
O

NO: DELGA 517, JANUARY 16, 10 AM

PRIORITY

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

CORRECTION TO DELGA 511

DCL

PENULTIMATE PARAGRAPH, SECOND SENTENCE: CHANGE "PRESENT"
TO "PROPER" SO THAT SENTENCE READS, IN PART, "BELIEVE UNDER
PROPER CIRCUMSTANCES TWO-THIRDS VOTE POSSIBLE ..."

Control:
Rec'd:

9192
JANUARY 16, 1957
10:35 AM



Handwritten: This document must be returned to
RM/R Central files
674.84A/1-1657

LODGE

CRH

HBS

Confidential File

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

~~NEA - EEO~~

S/S - ^{RO}~~ER~~ - Mr. Sturgill

No reply necessary.

NEA:NE:SCBlackiston, Jr.

McC. 7/14
AS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

January 24, 1957

NFA - Mr. Oulashin

For your information

If the bureau desires to reply,
please inform me by Tuesday, January 29;
or return the correspondence with a
notation that no action will be taken.

RS
R. C. Sturgill
S/S-RO

Attachment: Ltr to Pres. fm Douglas
Horton dtd 1/16/57 re. so-
called "American Christian
Palestine Committee"
(S/S-505)

1/28/57
no action necessary.
A.C. [unclear]

5/5 Recd 3:50 pm

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

ROUTE SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

1/23/57

505

TO Mr. Fisher Howe
Director, Executive Secretariat
Department of State

**PROMPT HANDLING IS ESSENTIAL.
WHEN DRAFT REPLY IS REQUESTED
THE BASIC CORRESPONDENCE MUST
BE RETURNED. IF ANY DELAY IN
SUBMISSION OF DRAFT REPLY IS
ENCOUNTERED, PLEASE TELEPHONE
OFFICE OF THE STAFF SECRETARY.**

Date January 23, 1957

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

ACTION:

Comment _____
Draft reply _____
For direct reply _____
For your information _____
For necessary action _____
For appropriate handling ☒ _____
See below _____

Remarks: _____

By direction of the President:

A. J. Goodpaster
A. J. GOODPASTER
Staff Secretary

Jan 24

100-7-84191-1

HARVARD DIVINITY SCHOOL

OFFICE OF THE DEAN
45 FRANCIS AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

THE WHITE HOUSE

JAN 23 9 16 AM '57

January 16, 1957 RECEIVED

Dear Mr. President:

Let me assure you that this is one letter which neither you nor any of your aides is asked to answer.

You have either just received or are about to receive a letter signed by "hundreds of outstanding Americans" asking that the United Nations prevent the remilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula by Egyptian troops and that the United States do this or that in the Middle East. These suggestions have a rather definitely Israeli tinge.

I am delighted that the American people have so much confidence in you that they write to you on any and every subject, but I deplore the method in working up this type of letter.

The so-called "American Christian Palestine Committee" has composed this letter and has written to innumerable unsuspecting Americans asking them to sign it. Undoubtedly many of the will have signed it by the time it reaches you.

If you know the American Christian Palestine Committee already, you are aware that it is financed almost wholly from Zionist Funds. This fact, however, is never indicated in its literature. It is this deceitful "front" against which I think it fair to protest.

Similarly, the letter itself appears to the casual reader to be unbiased, but as one gets into it, it becomes evident that it is only a disguised bit of propaganda for the Zionist cause.

I am aware that I cannot here have told you anything that you do not already know--but it has crossed my mind that the time has now come for some of us citizens to protest against this kind of procedure on the ground of what I believe to be its essential dishonesty.

Yours faithfully,

Douglas Horton
Douglas Horton

39 The Hon. Dwight D. Eisenhower
DC/R President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Rev

Ch

Please see the enclosures - and please do not acknowledge or return them

Central
Files

Returned to
674.842/1-1557

MAR 29 1957

FILED

CS/JS

674.842/1-1657

DATE _____

You may list me as a signer of the "Christmas
Appeal to the President".

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

AMERICAN CHRISTIAN PALESTINE COMMITTEE

• 65 EAST 55 STREET • NEW YORK 22, N. Y. • MUrray Hill 8-3113 •

FOUNDERS, HONORARY CHAIRMEN

Dr. Henry A. Atkinson
Hon. Owen Brewster
Rev. Dr. John Haynes Holmes

CO-CHAIRMEN

Dr. Samuel Guy Inman
Dr. Alonzo G. Moron

VICE-CHAIRMEN

Dr. Sherwood Eddy
Hon. Irving M. Ives
Dr. Howard Mumford Jones
Hon. Warren G. Magnuson
Chancellor Daniel L. Marsh
Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr.
Hon. John W. McCormack
Dean Thomas Clark Pollock
Walter P. Reuther
Hon. Frederick L. Strong
Bishop Donald H. Tippet
Hon. Sumner Welles

SECRETARY

Mrs. Helen Gahagan Douglas

TREASURER

Dean Alfange

CHILDREN'S MEMORIAL FOREST

Dr. Howard M. LeSourd
Chairman

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Dr. Carl Hermann Voss
Chairman
Rev. Dr. Hampton Adams
Dr. Dewey Anderson
Prof. Stringfellow Barr
Manchester Boddy
Rev. Dr. Emory S. Bucke
Dr. Marguerite Cartwright
Hon. Oscar Chapman
Dr. Marquis W. Childs
Rev. Karl M. Chworowsky
Bartley C. Crum
Dr. Guy M. Davis, Jr.
Mrs. India Edwards
Father George B. Ford
Rt. Rev. Charles K. Gilbert
Prof. S. Ralph Harlow
Rev. Donald Harrington
Dr. Milton J. Hoffman
Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey
Rev. David R. Hunter
Dr. Frank Kingdon
Mrs. Serge Koussevitzky
Dr. and Mrs. Walter G. Lowdermilk
Hon. Theodore R. McKeldin
Dean Ernest O. Melby
Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Dean William Stuart Nelson
Prof. Reinhold Niebuhr
Bishop Glenn R. Phillips
Victor G. Reuther
Robert E. Smith
Rev. Dr. Ralph W. Sockman
Rev. Dr. Jesse W. Stitt
Dr. Herbert H. Stroup
Prof. Paul Tillich
Rev. Dr. Earl Hollier Tomlin
Pres. Charles J. Turck
Dr. Pierre van Paassen
Prof. Albert N. Williams
Dr. William Lindsay Young
Rev. Dr. Reuben K. Youngdahl

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Rev. Karl Baehr

December 21, 1956

Dear Friend:

We are confident that you appreciate fully both the gravity of the Near East situation and the opportunity now present for decisive action leading to an Arab-Israel peace.

We urge you to join with hundreds of other outstanding Americans in signing the enclosed Christmas appeal to President Eisenhower. Won't you sign the enclosed card and return it at once so that the message might be forwarded to the President during the Christmas week?

With all good wishes for a joyous Christmas and a rewarding New Year, we are

Sincerely yours,



Alonzo Moron
Co-Chairman



Samuel Guy Inman
Co-Chairman



Karl Baehr
Executive Director

AMERICAN CHRISTIAN PALESTINE COMMITTEE

• 65 EAST 55 STREET • NEW YORK 22, N. Y. • MUrray Hill 8-3113 •

FOUNDERS, HONORARY CHAIRMEN

Dr. Henry A. Atkinson
Hon. Owen Brewster
Rev. Dr. John Haynes Holmes

CO-CHAIRMEN

Dr. Samuel Guy Inman
Dr. Alonzo G. Moron

VICE-CHAIRMEN

Dr. Sherwood Eddy
Hon. Irving M. Ives
Dr. Howard Mumford Jones
Hon. Warren G. Magnuson
Chancellor Daniel L. Marsh
Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr.
Hon. John W. McCormack
Dean Thomas Clark Pollock
Walter P. Reuther
Hon. Frederick L. Strong
Bishop Donald H. Tippet
Hon. Sumner Welles

SECRETARY

Mrs. Helen Gahagan Douglas

TREASURER

Dean Alfange

CHILDREN'S MEMORIAL FOREST

Dr. Howard M. LeSourd
Chairman

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

Dr. Carl Hermann Voss
Chairman
Rev. Dr. Hampton Adams
Dr. Dewey Anderson
Prof. Stringfellow Barr
Manchester Boddy
Rev. Dr. Emory S. Bucke
Dr. Marguerite Cartwright
Hon. Oscar Chapman
Dr. Marquis W. Childs
Rev. Karl M. Chworowsky
Bartley C. Crum
Dr. Guy M. Davis, Jr.
Mrs. India Edwards
Father George B. Ford
Rt. Rev. Charles K. Gilbert
Prof. S. Ralph Harlow
Rev. Donald Harrington
Dr. Milton J. Hoffman
Hon. Hubert H. Humphrey
Rev. David R. Hunter
Dr. Frank Kingdon
Mrs. Serge Koussevitzky
Dr. and Mrs. Walter C. Lowdermilk
Hon. Theodore R. McKeldin
Dean Ernest O. Melby
Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Dean William Stuart Nelson
Prof. Reinhold Niebuhr
Bishop Glenn R. Phillips
Victor G. Ruether
Robert E. Smith
Rev. Dr. Ralph W. Sockman
Rev. Dr. Jesse W. Stitt
Dr. Herbert H. Stroup
Prof. Paul Tillich
Rev. Dr. Earl Hollier Tomlin
Pres. Charles J. Turk
Dr. Pierre van Paason
Prof. Albert N. Williams
Dr. William Lindsay Young
Rev. Dr. Reuben K. Youngdahl

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Rev. Karl Baehr

December 28, 1956

The Hon. Dwight D. Eisenhower
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

In this Christmas season our thoughts most naturally turn to the Holy Land. Yet an intensely disturbing scene greets the eye. The surrounding Middle Eastern nations are involved in bitter controversy. Peace seems most remote from that land whence its tidings were first transmitted. And yet, a time of great hope and promise may also be at hand.

You, more than any other American, Mr. President, confront a question, therefore, which today absorbs the closest attention of all Americans sensitive to the good name of the United States and to the need for world peace.

Simply put, the question is, what will happen in the Middle East when the Anglo-French and Israeli forces will have left Egypt? Will there be a return to Egyptian-directed fedayeen attacks on Israel? Will the Soviet-supported Nasser regime in Egypt continue to threaten the peace and stability of the Middle East, or will there be a genuine attempt to negotiate a settlement of conflicts which brought the world so perilously close to war in October and November?

Much depends, of course, upon what the United States does with its prestige in the Middle East and the United Nations. We believe that now is the time for the United States to use her great influence to help bring about a settlement of Middle Eastern problems.

America's objectives in the Middle East, as we understand them, are fourfold: (1) to assure the independence of each Middle Eastern state, including Israel; (2) to work for the economic well-being of the entire region; (3) to assure the steady flow of Middle Eastern oil so that both those nations which produce it and those which consume it will be guaranteed maximum benefits; and, (4) to insulate the operation of the Suez Canal from the politics of any one country, with the facilities of the Canal available to all nations.

December 28, 1956

We believe, Mr. President, that a strong United States initiative in the United Nations can secure these objectives. The conflagration so recently extinguished on the initiative of the United States has created a situation in the Middle East from which great achievements may yet be won. It awaits only a decisive step towards peace. The occasion, in short, is ripe for a solution of those problems which have plagued the area and much of the world for years.

We respectfully suggest, Mr. President: First, that the United Nations prevent the remilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula by Egyptian troops. Second, that the United Nations administer the Gaza Strip until a final disposition has been made of that territory. Third, that the United States offer to help finance a United Nations regional development program aimed at aiding the economies of all Middle East states, and making possible the resettlement of all refugees, both Arabs and Jewish. Fourth, that the Suez Canal controversy be settled as quickly as possible in the interests of the economies of all nations which depend so heavily on shipping through the Canal. Fifth, that the United States endeavor to bring about direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis leading to a settlement of the Palestine problem in the interests of both peoples. Sixth, and finally, we suggest that the U.N. troops remain to police the area until each of the objectives outlined above have been achieved, and, most urgently, until the Arabs and Israelis have negotiated a peace settlement.

These American objectives are neither selfish nor narrow. The program sketched for their implementation is not too difficult of fulfillment.

We believe the opportunity which is in your hands to achieve these objectives is singularly unique. We urge you in the interests of America and the peace of the world to press as rapidly as possible for the attainment of these ends.

Respectfully,

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

30
Action
NEAInfo
RMRSS
G
SP
CEUR
LIO
UMSAE
PUOP
OLIOCB
USIACIA
OSDARMY
NAVYAIR
DCL

ICA

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 863, January 17, 6 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 863, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 153, JIDDA 9,
DAMASCUS 106, LONDON 178, PARIS 149, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED,
NEW YORK 38

GOI maintains guarded silence but all other elements are speculating tirelessly on: 1. Israel's ability resist pressures urging her out of Sinai and Gaza; 2. Purported Afro-Asian resolution demanding sanctions if Israel fails comply; 3. Extent of sacrifice such resistance might impose on Israel; 4. Position of US, Hammarskjold and others re current Israel posture.

Principal organs Israel press found hope in Hammarskjold's and US spokesman's recognition Gulf of Aqaba is international waterway, particularly US view that restoration status quo ante would represent unacceptable state of affairs. Reported US suggestion bulk of UNEF should be stationed Gulf of Aqaba area and Gaza Strip was welcomed and widely healded as partial recognition no real rightness Israel's position.

On other side ledger, Israel press and party spokesman express concern over US insistence Israel's problems could be considered only after her forces had been withdrawn from all territories formerly under control of Egypt; and similar utterances by SYG in his report.

Most depressing note sounded by Haaretz's UN correspondent who said "Everyone convinced withdrawal unavoidable and Jerusalem has accepted it. Clash between Israel and majority UN delegates is now over Israel's desire benefit somehow from Sinai campaign which is opposed to most delegation's position no side should benefit from use of force".

All political organs lamented withdrawal from points whose retention they felt strengthened Israel's security position. Like Lamerhav, however, they were prepared concede Israel had

no choice

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

674.84A/1-1757

HBS

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 10411
Rec'd: January 18, 1955
4:15 a.m.
File
NEOB
3-14-57
NE

1951
18
PM 12 12

NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 863, January 17, 6 p.m. from Tel Aviv

no choice and could support sacrifice entailed if withdrawal went no further. In representative comment, Lamerhav said re withdrawal from EL Arish, "It is black day for Israel-day heavy with evil portents. Withdrawal not result Israel's free will but of pressure and awareness Israel should better insist on holding Gaza Strip and Sharm Es Sheikh bringing about fall of government or making it falter at this stage does not benefit nation. Let foreign circles know unmistakably, however, Israel has reached farthest limit of retreat".

Nearly all political elements declared Israel's willingness withstand any degree economic pressure rather than surrender what she considered vital interests. Press obviously has pushed GOI vigorously on this point attempting ascertain its planning against eventuality UN or Western sanctions. Most papers are carrying unconfirmed stories "emergency" economic program involving severe "tightening of belts" being prepared by committee of Economic Ministers.

Responsible papers today quoted Finance Minister as saying if US economic aid were stopped in event UN sanctions GOI purchases abroad would be cut in half to \$30 million and capital goods purchases reduced 20 percent to \$25 million.

In midst of conjecture for necessity of such drastic action, Israeli spirits rose mercurially with reports late January 17 that Afro-Asian block would no longer demand Israel condemnation nor sanctions for its failure complete Sinai evacuation but would merely urge Israel complete withdrawal within five days.

LAWSON

LR:LMB

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 15 1967

AIR POUCH

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

PRIORITY

(Security Classification)

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

674.84A/1-1757

+R 684A.85

683.84A

683A.84A

FROM : AMCONGENERAL, JERUSALEM

105

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

January 17, 1957

DATE

REF : Congen Despatch 99, January 9, 1957

13 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.
	NEA-4	RM/R.2 CL-1-8 ID-4 P-1 USUN-1
	REC'D	OTHER
	1-24	CIA-12 OSD-4 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3 USIA-10

SUBJECT: Activities of the MACs during the Period 29 December 1956 through 4 January 1957

BEIRUT-1
CAIRO-1
DAMASCUS-1

Enclosed are copies of the substantive parts of the weekly reports prepared by the Mixed Armistice Commissions of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization which summarize their activities for the period 29 December 1956 through 4 January 1957.

William E. Cole
William E. Cole
American Consul General

Enclosure

Copy of Parts of MAC Weekly Reports
for 29 Dec. 1956 through 4 Jan. 1957

Copy sent Amman, Tel Aviv

Department pass to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus

674.84A/1-1757

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

1957 JAN 25 PM 3 46

MESSAGE CENTER

HKMiller/hkm

REPORTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE FILES

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Classification)

COPY

The following is a summary of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions for the period 29 December 1956 to 4 January 1957.

EGYPTIAN - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

As far as can be determined, conditions in general in the Gaza Strip were rather tranquil during the period under review.

During the night of 2 January and the morning of 3 January 1957, Israeli military personnel conducted a screening of the residents of the Sajaiya Quarter, on the east side of Gaza. At the same time, several school teachers as well as the former Chief of the Palestinian Police were taken into custody for questioning; most of whom have been released by this date.

UNTSO continues to furnish communications and clerical support to UNRWA.

Complaints and investigations

Nil.

HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The tension which existed along the border since September had one good effect and that was that discipline was tightened on both sides with a consequent reduction in the number of "minor" incidents reported. With this tension now considerably relaxed, the situation is now returning to "normal" and it may be anticipated that the number of "minor" incidents will increase.

There has apparently been a recent reduction in the number of Jordanian troops west of the Jordan.

Almost all the complaints submitted by the HJK Delegation alleging overflights refer now to border areas and the percentage of alleged overflights over the interior has become very low.

The Israeli Delegation still informs the MAC informally of each "Fedayeen" incident but does not submit a complaint.

The outstations of Nablus, Hebron and Latrun have continued to be manned by UNMOs.

The Senior Jordanian and Israeli Delegates met in the Chairman's office for an informal meeting on 31 December 1956. The atmosphere was quite friendly and several minor matters were settled between the delegates. They also agreed to consider the Chairman's suggestion that the marking of the demarcation line in the Sheikh Jarrah sector in Jerusalem be completed.

A Sub-Committee meeting, held on 31 December 1956, discussed missing persons, property and other problems incidental to the maintenance of the G.A.A.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

Two emergency meetings were held on 6 January 1957 in the absence of the Israeli Delegation to deal with three Jordanian complaints.

The Jordanian Delegation submitted 28 complaints: 3 alleging firing across the demarcation line - no investigation requested; 1 alleging crossing the demarcation line and firing (one Jordanian killed, one wounded) - investigated and subject of 279th Emergency Meeting; 24 alleging overflights - no investigation requested but two of these were witnessed by UNMOs whose evidence were used at the 280th Emergency Meeting.

The Israeli Delegation submitted 1 complaint alleging a derogatory statement in a Jordanian newspaper on 27 December following a press conference by Prime Minister Nabulsi on 26 December.

Outstanding complaints: HJK-1,198; Israel-350; Total-1,548

ISRAEL - LEBANESE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The period under review has been quiet. The problem of acceptance by Israel of the 32 persons who infiltrated on 16 October is still pending.

The Lebanese Delegation submitted 1 complaint alleging that on 31 December 1956 at 0830Z a jet plane coming from Israel overflow the Lebanese territory at a high altitude from Labouna to Tyre, then flew back to Israel.

The Israeli Delegation submitted no complaint.

ISRAEL - SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The period under review has been quiet.

In answer to further request of Chairman for safe passage on Banat Yacoub bridge, the Senior Israeli Delegate has cabled the following:

"The situation and in particular Syrians' threats and warlike preparations make it necessary for the bridge to remain closed. I regret that this may be causing members of UNTSO some slight delay in communications and other such inconveniences. This does not really affect the work of ISMAC which in any way has been virtually inoperative during the past two years."

No inspection was made on the site of the Jordan River Project in the central sector of the Demilitarized Zone.

The Israeli Delegation submitted 1 written complaint confirming a verbal complaint which alleged that on 16 December three Syrians crossed into Israel and stole 32 head of cattle belonging to the settlement of Conen. Israel did not request an investigation by the MAC but asked the Chairman to contact the Syrian authorities and ensure the immediate return of the cattle. The Syrian authorities have so far not submitted the results of the investigation requested by the Chairman.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page _____ of _____

Desp. No. _____

From _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

Page 3 of _____

Encl. No. 1

Desp. No. 105

From Jerusalem

The Syrian Delegation submitted no complaint.

Outstanding complaints: Israel-636; Syria-743; Total-1,379

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

JW/K

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 17, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal from Egypt; Use of the UNEF; Egypt's Economic Measures Against Western Firms; Agreement on Canal Operation

PARTICIPANTS: Manlio Brosio, Italian Ambassador
NEA - William M. Rountree
WE - James D. Crane
NE - Maurice S. Rice

COPIES TO: NEA (2cc)
NE (3cc)
OLI (1cc)
WE (1cc)
UNP (2cc)

074.84A/1-1757

Israeli Withdrawal; United Nations Emergency Force - The Ambassador, who called at his request, asked for Mr. Rountree's views on the Afro-Asian resolution, introduced in the General Assembly yesterday, which called for the Secretary General to continue his efforts to secure the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egypt, and on Ambassador Lodge's speech calling for the deployment of the UNEF along the Egyptian-Israeli Armistice line and at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. Mr. Rountree said that we have consistently supported the positions that the Israelis must withdraw completely and that the despatch of the UNEF would serve to observe and to preserve the peace in the area. One of the acute dangers in the situation derives from the consequences of an Egyptian attempt to reoccupy the Gaza strip and the area opposite the islands at the entrance to the Gulf. The purpose of Ambassador Lodge's speech was to support the call for the Israeli withdrawal and to emphasize the importance we attach to the UNEF occupation of the areas in question to preserve the peace. Mr. Rountree agreed with Ambassador Brosio that Israel appears determined to hold the two places until it receives assurances that the UNEF will take over.

Egypt's Economic Measures - Mr. Rountree confirmed the fact that we are concerned over President Nasser's recent actions against foreign companies. It is difficult to see how they can benefit Egypt. They will discourage foreign investment; many firms which have not been taken over surely will seek to leave. Although Nasser states that Egypt's economy is sound, it

is in

CONFIDENTIAL

674.8400/1-1757

FEB 21 1957

FILED

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

is in a desperate condition. Although the present measures may be designed to obtain capital quickly, they have set back the Egyptian economy many years in view of the resulting discouragement to foreign investment.

91-1021
Agreement on the Canal Operation - The Ambassador asked how the United States viewed the French proposal for a provisional agreement on the operation of the Suez Canal before it is open to traffic. Mr. Rountree said that we want an agreement, even a provisional one, before the Canal is open and that we believe the approach is through the Secretary General, not through a commission or in direct negotiations. There are some indications, he added, that Nasser would like an agreement based on the lines of the six principles.

NEA:NE:MSRice:bk:av
1/20/57

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 17, 1957

SUBJECT: Gaza and Aqaba

674.34A

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Israel Embassy
NEA - Mr. William M. Rountree
NEA:NE - Mr. Donald C. Bergus

COPIES TO: NEA (2cc), NE (2cc), IO (cc), Tel Aviv (cc), Cairo (cc)

Mr. Shiloah referred to the present United Nations General Assembly debate on Israel withdrawal. He said Israel wished to evacuate its forces from the Straits of Tiran but had an interest in preventing a situation which would create a threat to Israel's economy. Israel wanted an arrangement which would prevent a return of the blockade. The Israelis had been taken aback by the Secretary General's report, particularly by his statement that Israel had been silent on the question of Gaza. Mr. Shiloah stated that the Secretary General himself had proposed in earlier discussions that the question of Gaza be left to a later stage. As for the Afro-Asian resolution, Israel admitted non-compliance with the November 2 resolution, but this was not the same as refusal to comply. He hoped that the United States would not vote for the Afro-Asian resolution in its present form but would consider amendments pointing out the international interest in Aqaba. Mr. Rountree stated that we were in close touch with the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations which would probably be exchanging views with the Israel Delegation.

On the handling of Aqaba, Mr. Shiloah said that there were a number of alternatives. The best solution would be a peace settlement, but since this was not in the cards, Israel would like a U.S. guarantee that there would be no interference in shipping through the strait. He was afraid that we were not ready to give such a guarantee, so it was felt that the least that Israel could rely on was the assignment of the UNEF to the task of occupying Sharm al Sheikh until an agreement covering the free use of the straits could be

DC/R

Anal

Rev

Cat

CONFIDENTIAL

GPO 912677

This Document Must Be Returned to 674.34A/1-1757

CS/J

worked

1957

674.34A/1-1757

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

worked out. A United Nations General Assembly resolution merely affirming the international character of the straits would not meet the issue. Mr. Rountree said he could not add much to the remarks the Secretary had made to the Israel Foreign Minister. Mr. Shiloah was probably right about U.S. inability to give a unilateral guarantee. He hoped it would be possible to work out a satisfactory arrangement but we would have to feel our way along. He hoped that the UNEF could play a role in this matter. Mr. Rountree inquired as to the recent Saudi charge that Israel troops had landed on Saudi territory at the straits, and the Israel charge that an Israel vessel had been fired upon by the Saudis. Mr. Shiloah said that he was quite sure the Israelis had not landed on Saudi territory. Israel did not wish to become involved with Saudi Arabia at Tiran. He speculated that an Israel vessel may have made some kind of startling gesture in the straits, such as blasting its horn, which frightened the green Saudi troops into firing.

On Gaza, Mr. Shiloah felt it would be fatal to hand it back to the Egyptians since this would inevitably lead to the resumption of hostilities in a short time. Israel did not wish to annex the strip. The suggestion to hand it over to the UNEF to administer was impractical and harmful. The best solution would be an arrangement whereby Israel administered the strip under United Nations supervision. This would provide for better security. Israel would immediately absorb economically a number of the people living in the strip. This could be a ray of hope, a turning point in the Middle East picture.

Mr. Rountree wondered how it could be a turning point when it was almost certain that Israel administration of the strip might be opposed by the inhabitants of the strip but would most certainly be opposed by the Arab states and the Afro-Asian bloc. Syria's linking of Israel withdrawal from Gaza with reopening of the pipelines was indicative of the Arab attitude. Mr. Shiloah asked if the U.S. had any views as to the ultimate disposition of Gaza. Mr. Rountree said that we were considering the matter but had not taken any position on it.

RE: NE: DCBergus:roj - 1/18/57

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 17, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza and Aqaba

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Dr. Nahum Goldmann, Chairman, Jewish Agency for Palestine
Philip M. Klutznick, B'nai B'rith
Adolph Held, President, Jewish Labor Committee
Rabbi Philip Bernstein, Chairman, American Zionist Committee
for Public Affairs

COPIES TO: Stuart W. Rockwell, NEA/NE
S/S(2), NEA, NE(2), EUR, IO, USUN, American Embassies Cairo,
Tel Aviv, Moscow, London, Amman, Paris, Damascus, Jidda, Beirut
and Baghdad

Mr. Goldmann asked the Secretary whether he saw any possibility that the United States could give assurances to Israel concerning the right of Israel to free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and to protection against fedayeen raids.

The Secretary said that meeting the Israeli needs on these points is one of our objectives. It would be a tragedy if the unsatisfactory status quo should be re-established in the Near East after the hostilities. However, the United States alone is not in a position to give assurances on these points. The primary responsibility for the solution of issues lies with the United Nations. We believe that Israel has the right to use international waterways and that the Gulf of Aqaba is an international waterway. We also think that the reasoning behind the Security Council's decision in 1951 against the recourse to belligerent rights by Egypt to justify preventing Israel shipping from transiting the Suez Canal applies equally to the Gulf of Aqaba. How to work this out is very complicated. We are discussing this problem with the Secretary General and others in the United Nations. We are not in a position to give assurances as to if it can be worked out or how it can be worked out. Much depends on the decisions of the Secretary General and the Consultative Committee assisting him with regard to the UNEF. Their interpretations of the extent of the authority of UNEF are important. We will do all we reasonably can, but we are only one member of the United Nations.

The Secretary remarked that it does not do any good to have it appear publicly that the Department is being pressed by Jewish elements in this

country

CONFIDENTIAL

674.84A/1-1757

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

CS/W

JAN 23 1957

Rm/R
file

394

This document must be returned to

674.84A/1-1757

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

country with regard to these problems. Such pressure doesn't make us push any harder to solve the issues and handicaps us by creating the suspicion that we are acting on behalf of Jewish interests. We are working for solutions on the basis of the principles of justice and international law, and our influence is stronger if it appears that this is the basis for our actions and not the activities of pressure groups.

Mr. Goldmann inquired whether the Secretary thought that the United Nations had authority to install the UNEF in Sharm el Sheikh until agreement was reached regarding passage through the Gulf of Aqaba.

The Secretary doubted that a new resolution specifically authorizing the UNEF to be used for that purpose would get enough votes to pass the Assembly. He was more hopeful that authority to position the UNEF in that area could be developed within the terms of the present resolution. The Secretary General was reluctant to take such action without a new resolution but perhaps he could be persuaded.

Mr. Klutznick mentioned the preoccupation of American Jews with the lack of progress towards solution of the basic issues in the Palestine dispute.

The Secretary said that this is one of his principal concerns and that is why he had been so sorry to see the possibility of solution set back even further by the hostilities. He was not encouraged about the future of Israel if this was to be in the framework of an armed camp ringed by enemies. There had to be some degree of intercourse between Israel and its neighbors. A permanent atmosphere of hostility would in his view wear out even a nation as brave, resilient, and purposeful as Israel.

Rabbi Bernstein inquired whether the Eisenhower proposal might offer a hope for progress.

611.80
The Secretary said that he thought that it might. A more significant United States presence in the area, driving out Communist influence, would create a climate where it might be more possible to solve this long-standing problem. The Secretary added that the continuing existence of Israel is an essential part of our foreign policy. We would never support or encourage any country which was planning to attack Israel. A stronger United States presence in the area is essential to the preservation of Israel, since it will weaken the position of the Communists in the Near East. If the "Eisenhower Doctrine" should be defeated, this would be a disaster for Israel because it would mean turning the area over to the Communists. History has shown that the Communists do not hesitate to promise the Arabs assistance and that the Arabs in many cases have no scruples against seeking and accepting such assistance.

711.886a
Mr. Klutznick asked whether there was any possibility that the Department might take up with King Saud the matter of discrimination against Jews by the Saudi Arabian Government in connection with the stationing of United States

personnel

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

xx
7/8/57
personnel at Dhahran. The Secretary said that he expected we would talk over all problems with King Saud. It would be most unfortunate if there were any public references intimating that the Department intended to take up this matter with the King and the Secretary considered that he had made no answer to the question. Mr. Klutznick said that he and his friends understood perfectly and that nothing would be said.

As the discussion ended the Secretary said he hoped that the Jews in New York would not be discourteous to King Saud when he arrived. Mr. Klutznick said that a problem was definitely involved but that he and his friends would do their best to see that there was no trouble.

NEA:NE:SWRockwell:tmn/amb
1/18/57

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

57-H
Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

P

UOP

O

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2338, January 19

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2338; REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 52

JOINT USIS-EMBASSY MESSAGE

British delegate to UN during discussion by General Assembly of withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egypt expressed Britain's wish to place Gaza strip under international control. He further demanded internationalization of Gulf of Aqaba.

"Commenting on this, an Egyptian official source said this was in contradiction with resolution of UN which ruled that Israel should withdraw behind truce line. Furthermore this attempt on Britain's part is nothing but continuation of her conspiracy in collusion with Israel against Egypt and Arabs of Palestine. Egypt could on no account accept such conspiracies and insists that Israel should implement UN resolutions.

"Official source added that Egypt had agreed to clearing of Suez Canal in compliance with UN resolutions and that it had also facilitated the clearing operations in every possible way. If Britain tried for Israel (sic) to profit through her aggression this would greatly complicate matters."

HART

MGG:JJ

Control: 11481
Rec'd: January 19,
10:09 p.m.This document must be returned to
RM/R 674.84A/1-1957
Central
files

HBS

NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

UNCLASSIFIED

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

57-H
Action
NEA

Control: 11483
Rec'd: January 19, 1957
10:08 pm

Central
File

Info
RMR
SS
G
SP
C
L
IO
P
UOP
ND
O
OLI

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2340, January 19

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 2340 REPEATED INFORMATION USUN 54

JOINT USIS-EMBASSY MESSAGE

Following announcement issued tonight by information department
GOE:

OCB
USIA
CIA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

"In meeting held by Arab Heads of State, Egypt expressed view that she considered Gaza sector part of Egypt's territory and that, under no circumstances, would she accept attempts at subjugating Arab people of Gaza to any foreign administration whatever name such administration may carry.

"It was decided that any attempt at changing the form of rule Gaza had before tripartite aggression could only be interpreted as unacceptable continuation of aggression".

HART

MGG:CC/8

674.84A/1-1957

Returned to

HBS

FLB 6 1957

1957 JAN 21 AM 6 22
MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

PERMANENT

UNCLASSIFIED

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

31

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

USUN

P

UOP

O

SCS

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2353, January 21, 10 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 2353; REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 125

1. UN official reports exchange of prisoners began morning 21 January when Israelis turned over 500 of 5,800 total. Egyptians have four total -- not (repeat not) known if these yet turned over. Israelis planning release 500 per day.

2. Train, presumably from Israel, carries prisoners to point 10 miles east of Al Arish where picked up by Red Cross and UNEF representatives and driven to location south of Al Arish.

Here prisoners returned to Egyptians.

3. UN regards its role in this repatriation as unofficial and above is not (repeat not) UN.

HART

SW:RAP/7

Control:

12432

Rec'd:

January 22, 1974

7:21 a.m.

This Document Must Be Returned to
RM/R 674.84A/1-2157

HBS

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NEA
MESSAGE CENTER
1974 JAN 22 AM 11 05

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

In reply refer to:
AFM

April 10 1957

Dear Miss Gildersleeve:

Your letter dated January 21 addressed to the President was referred to the Department for study and reply. I regret the delay in answering but I have asked several officers of the Department to examine your comments on the Arab world, which have been read with keen interest.

I was particularly struck with your suggestion for a combined University and Center of Arab Culture, since this coincides with a number of other educational possibilities now being studied in the Department.

Political circumstances, including the developments you mention in the Middle East, have thus far restricted attempts at area-wide cultural cooperation. But the idea of modern universities in North Africa, and particularly in Morocco, has been under consideration for many years, even before the proclamation of Moroccan and Tunisian independence. In this connection, the Department of State has made efforts to enlist private support and interest in the U.S. for the development and extension of secondary schools, especially in Morocco, looking toward the creation of a future institution of higher learning which would embody local ideas and local efforts but would enjoy Western support and assistance.

Thus far, economic difficulties and budgetary limitations of the new North African governments and the heavy commitments of the American private foundations in other areas have delayed progress toward the type of institution which you mention. While it is hoped that sufficient funds will be available in the coming year to expand further the Department's Exchange of Persons programs, these could not really fulfill the needs in North Africa of which you speak.

Miss Virginia G. Gildersleeve,
Bedford Village,
New York.

NEA:AFN:JHvey, Jr.:gr
4-8-57

CC: NEA/P, P:SEV

Mr.	
Re	
Cat	

S/S CR

APR 10 1957 P.M.

FW 674840/1-2157

I am sure you will share our hope that the obstacles thus far encountered may prove only temporary. The Department is of course greatly interested in the type of cultural advancement and rapprochement of which you speak and plans to continue efforts to promote interest in the creation of centers of higher learning, perhaps on a regional rather than national basis, with different faculties located in various parts of North Africa. I should think a cultural center of the type you mention might fit very well into this kind of organization.

In any event, I sincerely appreciate your interest and would welcome any further suggestions you might have as to how we could move forward more rapidly toward the objectives you describe in your letter.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph Palmer 2nd
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for African Affairs

VIRGINIA C. GILDERSLEEVE
BEDFORD VILLAGE
NEW YORK

*reply drafted in
AFN: DR Noland,
SABoney, Jr. - 3-26-57
4-2-57*

January 21, 1957

*Draft file
2/21
dc*

His Excellency Dwight D. Eisenhower
President of the United States
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

I was deeply touched by your personal note to me on the eve of Election Day, thanking me for the telegram which congratulated you on your courage and moral integrity in dealing with Middle East affairs. Now I venture to send you a few ideas concerning this troubled region for which I have worked during many years. These suggestions may conceivably be of some use or stimulus to you and your Middle East advisers.

There will be no real peace in the Middle East so long as the Arab-Israeli enmity continues to be so bitter. As for any sort of permanent settlement between the two sides, experts seem to agree that that has become absolutely impossible for the present, because the Israeli invasion of Egypt so greatly increased the passionate hatred felt by the Arabs for the Zionists. The UN can perhaps preserve a "cease fire" by cordons of Emergency Police or barbed wire along the boundaries, but that is not peace.

We must therefore use this interval to try to make real peace possible in future by draining off some of the hate and fear, the bitter emotions of resentment against injustice, which now block the road to peace. We have limited ourselves too much to military, financial, and political methods. The tragic problem needs a new, bold, imaginative approach. Here is just one example of how America might begin to win again the confidence of the Arab world.

PUBLIC SERVICES DIV.

54

AUG 29 1957

FILED

IN/A
Central
Files

674.84A/1-2157

LWS

674.84A/1-2157

This Document Must Be Returned to

VIRGINIA C. GILDERSLEEVE
BEDFORD VILLAGE
NEW YORK

- 2 -

The Arabs are a very proud people, proud of their great culture of the past, which preserved for us the riches of ancient learning and added to them when Europe was sunk in darkness, proud of their beautiful, oratorical, poetic language. They care far more for being Arabs than for the governments of the new separate nations recently risen from the Arab world. They feel that as Arabs they have been despised and insulted by the West. They desperately need something to restore their sense of personal dignity and recognition by the West of their proud place in Mediterranean history.

If we can give them this we may gradually rewin their friendship and confidence. We can never buy it with money or economic development.

The creation by the West, or rather with the help of the West, of a distinguished Center of Arab Culture (a kind of "Arab Williamsburg" plus a university) at the western end of the Mediterranean would appeal deeply to the pride and the imagination of the Arab world. This Center would preserve the best of Arab culture. To it would come many of the most brilliant young Arabs, to learn of the great history and powers of their race, and many young scholars of the West, to discover how to appreciate the achievements of Arab culture and understand the nature of Arabs. This Center would not be designed to westernize Arabs (though it might incidentally achieve something of that) but rather to restore them in some slight measure to that brilliant place they long occupied in the Mediterranean world, and keep them from slipping wholly into the Orient.

Where should the Center be? Perhaps in Spain, which we should certainly use as a link with the "Moorish" world. Spain is eager to become the "big brother" of the Arabs. She has just released Spanish Morocco. She is eager to regain prestige as a Mediterranean power. She is a "natural" where Arabs are concerned, for their blood is in her veins, their highest forms of culture are represented in her

VIRGINIA C. GILDERSLEEVE
BEDFORD VILLAGE.
NEW YORK

- 3 -

culture. Possibly Spain might be induced, for a considerable sum, to set aside the Alhambra, the finest example of Moorish architecture, and an area adjacent to it, for the great Center of Arab Culture.

Failing Spain, I feel sure that Morocco would be happy to offer land for such a Center, increasing her own prestige as well as emphasizing the Mediterranean quality of Arab culture as opposed to the Asiatic.

You, Mr. President, who as President of Columbia University developed the fine Conference Center at Arden, can appreciate what this new project might mean in bridging the chasm between our minds and the Arabs, turning their thoughts from their bitter grievances of today to the glories of the past and the possibilities of the future.

With your support the plan could doubtless secure the necessary funds from one or more of the great American Foundations. It should not, of course, be financed or controlled by our Government, though it should have your impetus and blessing as one of the first manifestations of the spirit of the Eisenhower Doctrine, which many of the Arabs now misunderstand. It would follow well after the visit of King Saud, which you have so wisely arranged and which will, I hope, soothe to some extent the wounded pride of the Arabs.

I venture to put these ideas before you because I have long been closely associated with Arabs. I think I know their character and I think they trust me.

Believe me, Mr. President,

Sincerely yours,

Virginia C. Gildersleeve.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

38
ActionNEA
Info

RMR

SS
G
SP
C
EUR
L
IO
USUN
E
PUOP
OLIOCB
USIA
CIA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIRDCL
ICA

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 874, JANUARY 22

UNCLASSIFIED

Control: 13155
Rec'd: JANUARY 23, 1957
5:48 AM

1957 JAN 23 AM 11 14

NEA
SAGIT CENTER

674.84A/1-2257

HBS

ISRAEL REACTION TO UN 5-DAY-FOR-WITHDRAWAL RESOLUTION COMBINED RESENTMENT THAT WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL BUT "VITAL POINTS" WAS NOT PROPERLY APPRECIATED, WITH RELIEF (1) THAT RESOLUTION DID NOT CALL FOR SANCTIONS AND (2) THAT IMPORTANT NATIONS EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING OF ISRAEL'S APPREHENSION ABOUT ITS SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AS LINKED RESPECTIVELY TO GAZA STRIP AND TIRAN STRAITS.

ON LAST POINT JERUSALEM POST SAID "ALMOST UNANIMOUS GA REITERATION THAT ISRAEL SHOULD LEAVE SINAI DESERT IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN GENERAL REALIZATION OF WHAT RETURN TO STATUS QUO WOULD INEVITABLY LEAD TO SUCH RETURN MIGHT WELL MEAN RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES SPREADING WITHOUT DOUBT INTO GENERAL CONFLAGRATION INVOLVING WHOLE OF MIDDLE EAST CONSEQUENT RUSSIAN INTERVENTION AND PRACTICAL CERTAINTY OF THIRD WORLD WAR". SIMILARLY, HAARETZ (INDEPENDENT) DECLARED "WESTERN POWERS HAVE ALREADY INFORMED HAMMARSKJOLD THEY WON'T ACCEPT RETURN TO STATUS QUO AND THAT UNEF SHOULD BE POSTED ALONG STRAITS UNTIL FINAL RESOLUTION IS FOUND."

ALL PAPERS, EXCEPT COMMUNIST, REITERATED ESSENTIALITY IDF REMAINING IN PRESENT POSITIONS TIRAN AND GAZA AGAINST ANY PRESSURE IN ABSENCE EFFECTIVE GUARANTEES. COMMENT BY DAVAR (HISADRUT) WAS TYPICAL: "STRONGEST MOST TANGIBLE GUARANTEE FOR FREE PASSAGE AND BORDER SECURITY WOULD BE IDF MAINTENANCE POSTS NOT YET EVACUATED. WHOEVER DEMANDS EVACUATION BY IDF SHOULD PROPOSE OR PROVIDE SUBSTITUTE... ISRAEL WILL NOT WITHDRAW FROM HER CLAIMS FOR ABSOLUTE SECURITY ON LAND AND SEA AND WILL FIRMLY ADHERE TO THESE DEMANDS REGARDLESS OF HARDSHIP AND SUFFERING." HERUT WENT FARTHER TO SAY "THERE WILL BE NO MORE WITHDRAWALS EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT GUARANTEES. ONLY FORCE CAPABLE OF GUARANTEEING ISRAEL'S VITAL INTERESTS WHERE UN HAS FAILED FOR EIGHT YEARS IS IDF."

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNCLASSIFIED

THERE IS

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS ACTION

UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 874, JANUARY 22, FROM TEL AVIV

THERE IS CONTINUED SPECULATION THAT US HAS SECRETLY APPLIED SANCTIONS WHICH, SOME THOUGHT, MIGHT BE INTENSIFIED. ACCORDING TO DAVAR, "USG HAS NOT WAITED FOR UN RESOLUTIONS BUT SINCE SINAI CAMPAIGN HAS FROZEN GRANT IN AID TO ISRAEL AND SALES OF SURPLUS FOOD, IN ADDITION TO DISCONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND IRRIGATION LOAN OF \$75 MILLION WHICH WAS ABOUT TO BE APPROVED. THIS FREEZING, WHICH ISRAEL HOPES IS TEMPORARY, AFFECTS FOREIGN CURRENCY AND DEVELOPMENT BUDGETS JUST NOW WHEN ISRAEL IS PREPARING TO ADMIT AND ABSORB ABOUT 100,000 IMMIGRANTS WHO WOULD BE EMPLOYED IN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. SOME NEWSPAPERS HURRIED TO PUBLISH UNRELIABLE REPORTS ABOUT ECONOMIC EMERGENCY PLANS BEING PREPARED BY ECONOMIC DEPARTMENTS. PUBLICATION OF MISLEADING DETAILS CAN ONLY SPUR SPECULATORS TO FISH IN MURKY WATERS OF IMPENDING ECONOMIC CRISIS. NEW ECONOMIC POSITION MAY REQUIRE CHECKING OF PERSONAL EXPENDITURE, INCREASED PRODUCTION AND EXPORTS AND REGIME OF SUBSISTENCE BASED ON ISRAEL'S OWN RESOURCES. IT IS ISRAEL'S DUTY, HOWEVER, TO AVERT SLUMP LIKELY TO AFFECT POSSIBILITIES OF ABSORBING WAVE OF IMMIGRATION NOW EXPECTED."

AL HAMISHMAR (MAPAM) SAID THAT BOTH USSR AND US HAD ALREADY APPLIED SANCTIONS, FIRST CANCELLING OIL CONTRACTS. LATTER STOPPING ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL AID. IT QUOTED AHUD AVRIEL, MAPAI MK, AS SAYING US WILL CAUSE "GREAT DETERIORATION OF ISRAEL'S ECONOMIC POSITION BY COVERT MEANS WHICH WILL NOT AROUSE PUBLIC OPINION. (EXTENSION OF THIS PRESSURE) WILL AFFECT EACH CITIZEN, EACH HOUSE, EACH FAMILY AND IS LIKELY TO HAVE MORE SERIOUS EFFECTS THAN GENERAL MOBILIZATION. EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL MAY BE FORCED FOR FEW WEEKS TO LIVE ON HER OWN RESERVES WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF BUYING ABROAD, WE WILL NOT GIVE IN. ISRAEL WILL FIGHT FOR HER RIGHTS UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCE AND USE ALL HER MEANS."

ALL PAPERS PROMINENTLY FRONTPAGED SPEECH BY BEN GURION TO CENTRAL COUNCIL OF MAPAI KIBBUTZIM IN WHICH HE DECLARED THAT "IF FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH GULF OF EILAT IS NOT ADEQUATELY GUARANTEED, WE WILL MAKE OUR OWN GUARANTEES." HE URGED KIBBUTZIM TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING CHAIN OF OUTPOSTS FROM BEERSHEBA TO EILAT. "NONE OF OUR PROJECTS," HE SAID, "WILL ASSUME REALITY UNLESS THEY ARE GUARDED BY SETTLEMENTS IN DEEP SOUTH."

LAWSON

VH

MAP 15 1977

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 22, 1957

SUBJECT: Israel Withdrawal

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
G - Robert Murphy
NE - Donald C. Bergus

COPIES TO: S/S(2cc), G(cc), U(cc), NEA(cc), NE(2cc), IO(cc), USUN(cc)

Mr. Shiloah handed Mr. Murphy the paper setting forth the Israel position on the Sharm el Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip. The original had been handed to the UN Secretary General by Ambassador Eban. On Sharm el Sheikh, the Israelis were willing to withdraw their forces from the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba to be replaced by the UNEF. What was required was the making precise of the function of the UNEF, the fact that its departure from the area was a matter for UNEF to decide, and the stationing of UNEF in the Sharm el Sheikh area until another effective means had been found to secure free navigation through the Gulf of Aqaba and to prevent hostilities in that area. Israel felt that the Secretary General should take some initiative along these lines but up to now he had been quite formalistic. Mr. Shiloah thought it would be helpful if the United States exerted its influence to prevent the present situation from becoming frozen or reaching an impasse.

On Gaza, Israel hoped that the United States would see the merit of Israel's proposal that Israel's services be used in the administration of the area. Israel foresaw a situation where there would be three effective elements in the administration of Gaza: the United Nations, local government, and Israel elements, particularly in the field of internal security.

Mr. Murphy said that we would look into these matters. Mr. Shiloah thought it would be useful if Mr. Eban and he had an opportunity to

discuss this

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

discuss this situation with the Secretary. What he envisaged was a private talk along the lines of previous discussions, where the press was not informed of the fact that the Israel Ambassador was calling, and the private entrance to the Secretary's office was used. Mr. Murphy said he would see if this could be worked out. He mentioned the Secretary's heavy schedule during the next few days.

NEA:NE:DCBergus:crm
1/23/57

CONFIDENTIAL

TO:

2/7/57
NEH/p- Mr. Fuge

FROM: P:SEV - Charles E. Rushing

3305 - SA-20

- Ext. 3741 or 2830

I would appreciate receiving any suggestions for replying to the attached communication.

If you prefer to answer directly, would you kindly send a copy of your reply to me? Thank you.

MRS. WOOLSEY CARMALT

21 Belmont Avenue, Northampton, Massachusetts

Jan 15

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED TO THE MR/R CENTRAL FILES

674.84A/1-2257 US/10

Dear Mr. President
I am enclosing
article from the
Herald-Tribune
I am sad the Egyptian
people could not
get the medicine from
where
their
But wishes always
Margaret Carmalt

RECEIVED DIV.

1957 JAN 26 AM 10 20

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RECEIVED DIV.

JUN 4 1957

1957 JUN 4 PM 9 20

PUBLIC SERVICES DIV.

674.84A/1-2257

A Middle Eastern Double Standard?

By Marguerite Higgins

Is this fair if we do?

WHY is American policy today in the Mid-East so suspect? Is it really all the result of wicked Communist propaganda? Or—as many Arabs claim—is this country continuing a double standard aimed at manipulating governments and gaining its own way in spite of the will of the Mid-Eastern people? If the United States is to try and retrieve the situation in the Mid-East it is certainly elementary psychology that we must at least understand — whether we agree or not—the prevailing attitudes.



Higgins

And a good place to begin is with three events that went comparatively unnoticed in this country but — from the Mid-East point of view — do much to explain the renewed outburst of anti-American sentiment that followed the honeymoon occasioned by this country's stand against the triple aggression against Egypt.

The first event was the State Department's rebuff of an Egyptian request to be permitted to purchase 200,000 tons of surplus wheat and \$5 million worth of medicine, the latter being particularly short in Port Said, which bore the brunt of the attack.

All this, of course, raises the question of just what the American policy is to be vis-a-vis Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Is it now our policy to withhold all aid from Egypt in the hope that Nasser will be toppled by economic difficulties in his own country?

And is it sound policy — if we are trying to win confidence in the Mid-East — to work for the downfall of the Arab figure whom the vast majority of the masses in the Mid-East look on as a hero?

Our first concern must be the Mid-East as a whole. Does the refusal of medicine and wheat to the Egyptians do anything but damage American desire to win friends and convince the Arabs

of her genuine desire to promote their prosperity and independence?

How can we reproach Egypt for turning to the Soviet bloc for assistance (which was granted) if we refuse her requests to us?

This last week in Washington a highly respected Arab statesman (not Egyptian) commented: "America gained much respect in the Arab world for her opposition to the invasion of Egypt. But we cannot understand your subsequent actions. It is clear to us (though we can't admit it publicly) that the United States must come to the rescue of its European allies because their strength is your strength. In your eyes you were not rewarding aggression but helping friends in need. But having come to the aid in terms of millions of dollars to the aggressors, how can you — traditionally a charitable nation — refuse to grant at least token aid to the victims of aggression? You don't have to prop up Nasser's regime. But what have you to lose with a grant of medicine and the shipment of some wheat? It is the people of Egypt you are hurting, not Nasser. But most of all you hurt yourselves."

Shortly after Egypt's request for wheat and medicine was rebuffed, a second — and related — event took place. This was the State Department's announcement that Israel had been granted the right to purchase \$1.9 million dollars worth of surplus American corn.

Now this correspondent believes that Israel should be permitted whatever she needs from this country whether it be corn, wheat or medicine.

But it is not hard to understand why the Arab world should find a considerable element of double standard in the fact that Israel, which committed the aggression, should be given the right to purchase surplus goods while the same right is denied to Egypt, the victim of the aggression.

The third event was the United States announcement that it was sympathetic to Poland's desire to obtain long-term credits to buy wheat in this country. For the cynics, the obvious quip was that the best way to get aid is to start a war (like Israel, Britain and France) or be a Communist nation that drops hints of going Titoist.

Certainly in the long run the success or failure of the free world's policy is going to be deeply involved in its relations with Egypt. It is equally certain that the controversy over Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser is going to rage for a long time. There is no doubt that, in Western eyes, Nasser has an absolute genius for bad timing and horrible public relations.

His expulsion of British, French and stateless Jews from Egypt was a terrible tragedy for them — and for Egypt — which had always had such a proud record of tolerance. And yet, if we are not to have a double standard we must remember that in times of desperation nations do desperate things—as witness Israel's expulsion of nearly a million Arabs during and after the 1948 conflict.

During his testimony, Secretary Dulles expressed the conviction that Nasser was not as bad as painted in the press and also the faith that the Arab world, being religious and God fearing, had a natural antipathy to communism as such. Granted that this antipathy exists, there is something terribly wrong in the fact that Communist influence has managed to penetrate as far as it has already.

America now carries a terrible responsibility not just for ourselves but for the people of Israel and the citizens of Western Europe. Israel would be mortally endangered should America fail to gain trust and confidence of the Arab world. Soviet Premier Bulganin himself has predicted the "end of Israel" as a nation should Communists gain the upper hand. And as everybody knows the loss of oil would paralyze Europe.

But as an Arab leader recently expressed it: "If America can apply the same standards to the Arabs as it does to Israel, Britain and France, if you can really prove yourselves to be — so far as the Mid-East is concerned — really fair, it will do more than all the promises of dollars and sales of arms. At the time of the invasion of Egypt, America's actions caused us to believe that the beginning of the end of the double standard was at hand. Now we are in doubt. So long as the doubt exists, America cannot be fully welcome in the middle East."

June 18 1957

Dear Mrs. Carmalt:

After consideration at the White House your letter of January 22, 1957 to President Eisenhower concerning assistance to Egypt has been referred to this Department so that we might also see your comments. I deeply regret the inadvertently long delay in this response.

As you may know, the funds blocked by order of the United States Treasury, following seizure of the Universal Canal Company, were those held at that time for the account of the Government of Egypt and its instrumentalities and those funds that were held for the account of the Universal Suez Canal Company. The order does not affect funds acquired by the Government of Egypt or its instrumentalities subsequent to the date of the blocking order and does not preclude Egypt from financing essential imports from unblocked assets which Egypt has.

You may be interested in the comments of Secretary Dulles concerning problems arising from payment of tolls to the Egyptian authority by American ships, and the freezing of Egyptian funds to protect against such risks. A Department of State release of the Secretary's news conference of April 2 is enclosed. The exchange in question is found at the bottom of page five and the top of page six.

Please be assured that your interest in writing the President in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

John P. Maggar
Chief
Public Services Division

Enclosure:

✓ As stated.

Mrs. Woolsey Carmalt,
21 Belmont Avenue,
Northampton, Massachusetts.

NEA/P:Frye (J)

P:SEV:PDConstable:CR:rjw

S/S-CR

JUN 17 1957 P.M.

Info re blocked assets
cleared by L/E-Mr. Metzger (I)

6/13/57

674.842/1-2257

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

31

SECRET

Action

NEA

Control: 14001

Rec'd: January 24, 1957
7:14 a.m.

Info

RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 882, January 23, 6 p.m.

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

P

UOP

O

OLI

IOP

OCB

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

SENT. DEPARTMENT 882; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 156, JIDDA 12, DAMASCUS 109, LONDON 180, PARIS 150, USUN 39, JERUSALEM UNNUMBERED

JERUSALEM POST (which frequently voices official view) this morning reports Cabinet met yesterday "in extraordinary session" to consider basis statement GOI policy on guarantees for Tiran Straits and on future of Gaza strip. Embassy is informed that Ben Gurion will deliver this statement to "very important" special session Knesset this afternoon.

Cabinet reportedly discussed proposals arising during Eban-Hammarskjold talks in New York with attention centered on possibility changing function UNEF from supervision Sinai evacuation to indefinite control sensitive areas. Article notes "strong opinion" in west that Israel must be assured basic security Tiran and Gaza but adds that Assembly vote probably necessary to change UNEF function and make its duties and tenure UN responsibility.

Explanation of proposals considered may represent GOI thinking which Embassy assumes is available to Department in more detail in Washington or through USUN. On Tiran GOI wants "effective provision" that Egypt cannot re-establish shore batteries. On Gaza three problems enumerated:

- 1) Security-no international force can stop Fedayeen. Israel willing withdraw IDF and substitute civil police.
- 2) Development- Israel prepared "lend every cooperation to prosperity and growth of area" including irrigation network tie-in and marketing facilities. Exports already 100,000 cases Gaza citrus noted.
- 3) Refugees- primarily UN responsibility as part larger problem but Israel "prepared to contribute to permanent solution.

Comment: Gaza

PERMANENT

SECRET

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of reproduction taken.

This Document must be returned to the RM/R Central Files

674.84A/1-2357

CAA

SECRET FILE

FILED

MAY 20 1957

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED

Destroyed in RM/R

Copy No(s)

SECRET

-2- 882, January 23, 6 p.m. from Tel Aviv

Comment: Gaza proposals are logical extension Ben Gurion's views presented earlier this month to me and British Ambassador (EMBTELS 812 and 837). GOI has in fact been proceeding as if Israel civil administration in Gaza strip would be permanent. Irrigation tie-in began immediately after hostilities ceased (EMBTEL 567) and communications and administrative coordination now far advanced.

Press editorial comment this morning stresses necessity Israel standing fast in present positions unless adequate guarantees received. Egyptian aggressive intent is viewed with concern, fear of "formal" but inadequate guarantees is expressed, and suggestion made Hammarskjold feels he must be able offer Egypt parallel posting UNEF in both Israel and Egypt. Most papers flatly reject this possibility.

LAWSON

SW:DT

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

58-B
Action
IO

Info
RMR

SS
G
SP
C
EUR
NEA
L
IO
E
P
O

FROM: Ottawa

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 353, January 23, 4 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 353; REPEATED INFORMATION NEW YORK 15.

DEPARTMENT PASS USUN

Under-Secretary Leger handed me January 23 aide memoire expressing grave view Canadian Government takes of existing Arab-Israeli impasse in GA. Text contained in my immediately following telegram. Pearson in New York pessimistic over current GA trend. He and External Affairs believe US alone possesses sufficient influence with both Arabs and Israeli to produce constructive outcome.

Cabinet here will consider subject morning January 24 and presumably act on recommendation due from Pearson tonight as to how Canada should vote on any GA resolution condemnatory of Israel and imposing economic sanctions. If Cabinet decision is to vote against such resolution, then it would consider further question of whether or not Canada would participate in imposition of sanctions if resolution was nevertheless carried.

Leger expressed no doubt US completely shares Canadian estimate gravity of situation and outcome to be sought. Canadian fear is that we under estimate our influence with both parties and purpose aide memoire essentially is to urge us exert every effort.

Pearson last night reported Hammarskjold extremely discouraged following his talks with Israeli and Egyptian delegates. Fear is that Secretary General will not include in his report to Assembly recommendations that UNEF move into Gaza strip and Gulf area and accept responsibility policing armistice which in Canadian view would provide best approach. Canadian paternity UNEF an element, but there is no doubt Canadian Government genuinely alarmed over possibility complete break down UN effort in Middle East.

Leger

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

674A.84A/1-2357

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

This Document must be Registered
in the RM/R Central Files

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 353, January 23, 4 p.m. from Ollow

Leger asked me pass him any word regarding our attitude which I might receive before Cabinet meeting in morning, but I hold out no strong hope that I would receive any reply that soon.

MERCHANT

AB:SGC

Note: Passed USUN, 1/23/57, 8 p.m. CTW 696-R

CONFIDENTIAL

NND 897403
BOX 2677

9B
1/3/C

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 674.84A/1-2357
Tel 354
Date 1/23/57
From Ottawa
To SecState

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☒ Security-Classified Information
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

State
Authority

1/4/89
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

9B

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

EAU OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS

47-D
Action

1140/6

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 13788
Rec'd: JANUARY 23, 1957
11:08 PM

*Ship
10
new/19
file*

IO

FROM: NEW YORK

Info

MESSAGE CENTER

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS
G
SP
C
EUR
NEA
L
R
O

NO: DELGA 571, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M.

NIACT

FOR SECRETARY AND WILCOX FROM LODGE

RE GAZA AND AQABA

HAMMARSKJOLD REPORT RE ABOVE SUBJECT AND ISRAEL AIDE MEMOIRE
CONTAINING ISRAELI PROPOSALS BEING SENT IN SUBSEQUENT TELEGRAMS.
REPORT TO BE MADE PUBLIC ON FRIDAY.

HAMMARSKJOLD REPORT EMPHASIZES IMPORTANCE BROADER IMPLEMENTATION
OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. IT CONTAINS SUGGESTIONS FOR STATIONING
UNEF ON BOTH SIDES ARMISTICE LINE WITH UNEF ASSUMING SUPERVISORY
DUTIES OF TSO IN ALL TERRITORIES WHERE TSO NOW FUNCTIONS UNDER
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. SYG EXPRESSES
VIEW MAY BE DESIRABLE IN DUE TIME TO HAVE LEGAL STATUS OF
GULF OF AQABA DEFINITELY DETERMINED. HE SAYS THAT WITH BROADER
IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, PARTIES SHOULD BE ASKED
TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL NOT ASSERT ANY BELLIGERENT
RIGHTS, INCLUDING SUCH RIGHTS IN GULF OF AQABA AND STRAITS
OF TIRAN. HE ENVISAGES UNEF UNITS WILL ENTER SHARM ELNSEHIKH
AREA UPON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. HE EXCLUDES UNITED
NATIONS ACCEPTANCE ISRAEL CONTROL OVER GAZA AREA.

ISRAEL AIDE MEMOIRE MAKES FOLLOWING MAIN POINTS:

A) UNEF FORCES ALONG WESTERN COAST OF GULF OF AQABA WITH FUNCTION
ENSURING THAT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IS MAINTAINED AND THAT
BELLIGERENT ACTS AVOIDED IN GULF AND STRAITS;

(B) UNEF TO STAY IN GULF AREA UNTIL PEACE SETTLEMENT ACHIEVED

(C) NO ISRAELI

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION OF THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

674.84A/1-2357

PA

FILED
JAN 23 1959

CLASSIFIED

674.84A/1-2357

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DELGA 571, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

(C) NO ISRAELI MILITARY FORCES TO REMAIN IN AREA OF GAZA, AND ISRAELIS WILL SUPPLY ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES AND UTILITIES, DEVELOP LOCAL ADMINISTRATION AND MAINTAIN LAW AND ORDER;

(D) SINCE ISRAELIS CARRY ON NECESSARY SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS, ENTRY OF UNEF INTO GAZA AREA IS NOT ENVISAGED UNDER ISRAEL PLAN.

(E) ISRAEL WILL MAKE FULL CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS ANY UNITED NATIONS PLAN FOR THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEES, INCLUDING THOSE IN GAZA.

I SAW HAMMARSKJOLD AND BUNCHE TONIGHT AT THEIR REQUEST. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE HAD SEEN PEARSON WHO HAD REACTED FAVORABLY TO HIS DRAFT REPORT. HE HAD ALSO JUST SEEN FAWZI WHO WAS CRITICAL OF SEVERAL OF THE FORMULATIONS IN THE REPORT BUT, IN GENERAL, WAS NOT UPSET OVER IT.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT HE BELIEVES HIS REPORT IS NOT VERY FAR FROM THE SECRETARY'S THINKING, AND THAT ONE OF THE FIRM ELEMENTS IN THE ENTIRE PICTURE IS IMPORTANCE OF IMPLEMENTING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

HAMMARSKJOLD DESCRIBED THE ISRAELI POSITION AS UNFORTUNATE AND CONTRARY TO THE UNITED NATIONS. HE SAID THE ISRAELIS WERE TRYING TO ANNEX GAZA. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID ISRAELI INSISTENCE THAT UNEF REMAIN IN STRAITS AREA UNTIL A PEACE SETTLEMENT WAS ACHIEVED WAS IMPOSSIBLE.

IN HIS VIEW, THE ISRAELI POSITION OPPOSING UNEF IN GAZA HAS PUT IN SERIOUS QUESTION ISRAELI LEGAL CLAIMS TO THE AREA. WHEN THE ISRAELIS INFORMED HIM THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO MAKE FULL CONTRIBUTION TO ANY UN PLAN FOR PERMANENT SETTLEMENT REFUGEES, INCLUDING GAZA, HAMMARSKJOLD ASKED WHETHER THIS WOULD INCLUDE REPATRIATION. EBAN'S RESPONSE WAS "I DO NOT WISH TO ELABORATE". WHEN HAMMARSKJOLD ASKED EBAN WHY ISRAELIS WERE AGAINST UNEF FORCE IN GAZA, EBAN'S RESPONSE WAS "THAT IT IS SIMPLY A MATTER OF OPINION".

HAMMARSKJOLD

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- DELGA 571, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

HAMMARSKJOLD BELIEVES THAT IF PRESSURE CAN BE PUT ON THE ISRAELIS TO GET OUT, ~~IT IS POSSIBLE TO GET AGREEMENT ON MANY OF THE THINGS WHICH ISRAELIS DESIRE.~~ HAMMARSKJOLD EMPHASIZED THAT CAIRO CANNOT MAKE CONCESSIONS BEFORE ISRAELIS HAVE WITHDRAWN BECAUSE SUCH CONCESSIONS WOULD APPEAR AS FRUITS OF AGGRESSION. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID THAT FAWZI DID NOT CRITICIZE SYG'S REPORT ON THE BASIS OF SUBSTANCE BUT RATHER FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF TIMING. HAMMARSKJOLD BELIEVES THAT THE EGYPTIAN POSITION HAS BEEN STRENGTHENED AS A RESULT OF THE ADAMANT STAND TAKEN BY THE ISRAELIS, AND THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL LOSE BOTH VOTES AND FRIENDS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

HAMMARSKJOLD PUT PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE FACT THAT THE SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN HIS REPORT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED IF THE ISRAELIS COMPLETE THEIR WITHDRAWALS FROM SINAI. HAMMARSKJOLD BELIEVES, AND HE REPORTED PEARSON HAS SIMILAR VIEW, THAT ~~THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN THE SYG'S REPORT WHICH CAN BE PUT INTO A RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE CONSTRUCTIVE STEP FORWARD.~~ HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT NUMBER OF HIS SUGGESTIONS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE EGYPTIANS, IF THEY WERE CONSIDERED AFTER THE ISRAELIS HAD WITHDRAWN.

HAMMARSKJOLD'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE NEW ISRAELI POLICY WAS PERSONAL WITH BEN GURION AND WAS NOT AGREED TO BY SOME OF THE ISRAELI OFFICIALS HERE.

THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT IT IS A BLUFF -- AN EXTREME POSITION FROM WHICH THEY MAY BE WILLING TO RETREAT BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH A BELIEF.

THEY ARE APPARENTLY COUNTING ON AMERICAN SUPPORT. THEY HAVE DELIBERATELY ADOPTED A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT POLICY AND ARE PREPARED FOR THE WORST.

THIS POLICY MAKES INEVITABLE A RESOLUTION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO GET A TWO-THIRDS VOTE FOR AUTHORIZATION OF THE UN EMERGENCY FORCE TO DO ALL THE THINGS THE ISRAELIS WANT TO HAVE DONE.

THIS IS A VERY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-4- DELGA 571, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

THIS IS A VERY UNFORTUNATE TURN OF EVENTS ON A PAR WITH THE INVASION OF SINAI ON OCTOBER 29 OF WHICH IT IS A CONTINUATION. IT IS OF COURSE A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THE RESOLUTION ON WITHDRAWAL.

I RECOMMEND THAT A HIGH-LEVEL EFFORT BE MADE IN WASHINGTON TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS THAT THEY ARE GOING AGAINST THEIR OWN BEST INTERESTS, AND THAT IN ADOPTING THIS POLICY THEY HAVE PREVENTED THE SECRETARY GENERAL FROM WORKING OUT ALL THE THINGS WHICH ARE IN THEIR BEST INTERESTS. IF THESE FAIL, PRESSURE SHOULD BE EXERTED TO BRING ABOUT A CHANGE OF AN ATTITUDE WHICH IS DANGEROUS TO WORLD PEACE, TO THE UN AND TO THE US. IF IT WAS JUSTIFIABLE TO APPLY PRESSURE TO GET THEM TO WITHDRAW FROM SINAI, IT IS EQUALLY JUSTIFIABLE TO DO SO NOW.

LODGE

CV

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

44
Action *und/6 am*

IO FROM: NEW YORK

Info RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M.

G
SP
C
EUR
NEA

L
R
O
VERBATIM TEXT

FOR SECRETARY AND WILCOX FROM LODGE

RE AIDE MEMOIRE ON THE ISRAEL POSITION ON THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH
AREA AND THE GAZA STRIP

A. BACKGROUND

1. IN CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE SYG AND THE ISRAEL DEL DURING
DECEMBER 1956 AND JANUARY 1957 IT WAS AGREED THAT THE DISCUSSION
OF THE PROBLEMS OF SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND THE GAZA STRIP BELONGED
TO THE FINAL STAGE OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. THERE IS AN
INTERNATIONAL INTEREST INVOLVED IN THE FORMER; AND THE
PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE LATTER ARE ESPECIALLY COMPLEX.

2. ISRAEL'S APPROACH TO THESE, AS TO OTHER PROBLEMS, IS
INFLUENCED PRIMARILY BY THE POLICY OF BELLIGERENCY MAINTAINED
BY EGYPT FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THIS POLICY FINDS EXPRESSION
IN THE EGYPTIAN DOCTRINE OF A "STATE OF WAR"; IN EGYPT'S
REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S CHARTER RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY,
INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY; AND IN THE ORGANIZATION BY EGYPT
OF HOSTILE ACTS INCLUDING RAIDS; ARMED ATTACKS; AND BLOCKADE
ACTIVITIES IN THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE GULF OF AQABA.

IT IS CLEAR THAT ISRAEL'S POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT MUST BE INFLUENCED
BY EGYPT'S POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL, SINCE THE DUTIES OF MEMBER
STATES TOWARDS EACH OTHER UNDER THE CHARTER ARE GOVERNED
BY THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY. FOR THIS REASON THE GOVERNMENT
OF ISRAEL HAS ATTEMPTED TO ELICIT A DEFINITION OF EGYPT'S

BASIC POLICY

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

Do not be returned
to the RM/R central files

674.34A/1-2357

PA

MAY 28 1959

CLASSIFIED

674.34A/1-2357

- 2 - DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

BASIC POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL. ON 4 NOV 1956 AND THEREAFTER ISRAEL ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY WHETHER EGYPT INTENDS TO MAINTAIN A STATE OF WAR AGAINST ISRAEL; WHETHER SHE AGREES TO RECALL FEDAYEEN GANGS UNDER HER CONTROL IN OTHER TERRITORIES; WHETHER SHE WILL SUSPEND THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AND BLOCKADE OF ISRAELI BOUND SHIPPING IN THE SUEZ CANAL; AND WHETHER SHE WILL AGREE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL WITH A VIEW TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE. EGYPT'S LACK OF RESPONSE TO THESE QUESTIONS CAN ONLY BE INTERPRETED AS SIGNIFYING THAT EGYPT INTENDS TO MAINTAIN HER BELLIGERENT POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL ON LAND, SEA AND IN THE AIR.

3. THIS CONSIDERATION STRENGTHENS ISRAEL'S CONCERN TO ENSURE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF HER FORCES FROM EGYPT SHOULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN IN SUCH MANNER AS TO STRENGTHEN THE SERIOUS LIKELIHOOD OF WARLIKE ACTS AGAINST HER.

4. THE POSITION WOULD BE RADICALLY DIFFERENT IF EGYPT WOULD AGREE TO A POLICY OF SIMULTANEOUS LIQUIDATION OF BELLIGERENT ACTS. ISRAEL IS WILLING AT ANY TIME TO SIGN A PROTOCOL OR OTHER INSTRUMENT FOR THE MUTUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS LIQUIDATION OF BELLIGERENCY; OR A NON-AGGRESSION PACT.

B. THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH AREA

1. THE AIM IS THE SIMULTANEOUS RECONCILIATION OF TWO OBJECTIVES - THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES, AND THE GUARANTEEING OF PERMANENT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, BY THE PREVENTION OF BELLIGERENT ACTS AGAINST SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE GULF OF AQABA, WHICH HAVE THE CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE EXISTS.

2. THE NEED FOR ACCOMPANYING ANY WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES BY RELATED MEASURES FOR ENSURING FREE NAVIGATION AND THE PREVENTION OF BELLIGERENCY IS DICTATED BY THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

(A) FOR SIX YEARS EGYPT IMPOSED ILLEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE
PASSAGE OF

- 3 - DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

PASSAGE OF SHIPPING TO ELATH BY THE USE AND THREAT OF FORCE,
THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GUN POSITIONS AT SHARM EL-SHEIKH.

(B) IF EGYPT WERE ABLE TO REESTABLISH HER GUN POSITIONS AND TO EXERCISE FORCIBLE RESTRICTIONS ON ISRAEL-BOUND SHIPPING A GRAVE DANGER WOULD ARISE TO PEACE AND SECURITY. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CANNOT INTEND ITS RESOLUTIONS TO LEAD, IN THE COURSE OF THEIR IMPLEMENTATION, TO THE RESTORATION OF AN ILLEGAL SITUATION WITH A CONSEQUENT ERUPTION OF CONFLICT.

(C) EGYPT HAS NOT TAKEN ANY STEPS TO COMPLY WITH THE BASIC DECISION AGAINST BELLIGERENCY AND MARITIME RESTRICTIONS ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 1 SEPT 1951. THIS FACT HAS A DIRECT EFFECT ON THE NATURE OF ISRAEL'S OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS EGYPT AND ON THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO BE SAFEGUARDED AGAINST MARITIME BLOCKADE IN OTHER WATERWAYS.

(D) MANY NATIONS HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATIONS IN THE GULF OF AQABA, AND IN THE RECENT DISCUSSION OF THE GA A WIDE CONSENSUS OF OPINION WAS HEARD IN FAVOR OF ESTABLISHING SUITABLE MEASURES FORTHWITH FOR ENSURING FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.

(E) THE DEPRIVATIONS SUFFERED IN THE PAST, AND STILL BEING SUFFERED BY MANY NATIONS, INCLUDING ISRAEL, THROUGH EGYPT'S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH HER INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE SUEZ CANAL MAKE IT IMPERATIVE TO ENSURE THAT THE BLOCKADE IS NEVER RESTORED TO THE GULF OF AQABA.

3. EGYPTIAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE DECISION OF THE SC ON 1 SEPT 1951 HAS LEGAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL PRIORITY OVER ISRAEL'S DUTY TO FULFILL RECOMMENDATIONS IN WHICH EGYPT HAS AN INTEREST. ACCORDINGLY ISRAEL FORMALLY REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ASCERTAIN EGYPT'S INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE 1951 RESOLUTION OF THE SC.

4. MANY DELS WHICH SPOKE IN THE GA DURING THE RECENT DEBATE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE UNEF MIGHT BE SO DEPLOYED AS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. SOME DELS INVITED THE

- 4 - DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

INVITED THE SYG TO MAKE PROPOSALS IN THIS CONNECTION.

5. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL CONSIDERS THAT THE UNEF COULD BE A FACTOR IN THE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM IF THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS WERE CONFIRMED AND IMPLEMENTED:

(I) ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES, THE POSITIONS EVACUATED ALONG THE WESTERN COAST OF THE GULF OF AQABA WOULD BE HELD BY THE UNEF, AS HAS BEEN THE CASE WITH OTHER AREAS FROM WHICH ISRAEL FORCES HAVE WITHDRAWN.

(II) IT WOULD BE THE FUNCTION OF THE UNEF TO SEE TO IT THAT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION WAS MAINTAINED AND BELLIGERENT ACTS AVOIDED IN THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. THE PREVENTION OF ACTS OF BELLIGERENCY IS DEFINITELY WITHIN THE MANDATE OF THE UNEF.

(III) THE UNEF WOULD REMAIN IN THE AREA UNDER DISCUSSION SO LONG AS IT HAD ITS FUNCTION TO PREVENT ANY RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES.

(IV) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS THE UNEF WOULD MAINTAIN ITS POSITION ALONG THE WESTERN SHORE OF THE GULF OF AQABA UNTIL ANOTHER EFFECTIVE MEANS WAS AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED FOR ENSURING PERMANENT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND THE ABSENCE OF BELLIGERENT ACTS IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE GULF OF AQABA.

(V) SUCH EFFECTIVE MEANS WOULD BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN FOUND WHEN A PEACE SETTLEMENT WAS ACHIEVED; OR WHEN SECURE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION WAS GUARANTEED BY OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS TO WHICH ISRAEL WAS A PARTY.

C. THE FUNCTION OF UNEF

1. ALL THE ELEMENTS IN THE ABOVE PROPOSALS (THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES; THE NEED TO GUARANTEE FREE NAVIGATION; THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE UNEF WITH THE FUNCTION OF PREVENTING BELLIGERENCY; AND THE NEED TO SECURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE SC'S RESOLUTION OF 1 SEPT 1951) WERE ADVOCATED BY MANY DELS IN THE COURSE OF THE RECENT

- 5 - DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

THE RECENT GA DEBATE.

2. IT IS EVIDENT THAT, IF THE UNEF IS TO DEVELOP ITS CAPACITY TO HELP SOLVE THIS PRBLEM, MORE CLARITY AND PECISION ARE NEEDED IN DEFINING ITS CHARACTER, ITS FUNCTIONS, AND, ABOVE ALL, THE DURATION OF ITS TENURE AND THE CONDITIONS FOR THE TERMINATIONS OF ITS ASSIGNMENTS. THE NEED FOR SUCH PRECISION IS THE MORE URGENT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT MANY DELS, INCLUDING THOSE WHOSE TROOPS COMPOSE THE FORCE, HAVE EXPRESSED CONFLICTING VIEWS ON THE FUNCTIONS AND NATURE OF THE FORCE.

D. THE GAZA STRIP

ISRAEL'S APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION COMPRISES THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

(1) THE EGYPTIAN OCCUPATION OF GAZA AROSE OUT OF ACTS OF FORCE COMMITTED IN 1948 DURING AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW A RECOMMENDATION OF THE GA, AND IN DEFIANCE OF SUCCESSIVE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS BY THE SC.

(2) THE AREA HAS NEVER BEEN PART OF EGYPT AND ITS INHABITANTS ARE NOT EGYPTIAN CITIZENS.

(3) DURING EIGHT YEARS OF OCCUPATION EGYPT USED THE GAZA STRIP SOLELY AS A SPRING-BOARD FOR ASSAULTS AGAINST ISRAEL. THE NOTORIOUS FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT HAD ITS MAIN CENTRES AND RECRUITING GROUNDS IN GAZA. AS A RESULT OF THIS FACT, GAZA WAS THE SOURCE OF CONSTANT THREATS TO PEACE AND TRANQUILITY OVER A LARGE PROPORTION OF ISRAEL'S TERRITORY.

(4) DURING THE OCCUPATION EGYPT MADE NO ATTEMPT TO REHABILITATE ANY OF GAZA'S REFUGEE POPULATION OR TO DEVELOP THE POLITICAL FREEDOM OR ECONOMIC WELFARE OF THE PERMANENT RESIDENTS OF THE ZONE.

(5) AT THE PRESENT TIME LAW AND ORDER PREVAIL IN GAZA. ITS MUNICIPAL INSTUTIONS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES ARE SOKNDLY ESTABLISHED. AUTONOMOUS LOCAL GOVERNMENT IS BEING DEVELOPED; AND NUMEROUS ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES ACCRUE TO THE ZONE FROM THE ASSOCIATION OF ITS ECONOMIC LIFE WITH THAT OF ISRAEL. A REPORT BY A REP OF THE SYG (DOC A/3491) MAKES IT CLEAR THAT HARDSHIP AND DISORDER WOULD

- 6 - DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

DISORDER WOULD RESULT FROM THE DISRUPTION OF THIS PATTERN OF GROWING STABILITY.

(6) ISRAEL DOES NOT SEEK TO ANNEX GAZA OR TO MAINTAIN ITS MILITARY FORCES THERE. ON THE OTHER HAND, ISRAEL IS THE ONLY STATE WHICH HAS A DIRECT INTEREST IN A PEACEFUL, ORDERLY AND PROSPEROUS GAZA STRIP.

IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS ISRAEL OFFERS THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMME FOR STUDY AND COMMENT:

(A) NO ISRAEL MILITARY FORCES WILL REMAIN IN THE AREA OF THE GAZA STRIP.

(B) ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPLY ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES INCLUDING AGRICULTURE, EDUCATION, HEALTH, INDUSTRY, LABOR, WELFARE.

(C) LAW AND ORDER WILL BE MAINTAINED BY THE ISRAEL POLICE (INCLUDING LOCAL POLICE).

(D) ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE AVAILABLE AND TO DEVELOP THE PUBLIC UTILITIES SUCH AS ELECTRICITY AND WATER.

(E) ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN TOWNS AND VILLAGES.

(F) ISRAEL WILL SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION OF ABOUT 80,000, TWO-THIRDS OF WHOM WERE UNEMPLOYED UNDER EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION.

(G) THE NECESSARY FUNCTIONS OF SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATION ARE ALL COVERED BY THE ABOVE PROPOSALS. AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCE WOULD NOT BE ABLE EFFECTIVELY TO UNDERTAKE THE POLICE DUTIES NECESSARY TO PREVENT A RECRUDESCENCE OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES. NOR WOULD SUCH A FORCE BE IN A POSITION TO CARRY OUT MEASURES OF ADMINISTRATION AND OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. FOR THESE REASONS THE ENTRY OF UNEF INTO THE GAZA AREA IS NOT ENVISAGED UNDER THIS PLAN.

(H) ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNRWA IN CONNECTION WITH THE

- 7 - DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

TION WITH THE CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF THE REFUGEES.

(I) ISRAEL WILL MAKE ITS FULL CONTRIUBTION TOWARDS ANY UN PLAN FOR THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEES, INCLUDING THOSE IN GAZA. ISRAEL URGES THAT SUCH PLANS BE FORMULATED AND IMPLEMENTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(J) IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE MATTERS, ISRAEL IS READY TO WORK OUT WITH THE UN A SUITABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH RESPECT TO THE GAZA STRIP.

"

LODGE

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

UNITED NATIONS
UNITED STATES MESSAGE

SENT TO: USUN NEW YORK

GADEL 116 PRIORITY

11393

1957 JAN 23 PM 7 42

DC/T

see DC/T for

Origin

Re Israeli Withdrawals

Info:

1. Since determination our position next steps Israeli withdrawal problem depends in part on attitude SYG takes ~~language~~ on measures suggested DEPTTEL 507, request you seek earliest opportunity ascertain ~~language he intends use~~ in next report.

2. We continue strongly prefer deal with Gaza and Strait Tiran problems by supporting actions taken and reported by SYG as logical interpretations UNEF's role, but would appreciate SYG's and your present estimate desirability and feasibility GA resolution this matter.

3. Meanwhile suggest you inform Canadian Del measures suggested DEPTTEL 507 and 511 and urge they seek UNEF Advisory Committee's support, recommending

4. In view reports Arabs reviving resolution/~~sanctions~~ against Israel also suggest you inform appropriate Asian-African delegations our view GA not in position vote sanctions against Israel alone so long as Egypt remains in default SC decisions (i.e. fedayeen raids and Egyptian attitude toward Israeli passage through Canal). You may wish add that although we agree Israel should not ~~profit~~/profit from incursion into Egypt, we equally anxious see that appropriate steps taken deploy UNEF in manner calculated prevent recurrence hostile action by either side.

Dist.
Desired
(Office
Only)

DC/R

Ans 68

Rev

Quellen
(7) BULLES
70 Wilcox

Drafted by:

IO:UN/SDPalma:rs

1/23/57

Telegraphic transmission and

Classification approved by:

IO - F. O. Wilcox

Clearance:

L-Mr. Meeker

G

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

JAN 23 1957 P.M.

This Document must be Returned to
RM/R
Central
Files

674.84A/1-2357

CONFIDENTIAL
674.84A/1-2357

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

14728

57 JAN 22 PM 7 27

SENT TO: USUN NEW YORK GADEL 125 PRIORITY

RE: Resolution on SYG Report and Israeli Withdrawal, DELGAS 590, 598 and GADEL 119.

Subject views set forth GADEL 123, following are Department's comments on texts contained REFTELS, most of which previously conveyed in Sisco-DePalma telecons:

1. Suggest text contained GADEL 119 be modified by:

(a) revising sixth paragraph to read QUOTE Approves the recommendations and measures proposed by the Secretary General in his report, for implementation upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces UNQUOTE and

(b) adding new final paragraph to read QUOTE Requests the SYG, in consultation with the parties concerned, to take appropriate steps to implement these recommendations and measures and to report as appropriate to the GA UNQUOTE.

2. Suggest following modifications text contained DELGA 590:

Paragraph (1) substitute QUOTE calls upon UNQUOTE for QUOTE demands that UNQUOTE ~~UNQUOTE~~

Paragraph (2) to read: QUOTE Notes with appreciation the SYG's report and approves the recommendations and measures proposed by the SYG therein, for implementation upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces. UNQUOTE

Paragraph (3) substitute QUOTE assure UNQUOTE for QUOTE represent re UNQUOTE.

Paragraph (4) should be deleted since essential point covered fully

Drafted by: IO:UNP:SDePalma:rs

1/29/57

Telegram classification approved by

IO - F. O. Wilcox

Clearance: L/UNA - Mr. Meeker

Rev

Det

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

JAN 29 1957 P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

more appropriately paragraph (5).

Requests

Paragraph (6) to read QUOTE ~~the SYG~~ the SYG to make arrangements, after consultations with the parties concerned, for the deployment of UNEF on both sides of the armistice demarcation line, including the Gaza strip, so that it may be in a position to cooperate in the supervisory duties of the Truce Supervision Organization in the areas where the Organization ~~is~~ ~~is authorized to function under the armistice agreement between Egypt and Israel, to prevent incursion and raids across the armistice demarcation line; and to maintain quiet and peaceful conditions along the line.~~ UNQUOTE

Paragraph (7) to be deleted on ground such vague language (i.e. these areas deployment) bound create future difficulty and not necessary in view provisions armistice agreement governing deployment Egyptian-Israeli forces.

~~Paragraph (8) should read QUOTE Urges that, without prejudice to possible reference of any legal questions regarding the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran, the parties to the armistice agreement refrain from asserting or exercising any belligerent rights, or from interfering in any way with shipping, in these waters.~~ UNQUOTE

Paragraph (9) should ~~read~~ read QUOTE Urges that, ^{without prejudice} ~~in order~~ to possible reference of any legal questions regarding the Gulf of Aqaba ^{and the Strait of Tiran} for determination in the International Court of Justice or another appropriate forum, the parties to the armistice agreement refrain from asserting or exercising any belligerent rights, or from interfering in any way with shipping, in these waters. UNQUOTE

3. In light GADEL (123), we are not commenting on two resolution contained DELGA 598, although above comments would apply to corresponding paragraph.

CONFIDENTIAL

DULLES
(70w)

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 23, 1957

SUBJECT: GAZA STRIP; PROBLEMS FACED BY UNRWA

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Henry R. Labouisse, Director of UNRWA
Mr. Sherwood Moe, Mr. Labouisse's Executive Assistant
IO - Francis O. Wilcox
NEA - James M. Ludlow
NE/E - Randolph Roberts
NE - Donald C. Bergus
COPIES TO: UNP - David L. Gamon

RM/R
OLI
USUN
IO
UNP
NEA

Amembassy Beirut

1-1408

1. Gaza. Mr. Labouisse said that the question of the future of the Gaza Strip poses some very difficult problems. In his opinion the area should not be placed under the exclusive control of either Israel or Egypt. He said that, while control by Israel makes better sense from the standpoint of the economy of the Strip and the welfare of its inhabitants, it is politically unfeasible; so would be Israeli administrative control under UN supervision. Neither did he favor a return of the area to exclusive Egyptian control. During the months prior to the Israeli invasion the Egyptians had made things difficult for UNRWA by not permitting Mr. Lucas and other UNRWA personnel access to the Strip to take up their tasks there, by declaring 3 UNRWA personnel persona non grata, and by refusing UNRWA personnel permission to leave the Strip. Just recently, he said, Egypt has indicated its intention to resume such tactics should it regain control of the Strip. Moreover, should the Egyptians return, they would do so as vindicated heroes with the result that conditions, insofar as UNRWA is concerned, would be worse than before. The only two remaining possible solutions, he felt, were to have the UN take over the Strip or to have the Egyptians administer the Strip under UN supervision. He mentioned that the normal cost to Egypt of administering the Strip (not including its military expenses there) were at least \$3,000,000 a year. As a face saving device for Egypt, should it not be permitted to return to the Strip unconditionally, he suggested that the UN enter into the El Agha zone at the same time that it enters the Strip. One thing that is most important, he stressed, is for the UN to enter the Strip before the Israeli withdrawal rather than after it. Any hiatus between the Israeli departure and the

arrival

CONFIDENTIAL

NOR
Central
Files

Returned 191

374.84A/1-2357 C3/F

674.84A/1-2357

12
20.51

52

157

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

arrival of UN troops would result in serious disorder, he explained. He said that he conveyed this view to both Hammarskjold and Bunche.

2. Problems Facing UNRWA. Mr. Labouisse mentioned that one of the important problems that has been facing UNRWA is discrimination against the Agency by the Egyptian and Syrian Governments. He had told officials of both governments that it was up to the host governments to decide whether they want UNRWA to operate. If so, they must give it their full cooperation; if not, other arrangements must be made, such as turning over to the host governments operational responsibility for the work so far performed by the Agency. Mr. Wilcox, agreeing with the recommendations regarding the reconsideration of the Agency's terms of reference made by Mr. Labouisse in his Annual Report to the General Assembly, and commenting on the evident lack of sincerity on the part of the Syrians in their dealings with the Agency, added that there were some doubts in his mind as to the advisability of turning over to the host governments responsibility for the refugees. He doubted that the welfare of the refugees would be safeguarded under such circumstances and felt that some effective check would have to be retained over the host governments in the event the administration of relief should go wrong.

Mr. Wilcox asked Mr. Labouisse what would happen in the Assembly if an effort were made there to turn administrative responsibilities for the refugees over to the host governments. Mr. Labouisse said that the Arab governments would object for the following reasons: it would be more difficult for individual governments to raise funds than for an international agency and they would prefer to have the Agency as a scapegoat which they need in view of their inability so far to help solve the refugee problem. He said that the refugees could be integrated in Syria with the least amount of difficulty; that their official integration in Lebanon would pose political problems due to the fact that they are mostly Moslems; that Jordan is not equipped to integrate the refugees; and that the problem of settling their status was very difficult in the Gaza Strip.

Mr. Labouisse then dwelt on the Agency's financial difficulties which, if not solved soon, will render all of the other problems academic. Unless more money is forthcoming the Agency will have about \$1,400,000 on July 1. As it must have at least that amount committed for future supplies and for immediate planning, further funds must be found before that date if the Agency is to continue to operate after the middle of this year. He gave Mr. Wilcox three tables (copies attached) two of which give the present financial picture of the Agency and one of which proposes additional cash payments from the United States Government to help UNRWA tide its operations over its current budget year (which is an 18-month period ending December 31, 1957). Even should the United States be able to give this additional help, Mr. Labouisse pointed out, there would be a deficit in UNRWA funds of \$13,000,000. He hoped that this gap could be met through additional contributions from other governments. He has in mind, in particular, Germany which now contributes very little and is in a position to contribute more, and Venezuela which makes no contribution at present.

In response

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

In response to a request, Mr. Labouisse then gave the following personal recommendations on the points raised under paragraph 105 of his Annual Report:

a) At present the refugees are receiving an average of 1,600 calories a day; this is not sufficient and should be augmented; an increase of 100 calories per day would cost at least \$1,000,000 per year.

b) The Agency's educational program should not be expanded to take care of more secondary class students.

c) The Agency should not reimburse host governments for expenses incurred by the latter in helping to educate refugee children; there are more important goals for the Agency to aim at.

d) A limited public works program for the Gaza Strip would be a good idea; it would help strengthen security within the Strip by reducing the feeling of frustration there.

e) Any extension of the Agency's mandate to allow it to encourage economic development in the host countries should be in connection with definite programs which, within a specified limit of time, would result in reducing the refugee rolls by a predetermined number of persons.

f) The Agency should not provide rations for additional children in Jordan in the absence of government action to remove ineligible persons from the rolls.

g) The Agency should not extend relief to refugees who recently have applied for relief unless a complete census of refugees is carried out.

101
IO:UNP:DJGamon:lmr

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE I

Estimated Income and Expenditure
(for period July 1, 1956 to December 31, 1957)
(in millions of dollars)

	<u>Relief</u>	<u>Rehabilitation</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Budget for 18 months:</u>	43.4	22.1	65.5
<u>Income:</u>			
<u>From prior pledges</u>			
U.K.		1.0	
*U.S.			
<u>From pledges for period to June 30, 1957</u>			
U.S.	17.5		
U.K.	4.4		
Subtotal	21.9		
Others	1.1		
Subtotal	23.0		
Anticipated	1.0		
TOTAL	24.0	1.0*	
<u>Assuming pledges are made</u> <u>at same rate for balance of</u> <u>18 month period (i.e.</u> <u>July 1, 1956 - Dec. 31, 1957)</u>	36.0	1.0*	37.0
<u>Deficit for 18 months:</u>	7.4	21.1*	28.5

* The U.S. has promised a substantial payment in the Spring toward the rehabilitation budget, but the amount is unknown.

January 22, 1957

TABLE IICash Position (In millions of dollars)

Funds available January 1, 1957	-	\$ 7.2*
<u>Add</u> estimated income to June 30, 1957 on assumption all pledges for relief and UK pledge of \$1.0 for rehabilitation are paid	-	<u>13.7</u>
Total	-	\$ 20.9
<u>Subtract</u> estimated expenditures to June 30, 1957	-	<u>19.5</u>
Estimated funds available July 1, 1957	-	1.4*

* Because of its extensive operations and the uncertainty of its income, the Agency should have available working capital of at least \$14 million. The situation as of Jan. 1 and the estimated position as of July 1 are therefore most alarming.

January 22, 1957

Table III

Proposed additional cash payments from U.S.
toward current 18-month budget
(in millions of dollars)

Balance of \$17.5 million pledge for relief (\$8.75 has been paid) for U.S. fiscal year 1956/57	\$ 8.75
One-half of assumed pledge of same amount for U.S. fiscal year 1957/58	\$ 8.75
Payment on account of \$30.9 million outstanding U.S. pledge for rehabilitation at rate of 70% of Agency's rehabilitation budget (\$22.1)	\$15.5
	<hr/>
	\$33.0

This would leave a deficit against the budget of \$65.5 million for the 18-month period of \$13.0 million. Of this deficit, \$7.4 million will be in the relief budget and \$5.6 in rehabilitation.

Jan 23 57

February 13 1957

Mr John F Dallas
Secretary of State

Enclosed clipping from Boston
Daily Record Jan 23

I'm no more interested in Jews
than Arabs. Only in justice & fair
treatment I am wondering if the
rich oil land was in Jew territory
if it wouldn't make a vast difference
in our attitude towards the Jews

ASNC
A Cor
Respectfully

1/29 George A Morrell
982 West Canton St
Boston Mass

FEB 13 1957

FILED

674.842-1-2357

Reasonable Request

IT IS HARD to understand how the United Nations can reject Israel's demand for guarantees for its existence.

The fact is that Egypt has used the support of the United States to start a new Fedayeen campaign against Israel and continues to stir up the Arab nations against the West.

Unless Israel is assured that Gaza will not be employed as a base for the destruction of Tel Aviv and as a sanctuary for bandits, she cannot evacuate this area which Nasser did not have the courage to defend.

The United Nations has proved itself so weak with regard to Hungary and so firm with regard to Israel that it is not difficult to recognize in both instances the overwhelming fear of Soviet Russia.


If all that the United Nations can do is to produce reflexes to Russian policy, that body cannot long claim the respect of the American people.

182 West End St
Boston Mass



Mr John F. Dallas
Secretary of State

Washington D C



674.84A/1-2357

CS/J
674.84A/1-2357

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

44-48

SECRET

1

Action

Control: 14410
Rec'd: January 24, 1957
6:07 p.m.NEA
Info
RMR

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2379, January 24, 3 p.m.

SS
G
SP
C
EUR
L
IO
E
O
OLICIA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

SENT DEPARTMENT 2379, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 164, BAGHDAD 147, BEIRUT 254, DAMASCUS 160, JIDDA 170, LONDON 482, PARIS 408, TEL AVIV 126, USUN 5.

Egyptian Naval C-in-C told Naval Attache January 22 Israelis have three frigates and some landing craft in Gulf of Aqaba and possibly some torpedo boats. Egyptians also understand Israelis have been constructing fuel storage tanks for which oil pipeline being laid to Elath and that shore battery has been seen. C-in-C said he had forces in Suez Gulf and felt situation potentially explosive unless Israelis evacuate straits area. C-in-C emphasized Aqaba Gulf not "international water", stating it must be considered as divided in middle and constituting territorial waters Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

LR/6

This Document Must Be Returned to
RM/R
Central
Files
674.84A/1-2457

HBS

SECRET

SECRET

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

Copy No(s)

Destruction

Name

Date

2-7-57

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

45

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

R

O

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 889, January 24, 8 p.m.

Control:

Rec'd:

15346

January 25, 1957

8:01 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 889, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 157, JIDDA 13, DAMASCUS 111, LONDON 181, PARIS 151, CAIRO 156, JERUSALEM 155, USUN 40.

Ben Gurion made major foreign policy speech to Knesset January 22 setting forth GOI's minimum requirements in disposition Tiran Straits and Gaza Strip problems. Coalition parties, joined by general Zionists, Aguda and Poalei Aguda, then passed strong supporting resolution.

Speech was GOI's most unequivocal public statement on these issues, although very much in pattern his remarks to me December 30 (EMBTTEL 786). After familiar review Israel's difficult story since State's establishment, dedication to UN despite frustration hopes reposed in it for solution Israel's difficulties, and events leading up to Sinai-Gaza campaign, he made following principal points:

(1) Israel has no interest in acquisition west coast Eilat Straits but until satisfactory arrangements can be made, "IDF will continue to safeguard free navigation".

(2) Egyptian influence cannot be restored in Gaza Strip. Because UNEF force would not be able to prevent Fedayeen activity Israel, while not desiring to maintain armed forces there, "must remain in Strip with suitable relationship between Israel's administration and UN. Israel will use civilian rather than military police".

(3) Egyptian-Israeli GAA is "violated and broken beyond repair. Israel does not claim that absence of AA means "existence of state of war with Egypt and is prepared to confirm its position on this by signing with Egypt immediately agreement of non-belligerency and mutual non-aggression".

(4) He said Israel must insist on demilitarization of entire Sinai.

Supporting resolution voted by Knesset made points one and two even more

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

This Document Must Be Returned to
RM/R
Central
Files
NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

Confidential File

076.84A/1-2437

H133

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 889, January 24, 8 p.m. from Tel Aviv

even more emphatically than Ben Gurion.

Speakers of nearly all parties echoed Ben Gurion's insistence on satisfactory arrangements for Gaza and Tiran Straits.

Principal criticism voiced by both Herut and general Zionists charged him with tardiness in demanding Sinai demilitarization.

Comment: Foreign Ministry official observed informally to Embassy officer that speech was intended to make Israel's position unmistakably clear abroad rather than satisfy local opinion which has been fully aware for some time of GOI's attitude as Ben Gurion outlined it.

He added GOI felt public opinion western countries was swinging strongly in Israel's favor but that government's were not yet as sympathetic. Along this line, Mapai member Knesset Meir Argov, speaking in support of Ben Gurion, said "90 percent western press now justified Israel's demands by contrast to their attitude three weeks after Sinai campaign".

LAWSON

MGG:HC/14

1rul*

1961 21 889

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

55
Action

NEA

Info

RM/R

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IC

P

UCF

O

OLI

CCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FROM: DAMASCUS

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1748, January 24, 3 p.m.

SENT DEPARTMENT 1748, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 112.

PASS USIA.

On basis Ben Gurion speech to Knesset January 23, Syrian press January 24 reports Israel challenges UN refusing withdraw troops Gaza Strip. ASRP, G-2 Damascus daily AL RAI AL-AM alleges US Government told Israel take this stand so as bargain with Egypt on future Suez canal and peace with Israel. Communist daily AL-NAR claims Israel's effrontery results from past President Eisenhower's ME plan designed strengthen Israeli intentions expand.

MOOSE

SW: DMB/16

Control: 14234

Rec'd: January 24, 1957
12:07 p.m.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES

674.34A/1-2457

1957 JAN 25 AM 8 16

NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

674.84A/1-2457
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

32-D

Action

Control: 13844

Rec'd: JANUARY 24, 1957
2:03 A.M.

IO
Info
RMR

FROM: NEW YORK

SS
O
SP
C
EUR
NEA
L
R
O

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 575, JANUARY 24, 1 A.M.

NIACT

FOR SECRETARY AND WILCOX FROM LODGE

VERBATIM TEXT

SYG REPORT RE GAZA, TIRAN

"1. IN ITS EFFORTS TO HELP TOWARDS SOLUTIONS OF THE PENDING PROBLEMS IN THE AREA, UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS MUST BE GOVERNED BY PRINCIPLE AND MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW AND VALID INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. ON HIS PART, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN CARRYING OUT THE POLICIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, MUST ACT WITH SCRUPULOUS REGARD FOR THE DECISIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE OTHER PRINCIPAL ORGANS. IT MAY BE USEFUL TO NOTE THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOREGOING FOR THE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE PRESENT SITUATION. IN THIS REGARD, IT WOULD SEEM THAT THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE GENERALLY RECOGNIZED AS NON-CONTROVERSIAL IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE LIMITS WITHIN WHICH THE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CAN BE PROPERLY DEVELOPED. WITHIN THIS SCOPE, POSITIVE UNITED NATIONS MEASURES CAN AND HAVE TO BE DEVELOPED ALONG LINES WHICH IN THIS CASE, TOGETHER WITH FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL TROOPS, WOULD REPRESENT EFFECTIVE PROGRESS TOWARD THE DESIRED CREATION OF PEACEFUL CONDITIONS IN THE REGION.

"A. THE UNITED NATIONS CANNOT CONDONE ANY CHANGE OF THE STATUS JURIS RESULTING FROM MILITARY ACTION CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER. THE ORGANIZATION MUST, THEREFORE, MAINTAIN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

674.844A/1-2457

- 2 - DELGA 575, JANUARY 24, 1 A.M., FROM NEW YORK

THEREFORE, MAINTAIN THAT THE STATUS JURIS EXISTING PRIOR TO SUCH MILITARY ACTION BE RE-ESTABLISHED BY A WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS, AND BY THE RELINQUISHMENT OR NULLIFICATION OF RIGHTS ASSERTED IN TERRITORIES COVERED BY THE MILITARY ACTION AND DEPENDING UPON IT.

"B. THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE BY THE UNITED NATIONS OTHER THAN THAT UNDER CHAPTER VII REQUIRES THE CONSENT OF THE STATE IN WHICH THE FORCE IS TO OPERATE. MOREOVER, SUCH USE MUST BE UNDERTAKEN AND DEVELOPED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES MENTIONED UNDER A. IT MUST, FURTHERMORE, BE IMPARTIAL, IN THE SENSE THAT IT DOES NOT SERVE AS A MEANS TO FORCE SETTLEMENT, IN THE INTEREST OF ONE PARTY, OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS OR LEGAL ISSUES RECOGNIZED AS CONTROVERSIAL.

"C. UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS MUST RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF MEMBER GOVERNMENTS RECOGNIZED IN THE CHARTER, AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, NOT CONTRARY TO THE AIMS OF THE CHARTER WHICH ARE CONCLUDED IN EXERCISE OF THOSE RIGHTS.

"2. POINT A ABOVE, IN GENERAL TERMS, IS CLEARLY REFLECTED IN THE VARIOUS DECISIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES. ITS FURTHER CONSEQUENCES WITH RESPECT TO DE FACTO SITUATIONS OF A NON-MILITARY NATURE IN VARIOUS TERRITORIES WILL REQUIRE CONSIDERATION IN LATTER PARTS OF THIS REPORT IN CONNECTION SPECIFICALLY WITH THE DISCUSSION OF THE BEARING OF POINT C ABOVE ON THE CASES AT ISSUE.

"3. POINT B ABOVE FINDS EXPRESSION IN THE SECOND AND FINAL REPORT ON THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE, DOCUMENT A/3302, PARAGRAPHS 8 AND 12, FROM WHICH THE FOLLOWING TWO PASSAGES MAY BE QUOTED: IT FOLLOWS FROM ITS (UNEF'S) TERMS OF REFERENCE THAT THERE IS NO INTENT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FORCE TO INFLUENCE THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE PRESENT CONFLICT AND THEREBY THE POLITICAL BALANCE AFFECTING EFFORTS TO SETTLE THE CONFLICT.

FURTHER, NOR, MOREOVER, SHOULD THE FORCE HAVE MILITARY FUNCTIONS EXCEEDING THOSE NECESSARY TO SECURE PEACEFUL CONDITIONS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS FOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GENERAL

- 3 - DELGA 575, JANUARY 24, 1 A.M., FROM NEW YORK

ASSEMBLY OF 2 NOVEMBER 1956, WHERE THE PARTIES ARE URGED TO OBSERVE SCRUPULOUSLY THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS.

11

"5. IN CONSIDERING THE SITUATION IN GAZA THE FOLLOWING SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

"6. ARTICLE V OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ARMISTICE LINE ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE VI IS NOT TO BE CONSTRUED IN ANY SENSE AS A POLITICAL OR TERRITORIAL BOUNDARY, AND IS DELINEATED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND POSITIONS OF EITHER PARTY TO THE ARMISTICE AS REGARDS ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION. IT GOES ON TO SAY THAT THE BASIC PURPOSE OF THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE IS TO DELINEATE THE LINE BEYOND WHICH THE ARMED FORCES OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES SHALL NOT MOVE..."

"7. ALTHOUGH THE ARMISTICE LINE THUS DOES NOT CREATE ANY NEW RIGHTS FOR THE PARTIES ON EITHER SIDE, IT RESULTED IN A DE FACTO SITUATION BY LEAVING THE CONTROL (SEE ARTICLE VII) OF THE TERRITORY IN THE HANDS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE MILITARY FORCES OF WHICH WERE THERE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STIPULATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE. THE CONTROL IN THIS CASE OBVIOUSLY MUST BE CONSIDERED AS INCLUDING ADMINISTRATION AND SECURITY.

"8. IN ARTICLE IV IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR INTERESTS OF A NON-MILITARY CHARACTER IN THE AREA OF PALESTINE COVERED BY THE AGREEMENT, MAY BE ASSERTED BY EITHER PARTY AND THAT THESE, BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT BEING EXCLUDED FROM THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS, SHALL BE, AT THE DISCRETION OF THE PARTIES, THE SUBJECT OF LATER SETTLEMENT. IT FOLLOWS THAT THE DE FACTO ADMINISTRATIVE SITUATION CREATED UNDER THE ARMISTICE MAY BE CHALLENGED AS CONTRARY TO THE RIGHTS, CLAIMS OR INTERESTS OF ONE OF THE PARTIES, BUT THAT IT CAN BE CHANGED LEGALLY ONLY THROUGH SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

"9. THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED BY BOTH PARTIES AND, ACCORDING TO ARTICLE XII, REMAINS IN FORCE UNTIL A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS ACHIEVED. IT WAS APPROVED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS THE ORGANIZATION MAY WISH TO MAKE IN ORDER TO FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACEFUL CONDITIONS, THE AGREEMENT MUST BE FULLY RESPECTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS. THUS,

- 4 - DELGA 575, JANUARY 24, 1 A.M., FROM NEW YORK

NATIONS. THUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CANNOT RECOGNIZE A CHANGE OF THE DE FACTO SITUATION CREATED UNDER ARTICLE VI OF THE AGREEMENT UNLESS THE CHANGE IS BROUGHT ABOUT THROUGH SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES; NOR, OF COURSE, CAN IT BE ASSISTANCE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF A DE FACTO SITUATION CONTRARY TO THE ONE CREATED BY THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. THIS EXCLUDES THE UNITED NATIONS FROM ACCEPTING ISRAEL CONTROL OVER THE AREA, EVEN IF IT WERE ESTABLISHED BY NON-MILITARY MEANS. IT WOULD ALSO EXCLUDE SUCH DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNEF AS WOULD BE NECESSARY, IN THE ABSENCE OF ISRAEL TROOPS, IN ORDER TO PROTECT AND MAINTAIN AN ISRAEL ADMINISTRATION.

"10. DEPLOYMENT OF THE UNEF IN GAZA, UNDER THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WOULD HAVE TO BE ON THE SAME BASIS AS ITS DEPLOYMENT ALONG THE ARMISTICE LINE IN THE SINAI PENINSULA. ANY BROADER FUNCTION FOR IT IN THAT AREA, IN VIEW OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND A RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, WOULD REQUIRE THE CONSENT OF EGYPT. A WIDENING OF THE UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE AREA, BEYOND ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE REFUGEES, WOULD LIKEWISE HAVE TO BE BASED ON AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT. IT FOLLOWS, THEREFORE, THAT ALTHOUGH THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS ENTITLED TO RECOMMEND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATION AND TO REQUEST NEGOTIATIONS IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, IT CANNOT INCLUDE IN THAT RECOMMENDATION A REQUIREMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITHOUT EXCEEDING ITS POWERS AND ACTING IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.

III

"11. THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL PROVIDED, IN ARTICLES VII AND VIII, FOR RESTRICTIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE PARTIES ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE. THE PROVISIONS OF THESE TWO ARTICLES HAD BEEN UNDERMINED PROGRESSIVELY BY THE DEVELOPMENT IN THE AREA OVER RECENT YEARS, AND, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CRISIS, WERE NOT BEING FULFILLED. THERE IS UNIVERSAL RECOGNITION THAT THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS, OF WHICH THIS DETERIORATION FORMED A PART, SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO RETURN.

"12. AS A STEP TOWARD REDUCTION TENSION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACEFUL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 5 - DELGA 575, JANUARY 24, 1 A.M., FROM NEW YORK

OF PEACEFUL CONDITIONS IN THE REGION, A RETURN TO FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THESE TWO ARTICLES SEEMS ESSENTIAL. MOREOVER, WHATEVER THE STATE OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IN GENERAL LAST YEAR, IT WOULD SEEM APPARENT THAT A NEGATION OF THAT AGREEMENT WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPEDE ANY EFFORT TO LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR PROGRESS TOWARD SOLUTIONS OF PENDING PROBLEMS. THE PROVISIONS IN THE AGREEMENT WERE THE RESULT OF CAREFUL ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY SITUATION, AND THE OBJECTIVES DEFINED IN THE COURSE OF THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD STILL HAVE VALIDITY AS STEPS IN THE DESIRED DIRECTION. IF NOW THE MILITARY CLAUSES OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WERE AGAIN TO BE FULLY IMPLEMENTED, OTHER ESSENTIAL PARTS OF THE ARMISTICE REGIME WOULD BECOME EFFECTIVE - A DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT BEARING ON THE OTHER PROBLEMS IN THE REGION.

"13. ACCORDING TO ARTICLE VII, EGYPTIAN 'DEFENSIVE FORCES' ONLY MAY BE MAINTAINED IN THE AREA OF THE WESTERN FRONT UNDER EGYPTIAN CONTROL. ALL OTHER EGYPTIAN FORCES SHALL BE WITHDRAWN FROM THIS AREA TO A POINT OR POINTS NO FURTHER EAST THAN EL ARISH-ABOU AOUEIGILA. ACCORDING TO THE SAME ARTICLE, ISRAEL 'DEFENSIVE FORCES' ONLY, WHICH SHALL BE BASED ON THE SETTLEMENTS, MAY BE MAINTAINED IN THE AREA OF THE WESTERN FRONT UNDER ISRAEL CONTROL. ALL OTHER ISRAEL FORCES SHALL BE WITHDRAWN FROM THIS POINT TO A POINT OR POINTS NORTH OF THE LINE DELINEATED IN THE SPECIAL MEMORANDUM OF 13 NOVEMBER 1948 ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 4 NOVEMBER 1948. THE DEFINITION OF 'DEFENSIVE FORCES' IS GIVEN IN AN ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT.

"14. ARTICLE VII OF THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT AN AREA COMPRISING THE VILLAGE OF EL AUJA AND VICINITY, AS DEFINED IN THE ARTICLE, SHALL BE DEMILITARIZED, AND THAT BOTH EGYPTIAN AND ISRAEL ARMED FORCES SHALL BE TOTALLY EXCLUDED THEREFROM. THE ARTICLE FURTHER PROVIDES THAT ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE OF THE FRONTIER, FACING THE EL AUJA AREA, NO EGYPTIAN DEFENSIVE POSITIONS SHALL BE CLOSER TO EL AUJA THAN EL QOUSEIMA AND ABOU AOUEIGILA. IT ALSO STATES THAT THE ROAD TABA-QOUSEIMA-AUJA SHALL NOT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 6 - DELGA 575, JANUARY 24, 1 A.M., FROM NEW YORK

SHALL NOT BE EMPLOYED BY ANY MILITARY FORCES WHATSOEVER FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENTERING PALESTINE.

"15. THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT THE EXECUTION OF ITS PROVISIONS SHALL BE SUPERVISED BY THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION, ESTABLISHED UNDER IT, AND THAT THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMISSION SHALL BE MAINTAINED IN EL AUJA.

"16. ACCORDING TO THE DECISIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE SHALL BE DEPLOYED AT THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN THE FORCES OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT, I.E. ALONG THE ESTABLISHED ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CONCURRED IN ARTICLE 12 OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S 'SECOND AND FINAL REPORT' (A/3305) WHICH SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE ON ONLY ONE SIDE OF THE ARMISTICE LINE. ON THE BASIS OF THIS DECISION, THE FORCE WOULD HAVE UNITS IN THE GAZA AREA AS WELL AS OPPOSITE EL AUJA. WITH DEMILITARIZATION OF THE EL AUJA ZONE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, IT MIGHT BE INDICATED THAT THE FORCE SHOULD HAVE UNITS ALSO STATIONED ON THE ISRAEL SIDE OF THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE, AT LEAST IN THAT ZONE. SUCH DEPLOYMENT, WHICH WOULD REQUIRE A NEW DECISION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF THE FORCE BEING IN A POSITION TO ASSUME THE SUPERVISORY DUTIES OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION IN ALL THE TERRITORY WHERE THAT ORGANIZATION NOW FUNCTIONS UNDER THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL. IN BOTH GAZA AND EL AUJA, THE FUNCTIONS OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION AND THE FORCE WOULD SOMEWHAT OVERLAP IF SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WERE NOT TO BE MADE. AS AN ARRANGEMENT OF THIS KIND WAS NOT FORESEEN BY THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, IT OBVIOUSLY WOULD REQUIRE THE CONSENT OF THE TWO PARTIES TO THAT AGREEMENT. SUCH MUTUAL CONSENT MIGHT BE GIVEN TO THE UNITED NATIONS DIRECTLY, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE ARRANGEMENTS BY THE PARTIES WOULD HAVE TO BE MADE ON AN AD HOC BASIS.

"17. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLES VII AND VIII OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD AT PRESENT BE FACILITATED BY THE FACT THAT THERE ARE NO EGYPTIAN MILITARY POSITIONS IN THE AREA UNDER CONSIDERATION AND THAT, THEREFORE, IMPLEMENTATION BY ISRAEL DOES NOT REQUIRE A SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY UNITS ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE. THE ONLY CONDITION WHICH MUST BE FULFILLED, IN ORDER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 7 - DELGA 575, JANUARY 24, 1 A.M., FROM NEW YORK

IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH RECIPROCITY, WOULD BE EGYPTIAN ASSURANCE THAT THEIR FORCES WILL NOT TAKE UP POSITIONS IN THE AREA IN CONTRAVENTION OF ARTICLES VII AND VIII. EGYPT HAS MOVED INTO SINAI UP TO NOW ONLY THOSE SMALL POLICE UNITS WHICH HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED NECESSARY IN SUPPORT OF THE RE-ESTABLISHED LOCAL CIVIL ADMINISTRATIONS.

"18. AS INDICATED IN THE PREVIOUS REPORT (A/3500), THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE AND THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION, WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE CEASE-FIRE, SHOULD CO-OPERATE IN THE PREVENTION OF INCURSIONS AND RAIDS ACROSS THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES. IT WAS FURTHER INDICATED IN THE SAME REPORT THAT, ONCE THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE ENSURED, IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION OF 2 NOVEMBER 1956, FORMAL ASSURANCE SHOULD BE SOLICITED FROM THE PARTIES TO DESIST FROM RAIDS AND TO TAKE ACTIVE MEASURES TO PREVENT INCURSIONS. IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE THE CIRCULATION OF THIS LAST REPORT, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS BEEN INFORMED OF THE DESIRE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT THAT ALL RAIDS AND INCURSIONS ACROSS THE ARMISTICE LINE, IN BOTH DIRECTIONS, BE BROUGHT TO AN END, AND THAT UNITED NATIONS AUXILIARY ORGANS AFFORD EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE TO THAT EFFECT.

"19.(A) THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE GULF OF AQABA IS OPEN TO CONTROVERSY IN THE SENSE THAT THERE IS NO AUTHORITATIVE FINDING THAT IT IS AN INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY. AS INDICATED IN THE PREVIOUS REPORT, (A/3500), IT MAY BE MAINTAINED THAT IT HAS THIS STATUS AND THAT, THEREFORE, THE RIGHT EXISTS TO INNOCENT PASSAGE IN THE GULF AND THROUGH THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. CONVERSELY, IT MAY, HOWEVER, BE ASSERTED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL RULES GOVERNING THE STRAITS OF TIRAN ARE ONLY THOSE APPLICABLE TO ORDINARY TERRITORIAL WATERS. IN THE LATTER EVENT, THERE WOULD STILL BE A RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE, ALTHOUGH PROBABLY OF A MORE LIMITED CHARACTER.

"20. IT MAY BE DESIRABLE, IN DUE TIME AND IN AN APPROPRIATE WAY, TO HAVE THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE GULF OF AQABA DEFINITELY DETERMINED. PENDING SUCH DETERMINATION, IT IS TO BE RECOMMENDED THAT, WHATEVER RIGHTS THERE MAY BE IN THE GULF AND THE STRAITS, SUCH RIGHTS

- 8 - DELGA 575, JANUARY 24, 1 A.M., FROM NEW YORK

SUCH RIGHTS BE EXERCISED WITH RESTRAINT ON ALL SIDES. FROM THE OBVIOUS INTERNATIONAL INTEREST IN FREE PASSAGE IT FOLLOWS, SPECIFICALLY, THAT ANY ACTION BASED ON A CLAIM OF BELLIGERENT RIGHTS SHOULD BE SUCH AS TO LEAVE UNHARMED THE INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS INVOLVED, AND, THEREFORE, THAT A CLAIM OF THIS NATURE SHOULD BE EXERCISED ONLY IF CLEARLY NON-CONTROVERSIAL.

"21. B) THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, IN ITS RESOLUTION 1 SEPTEMBER 1951, CONCERNING PASSAGE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SHIPPING AND GOODS THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL, CONSIDERED THAT SINCE THE ARMISTICE REGIME, WHICH HAS BEEN IN EXISTENCE FOR NEARLY TWO AND A HALF YEARS, IS OF A PERMANENT CHARACTER, NEITHER PARTY CAN REASONABLY ASSERT THAT IT ACTIVELY IS A BELLIGERENT OR REQUIRES TO EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF VISIT, SEARCH AND SEIZURE FOR ANY LEGITIMATE PURPOSE OF SELF DEFENSE. ON THAT BASIS THE COUNCIL CALLED UPON EGYPT TO TERMINATE THE RESTRICTIONS OF THE PASSAGE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL SHIPPING AND GOODS THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL. THE GENERAL FINDING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS A DIRECT BEARING ON THE QUESTION OF SHIPPING THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. IT REMAINS VALID AND WARRANTS CORRESPONDING CONCLUSIONS AS LONG AS THE ASSUMPTIONS REMAIN CORRECT. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN THE YEARS WHICH HAVE PASSED SINCE THE RESOLUTION WAS ADOPTED, AN EVER WIDENING NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT HAS DEVELOPED, ENDING IN THE ISRAEL MILITARY ACTION 29 OCTOBER 1956. IT SHOULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT ISRAEL'S REQUEST IN THE COMMUNICATION 23 JANUARY 1957 THAT THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ASCERTAIN EGYPT'S INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE 1951 RESOLUTION, IS PRESENTED WHILE ISRAEL STILL HAS MILITARY FORCES ON EGYPT'S TERRITORY AS A RESULT OF MILITARY ACTION AND WHILE, FURTHER, ISRAEL IN THE SAME COMMUNICATION MAKES PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE GAZA STRIP WHICH CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

"22. C) AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES, THE ARMISTICE REGIME MAY BE CONSIDERED AS AGAIN IN PART OPERATIVE. IT FOLLOWS FROM THE FINDINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN 1951, THAT UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES THE PARTIES TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED AS ENTITLED TO CLAIM ANY

- 9 - DELGA 575, JANUARY 24, 1 A.M., FROM NEW YORK

CLAIM ANY BELLIGERENT RIGHTS. THE IMPLICATION OF THIS CONCLUSION FOR THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE IN THE GULF AND THE STRAITS OF TIRAN IS CLEAR. WERE THE SUBSTANTIVE CLAUSES OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY ARTICLES VII AND VIII, NOW TO BE IMPLEMENTED, THE CASE AGAINST ALL ACTS OF BELLIGERENCY, WHICH IS BASED ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE ARMISTICE REGIME, WOULD GAIN FULL COGENCY. WITH SUCH A BROADER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT THE PARTIES SHOULD BE ASKED TO GIVE ASSURANCES THAT ON THE BASIS ESTABLISHED, THEY WILL NOT ASSERT ANY BELLIGERENT RIGHTS (INCLUDING, OF COURSE, SUCH RIGHTS IN THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE STRAITS OF TIRAN).

"23. D) AS A CONCLUSION FROM PARAGRAPHS A), B) AND C) IT MAY BE HELD THAT, WHATEVER THE PRECISE LEGAL STATUS OF THE GULF OF AQABA, EGYPT, AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES - AND EVEN WITHOUT FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SUBSTANTIVE CLAUSES OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS - SHOULD CONSIDER THAT ITS CLAIM TO RIGHTS OF BELLIGERENCY IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN IS SO MUCH IN DOUBT THAT, IN VIEW OF THE GENERAL INTERNATIONAL INTEREST AT STAKE, IT SHOULD NOT BE EXERCISED. THIS WOULD GIVE A BASIS FOR A DE FACTO PACIFICATION WHICH SHOULD BE FORMALIZED WHEN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT IS MORE FULLY IMPLEMENTED.

"24. (E) ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL TROOPS FROM THE SHARM-AL-SHAIK AREA, UNEF UNITS WILL ENTER THE AREA. WERE THE STATE OF AFFAIRS DESCRIBED ABOVE TO BE ESTABLISHED, THEY WOULD 'NOT HAVE ANY FUNCTION' IN THIS AREA AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL. IN ANY CASE, THE ROLE OF UNEF SHOULD BE SO DEFINED AS NOT TO PREJUDGE THE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION MENTIONED IN PARAGRAPH(A) ABOVE: THE UNEF, THUS, CANNOT BE DEPLOYED IN SUCH WAY AS TO SAFEGUARD ANY SPECIAL POSITION ON QUESTION A), BUT IT MAY, AT LEAST TEMPORARILY, FUNCTION IN SUPPORT OF MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN ACCORD WITH WHAT HAS BEEN SAID ABOVE.

"25. F) IT MAY BE AGREED THAT SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IN THE NATURE OF OBSERVERS, WOULD ASSIST THE PARTIES TO MAINTAIN PEACEFUL CONDITIONS IN THE AREA AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF UNEF.

V. "26. IN THE

- 10 - DELGA 575, JANUARY 24, 1 A.M., FROM NEW YORK

V

"26. IN THE LAST REPORT (A/3500), IT WAS STATED AS ESSENTIAL THAT, THROUGH PROMPT CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST PHASES OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS, MEMBER GOVERNMENTS SHOULD NOW BE ENABLED TO TURN TO THE CONSTRUCTIVE TASKS TO WHICH THE ESTABLISHMENT AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE, A FULL WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES, A DESISTING FROM RAIDS AND SCRUPULOUS OBSERVANCE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS, SHOULD OPEN THE WAY.

"27. THE SAME REPORT PAID SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM OF RAIDS. IN THE DEBATE FOLLOWING THE PRESENTATION OF THE REPORT, EXPRESSIONS WERE GIVEN TO CONCERN ABOUT THE PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES FROM THE RESIDUAL TERRITORIES HELD AT GAZA AND AT SHARM-AL-SHAIKH. THESE LATTER ISSUES, AND THE ISRAEL VIEWPOINTS ON THE WAY IN WHICH THEY MIGHT BE MET, HAVE BEEN FURTHER ELUCIDATED IN THE COMMUNICATION OF 23 JANUARY FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL.

"28. IN THIS PRESENTATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE SITUATION NOW PREVAILING, THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS ENDEAVOURED TO CLARIFY BOTH THE LIMITS ON UNITED NATIONS ACTION SET BY CONSIDERATIONS OF PRINCIPLE AND LAW, AND THE DIRECTIONS IN WHICH SUCH ACTION COULD BE USEFULLY DEVELOPED IN THE CASE OF THE TWO LAST MENTIONED PROBLEMS AND RELATED QUESTIONS. THE BASIS FOR DOING SO HAS BEEN PRIMARILY THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, SCRUPULOUS OBSERVANCE OF WHICH WAS REQUESTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ITS RESOLUTION OF 2 NOVEMBER 1956. THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BELIEVES THAT THE CONCERN EXPRESSED IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEBATE IN CONNECTION WITH THE FINAL WITHDRAWAL CAN BE MET WITHIN THE OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF THE UNITED NATIONS TO BASE ITS ACTION ON PRINCIPLE, ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS. A DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED NATIONS ACTION, AS INDICATED, WOULD REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT STEP IN PREPARATION OF FURTHER CONSTRUCTIVE MEASURES AND THUS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 11 - DELGA 575, JANUARY 24, 1 A.M., FROM NEW YORK

AND THUS, TOGETHER WITH THE FULL WITHDRAWAL, WOULD REPRESENT REAL PROGRESS TOWARD THE CREATION OF PEACEFUL CONDITIONS IN THE REGION.

"29. AMONG THE FURTHER PROBLEMS WHICH NOW REQUIRE THE ATTENTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IT IS NATURAL IN THIS CONTEXT TO DRAW ATTENTION SPECIFICALLY TO THE REFUGEE QUESTION. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION IN GAZA MAY IMPOSE ADDED RESPONSIBILITIES ON THE UNITED NATIONS. AMONG PROBLEMS WITH REGARD TO WHICH EFFORTS ARE ALREADY UNDER WAY, MENTION MAY BE MADE OF THE QUESTION OF FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS CONCERNING THE SUEZ CANAL. ATTENTION SHOULD ALSO NOW BE GIVEN TO VARIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS FLOWING FROM THE CRISIS.

"30. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT FORTHCOMING NEGOTIATIONS, AIMED AT CONTINUED PROGRESS, SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON CONCRETE ISSUES AND SHOULD MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM GAINED DURING THE PRECEDING PHASE, AS ILLUSTRATED BY THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT BOTH OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE AND OF THE CANAL CLEARING OPERATION. IF THIS MOMENTUM IS TO BE MAINTAINED OR ACCELERATED, IT WILL REQUIRE FROM THE PARTIES A WILLINGNESS TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS TOWARD OBJECTIVES TRANSCENDING THE IMMEDIATE ISSUES AT STAKE. PRACTICALLY ALL OF THESE ISSUES ARE COMPLICATED AND DELICATE AND MIGHT DEVELOP INTO SERIOUS STUMBLING BLOCKS IF THEY ARE NOT APPROACHED IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT SEEKING ESSENTIALS. PROGRESS WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE IF TEMPORARY COMPLICATIONS, SIGNIFICANT ONLY WITHIN A NARROW FOCUS, ARE PERMITTED TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM SOLUTIONS OF WIDER AND OF LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE."

LODGE

RVH

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE44-D
ActionControl: 14478
Rec'd: JANUARY 24, 1957
10:32 P.M.

IO FROM: NEW YORK

Info RMR TO: Secretary of State MESSAGE CENTER

SS NO: DELGA 583, JANUARY 24, 8 PM.

G
SP
C
EUR PRIORITYNEA
L RE GAZA, AQABA
R
O

FAWZI CAME IN TO SEE LODGE AND SAID THAT HIS FIRST REACTION TO ISRAELI UNWILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW IS THAT THIS IS A MATTER WHICH CONCERNS ENTIRE GA SINCE IT ENDANGERS PEACE AND PUTS UN IN DIFFICULT POSITION. FAWZI'S INTENTION, PENDING CONSULTATIONS WITH CAIRO AND OTHER DELS HERE, IS NOT TO RUSH MATTERS BY PRESENTING RES. HE SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ESTABLISH FACTS BEFORE GA AND TRY TO GET REACTIONS SO THAT GA CAN WORK AS A TEAM. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT GA MEETING ON MONDAY WOULD NOT BE VIOLENT OR PARTISAN AND THAT GA WOULD ACT WITH FULL AWARENESS ITS RESPONSIBILITIES.

HE EMPHASIZED, AS IN PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS, THAT ECONOMIC MEASURES CONTINUE TO BE MAINTAINED AGAINST EGYPT AND THAT WAR DAMAGES ARE STILL OUTSTANDING, WHILE AT SAME TIME ECONOMIC AID IS BEING GIVEN TO UK, FRANCE AND ISRAEL. HE SAID EGYPT COULD NOT UNDERSTAND HOW RESTRICTIONS COULD BE MAINTAINED AGAINST HER WHEN HER ECONOMY WAS BEING RUINED AS A RESULT OF AGGRESSION AGAINST HER WHICH UN HAD CONDEMNED.

HE SAID THAT GOOD PROGRESS IS BEING MADE ON CLEARANCE OF CANAL AND THAT IN HIS VIEW CHOICE FOR EGYPT AND OTHERS IS WHETHER SUEZ CANAL IS TO BE LINK OF COOPERATION OR BONE OF CONTENTION. FAWZI EXPRESSED HOPE THAT FIRST ALTERNATIVE WOULD PREVAIL. HE MADE STATEMENT THAT ANY SHIP WHICH PAID ITS TOLLS TO EGYPT WILL BE ALLOWED TO PASS. IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUERY AS TO WHETHER THIS INCLUDED ISRAELI SHIPS, FAWZI WAS NON-COMMITTAL AND REPEATED THAT EGYPT COULD NOT ACCEPT ANY CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ISRAELI COMPLIANCE. FAWZI SAID EGYPT WAS READY TO REACH AGREEMENT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION OF THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

674.84A/1-2457

PA

CLASSIFIED
FILED
JAN 24 1957
674.84A/1-2457

674.84A/1-2457

-2- DELGA 583, JANUARY 24, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK.

AGREEMENT RE SUEZ SETTLEMENT INCLUDING COMPENSATION FOR SUEZ CANAL COMPANY. HE INFORMED US THAT HE WILL TELL SYG TODAY ORALLY THAT AS SOON AS ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED, EGYPT IS READY TO DISCUSS SUEZ CANAL SETTLEMENT IN A POSITIVE, CONSTRUCTIVE AND EXPEDITIOUS WAY.

IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTION, FAWZI SAID HE BELIEVES THE SYG'S REPORT IS GENERALLY GOOD. HE COMMENTED ON QUESTION OF LEGAL STATUS OF AQABA MENTIONED IN SYG REPORT. FAWZI SAID THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT OPPOSE ANY SUGGESTION FOR ADVISORY OPINION FROM ICJ.

WE INQUIRED OF FAWZI WHETHER HE HAD CONSIDERED ADVANTAGES FROM EGYPT'S POINT OF VIEW OF NOT LINKING WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES WITH QUESTION OF RESUMPTION DISCUSSIONS RE BASIC SUEZ CANAL SETTLEMENT. FAWZI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE ADVANTAGE THIS MIGHT GIVE THEM, BUT THERE WAS ANOTHER SIDE TO THE COIN AND QUOTED BRIAND'S STATEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS IF IT WEREN'T FOR PROBLEMS OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

LODGE LATER SAW PEARSON TO GET THEIR IDEAS RE POSSIBLE GA ACTION. PEARSON SAID CANADA CANNOT SUPPORT ANY RESOLUTION IMPOSING SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAELIS. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE RESOLUTION WITH SANCTIONS COULD GET TWO-THIRDS VOTE.

AS INDICATED IN LODGE-WILCOX TELECON, PEARSON SAID THEY HAD IN MIND RESOLUTION WHICH SHOULD CONTAIN 4 ELEMENTS: (A) CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL; (B) AUTHORIZATION OF UNEF TO BE DEPLOYED ON BOTH SIDES OF ARMISTICE LINE, INCLUDING EL AUJA AREA; (C) UNEF POSITIONED IN AQABA AREA WITH POSSIBLE USE OF OBSERVERS AND SOME FORM OF AIR INSPECTION, AND (D) UNEF POSITIONED BOTH SIDES DEMARCATION LINE IN GAZA AREA WITH EGYPTIANS TAKING OVER CIVIL ADMINISTRATION OF GAZA.

PEARSON STRESSED DESIRABILITY US-CANADIAN INITIATIVE IN LIGHT OF FACT THAT SOME DELS ARE WORKING ON A PUNITIVE RESOLUTION AND OTHERS

-3- DELGA 583, JANUARY 24, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK.

AND OTHERS ARE WORKING ON RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD IN EFFECT HAVE UN TAKE OVER ENTIRE SINAI, WHICH IN PEARSON'S VIEW WAS TOTALLY UNREALISTIC. AMONG THESE HE MENTIONED READY TO TAKE INITIATIVE AND WHOSE IDEAS AND SPONSORSHIP HE THOUGHT UNDESIRABLE, WAS AUSTRALIA. PEARSON BELIEVES WE MUST MOVE QUICKLY, AND THAT WE MUST BE CAREFUL IN THE CHOICE OF SPONSORS SO THAT RESOLUTION CAN ACHIEVE WHAT WE DESIRE. FEELING WAS THAT FOLLOWING MIGHT BE INCLUDED: US, CANADA, NORWAY, INDIA, YUGOSLAVIA, COLOMBIA AND BRAZIL.

WE AGREED TO CONSULT FURTHER FRIDAY ON BASIS OF SPECIFIC TEXT. I FEEL US EARLY INITIATIVE IS MOST IMPORTANT, AS I TOLD WILCOX THIS EVENING, AND URGE DEPARTMENT PROVIDE ME WITH DRAFT RESOLUTION ON WHICH I CAN CONSULT AGAIN WITH PEARSON IMMEDIATELY IN THE MORNING.

LODGE

RBW



CONFIDENTIAL

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
MR. WILCOX

JAN 24 1957

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO THE
UNITED NATIONS

Two Park Avenue,
New York 16, New York,
January 24, 1957.

6198

PMK
126
268
3/5/64

Dear Francis:

Following is in confirmation of the message telephoned to your office and that of Mr. Dulles today:

"We received GADEL 116 after we had already sent DEIGAS 571, 572, and 575. I believe the Department should reconsider the view expressed in the fourth paragraph of GADEL 116 which means that we would be treating sanctions against Israel as a quid pro quo for enforcing Security Council decisions regarding the Egyptian attitude toward Israeli passage through the Suez Canal.

"The clear implication of this is that a country (in this case Israel) is entitled to take the law into its own hands, unilaterally violate the Charter, and violate a General Assembly resolution overwhelmingly calling for withdrawal of forces in order to implement a previous decision of the Security Council.

"The argument that we have not supported sanctions against the Soviet Union in the case of Hungary cannot be used to support a decision not to invoke sanctions against Israel since it is clear that sanctions against the Soviet Union would be ineffective whereas sanctions against Israel would be effective.


"The present outlook is that a resolution on sanctions will pass, even with our opposition or abstention. We will then be confronted with a decision far harder and more difficult than we confront now and will probably have to support the United Nations.

"Israel should therefore be told now that she must change her present policy which is so much against her own best interests, and that the United States, in view of our consistent policy since last October 29th, would feel constrained to support a proper resolution on sanctions. A change in Israeli policy may bring about a change in Egyptian policy

The Honorable
Francis O. Wilcox,
Assistant Secretary of State
for International Organization Affairs.

/(Fedayeen

Signed
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

(Fedayeen raids and freedom of transit), but I very much doubt that any of the things Israel desires can be achieved if we take the position suggested in paragraph 4 of GADEL 116, which is very close to the present Israeli position."

Sincerely yours,

Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 24, 1957

SUBJECT: Israeli Withdrawal from Egypt

PARTICIPANTS: Baron Silvercruys, the Belgian Ambassador
Mr. J. Raoul Schoumaker, First Secretary of Belgian Embassy
NEA - Mr. Rountree
NE - Maurice S. Rice

COPIES TO: NEA (3cc)
NE (2cc)
EUR (cc)
IO (cc)
OLI (cc)

Baron Silvercruys, who called at his request, said that his government had instructed him to ascertain the United States attitude on Israel's stated position regarding its withdrawal from Egypt, which the Ambassador described as being (1) Egypt must not be allowed to reoccupy the Gaza Strip or block passage through the Straits of Tiran for Israeli shipping; (2) the Eastern part of Sinai must be demilitarized; (3) the United Nations should keep its forces in Sinai until all outstanding problems between Israel and Egypt are settled; and (4) there must be assurances of free passage of the Suez Canal for ships of all nations. Israel, he said, had sought Belgium's support on these points but had not received a commitment.

5✓ Mr. Rountree stated that in this situation there are distinctions between what is desirable and what is immediately attainable. Israel, whose action against Egypt was condemned overwhelmingly, has been called upon by the United Nations to withdraw unconditionally, most recently five days ago. It is difficult now to associate the withdrawal with certain objectives, however desirable they may be. The United States now cannot say that withdrawal should be conditional and that Israel must have certain guarantees before complying with the United Nations resolutions. The United States recognizes the difficulties posed by the Gaza Strip and the Gulf of Aqaba and hopes that some accommodation can be found. A solution to these problems before Israel completes its withdrawal would be desirable. This, however, is not likely to occur. The solution cannot be dictated by Israel; the United Nations must consider the matter. Our position regarding transit of the Canal is clear; we agree that Israeli ships should be permitted to pass, but it is not possible for Israel to make a transit guarantee a condition to its withdrawal.

CONFIDENTIAL

574.347/1-2457

MAR 7 1957

CS/HHH

674.347/1-2457

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Answering a question as to the possible future role of the United Nations Emergency Force, Mr. Rountree explained that Egypt agreed only to allow the force to oversee the cease fire and withdrawal of the invading forces and that the expansion of the terms of reference of the force might present difficulty. According to the terms under which it agreed to the United Nations Emergency Force mission, Egypt might say at any time that the force should leave the Canal Zone. How long it will be permitted to remain on Egyptian territory depends in part on Egypt's attitude, which might be affected by its reaction to Israel's demands regarding its withdrawal.

The Ambassador then asked for Mr. Rountree's comment on Israel's proposal that it remove its armed forces from the Gaza Strip but leave civil administrators and a police force under the protection of the United Nations Emergency Force. Mr. Rountree regarded as remote the possibility of such an arrangement since it would mean the United Nations' assuming responsibility for Israeli supervision of an area which, while though not Egyptian, had previously been Egyptian-administered.

NEA:NE:MSR:ice:bk:av

1/25/57

WNR

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

LINP - Gorman

44

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action
IO

Control: 15385
Rec'd: JANUARY 25, 1957
10:30 P.M.

FROM: NEW YORK

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: DELGA 589, JANUARY 25, 10 P.M.

G

SP

C

PRIORITY

EUR

NEA

VERBATIM TEXT

ARA

FE

SYG REPORT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

L

E

R

P

O

FOLLOWING DRAFT RESOLUTION GIVEN GADEL OFFICER BY AUSTRALIANS
THIS MORNING. IN VIEW CANADIAN INITIATIVE, UK SEEKING TO
DISSUADE AUSTRALIA FROM GOING AHEAD ON BASIS THIS DRAFT:

IOP

BEGIN TEXT

DCL

QUOTE

THE GA,

RECALLING THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GA OF NOV. 2, THE TWO RESOLUTIONS
OF NOV. 4, THE RESOLUTION OF NOV. 5 AND THE TWO RESOLUTIONS
OF NOV. 7, 1956,

NOTING PARTICULARLY THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE GA OF NOV. 2

(A) URGED ALL THE PARTIES THEN INVOLVED IN HOSTILITIES IN
THE AREA TO AGREE ON AN IMMEDIATE CEASE-FIRE AND AS PART
THEREOF, HALT THE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES AND ARMS INTO
THE AREA.

(B) URGED THAT THE PARTIES TO THE ISRAEL-ARAB ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT OF 1948 SHOULD OBSERVE SCRUPULOUSLY THE PROVISIONS
OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

NOTING THAT THE EMERGENCY INTERNATIONAL UN FORCES REFERRED



Th
Rt
Caut
File
Must Be Returned to 674.84A/1-2557 HBS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PERMANENT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2- DELGA 589, JANUARY 25 10 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

TO IN RESOLUTION OF THE GA OF NOV. 4 NO. 998 (ES-1) HAS BEEN DULY ESTABLISHED BY THE RESOLUTION OF THE GA ON NOV. 5, 1956, 1000 (ES-1) TO SECURE AND ENFORCE THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH ALL THE TERMS OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE GA OF NOV. 2, 1956.

NOTING THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE GA OF NOV. 7, 1956, NO. 1002 (ES-1) CONCURRED IN THE DEFINITION OF FUNCTIONS OF THE SAID UN FORCES AS STATED IN PARA 12 OF THE SYG'S REPORT OF 6 NOV. 1956 (A/3302).

NOTING THAT THE DEFINITION OF FUNCTIONS AS STATED IN THE SAID PARA OF THE SAID SYG'S REPORT WERE

(A) WHEN A CEASE FIRE IS BEING ESTABLISHED, TO ENTER EGYPTIAN TERRITORY WITH THE CONSENT OF THE EGYPTIAN GOVT IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN QUIET DURING AND AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF NON-EGYPTIAN TROOPS;

(B) TO SECURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE OTHER TERMS ESTABLISHED IN THE SAID RESOLUTION OF 2 NOV. 1956 AND THAT THESE FUNCTIONS SHOULD COVER AN AREA EXTENDING ROUGHLY FROM THE SUEZ CANAL TO THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINES ESTABLISHED IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL.

RECALLING THE RESOLUTION OF THE GA NO. 453 OF 19 JAN. 1957,

NOTING THE REPORT OF THE SYG PURSUANT TO SUCH LAST MENTIONED RESOLUTION DATED 15 JAN. 1957,

AUTHORIZES THE SYG TO MAKE SUCH ARRANGEMENTS AS HE MAY DEEM ADVISABLE FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE EMERGENCY INTERNATIONAL UN FORCE IN SUCH PART OF THE AREA BEYOND THE ARMISTICE LINES WHICH HAS BEEN PENETRATED BY THE ARMED FORCES OF ISRAEL FOR THE PURPOSE, BUT ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE, OF ENSURING COMPLIANCE BY ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN HOSTILITIES WITH THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GA, MAINTAINING THE CEASE FIRE AND QUIET AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-3- DELGA 589, JANUARY 25 10 P.M., FROM NEW YORK.

WITHDRAWAL OF NON-EGYPTIAN TROOPS FROM THE AREA, SAFEGUARDING THE SAID ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND ENSURING AGAINST THE RECURRENCE OF HOSTILITIES BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

REQUESTS THE SYG, FOR THE PURPOSES SET OUT IN THE PRECEDING PARA, TO CONSULT AS HE DEEMS EXPEDIENT WITH THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED BY THE RESOLUTION OF THE GA OF 7 NOV. 1956 AND WITH THE CHIEF OF COMMAND OF THE UN EMERGENCY FORCE,

CALLS UPON ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW ALL ITS FORCES FORTHWITH BEHIND THE ARMISTICE LINES.

UNQTE

END TEXT.

LODGE

OKY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation

674,84A/1-2557Tel Delga 590

Date

1/25/57

From

New York

To

Sec State

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:



Security-Classified Information



Otherwise Restricted Information

State
Authority1/4/89
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

(90)

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

13967

1957 JAN 28 PM 7 43

DC/T

for DCIT use only

SENT TO: AmEmbassy, LONDON 5193
AmEmbassy, PARIS 2833
AmEmbassy, OTTAWA (by pouch) *Sen*

Origin
EUR
Info

Code Room please repeat DELGA 590 January 25, from New York,
New York
(Control No. 15394); GADEL 119 January 25, to ~~XXXXX~~ (Control No.
12476).

674.84a

674.84a / 1-2557
Dulles
(725)

DULLES

Report on Israeli withdrawal

This Document Must Be Returned to
RM/R
Central
Files

574.84A/1-2557 C3/F

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)

EUR
SS
IO

62

Drafted by:

EUR:LStaples:bh 1-28-57

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Taylor G. Belcher

Clearances:

S/S-CR

JAN 28 1957 P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

674.84b / 1-2557
Confidential

CONFIDENTIAL

Office Memorandum Dugy
 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : IO - Mr. Wilcox

DATE: January 25, 1957

FROM : UNP - Mr. DePalma

MR. WILCOX
 JAN 25 1957
 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF AMERICANS
 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Secretary General's Reactions to Our Draft Resolution
Concerning His Report.

Mr. Sisco called to say that he had been requested to show the Secretary General the draft of our proposed resolution, making clear that it was ad referendum. The Secretary General had confined his comments to the penultimate paragraph which now reads: "Approves the recommendations and measures proposed by the Secretary General in his report, which are to be implemented upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces."

The Secretary General suggested that two paragraphs along the following lines be substituted for the above:

"Notes the recommendations and measures proposed by the Secretary General in his report;

"Requests the Secretary General to consult with the parties concerned with a view to implementing, upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces, measures to achieve the aims indicated in the report, having regard for the recommendations contained therein."

The Secretary General had also suggested that a final paragraph be added which would request him to report as appropriate on the results of his consultations.

The Secretary General also reported that Fawzi hopes that there will be "free debate" on Monday, with no resolution being introduced. Fawzi would like to have a two or three-day interval following Monday's debate during which the Secretary General would consult with the parties.

The Secretary General believes that, in the light of Fawzi's reaction, timing is very important and that the resolution should not be tabled pending developments.

I told Mr. Sisco that my personal, off-the-cuff reaction was that, while we would want to be guided as much as possible by the Secretary General's views, his substitute for our penultimate paragraph seemed to fall far short of what was necessary at this time. I told him that conceivably it might be possible to achieve somewhat the same objective which the Secretary General apparently seeks if we were to introduce some language in our penultimate paragraph making it clear

that we

10 : UNP : S. DePalma CONFIDENTIAL

Rmk
 R/G
 ebt
 5/5/64

674.842/1-2557

interfiled by RM/A

1

that we are approving the recommendations and measures proposed in his report as a basis for achieving the objectives set forth in the General Assembly's resolutions.

I also told him that I personally thought it would be a mistake not to introduce a resolution by Monday, but that I assumed the Department would be agreeable to deferring the vote for several days, during which the Secretary General would continue his consultations. Mr. Sisco said that he would report the Secretary General's comments to Ambassador Lodge and urge that Ambassador Lodge see the Secretary General in order to be sure that we understand what the Secretary General is after.

cc: IO - Mr. Walmsley
UNP - Mr. Adams
L/UNA - Mr. Meeker
NE - Mr. Wilkins

IO:UNP:SDePalma:rs

INCOMING TELEGRAM

51 Department of State

ACTION COPY

57-H

Action

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 15751

Rec'd: January 26, 1957
4:00 p.m.This is
RM/R
Central
files

NEA

FROM: Cairo

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2412, January 26, 3 p.m.

G

SP

C

L

IO

R

SENT DEPARTMENT 2412, USUN 57.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION.

In conversation yesterday with Embassy officer Stavropoulos, UN legal advisor, referred to suggestion he had outlined to Indian Ambassador Jung providing for resolution of question freedom Aqaba straits by World Court. Jung had discussed idea with Nasser and had found him "very receptive" but according Stavropoulos concept presented Nasser by Jung involved lengthy legal process with both Egypt and Israel submitting separate briefs. Nasser envisioned court action lasting two or three years during which Egypt would enjoy status quo ante. In Stavropoulos' opinion control Israeli traffic would be reinstituted pending decision.

Stavropoulos pointed out to Jung that original concept envisioned a request to World Court by UNGA for advisory opinion and that this procedure would probably result in an opinion in six or seven months and that in other respects too this formula more practicable. He suggested that Nasser clearly understands that objective submitting issue to World Court is to provide Egypt with a "way out", that there virtually no (repeat no) possibility of decision supporting Egypt. Jung considers this a good approach to problem and said he would raise subject again with Nasser clarifying formula along these lines. Stavropoulos believes same method could be applied to issue of Israeli transit canal and thinks it might be best handled both issues at same time.

RSP:RBW/6

HART

FEB 14 1957

FILED

1957 JAN 28 AM 6 50

MESSAGE CENTER

HBS Confidential File

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

INCOMING TELEGRAM // Department of State

ACTION COPY

38

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

Control:

16049

Rec'd:

JANUARY 28

7:06 AM

1968 JAN 28 PM 2 18

NEA MESSAGE CENTER

674.84A/1-2657

HBS

NEA

FROM: TUN S

Info

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 356 JANUARY 26

OS

G

SP

EUR

L

IO

USUN

P

UCP

OLI

SENT DEPARTMENT 356, REPEATED INFORMATION PARIS 208, LONDON 100

JOINT STATE-USIS MESSAGE

BOURGUIBA ADDRESS TO NATION LAST NIGHT COVERED (A) ISRAELI FLOUTING UN RESOLUTIONS, (B) UK-YEMEN DISPUTE AND (C) ANNOUNCEMENT NATIONAL LOAN.

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

R

RE ISRAEL BOURGUIBA SAID IT MUST WITHDRAW FROM ALL EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. "WE ARE FIRMLY ON SIDE OF ANY VICTIM OF AGGRESSION. AGGRESSION SHOULD NEVER PAY OFF FOR AN AGGRESSOR. SHOULD ISRAEL OBTAIN GUARANTEES OR ADVANTAGES NOT POSSESSED PRIOR TO AGGRESSION, THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE REWARD FOR AGGRESSION AND FLOUTING OF MORALITY, LAW AND DECISIONS OF UN. ONLY RESPECT FOR DECISIONS OF UN CAN STRENGTHEN AUTHORITY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND FACILITATE SOLUTION PROBLEMS IN MANNER FAVORABLE MAINTENANCE WORLD PEACE."

RE YEMEN BOURGUIBA SAID THAT HE HAD TWICE DISCUSSED TUNISIA'S "ANXIETY" WITH BRIT AMB. HE SAID, "AFFAIR HAS BECOME SERIOUS ENOUGH TO MERIT ATTENTION OF UN...TUN GOVT BELIEVES IT NECESSARY TO SEND INVESTIGATING COMMISSION UNDER AUSPICES OF UNMO" AFTER EXPRESSING REGRET SUCH COLONIAL OUTPOSTS REMAIN WHEN "GREAT POLITICAL LEADERS SUCH AS EISENHOWER RECOGNIZE COLONIAL ERA IS OVER," PRAISED BRIT WISDOM IN GIVING UP INDIA ON OWN INITIATIVE AND WITHOUT BLOODSHED. "THIS IN NO WAY DIMINISHED ITS PRESTIGE AND IT ALSO SHIELDED INDIA FROM DANGER COMMUNISM. FOG COMMUNISM HAS CHANCE OF IMPLANTING ITSELF ONLY IN THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH DESPAIR OF LIBERATING THEMSELVES FROM COLONIAL YOKE."

EXPRESS

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED.

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

-2- 356 JANUARY 26 FROM TUNIS

EXPRESSED HOPE UK WOULD NOT HESITATE TO REVERSE ITS POLICY AND RENOUNCE LAST POCKETS OF COLONIAL SM AS CH MERELY GIVE ARGUMENTS TO ADVERSARIES OF CAMP OF LIBERTY.

"PEOPLE ONLY RESIGN THEMSELVES TO COMMUNISM WHEN THEY ARE PUSHED BY COLONIAL TYRANNY MISERY AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT." "IT IS TIME FOR WESTERN POWERS STILL HAVING COLONIES TO RENOUNCE THEM AND REPLACE COLONIAL TIES BY FREELY GIVEN COOPERATION UPON BASE AND WITHIN LIMITS OF RECIPROCAL INTEREST. THAT WOULD ASSUREDLY BE BEST MEANS OF BARRING ROUTE TO COMMUNISM.

AFTER PASSING REF TO RECENTLY INSTITUTED OBLIGATORY MILITARY SERVICE BOURGUIBA TURNED TO QUESTION OF "NATIONAL LOAN" TO BE FLOATED NEXT MONTH. IN THIS CONNECTION HE SAID THAT HERETOFORE TUNISIA HAD RELIED ON FR INVESTMENT SEVERAL BILLION FRANCS YEARLY. "AMERICA IS DISPOSED TO FURNISH US COMPLEMENTARY AID." HOWEVER TUNISIANS MUST EMPLOY ALSO THEIR OWN RESOURCES.

JONES

ULN

1961

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

13466

157 JAN 26 PM 8

For DCIT use

DC/T

SENT TO: USUN PRIORITY

Following report of conversation not yet cleared by Murphy.

~~Following report of conversation not yet cleared by Murphy.~~

Eban called Murphy January 26. Stated he had number criticisms UNSYG report: it difficult understand; UNSYG narrowed possibilities of solution Aqaba; closed all doors to solution re Gaza.

Re Aqaba Eban particularly disturbed at UNSYG's raising questions as to whether Straits Tiran were in fact international waterway and whether it could have decisive function there. Stated UNSYG had spoken much more positively on these two points in previous private communications to Israelis and that it was on this basis that Israel had made its proposals. Urged US take lead on this matter in UNGA so as to facilitate solution in terms of assignment UNEF to Sharm el Sheikh until firm international arrangements guaranteeing freedom of passage had been achieved. Eban was discussing draft resolution along these lines with Pearson. Indicated belief UNSYG inhibited from taking such initiative for fear Soviet and other UN member opposition.

Eban reported eight inch pipeline from Eilat to Beersheba would be completed by end March, would reach Mediterranean coast two weeks later. Source of oil had been obtained. (Presumably Iran). Sixteen inch pipeline in advanced planning stage.

Eban said Gaza more difficult because people involved. Israel control over strip, as Israel had proposed, would be limited by Israel declaration

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:DBergus:mgw

Clearances:

1-26-57

DC/T Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

G - Mr. BENNETT Bennett

Anal 68

Rev

CONFIDENTIAL

Rev

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

574-84401-1-2657 returned 5/9/57

CONFIDENTIAL FILE 574-84401-1-2657

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

of no intention to annex Gaza and recognized suzerainty of UN. There would not be outright takeover as India was doing in Kashmir. If Israel proposal encountered juridical difficulties, there should be attempt work out some kind of formula. Israel was thinking of some kind of enabling resolution which would permit UNSYG pursue further discussions with parties.

Eban hoped debate would not become a contest for denunciation and condemnation and asked US assistance along these lines. Murphy inquired what Israel would do in face UNGA resolution unsatisfactory to it. Eban made clear Israel forces would not leave Aqaba in absence effective arrangements for freedom of passage.

Murphy stated we wanted resolution acceptable to Israel and other interested parties. It should be based on UNSYG report, despite fact report had not been exactly what we had expected. We understood Israel viewpoint.

Eban expressed desire for consultation prior to US finalizing position on text of resolution. Shiloah expressed hope USG would take initiative and would not respond to Arab-Asian pressure tactics. Murphy said no such process going on.

Dulles

(WRB)

DULLES

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

January 26, 1957

TO : G - Mr. Murphy
FROM : NEA - William M. Rountree
SUBJECT: Israel Withdrawal from Tiran and Gaza; Ambassador Eban's Call on You, Saturday, January 26 at 4 P.M.

Discussion:

The Israel Ambassador is calling at his request to discuss the situation in the United Nations with respect to the withdrawal of Israel forces from the position at Sharm el Sheikh in the Straits of Tiran, and from Gaza.

The Israelis have submitted their position on these points to the Secretary General (Tab A). The Israel Government is declaring that this is their "final word" on the subject and that they will withdraw their forces on no other terms. The Israel Prime Minister made this clear in an extraordinary session of the Knesset on January 23. The Israelis maintain that they will withdraw from Sharm el Sheikh only if there is reason to be certain that the UNEF will remain there until an agreement between the interested states guaranteeing the international character of the Straits and freedom of navigation could be achieved. On Gaza, the Israelis would withdraw their military forces in favor of an arrangement whereby Israel civil and police officials actually administered the strip under some kind of UN supervision. The Israelis do not envisage the use of the UNEF in Gaza. They continue to maintain that the Israel-Egypt armistice agreement is dead and beyond resurrection.

The Secretary General's report was released on January 25. The text and a summary are attached (Tab B). It states that there is no present legal basis for turning Gaza over to Israel or UN administration. Deployment of the UNEF along both sides of the Israel-Egypt armistice lines is envisaged. While the Secretary General does not take a position as to whether the Straits of Tiran are in fact an international waterway, he also envisages the use of the UNEF at Sharm el Sheikh, at least temporarily pending assurances that neither side will assert belligerent rights in the area. The report throughout stresses the need for observance of the Israel-Egypt armistice agreement as called for in the UNGA resolution of November 2.

We feel that the Secretary General's report goes a long way toward meeting Israeli interests. It contains the essence of our position on the Gaza and Tiran problems.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

Recommendation:

That you make the following points in your discussion with the Israel Ambassador:

1. We have given careful study to the statement of views presented to the UN Secretary General by the Israel Government and to the report of the Secretary General. We intend to indicate our support of the SYG's report in the General Assembly. We believe the General Assembly should approve the recommendations and measures set forth in the report.

2. Fulfillment of the recommendations of the Secretary General will go far toward assuring by peaceful means certain Israel interests in security and trade. The essential first step must be withdrawal of Israel forces from points beyond the armistice line. We urge Israel to accept and comply with the recommendations of the Secretary General.

3. We feel that compliance with the November 2 UNGA resolution in all of its terms by all interested parties along the lines recommended by the Secretary General is essential. We shall make this view known at the General Assembly.

4. Israel's continued non-compliance with the wishes of the General Assembly make it increasingly difficult for Israel's friends to be of assistance to her.

Concurrence:

IO:UNP - Mr. DePalma *JB*

987 *tw* *2071*
NEA:NE:DCBergus:lk:nec

1/26/57

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM*Department of State*

44

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action

Control: 13816

Rec'd: JANUARY 24, 1957

12:46 P.M.

IO

FROM: NEW YORK

Info

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M.

G

SP

C

EUR

NIACT

NEA

L

VERBATIM TEXT

R

O

FOR SECRETARY AND WILCOX FROM LODGE

RE AIDE MEMOIRE ON THE ISRAEL POSITION ON THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH
AREA AND THE GAZA STRIP

A. BACKGROUND

1. IN CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE SYG AND THE ISRAEL DEL DURING
DECEMBER 1956 AND JANUARY 1957 IT WAS AGREED THAT THE DISCUSSION
OF THE PROBLEMS OF SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND THE GAZA STRIP BELONGED
TO THE FINAL STAGE OF THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. THERE IS AN
INTERNATIONAL INTEREST INVOLVED IN THE FORMER; AND THE
PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE LATTER ARE ESPECIALLY COMPLEX.

2. ISRAEL'S APPROACH TO THESE, AS TO OTHER PROBLEMS, IS
INFLUENCED PRIMARILY BY THE POLICY OF BELLIGERENCY MAINTAINED
BY EGYPT FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THIS POLICY FINDS EXPRESSION
IN THE EGYPTIAN DOCTRINE OF A "STATE OF WAR"; IN EGYPT'S
REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S CHARTER RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNTY,
INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY; AND IN THE ORGANIZATION BY EGYPT
OF HOSTILE ACTS INCLUDING RAIDS; ARMED ATTACKS; AND BLOCKADE
ACTIVITIES IN THE SUEZ CANAL AND THE GULF OF AQABA.

IT IS CLEAR THAT ISRAEL'S POLICY TOWARDS EGYPT MUST BE INFLUENCED
BY EGYPT'S POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL, SINCE THE DUTIES OF MEMBER
STATES TOWARDS EACH OTHER UNDER THE CHARTER ARE GOVERNED
BY THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY. FOR THIS REASON THE GOVERNMENT
OF ISRAEL HAS ATTEMPTED TO ELICIT A DEFINITION OF EGYPT'S

BASIC POLICY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 2 - DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

BASIC POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL. ON 4 NOV 1956 AND THEREAFTER, ISRAEL ATTEMPTED TO CLARIFY WHETHER EGYPT INTENDS TO MAINTAIN A STATE OF WAR AGAINST ISRAEL; WHETHER SHE AGREES TO RECALL FEDAYEEN GANGS UNDER HER CONTROL IN OTHER TERRITORIES; WHETHER SHE WILL SUSPEND THE ECONOMIC BOYCOTT AND BLOCKADE OF ISRAEL-BOUND SHIPPING IN THE SUEZ CANAL; AND WHETHER SHE WILL AGREE TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL WITH A VIEW TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE. EGYPT'S LACK OF RESPONSE TO THESE QUESTIONS CAN ONLY BE INTERPRETED AS SIGNIFYING THAT EGYPT INTENDS TO MAINTAIN HER BELLIGERENT POLICY TOWARDS ISRAEL ON LAND, SEA AND IN THE AIR.

3. THIS CONSIDERATION STRENGTHENS ISRAEL'S CONCERN TO ENSURE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF HER FORCES FROM EGYPT SHOULD NOT BE UNDERTAKEN IN SUCH MANNER AS TO STRENGTHEN THE SERIOUS LIKELIHOOD OF WARLIKE ACTS AGAINST HER.

4. THE POSITION WOULD BE RADICALLY DIFFERENT IF EGYPT WOULD AGREE TO A POLICY OF SIMULTANEOUS LIQUIDATION OF BELLIGERENT ACTS. ISRAEL IS WILLING AT ANY TIME TO SIGN A PROTOCOL OR OTHER INSTRUMENT FOR THE MUTUAL AND SIMULTANEOUS LIQUIDATION OF BELLIGERENCY; OR A NON-AGGRESSION PACT.

B. THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH AREA

1. THE AIM IS THE SIMULTANEOUS RECONCILIATION OF TWO OBJECTIVES -- THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES, AND THE GUARANTEEING OF PERMANENT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION, BY THE PREVENTION OF BELLIGERENT ACTS AGAINST SHIPPING IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE GULF OF AQABA, WHICH HAVE THE CHARACTER OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS IN WHICH THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE EXISTS.

2. THE NEED FOR ACCOMPANYING ANY WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES BY RELATED MEASURES FOR ENSURING FREE NAVIGATION AND THE PREVENTION OF BELLIGERENCY IS DICTATED BY THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

(A) FOR SIX YEARS EGYPT IMPOSED ILLEGAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE PASSAGE OF

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 3 - DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

PASSAGE OF SHIPPING TO ELATH BY THE USE AND THREAT OF FORCE,
THROUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GUN POSITIONS AT SHARM EL-SHEIKH.

(B) IF EGYPT WERE ABLE TO REESTABLISH HER GUN POSITIONS AND
TO EXERCISE FORCIBLE RESTRICTIONS ON ISRAEL-BOUND SHIPPING
A GRAVE DANGER WOULD ARISE TO PEACE AND SECURITY. IT IS
AXIOMATIC THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY CANNOT INTEND ITS RESOLUTIONS
TO LEAD, IN THE COURSE OF THEIR IMPLEMENTATION, TO THE
RESTORATION OF AN ILLEGAL SITUATION WITH A CONSEQUENT ERUPTION
OF CONFLICT.

(C) EGYPT HAS NOT TAKEN ANY STEPS TO COMPLY WITH THE BASIC
DECISION AGAINST BELLIGERENCY AND MARITIME RESTRICTIONS ADOPTED
BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 1 SEPT 1951. THIS FACT HAS A DIRECT
EFFECT ON THE NATURE OF ISRAEL'S OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS EGYPT
AND ON THE NEED FOR ISRAEL TO BE SAFEGUARDED AGAINST MARITIME
BLOCKADE IN OTHER WATERWAYS.

(D) MANY NATIONS HAVE A LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN THE FREEDOM
OF NAVIGATIONS IN THE GULF OF AQABA; AND IN THE RECENT DISCUSSION
OF THE GA A WIDE CONSENSUS OF OPINION WAS HEARD IN FAVOR OF
ESTABLISHING SUITABLE MEASURES FORTHWITH FOR ENSURING FREEDOM
OF NAVIGATION.

(E) THE DEPRIVATIONS SUFFERED IN THE PAST, AND STILL BEING
SUFFERED BY MANY NATIONS, INCLUDING ISRAEL, THROUGH EGYPT'S
REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH HER INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE
SUEZ CANAL MAKE IT IMPERATIVE TO ENSURE THAT THE BLOCKADE IS
NEVER RESTORED TO THE GULF OF AQABA.

3. EGYPTIAN COMPLIANCE WITH THE DECISION OF THE SC ON 1 SEPT
1951 HAS LEGAL AND CHRONOLOGICAL PRIORITY OVER ISRAEL'S DUTY
TO FULFILL RECOMMENDATIONS IN WHICH EGYPT HAS AN INTEREST.
ACCORDINGLY ISRAEL FORMALLY REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL
TO ASCERTAIN EGYPT'S INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE 1951
RESOLUTION OF THE SC.

4. MANY DELS WHICH SPOKE IN THE GA DURING THE RECENT DEBATE
RAISED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE UNEF MIGHT BE SO DEPLOYED
AS TO CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. SOME DELS
INVITED THE

- 4 - DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

INVITED THE SYG TO MAKE PROPOSALS IN THIS CONNECTION.

5. THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL CONSIDERS THAT THE UNEF COULD BE A FACTOR IN THE SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM IF THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS WERE CONFIRMED AND IMPLEMENTED:

(I) ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES, THE POSITIONS EVACUATED ALONG THE WESTERN COAST OF THE GULF OF AQABA WOULD BE HELD BY THE UNEF, AS HAS BEEN THE CASE WITH OTHER AREAS FROM WHICH ISRAEL FORCES HAVE WITHDRAWN.

(II) IT WOULD BE THE FUNCTION OF THE UNEF TO SEE TO IT THAT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION WAS MAINTAINED AND BELLIGERENT ACTS AVOIDED IN THE GULF OF AQABA AND THE STRAITS OF TIRAN. THE PREVENTION OF ACTS OF BELLIGERENCY IS DEFINITELY WITHIN THE MANDATE OF THE UNEF.

(III) THE UNEF WOULD REMAIN IN THE AREA UNDER DISCUSSION SO LONG AS IT HAD ITS FUNCTION TO PREVENT ANY RENEWAL OF HOSTILITIES.

(IV) IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CONSIDERATIONS THE UNEF WOULD MAINTAIN ITS POSITION ALONG THE WESTERN SHORE OF THE GULF OF AQABA UNTIL ANOTHER EFFECTIVE MEANS WAS AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED FOR ENSURING PERMANENT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND THE ABSENCE OF BELLIGERENT ACTS IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE GULF OF AQABA.

(V) SUCH EFFECTIVE MEANS WOULD BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN FOUND WHEN A PEACE SETTLEMENT WAS ACHIEVED; OR WHEN SECURE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION WAS GUARANTEED BY OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS TO WHICH ISRAEL WAS A PARTY.

C. THE FUNCTION OF UNEF

1. ALL THE ELEMENTS IN THE ABOVE PROPOSALS (THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES; THE NEED TO GUARANTEE FREE NAVIGATION; THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE UNEF WITH THE FUNCTION OF PREVENTING BELLIGERENCY; AND THE NEED TO SECURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE SC'S RESOLUTION OF 1 SEPT 1951). WERE ADVOCATED BY MANY DELS IN THE COURSE OF THE RECENT

- 5 - DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

THE RECENT GA DEBATE.

2. IT IS EVIDENT THAT, IF THE UNEF IS TO DEVELOP ITS CAPACITY TO HELP SOLVE THIS PROBLEM, MORE CLARITY AND PRECISION ARE NEEDED IN DEFINING ITS CHARACTER, ITS FUNCTIONS, AND, ABOVE ALL, THE DURATION OF ITS TENURE AND THE CONDITIONS FOR THE TERMINATIONS OF ITS ASSIGNMENTS. THE NEED FOR SUCH PRECISION IS THE MORE URGENT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT MANY DELS, INCLUDING THOSE WHOSE TROOPS COMPOSE THE FORCE, HAVE EXPRESSED CONFLICTING VIEWS ON THE FUNCTIONS AND NATURE OF THE FORCE.

D. THE GAZA STRIP

ISRAEL'S APPROACH TO THIS QUESTION COMPRISES THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:

(1) THE EGYPTIAN OCCUPATION OF GAZA AROSE OUT OF ACTS OF FORCE COMMITTED IN 1948 DURING AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW A RECOMMENDATION OF THE GA, AND IN DEFIANCE OF SUCCESSIVE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS BY THE SC.

(2) THE AREA HAS NEVER BEEN PART OF EGYPT AND ITS INHABITANTS ARE NOT EGYPTIAN CITIZENS.

(3) DURING EIGHT YEARS OF OCCUPATION EGYPT USED THE GAZA STRIP SOLELY AS A SPRING-BOARD FOR ASSAULTS AGAINST ISRAEL. THE NOTORIOUS FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT HAD ITS MAIN CENTRES AND RECRUITING GROUNDS IN GAZA. AS A RESULT OF THIS FACT, GAZA WAS THE SOURCE OF CONSTANT THREATS TO PEACE AND TRANQUILITY OVER A LARGE PROPORTION OF ISRAEL'S TERRITORY.

(4) DURING THE OCCUPATION EGYPT MADE NO ATTEMPT TO REHABILITATE ANY OF GAZA'S REFUGEE POPULATION OR TO DEVELOP THE POLITICAL FREEDOM OR ECONOMIC WELFARE OF THE PERMANENT RESIDENTS OF THE ZONE.

(5) AT THE PRESENT TIME LAW AND ORDER PREVAIL IN GAZA. ITS MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS AND PUBLIC UTILITIES ARE SLOWLY ESTABLISHED. AUTONOMOUS LOCAL GOVERNMENT IS BEING DEVELOPED; AND NUMEROUS ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES ACCRUE TO THE ZONE FROM THE ASSOCIATION OF ITS ECONOMIC LIFE WITH THAT OF ISRAEL. A REPORT BY A REP OF THE SYG (DOC A/3491) MAKES IT CLEAR THAT HARDSHIP AND DISORDER WOULD

- 6 - DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

DISORDER WOULD RESULT FROM THE DISRUPTION OF THIS PATTERN OF GROWING STABILITY.

(6) ISRAEL DOES NOT SEEK TO ANNEX GAZA OR TO MAINTAIN ITS MILITARY FORCES THERE. ON THE OTHER HAND, ISRAEL IS THE ONLY STATE WHICH HAS A DIRECT INTEREST IN A PEACEFUL, ORDERLY AND PROSPEROUS GAZA STRIP.

IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CONSIDERATIONS ISRAEL OFFERS THE FOLLOWING PROGRAMME FOR STUDY AND COMMENT:

(A) NO ISRAEL MILITARY FORCES WILL REMAIN IN THE AREA OF THE GAZA STRIP.

(B) ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPLY ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES INCLUDING AGRICULTURE, EDUCATION, HEALTH, INDUSTRY, LABOR, WELFARE.

(C) LAW AND ORDER WILL BE MAINTAINED BY THE ISRAEL POLICE (INCLUDING LOCAL POLICE).

(D) ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE AVAILABLE AND TO DEVELOP THE PUBLIC UTILITIES SUCH AS ELECTRICITY AND WATER.

(E) ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO DEVELOP LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN TOWNS AND VILLAGES.

(F) ISRAEL WILL SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF LIVELIHOOD FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION OF ABOUT 80,000, TWO-THIRDS OF WHOM WERE UNEMPLOYED UNDER EGYPTIAN ADMINISTRATION.

(G) THE NECESSARY FUNCTIONS OF SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATION ARE ALL COVERED BY THE ABOVE PROPOSALS. AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY FORCE WOULD NOT BE ABLE EFFECTIVELY TO UNDERTAKE THE POLICE DUTIES NECESSARY TO PREVENT A RECRUDESCENCE OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES. NOR WOULD SUCH A FORCE BE IN A POSITION TO CARRY OUT MEASURES OF ADMINISTRATION AND OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. FOR THESE REASONS THE ENTRY OF UNEF INTO THE GAZA AREA IS NOT ENVISAGED UNDER THIS PLAN.

(H) ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNRWA IN CONNECTION WITH THE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

- 7 - DELGA 572, JANUARY 23, 11 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

TION WITH THE CARE AND MAINTENANCE OF THE REFUGEES.


(I) ISRAEL WILL MAKE ITS FULL CONTRIBUITION TOWARDS ANY UN PLAN FOR THE PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF THE REFUGEES, INCLUDING THOSE IN GAZA. ISRAEL URGES THAT SUCH PLANS BE FORMULATED AND IMPLEMENTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

(J) IN CONNECTION WITH THE ABOVE MATTERS, ISRAEL IS READY TO WORK OUT WITH THE UN A SUITABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH RESPECT TO THE GAZA STRIP.

"

LODGE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE



SUMMARY OF SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
ON ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL OF JANUARY 25, 1957

In its efforts to reach a solution to the problems of the Near East, the United Nations must act in accordance with principle and be in agreement with international law and valid international agreements. The SYG is carrying out UN policies and must act with scrupulous regard for GA and SC decisions. Within the scope of the following points and together with full withdrawal of Israel forces there can be effective progress toward peaceful conditions in the area.

A. UN cannot condone any change in status juris resulting from military action contrary to charter.

B. Use of UN military force other than under Chapter VII of Charter requires consent of state in which force is to operate, and must be consistent with point mentioned under A.

C. UN actions must respect rights of member governments recognized in Charter and International Agreements.

1. Re Gaza

Although Egypt-Israel General Armistice Agreement established Armistice lines are not to be construed as political or territorial boundary and were delineated without prejudice to rights or claims of either party, the GAA, which was approved by the Security Council, established a de facto situation which cannot be changed without consent of both parties and remains in force until peaceful settlement reached. Deployment of UNEF in Gaza would have to be under terms of GA resolutions and on same basis as deployment in Sinai. Any broader function would require Egyptian consent. UNGA can recommend additional functions but cannot require Egyptian compliance.

2: Re Defensive Zones and El Auja

The provision of the E-I GAA providing for restrictions on deployment of military forces by Israel and Egypt along armistice lines have not been respected in recent years. These provisions were a result of careful analysis of military situation. Full implementation of military clauses of armistice agreement would have important bearing on other problems in the region. According to decisions of GA the UNEF should be deployed along the established armistice line. The GA concurred in SYG report which specifically referred to deployment along one side of armistice line only. However, with demilitarization of El Auja in accordance with GAA, it might be indicated that UNEF should also have units on Israel side of line, at least in El Auja. UNEF could then assume supervisory duties

supervisory duties of UNTSO as they apply to E-I GA but this would require consent of parties.

3. Incursions and Raids

UNEF and UNTSO should cooperate in prevention of raids across Armistice lines.

4. Aqaba

The legal status of the Gulf is open to controversy since there is no authoritative finding that it is international waterway. It does appear that the right of innocent passage exists. It may be desirable in due time to have the legal status of Aqaba definitively determined in an appropriate way. Pending such determination restraint should be exercised on all sides in order that the international interests involved are left unharmed. Since the Security Council in 1951 called on Egypt to terminate its restriction on shipping of goods through the Canal, this resolution has a direct bearing on the question of Aqaba shipping. After the withdrawal of Israel forces behind the Armistice lines the E-I GAA may again be considered to be operative. Under these circumstances the parties may not be considered entitled to claim belligerent rights. The implication of this as it affects Aqaba is clear.

D. As a conclusion from the above, it may be held that whatever the precise legal status of the Gulf after the withdrawal of Israel forces Egypt should consider its claim to belligerent rights so much in doubt that it should not be exercised.

E. After withdrawal of Israel from Sharm el Sheikh UNEF forces will enter the area. If state of affairs described in D above is established UNEF will not have any function after withdrawal. In any case UNEF cannot be deployed so as to safeguard any special Israel position but may temporarily function in support of mutual restraint.

F. Special representatives of UN as observers may assist parties to maintain peaceful conditions in area after departure of UNEF. In Gaza the UN may be required to assume additional responsibilities with respect to the refugees.

A development of United Nations action as outlined above would represent real progress toward the creation of peaceful conditions in the region. Momentum so far obtained should be maintained in future negotiations which should concentrate on concrete issues. For this purpose the cooperation of the parties is required.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 26, 1957

SUBJECT: Gaza and the Straits of Tiran

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
G - Mr. Murphy
NE - Mr. Bergus

COPIES TO: G (cc), IO (cc), NEA (cc), NE (2cc), Tel Aviv, (cc), Cairo (cc)

Mr. Eban was critical of the Secretary General's report, stating that it had been difficult to understand. Mr. Hammarskjold had narrowed the opening to a solution of the Aqaba problem, he seemed to have closed all the doors to a solution in Gaza.

As for Aqaba there were a number of factors, including Israel's willingness to withdraw and the interest of a good many maritime nations in free passage through the Straits of Tiran. In previous conversations, the Secretary General had indicated to the Israelis a United Nations interest in keeping open this international waterway. Hammarskjold had also expressed the view that the UNEF could be posted at Sharm el Sheikh and remain there as long as necessary to prevent hostilities. It was on this basis that Israel had formulated its position. Hammarskjold's report now appeared to be a retreat from his previous statements. The Secretary General had attempted to explain his present views on the Straits on the basis of the fact that the International Law Commission was meeting on the problem of international straits during 1957.

It seemed to Mr. Eban that if Hammarskjold's interest was in preventing belligerency that the way to do it was through the use of the UNEF. Israel's continued occupation of Sharm el Sheikh could be considered as an act of belligerency; Egypt's resumption of the blockade

CONFIDENTIAL

RM/R
Central
Files

Be Returned to

374.844/1-2367 03/F

FILED

1-23-1957

674.844/1-23657

XR
220.5750

52

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

of the Straits would be an act of belligerency; posting of the UNEF at Sharm el Sheikh could forestall either of these belligerent situations.

Mr. Eban reported that an eight inch pipeline from Eilat would reach Beersheba by the end of March and the Mediterranean coast two weeks later. Israel was sure of a source of oil (which he hinted was Iran) to ship through the pipeline. This line would handle 700,000 tons of oil per year. Plans were in advanced stage for a sixteen inch pipeline. While there would be little exportable surplus of oil from the eight inch line, still it was important that this link be in being prior to the full opening of the Suez Canal. Shippers were also showing interest in sending general cargo overland from Haifa to Eilat. This was an expensive arrangement, using presently available transit facilities, but it was cheaper than the Cape route.

Mr. Eban said that he had been discussing with the Canadian Foreign Minister a draft resolution which would assign to the UNEF the task of keeping open the Straits of Tiran. Mr. Eban speculated that Mr. Hammarskjold's shift of position on the Straits may have arisen from his desire not to irritate the Soviet bloc. Mr. Shiloah thought that this might be too charitable an analysis, since he believed that Hammarskjold had made certain commitments to Nasser. Mr. Murphy said that we knew of no such commitments.

Mr. Eban continued that Gaza was a more difficult problem because people were involved. The proposed Israel control of the Gaza Strip would be limited by Israel's declaration of non-annexation of the Strip and acknowledgment of UN suzerainty over it. There would not be an outright take-over as India was doing in Kashmir. From the viewpoint of security and the welfare of the Gaza inhabitants, Israel's proposal had much more to offer. The local government councils in Gaza liked the Israelis. If the Israel proposal ran into juridical difficulties at the UN, Israel hoped that some formula could be worked out, based either on a temporary Israel role in the Strip, or the UN's calling on Israel, as a neighboring state, to assist in administering Gaza. Mr. Eban was thinking in terms of an enabling resolution to authorize the Secretary General to pursue further his discussions on Gaza.

Mr. Eban hoped that the U.S. would oppose a campaign of denunciation and condemnation in the General Assembly. He also asked that Israel be consulted on the text of any resolution which the U.S. intended to table.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

Mr. Murphy asked what Israel would do in the face of a UNGA resolution unsatisfactory to it. Mr. Eban replied that he would not continue to act as a servant of his Government if it took the frivolous course of leaving Sharm el Sheikh without arrangements for the UNEF's replacing it and firm assurances that freedom of navigation would be maintained. Mr. Shiloah said that Israel would not accept suicidal recommendations.

Mr. Murphy said that the U.S. wanted a resolution which would be acceptable to Israel and to others. It would be something based on Mr. Hammarskjold's report although the report had not been exactly what we had expected. We understood the Israel viewpoint on these matters. He felt that Aqaba was the more important of the two issues. The question was how to get the UNEF there. Mr. Shiloah felt that the U.S. should take the initiative and not join in railroading any resolution through at the initiative of Krishna Menon. He was afraid that other countries were pressuring the United States. Mr. Murphy said that no such process was going on.

gbl
NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 1/28/57

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

37

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Action
IO

Control: 15896
Rec'd: JANUARY 27, 1957
2:43 PM

Info
RMR

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State: CENTER

SS
G
SP
C
EUR
NEA
ARA
FE
L
E
R
P
O

NO: DELGA 593, JANUARY 27, 2 PM

PRIORITY



RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS

IOP

DCL

MURRAY (CANADA) INFORMED US THAT SYG AT UNEF ADVISORY COMMITTEE MEETING SATURDAY MORNING EXPRESSED VIEW THAT AFRO ASIAN GROUP WOULD NOT SUBMIT RESOLUTION ON MONDAY IF OTHERS WOULD SIMILARLY REFRAIN. SYG URGED THAT RESOLUTION BE KEPT IN "HIP POCKET" THEREBY PERMITTING DEBATE WITHOUT RESOLUTION ON MONDAY WITH VIEW TO RESUMING DEBATE ABOUT THURSDAY. MURRAY REPORTED PEARSON AND OTHER MEMBERS ADVISORY COMMITTEE AGREED WITH SYG. IN VIEW FACT THAT EGYPTIANS ALSO PREFER GA DEBATE ON MONDAY WITHOUT RESOLUTION AND FACT THAT EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS NECESSARY, MURRAY SAID THAT UNDOUBTEDLY WE WOULD NOT BE IN POSITION SUBMIT RESOLUTION BEFORE MONDAY EVENING AT EARLIEST. DURING COURSE THIS CONVERSATION, GADEL OFFICER STRESSED IMPORTANCE CAREFUL CONSULTATIONS AND DEVELOPING RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD GET TWO-THIRDS VOTE IN GA.

AS FOLLOW-UP TO TELEPHONE CONVERSATION LODGE HAD WITH FAWZI FRIDAY, WE SENT COPY RESOLUTION CONTAINED DELGA 590 AS WORKING DRAFT TO FAWZI SATURDAY AFTERNOON AND ASKED HIM FOR HIS PRELIMINARY REACTIONS.

MALIK (LEBANON) SAW LODGE SATURDAY MORNING AT FORMER'S REQUEST AND EMPHASIZED THAT CONTINUED ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON CONDITIONS BEFORE WITHDRAWAL WILL "MUDDY THE WATER". HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT BE ASKED TO GIVE FORMAL ASSURANCES AT THIS TIME. HE THOUGHT IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE TO MAKE PROGRESS THROUGH INFORMAL ASSURANCES THAT EGYPT MIGHT BE ABLE TO GIVE.

IN RESPONSE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

674.84A/1-2757

PA

CLASSIFIED

674.84A/1-2757

-2- DELGA 593, JANUARY 27, 2 PM

FROM: NEW YORK

IN RESPONSE HIS QUERY, LODGE INFORMED MALIK WE WERE IN PROCESS OF DEVELOPING RESOLUTION BUT WE HAD NOT COME TO DEFINITE POSITION AS YET. MALIK SAID ISRAELIS ARE SEEKING A DEMILITARIZATION OF GAZA AND THE AQABA AREA. HE THOUGHT THERE WERE AT LEAST TWO WAYS IN WHICH THIS COULD BE DONE. FIRST, THE APPROACH SUGGESTED BY SYG, NAMELY, GOING BACK TO A FULLER IMPLEMENTATION OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. SECOND WAY, WHICH MALIK PREFERRED, WAS FOR ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW; AND THIS TO BE FOLLOWED UP BY STATEMENT BY US AND OTHERS IN THE GA, SERVING NOTICE THAT WE INTENDED TAKE UP QUESTIONS OF AQABA AND GAZA IN GA. IN THIS WAY, MALIK SAID, WITHDRAWAL WOULD NOT BE LINKED WITH CONDITIONS, AND EGYPTIANS WOULD NOT BE EMBARRASSED BY HAVING TO GIVE PUBLIC FORMAL ASSURANCES.

LODGE

JCK

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

57-H

Action
IO

Info.
RMR

SS
G

SP
C

EUR
NEA

ARA
FE

L
R

P
O

IOP

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 595, JANUARY 27, 6 P.M.

PRIORITY

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

Control: 15899

Rec'd: JANUARY 27, 1957
7:24 P.M.



THIS AFTERNOON I CALLED ON FAWZI (EGYPT) AT HIS REQUEST. HE SAID HE HAD STUDIED THE WORKING DRAFT (DELGA 590) WHICH I HAD SENT HIM AND HAD JUST CONCLUDED A LUNCHEON MEETING WITH PEARSON (CANADA). AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH PEARSON, HE HAD PROPOSED, AND PEARSON HAD ACCEPTED, THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND RELATED PROBLEMS:

1. GENERAL DEBATE MONDAY, 28TH. WITH NO RESOLUTIONS TO BE INTRODUCED FROM EITHER ARAB-ASIANS OR OTHERS.
2. NO DEBATE ON TUESDAY DURING THE VISIT OF KING OF SAUDI ARABIA.
3. SYG TO MEET WITH A GROUP OF DELEGATIONS, SUCH AS THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OR OTHER GROUP OF HIS CHOOSING, REPRESENTING THE GA AS A WHOLE, BUT NOT INCLUDING THOSE ADHERING TO THE EXTREMES OF ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. SUCH A GROUP, FAWZI SAID, MIGHT INCLUDE CANADA, THE U.S., EL SALVADOR, COLOMBIA, NORWAY, YUGOSLAVIA, INDIA AND BURMA.
4. DEBATE TO BE RESUMED POSSIBLY THURSDAY, AT WHICH TIME A RESOLUTION WORKED OUT BY THE GROUP CHOSEN BY HAMMARSKJOLD IN (3) ABOVE WOULD BE INTRODUCED. SUCH A RESOLUTION WOULD CALL UPON ISRAEL ONCE AGAIN TO WITHDRAW AND INCLUDE AN ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH IN GENERAL TERMS REGISTERING GA'S INTENTION TAKE STEPS TO ESTABLISH PEACEFUL CONDITIONS IN THE AREA IMMEDIATELY UPON COMPLETION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

5. FAWZI WOULD BE PREPARED IN MEANTIME TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS BEGIN

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

CONFIDENTIAL

FILED
JAN 28 1957
UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

674.84A/1-2757

PA

UNCLASSIFIED

674.84A/1-2757

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DELGA 595, JANUARY 27, 6 P.M., FROM NEW YORK.

ON SPECIFIC MATTERS WHICH COULD BE INCLUDED IN A SECOND RESOLUTION TO BE INTRODUCED IMMEDIATELY UPON COMPLETION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WHICH HE WOULD EXPECT SEE DISCUSSED AND INCLUDED IN SUCH RESOLUTION WOULD BE (A) EXTENSION OF UNEF'S FUNCTIONS TO STOP INFILTRATION ACROSS THE ARMISTICE LINES, (B) EXTENSION OF UN RESPONSIBILITIES FOR REFUGEES IN GAZA, (C) REFERENCE OF STATUS OF STRAITS OF TIRAN AND GULF OF AQABA TO THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE.

FAWZI SAID THAT ABOVE APPROACH WOULD EMPHASIZE GENERAL UN INTEREST AND RESPONSIBILITY AS OPPOSED TO THE INTERESTS OF SPECIAL GROUPS. I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT BY SUCH AN APPROACH HE HAD TWO OBJECTIVES IN MIND. FIRST, THE INITIATIVE WOULD BE LEFT IN THE HANDS OF A BROADER GROUP WHO MIGHT BE EXPECTED MOVE FORWARD WITH RESOLUTIONS MORE FAVORABLE TO EGYPT THAN IF CANADIAN INITIATIVE ALONE WERE CONTINUED. SECOND, RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED BY SUCH A GROUP WOULD MAKE IT EASIER TO OBTAIN CAIRO'S AGREEMENT TO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT BE MADE. FAWZI MADE NO REFERENCE TO SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL AND INDICATED THAT THE GENERAL PARAGRAPH HE PROPOSED RE TAKING STEPS TO PRODUCE PEACEFUL CONDITIONS, TO BE INCLUDED IN THE FIRST RESOLUTION, WAS HIS OWN IDEA AND ONE THAT CAIRO WOULD NOT MUCH LIKE. HE SAID THAT HE WAS ANXIOUS TO HAVE A QUICK SOLUTION TO ALL THE PROBLEMS, AND THAT EGYPT WAS READY TO RE-ESTABLISH RELATIONS WITH LONDON AS SOON AS CONDITIONS MADE IT POSSIBLE. HE SAID THAT PEARSON WAS FAVORABLE TO HIS PROPOSAL, BUT I AM NOT SURE THAT THIS WILL BE COMPLETELY BORNE OUT.

THIS SEEMS TO ME TO BE AN AUSPICIOUS BEGINNING FOR ACTION IN THE GA WHICH CAN COMMAND MAJORITY SUPPORT. IT TENDS TO MAKE FAWZI A PARTNER AND TO COMMIT HIM. THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE CASE IF WE HAD NOT GIVEN HIM THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WORKED OUT WITH CANADA. THIS REQUIRED HIM TO GIVE US AN ANSWER AND TO COME FORWARD WITH SOME CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS.

I TOLD FAWZI, WHO SAID HE EXPECTED TO SEE THE SYG TONIGHT, TO TELL HAMMARSKJOLD THAT WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO CONSULT WITH HIM AS SOON AS HE WISHED.

LODGE

RBW

CONFIDENTIAL

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

14308

57 JAN 20 11 10 19

For DCL use only.

SENT TO: USUN NEW YORK GADELX 123 ~~XXXXXXXX~~ NIACT

674.840/1-2557
320/5780

674.840/1-2757

RE: Israeli Withdrawal and SYG Report, DELGAS 590, 593, 595.

We agree action on SYG's report must be tailored to requirement for
thirds majority and believe we must avoid pushing Egypt to point where it
rejects specific measures suggested SYG thereby undermining basis for GA action.
But we believe GA should not adopt any further resolution on Israeli withdrawal
in area. / without in same resolution endorsing recommendations SYG's report.

We are concerned [] that in absence firm initiative situation might
drift to point where we unable use our influence to maximum advantage. Now
that debate has started without any resolution as Fawzi requested, we believe
USDEL in concert Canadian delegation should press consultations with SYG,
potential cosponsors and other selected delegations on resolution which gives
GA support to recommendations and measures in SYG's report with view
introducing such resolution as soon as practicable.

Whether such support should be expressed in broad terms as suggested
GADEL 119 or by endorsing specific measures along lines DELGA 590 would
depend results your consultations. *but broad terms seem to us more practical.* But we do not favor letting approach
suggested by Fawzi preclude any form of GA endorsement SYG's report until
after Israeli withdrawals because (1) we believe Israeli withdrawal might be
facilitated by knowledge GA supports SYG's approach and (2) if, as we doubt,
Israel should withdraw in advance such GA action, we would have lost bargaining

POWER

Drafted by: IO:UNP:SDePalma:rs

1/28/57

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearances:

IO

L - Mr. Phleger

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

JAN 20 1957 A.M.

C-1

674.840/1-2757
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

[power with Egypt and its supporters. For these reasons we strongly hope will prove possible deal both with withdrawal and further measures in same resolution and that such resolution can be introduced within next day or two.]

Dulles **DULLES**

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY

January 28, 1957

TO : The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : IO - Mr. Wilcox
NEA - Mr. Rountree

SUBJECT: General Assembly Action on Israeli Withdrawal
and Secretary General's Report

Discussion:

As you know the Assembly resumed its discussion today of the question of Israel's withdrawal without any resolution having been introduced. This is keeping with Fawzi's wishes (see DELGA 595, TAB B) and the views of the Secretary General.

There is as yet no consensus in New York as to whether a resolution, if it is introduced, should deal in terms of very general support for the recommendations and measures suggested in the Secretary General's report or attempt to specify the measures in some detail. Our suggestion as to a resolution giving general support to the Secretary General's report is contained in GADEL 119 which you signed (TAB C). USUN's proposal for a much more specific resolution along the lines favored by Mr. Pearson is contained in DELGA 590 (TAB D).

Since the extent to which the General Assembly is prepared to endorse the Secretary General's report is not known, we believe our delegation should be actively consulting with a view to formulating a proposal on which the Assembly can act as soon as possible and which would give the Secretary General as much support as possible for the recommendations in his report (TAB E). We are concerned that in delaying the introduction of any resolution which deals with the Secretary General's report until after the withdrawal of Israeli forces, as Fawzi suggests, we are losing the possibility of exerting timely pressure on both Egypt and Israel.

Recommendations:

1. That you sign the attached telegram (TAB A) to USUN, and
2. That, if you concur in the telegram, you discuss this matter with Ambassador Lodge over the telephone in order to expedite the consultations in New York.

Concurrence:

L - Mr. Phleger

IO:UNP:SD:Palma:rs

RM/R
Anal 68
Rev
Cat H

CONFIDENTIAL

APR 29 1957

FILED

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

674.84A/1-2757

CSAK

674.84A/1-2757

*Hand carried by
Secretary approved
FOW. Tel. which sent
out 1/29, A.M.
SOP*

*RM/R
SP
file*

Jan 28, 1957

Dear Mr. Dulles

February 13, 1957

Why do countries, who themselves have obeyed U.N. resolutions, demand Israel obey (without guarantees)?

What has been done to make Russia & India obey resolutions? Britain and France obeyed

For the sake of the United Nations, I believe Israel should obey. Then

674842/1-2857

3.

Mr. Secretary I want
to protest very much
any kind of invitation
to J-Lite.

Sincerely yours,

(Miss) Esther F. Novick

190 Grove St.
Bloomfield, N.J.

2.

Why shouldn't the Soviet
Union and India obey also?

Or are there two
sets of rules? What
about Hungary and
Kashmir? India and
Russia should be made
to obey U.N. resolutions

~~of~~ ~~Mr.~~ Mr. Meenon
(India) should be
ashamed to insist
Israel get out of
Egypt while his country
(India) holds Kashmir
by force.


674.84A/1-2857

CS/J

674.84A/1-2857

FILED

FEB 1 1957



E. J. Murch
- 50 & Co
Springfield, MA

Secretary John F. Dretter
Washington, D.C.

February 6 1957

In reply refer to
NEA:NE

Dear Senator Purtell:

I have for reply your communication of January 26 to the Secretary enclosing letters from two of your constituents regarding the evacuation of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory.

We believe that all parties should comply with all terms of the United Nations General Assembly cease-fire resolution of November 2, 1956. These terms include withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines. The resolution also urges that steps be taken to reopen the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation and that all parties refrain from raids across borders or other violations of the armistice agreement.

The Secretary General's report of January 25 recommends the deployment of United Nations forces in Gaza and the Tiran area as the Israeli forces withdraw from them. We support the Secretary General's view that such measures will help restore stability to the area and pave the way for solution of the Near East's major problems.

We are working for a solution of the Suez Canal problem through renewed negotiations on the basis of the six principles adopted by the Security Council. Among these principles is the right of access to and transit through the canal of ships of all nations, without exception.

Our action in strong support of the United Nations in the recent hostilities is evidence of our concern for the peace and security of the Near East. We shall continue to give our full cooperation to United Nations efforts to solve the basic problems of the area, including those of Suez, Gaza, and the Straits of Tiran.

The letters of your two constituents are returned as requested.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

Letters from Dr. Marvin Shield Arons
and Mr. Harry Wunseh

The Honorable
William A. Purtell,
United States Senate.

NEA:NE:BBParker:rej - 2/2/5/57

S/S CR
FEB 5 1957 P.M.
FEB 6 1957

Central
Miss

674.84A/1-2857

CS/J

674.84A/1-2857

10/2/57
Ans 6
Rev. _____
Out. _____

ACTION
is assigned to

February 6 1957

Referred to
2-2-57
January 28, 1957

United States Senate

Letters from Dr. Marvin Shield Arons, 2643 Kennedy Ave.
Baltimore 18, Md., and Harry Wunsch, Compo Parkway,
Westport, Connecticut

protesting the forced evacuation by Israel of the
Gaza Strip without the guarantee from Egypt that she
will be permitted to use the Suez Canal or the Gulf of
Aqaba.
Respectfully referred to

Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary
Department of State

with thanks for such favorable consideration as
the communication herewith submitted warrants,
and for a report thereon, in duplicate to
accompany return of inclosure.

By direction of

William A. Purtell
William A. Purtell, U. S. S.

674.84A/1-2857

A/29

RECEIVED
DEPT. OF STATE

1957 JAN 3 PM 4 02

1/R
RECORDS
BRANCH

FEB 27 1957

FILED

Encl. att.
a.c.
f

322292

DC/R
29
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th

March 28 1951

Dear Mrs. Hand:

I have been asked to reply to your recent letter to Secretary Dulles concerning your interest in our foreign relations. We were happy to learn of your interest and your efforts to better acquaint yourself with the facts of international relations, and trust you will excuse the delay in this response.

Complying with your request, I am enclosing material which describes the regional organizations of which the United States is a member.

Parliamentary tactics surrounding the passage of any resolution or bill in any assembly or legislature are seldom recorded and reports of such tactics are often exaggerated by interested parties. The fact that the United Nations favored the creation of the state of Israel has never been questioned seriously. For example, when the membership of Israel in the United Nations came before that organization, the Security Council voted 9 to 1 with 1 abstention and the General Assembly voted 33 to 11 with 13 abstentions in favor of Israeli membership.

Egypt has closed the Suez Canal only to Israeli flag ships and shipments to and from Israel of a military nature. However, the Egyptians have defined "military cargoes" very broadly. I believe that you may find the booklet published by the Department on the history and status of Israel of interest, and I have therefore enclosed a copy for your further attention.

Sincerely yours,

John P. Meagher
Chief
Public Services Division

Enclosures:
As stated.

Mrs. R. A. Hand,
126 Leslie Avenue,
Merchantville, New Jersey.

P:SEU:CE Rushing:OBL:Qcd INFO-Fran IO Mr White NEA/PS/18/51

TO:

2/6/57
IC/P - Bob White
6/15/57

FROM: P: SEV - Charles E. Rushing
3305 - SA-20
Ext. 3741 or 2830

I would appreciate receiving
any suggestions for replying to the
attached communication.

If you prefer to answer directly,
would you kindly send a copy of your
reply to me? Thank you.

126 Leslie Ave
Merchantville, N.J.

Secretary John Foster Dulles
State Department
Washington, D.C.

7650

Dear Mr Secretary:-

After hearing a Mr Foster from the State Department tell of the number of letters your Department answers, I feel it would be all right to write you.

I need some information. First, the countries that are members of NATO and SEATO and are there any other regional groups, if so, their members.

Now in reference to the Arab-Israeli situation. I have made a study for some discussion groups. I have papers issued by your Department, viz: President Eisenhower's Speech on The Suez Canal, your speech at Dallas on the Middle East; your fact sheet on the Palestine refugees, articles from Foreign Affairs Magazine, Nasser on The Egyptian Revolution, General Glubb on the Jordan situation and Perez on the situation generally and the details of the help UN is providing, etc. I tell you this so you may know what I have studied.

Now this is what I want to know. I heard recently an Arab member of the UN speak and he made these statements. At the discussion at the UN on establishing Israel, they were all ready to take the vote and if it had been taken then the Arabs who were violently opposed to it would have won out, so the American representative, who I think he said was Mr Austin, proposed they should adjourn for forty-eight hours as it was the day before Thanksgiving. The Arabs protested that a discussion was ended and a vote would not take ten minutes, but Americans had their way, the vote was not taken and during the forty-eight hours the U.S. brought pressure on the smaller nations and when the vote was taken the Arabs were defeated and tricked. What did happen? Our reasons for championing the establishment of Israel? Sincerely
Thanks for any help.

(Mrs R.A.) Elizabeth Hand

374.441.1-2857

100

APR 15 1961

674800/1-2857

PUBLIC SERVICES DIV.

1957 JAN 23 PM 3:36

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1957 MAR 14 PM 4:24

PUBLIC SERVICES DIV.

FILED

P.S.--Someone asked him about the embargo on Israel shipping in the Suez. He said this was another misunderstanding, that it only applied to cargoes of a military character and not to all shipping. Certainly the impression I have from reading is that all shipping was included and I think that is the general impression. Are we wrong in this?

EE R -

We cannot comment on
one tactics. Actually there are
very few people around 10 who
were here at ~~that~~ time. I cert-
ainly don't know. Basically
all you can say is that we
did support Israel ~~for~~
in its quest for statehood.
what our reasons for supporting
Israel were you best get from
INEA. My impression is that
the plight of the thousands of

your emigrating from Eastern Europe and U.S. public opinion were the chief causes. You may be able to glean some others out of the pamphlet on Israel.

The note on the admission.

of Israel was

Security Council - 9

Египет

4.12

General Assembly - 33 - 11 - 13

Concerning The block

made on the Suez. The Arab
is technically correct but

The Blockade office in Alexandria has defined military cargoes very broadly including such items as foodstuffs and oil.

R. S. W.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

45

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

NEA

Control: 16767

Rec'd: JANUARY 29, 1957

4:59 A.M.

1957 JAN 29 PM 3 07

MESSAGE CENTER

674.84A/1-2957

HBS

Info

RMR

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 896, JANUARY 29

G

SP

C

EUR

ARA

L

IO

UMSA

E

P

UOP

ND

O

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

DCL

ICA

FOREIGN MINISTRY IN PUBLIC STATEMENT JANUARY 27 DESCRIBED HAMMARSKJOLD'S REPORT ON STATUS ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL AS "NEGATIVE AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE" AND SEEKS TO RESTORE STATUS QUO AND "WHICH HAS ALREADY ENDED IN DISASTER." FURTHER CHARACTERIZING REPORT AS "REMARKABLE NO LESS FOR WHAT IT IGNORES THAN FOR SOME OF THEORIES IT PROPOUNDS," STATEMENTS MAKES 7 POINTS:

- (1) SYG IGNORES EGYPTIAN INSISTENCE ON BELLIGERENCY.
 - (2) IN RESPONSE THIS BELLIGERENCY SYG MERELY URGES RESTORATION ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ALREADY SHOWN UNWORKABLE.
 - (3) SYG IGNORES FAILURE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND DOES NOT ASK EGYPT WHETHER SHE IS PREPARED MAKE PEACE.
 - (4) SYG "SEEKS FOR FIRST TIME GIVE COLOR TO EGYPT CLAIM BELLIGERENT STATUS AND RIGHT MAINTAIN BLOCKADE POLICY."
 - (5) SYG RECALLS UNSC 1951 RESOLUTION ON FREEDOM ISRAELI SHIPPING IN SUEZ CANAL BUT "SEEKS WEAKEN ITS VALIDITY" AND DOES NOT INDICATE DETERMINED EFFORT MADE BY HIM SEEK EGYPT'S COMPLIANCE.
 - (6) RE GAZA STRIP SYG SUGGESTS RESTORATION EGYPTIAN CONTROL INSTEAD OF AIMING AT CONDITIONS "WHICH WOULD MAINTAIN PRESENT CALM, SUSTAIN HOPE LOCAL INHABITANTS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTAIN REFUGEES FREE FROM EGYPT'S INTIMIDATION AND INCITEMENT."
 - (7) SYG GIVES NO ANSWER TO "BURNING PROBLEMS" OF EGYPT'S BELLIGERENCY, FREE PASSAGE IN GULF OF AQABA, AND GAZA STRIP.
- IN CONSLUSION STATEMENT NOTES REPORT "WARMLY WELCOMED" BY EGYPT.

ACCORDING PRESS CABINET AT WEEKLY MEETING YESTERDAY DISCUSSED UN SYG REPORT.
SOME NEWSPAPERS ASSERT CABINET REAFFIRMED SUPPORT FOR JANUARY 24

KNESSET STATEMENT

PERMANENT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 - 896, JANUARY 29, FROM TEL AVIV

KNESSET STATEMENT ON POLICY RE FURTHER WITHDRAWAL AND APPROVED IN PRINCIPLE GAZA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS "SUBMITTED BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES" IN STRIP. JERUSALEM POST SUGGESTS NUMBER OF POINTS IN SYG REPORT "REQUIRED FURTHER CLARIFICATION" BEFORE BECOMING ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL E. G., MEANING OF TERM "INNOCENT PASSAGE."

PRESS EDITORIAL COMMENT JANUARY 27-28 ON UN SYG REPORT IS UNANIMOUSLY CRITICAL (WITH EXCEPTION COMMUNIST.) ON JANUARY 27 DAVAR (HISTADRUT) SAYS "IT IS DIFFICULT CONCEIVE MORE BIASED REPORT" WHILE AL HAMISHMAR (MAPAM) SUMS UP REPORT AS DEMAND OF EVERYTHING FROM ISRAEL AND NOTHING FROM EGYPT. ON JANUARY 28 PAVERHAV (AHDUT AVODAH) CALLS ON ISRAEL TO STAND FIRM IN ORDER STRENGTHEN UN, AND HAMODIA (AGUDAT ISRAEL) SUGGESTS AFRO-ASIAN BLOC, WITH MORAL AUTHORITY REDUCED BY INDIA'S STAND ON KASHMIRE, WILL BE UNABLE OBTAIN REQUIRED MAJORITY FOR SANCTIONS.

JERUSALEM POST EDITORIAL TODAY SAYS WEST INCREASINGLY RECOGNIZES NECESSITY GIVING ISRAEL SECURITY GUARANTEES BUT THAT PLEDGES WILL DOUBTLESS BE PREDICATED ON PRIOR WITHDRAWAL. UN SYG ATTITUDE EXPRESSED HIS REPORT, INDICATES POST, GIVES LITTLE REASON FOR OPTIMISM RE EFFECTIVENESS LIKELY WESTERN GUARANTEES E.G., POSTING UNEF ON DEMARCATION LINE, IN GAZA AND SHARMES SHEIKH. POST SUGGESTS TIRAN QUESTION OPEN TO NUMBER OF SOLUTIONS BUT GAZA REQUIRES NON-RETURN EGYPTIANS AND CONTINUATION ISRAEL SUPERVISION. EDITORIAL CONCLUDES THAT RAPID PROGRESS IN SOLUTION PROBLEMS UNLIKELY IN VIEW SAUD VISIT TO US AND INDIAN ANNEXATION KASHMIR.

UN CORRESPONDENTS VARIOUS NEWSPAPERS PROVIDE DESPATCHES INDICATING BELIEF DANGER OF SANCTIONS LESS IMMINENT BECAUSE OF SUCCESS ISRAEL CONVINCING WESTERN POWERS OF NECESSITY FOR GUARANTEES AND BECAUSE OF INDIA'S FAILURE COMPLY WITH UN RESOLUTION ON KASHMIR. AT SAME TIME CORRESPONDENTS RECOGNIZE LIKELIHOOD UNGA WILL NOT ACCEPT ISRAEL'S PROPOSALS ON GAZA AND TIRAN STRAITS.

LAWSON

RVH

UNCLASSIFIED

FEB 5 1957

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

31

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

USUN

P

UOP

O

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AR

FROM: Damascus

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 1773, January 29, 10 a.m.

Control: 16820

Rec'd: January 29, 1957
6:12 a.m.SENT DEPARTMENT 1773; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 180, ANKARA 104
BAGHDAD 208, BEIRUT 504, CAIRO 216, JIDDA 102, TEL AVIV 115.

PASS USIA

Principal press theme January 25 to 27 was Israeli refusal comply UN Resolution re withdrawal troops. Most press accused US of responsibility Israeli intransigence, several following line of Rafi Al-Am (G-2 ASRP) that Ben Gurion and Eisenhower agreed Israeli stand would help force Arabs accept US plan for ME. All press January 27 carried somewhat calmer statement Prime Minister Asali:

(1) GOS examining situation carefully and still has faith in UN but,

(2) Arab States determined take measures compel Israel leave Sinai and Gaza.

Withdrawal question played down January 28 but criticism US continued:

(1) Bombay declaration Foreign Minister Bitar that charge of Communist infiltration false and designed provide excuse for imposition imperialist control ME nations, and

(2) special Asali statement for Radio Moscow that Syria objects Eisenhower program because it disregards UN principals and Arabs nationalism.

MOOSE

MESSAGE CENTER
MAM/MJH/6
1957 JAN 29 PM 4
22/1-7-16

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM
COPY IS PROHIBITED

MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES
674.34A/1-2957

674.34A/1-2957
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL

45

Action: *Jan 10/10*Control:
Rec'd:

17370

JANUARY 9, 1957

10:07 PM

This Document
Is Being
Controlled
Files

Info

RMR

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

IN CENTER

NO: DELGA 612, JANUARY 29, 8 PM

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

NEA

ARA

FE

L

UMSA

E

P

UOP

O

OLI

IOP

OCB

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

RE SYG REPORT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS, ETC.

LODGE SAW LALL (INDIA), WHO SAID INDIANS HAD BEEN PRESSING HARD IN CAIRO TO GET EGYPTIANS ADOPT REASONABLE ATTITUDE. LALL SAID EGYPTIANS CAN ACCEPT THREE STEPS IN RESOLUTION: (A) WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES; (B) REAFFIRMATION OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND CALL UPON PARTIES TO OBSERVE IT; AND (C) DEPLOYMENT OF UNEF ALONG BOTH SIDES ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN DEMARCATION LINE. LALL SAID THAT IS AS FAR AS EGYPTIANS CAN GO NOW. AFTER ISRAELI FORCES HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN, EGYPTIANS WOULD ACCEPT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ICJ ADVISORY OPINION ON QUESTION AQABA.

LALL BELIEVED RESOLUTION COULD BE LIMITED TO CALL UPON PARTIES TO OBSERVE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WITH SYG REPORTING ON ANY NON-COMPLIANCE. LALL BELIEVES NO EGYPTIAN FORCES WOULD MOVE INTO SHARM EL SHEIKH AREA IF ISRAELIS GET OUT. HE THINKS IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR SYG TO DEPLOY UNEF THERE. SHIPS COULD GO THROUGH STRAITS TIRAN SINCE EGYPTIAN TROOPS WOULD NOT MOVE IN. IF THERE WERE ANY BELLIGERENT ACTS COMMITTED IN STRAITS AREA, LALL SAID SYG COULD REPORT TO GA. LALL EMPHASIZED DETERRENT EFFECT OF THREAT OF SYG REPORT. IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUERY, LALL SAID HE BELIEVES EGYPTIANS WOULD BE WILLING TO CLOSE THEIR EYES TO PASSAGE OF ISRAELI SHIPS AND, IN FACT, HAVE DONE SO IN PAST WEEKS. LALL SAID THAT IF FAWZI WERE ASKED GIVE SUCH ASSURANCES PUBLICLY HE WOULD BE UNABLE DO SO.

WE POINTED OUT THAT, IN OUR VIEW, IT WAS NOT ENOUGH MERELY TO CALL UPON PARTIES TO OBSERVE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. SUCH REQUEST SHOULD BE TIED IN WITH AN APPROVAL OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF MEASURES CONTAINED IN SYG'S REPORT. DISCUSSION WITH LALL CONCLUDED WITH UNDERSTANDING WE WOULD CONSULT FURTHER.

LODGE

YAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

674.84A/1-2957 HBS

Confidential File

AIR POUCH
PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

674.84A/1-2957
X2 675.84A
683a.84A
683.84A

FROM : AMCONGENERAL, JERUSALEM

110

DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

January 29, 1957

DATE

REF : Congen Despatch 105, January 17, 1957

For/Dept. Use Only	ACTION	DEPT.	I N F O	OTHER
	REC'D			
	NER-4	R-1/R-2 01-8 IO-4 P-1 USUN-1 BEIRUT		
	2/6	CA-12 OSD-4 USIA-10 ARMY-4 NAVY-3 AIR-3		

SUBJECT: Activities of the MACs during the
Period 5 through 18 January 1957

CAIRO-1 DAMASCUS-1

Copies of the substantive parts of the weekly reports prepared by the Mixed Armistice Commissions of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization which summarize their activities for the period 5 through 18 January 1957 are enclosed.


William E. Cole
American Consul General

2 Enclosures

1. Copy of Parts of MAC Weekly Reports for 5 through 11 January 1957
2. Copy of Parts of MAC Weekly Reports for 12 through 18 January 1957

Copy sent Amman, Tel Aviv

Department pass to Beirut, Cairo, Damascus

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
HES

NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

1957 FEB 8 PM 2 05

HKMiller/hkm

REPORTER

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

COPY

The following is a summary of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions for the period 5 January to 11 January 1957.

EGYPTIAN - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The general situation during the period under review was quiet.

Two notables from the town of Gaza were placed in jail and are still there for allegedly disobeying a military order to visit Haifa and Tel Aviv as guests of the Israeli Government along with a group of other notables from the Gaza Strip.

The Egyptians in the civilian P.O.W. camp in Gaza were notified at 0400 hours on 10 January 1957 that they were to be moved to a new location for repatriation. All Egyptians were moved out of Gaza in buses at 0945 hours on 10 January and are believed to have been taken to El Arish. The Egyptian civilians located in the Rafah area were believed to have been moved to El Arish on the previous day.

There was a minor demonstration in the town of Gaza as the Egyptians were moved out. Young men shouted anti-Israeli and pro-Egyptian slogans. Merchants closed their shops but were forced by the police to open them again.

Complaints and investigations

Nil.

HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The situation along the border remained relatively quiet, but with an increase of complaints from HJK of small crossing and firings across the border.

Following HJK complaints to the General Assembly that Israel had been massing "big troop concentrations" along the border, patrols on both sides of the border were arranged with the permission of both parties. The Israel side was patrolled on 10 and 11 January 1957 and arrangements were made for patrols on the HJK side to commence on the 12th.

A very distorted article concerning the passing of information on "fedayeen" activities by the Israeli Delegation to the HJK Delegation at sub-committees meetings appeared in the Jerusalem Post of 10 January 1957. It remains to be seen whether this will affect the attitude of the HJK delegate in the sub-committee.

The outstations of Nablus, Hebron and Latrun have continued to be manned by UNMOs.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

The Senior Jordanian and Israeli delegates met in the chairman's office on 8 January 1957. Minor matters were discussed. The Senior Israeli delegate said that he was still studying the matter of marking the demarcation line in the Sheikh Jarrah sector, Jerusalem.

A Sub-Committee meeting, held on 8 January 1957, discussed missing persons, property and other problems incidental to the maintenance of the G.A.A.

The Jordanian Delegation submitted 13 complaints: 1 alleging crossing of the demarcation line by military units; 2 alleging firing across the demarcation line; 10 alleging overflights. (No investigations. No casualties.)

The Israeli Delegation submitted no complaint.

Outstanding complaints: HJK-1,208; Israel-350; Total-1,558

ISRAEL - LEBANESE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The period under review has been quiet.

A Sub-Committee was held on 9 January 1957.

On 10 January 1957, the Lebanese Delegation stated that, due to the non-compliance by the Israeli authorities with the provisions of the agreement regarding the return of infiltrators, it would not attend any further MAC meetings.

On 11 January 1957, the Senior Israeli Delegate informed the Lebanese Delegation that free passage was granted to all ships, including Lebanese ships, navigating through the Gulf of Aqaba.

The Lebanese Delegation submitted 1 complaint alleging one overflight of the Naqoura area by a jet plane coming from Israel.

The Israeli Delegation submitted no complaint.

ISRAEL - SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

During the period under review, the Israeli Delegation reported three shooting incidents having taken place on Lake Tiberias against Israeli fishermen. No casualties were reported. The Israeli Delegation also alleged that a settler from Gonen had been wounded by small-arm fire coming from Syria on 9 January 1957. (No investigation requested.) Aside from that, the period under review has been generally quiet.

No inspection was made on the side of the Jordan River Project in the central sector of the Demilitarized Zone.

The Israeli Delegation submitted 8 complaints: 1 alleging that a Syrian searchlight was directed towards Israel; 1 alleging an attempt by Syrians to

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

enter the settlement of Tel Kazir; 2 alleging overflights by Syrian aircrafts; 3 alleging Israeli fishermen on Lake Tiberias were fired at from Syrian territory (**); 1 alleging nets left behind by Israeli fishermen when they were fired at, on 4 January 1957, could not be recovered and were probably stolen by Syrians.

The Syrian Delegation submitted 1 complaint alleging an overflight.

Outstanding complaints: Israel-644; Syria-744; Total-1,388

(**) On 17 January 1957, the Jerusalem Post published the following information dated Tiberias, Wednesday (16 January 1957):

"Kinneret Fishermen Work in Peace"

" Fishing on Lake Kinneret this winter proceeded almost undisturbed, and the fishermen have been throwing their nets at every shore of the Lake and at any time they choose, the Ministry of Agriculture's Fisheries Department stated today.

The fishermen are picking the richest grounds, mainly in the north-eastern section of the Lake which is close to Syrian positions.

There was only one incident and that 'due to a misunderstanding,' nor were there any Syrian fishermen operating on the Kinneret this year. Last year, such infiltration occurred repeatedly. The quiet this season is explained here as due to the impact of the Sinai campaign on the Syrians who appear to be anxious to refrain from provocation."

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

COPY

The following is a summary of the activities of the Mixed Armistice Commissions for the period 12 January to 18 January 1957.

EGYPTIAN - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

Late on the night of 11 January 1957 a pregnant woman was murdered in her house in Beach Camp. In the morning the murder, with many atrocity embellishments, was attributed to Israeli military personnel. Small bands of refugee women, shouting slogans, sallied forth from the camp and proceeded to Gaza town. The women demonstrated in front of the police station and also in front of various UNRWA houses en route. The Israeli police eventually dispersed the demonstrators by firing a few bursts into the air. There is no record of anyone being injured. A few stones were thrown, mainly by children, indiscriminately and impartially at local taxis, an UNRWA car in the camp itself and at a UNTSO Jeep. A window was broken in both the UNRWA and UNTSO vehicles. Some of the shops in Gaza town were closed for a few hours in the early morning but were re-opened in the late morning and afternoon.

Careful inquiries by UNRWA International Staff in the camp indicate that the incident was apparently a private family quarrel and a jealousy crime. This view appears to be confirmed by reliable local European and Arab opinions.

UNRWA international personnel and local Arab dignitaries feel that the demonstration was incited and organized by disaffected elements in the camp. They also anticipate further periodic demonstrations.

UNRWA has changed the camp administrator in order to secure a firmer control in this camp which has been the scene of several incidents. They have also taken up the question of camp control with the Military Governor and armed Palestinian police are now located in the camp.

The general situation in Gaza town and Beach Camp has been perfectly quiet since the above incident.

School attendance fell off on Saturday, 12 January, as a result of the Beach Camp incident but the attendance has slowly picked up.

Rumor has it that the Israelis have removed from Gaza town most of the local government motorized transport in the last few days.

On the 17th of January the Military Governor held a meeting of some town dignitaries and mukhtars in an endeavour to form a committee which might assist with the restoration of normal activities in Gaza and also in an attempt to avoid future disturbances.

UNRWA, Red Cross and Baptist Hospital personnel visited El Arish independently during the early part of the week. They found the Egyptian internees from Gaza and Rafah well housed and no complaints were received from them.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(Classification)

UNRWA sources stated that the Israelis were systematically blowing up military barracks in El Arish. Israeli activity on the road to the east of El Arish seemed to indicate that the Israelis may have been preparing to demolish a section of the road. However, the informant was rather vague on this point.

UNTSO Observers continue to move in UN Jeeps and on foot around Gaza town and its environs.

The UNTSO continues to furnish communications and clerical support to UNRWA.

Complaints and investigations

Nil.

HASHEMITE JORDAN KINGDOM - ISRAEL MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

There has been no noticeable change in the situation along the border.

The Jordanians claimed to have shot one Jordanian detected attempting to cross into Israel by a Jordan Army Patrol.

The Jordan attitude appeared to be hardening in the day to day contacts between the parties.

About 450 pilgrims crossed from Israel into Jordan on Friday, 18 January to celebrate the Armenian Christmas. About 25 were turned back by the Jordanians, although it was claimed by the Israelis that their names were on the list agreed to by Jordan. After a considerable delay Jordan said these people would be permitted to pass but then the Israelis refused to permit them to leave Israel.

The Israel side of the border was patrolled on 13, 14, 15 and 17 January and the Jordan side on 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17 January. Fewer troops were seen on either side than for many months past.

The outstations of Nablus, Hebron and Latrun continued to be manned by UNMOs.

The Senior Jordanian and Israeli delegates met in the chairman's office on 14 January. The Senior Israeli delegate said that he was still studying the matter of marking the demarcation line in the Sheikh Jarrah sector.

A Sub-Committee meeting, held on 15 January, discussed missing persons, property and other problems incidental to the maintenance of the G.A.A. No mention was made of the newspaper article referred to in former report.

The Jordanian Delegation submitted 12 complaints: 1 alleging crossing of the demarcation line and firing by armed civilians; 9 alleging overflights;

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

1 alleging crossing of a Israeli motor launch into Jordan territorial waters in the Gulf of Aqaba; 1 alleging stone throwing across the demarcation line. (No investigations. No casualties.)

The Israeli Delegation submitted no complaint.

Outstanding complaints: HJK-1,220; Israel-350; Total-1,570

ISRAEL - LEBANESE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The period under review was quiet. The regular MAC meeting scheduled on 15 January was cancelled.

Entry visas for 12 of the 32 infiltrators from Israel have been granted so far by the Israeli authorities. The Lebanese authorities stated informally that the crossing of these individuals would be authorized as soon as the 20 other ones are accepted by Israel.

On 11 January, the Senior Israeli delegate informed the Lebanese Delegation that the "Poseidon" flying the Lebanese flag had sailed freely through the Tiran pass on her way to Aqaba.

On 12 January, the Senior Lebanese delegate requested confirmation of the identity of the above mentioned ship, which is unknown to the Lebanese Delegation.

The Israeli Delegation submitted 1 complaint alleging that during the night of 12/13 January the telephone line between Manara and Iftah was sabotaged at MR 2019 2854. (No investigation requested).

The Lebanese Delegation submitted 1 complaint alleging that a jet plane coming from Israel overflowed the El-Hamra and Merdjayoun areas on 14 January. (No investigation requested).

ISRAEL - SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

The period under review was quiet.

Patrols carried out at the junction of the Israeli, Syrian and Jordanian borders did not reveal anything to support the Jordanian allegation that Israelis were massing troops in that area.

No inspection was made on the site of the Jordan River Project in the central sector of the Demilitarized Zone.

The Israeli Delegation submitted 1 complaint alleging an overflight. (No investigation requested).

The Syrian Delegation submitted 1 complaint alleging that, on 9 January, an Israeli patrol penetrated inside Syrian territory and opened fire on a Syrian post. There were no casualties. An investigation was carried out (report not

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Page _____ of _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

(Classification)

Page 4 of _____
Encl. No. 2
Desp. No. 110
From Jerusalem

yet received in Jerusalem).

Outstanding complaints: Israel-645; Syria-745; Total-1,390

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

CONFIDENTIAL

7386

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: January 29, 1957

SUBJECT: Israel's Withdrawal

674.842

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Shimshon Arad, First Secretary, Israeli Embassy

Mr. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Special Assistant to
Assistant Secretary, IO, Department of State

COPIES TO:

RM/R ✓
IO
UNP
NEA
NE
USUN

This Document Must Be Returned to
RM/R
Central
Files

Mr. Arad came in to see me at his request. He wished to discuss the developing situation in the UN with respect to Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba. He wished to make three points:

1. He sees a solution in the making which would enable Israel to withdraw from the Gulf. He feels that this would be facilitated by phasing the timing of Israeli withdrawal and UNEF occupation in a more precise way, so that if Israel unilaterally announces the date of her withdrawal, it would be with the knowledge that UNEF entry would be "simultaneous".
2. With regard to Gaza, he said Israeli opinion is unanimous that Egypt must not be allowed to return to Gaza, on the grounds that Israel's vital security interests would be directly threatened again as they had been over the years by Egyptian infiltration based on Gaza. He implied that Israel was prepared to make magnanimous gestures with respect to the refugees in the Gaza Strip if she continued to be present in the area.
3. He strongly reiterated an earlier theme to the effect that the key to securing moderation of the Israeli position along lines of interest to us, is in a direct top-level, and sympathetic approach to Ben-Gurion. To have the desired effect it would have to come from the President or Secretary and should spell out what the U.S. actually is prepared to do to help safeguard Israel's security interests after she completes her withdrawal.

DC/R

Anal 6

Rev _____

Cat FR

CONFIDENTIAL

FILED
JAN 31 1957

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

374.842/1-2957

674.842/1-2957

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

I drew Mr. Arad's attention to Ambassador Lodge's statement of January 23 in the GA and suggested that the Israeli Government should find this a balanced and possibly helpful description of the way the U.S. views the solution of the current problem. I emphasized the extraordinary political importance that attaches to prompt Israeli withdrawal from the two areas; and the improbability that Israel could receive any more precise assurances from any quarter before her actual withdrawal. In this connection, I underscored the importance of Israeli acceptance of the Armistice Agreements, as the only available legal and moral basis on which conditions of peace and security can be re-established in the area. Speaking personally, I deplored the apparent rigidity and tactical hardness of the Israeli position as making it excessively difficult for those trying to be helpful in seeking a just solution.

I tried to ascertain how much give there might be in the Israeli position respecting Gaza. From Mr. Arad's response, I gathered that if a suitable third-party solution could be found which would deal effectively with the prevention of renewed Egyptian infiltration, he felt Israel could probably live with it.

JHB

IO:LPBloomfield:kg 1/39/57

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

ACTION COPY

674.84A/1-3C57^S

Info
RMR
SS
G
SP
C
EUR
NEA
ARA
FE
L
P
UCF
O
OLI

OCB
USIA
CIA

Control: 18211
Rec'd: JANUARY 30, 1957
9:06 PM

TO: Secretary of State MESSAGE CENTER

NO: DELGA 618, JANUARY 30, 8 PM

Com / R
File
Des

VERBATIM TEXT

RE SYG REPORT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS

FOLLOWING DRAFT RESOLUTION DEVELOPED IN ORDER MEET POINTS MADE TO US BY SYG, EGYPTIANS, CANADIANS AND NORWEGIANS. BOTH CANADIANS AND EGYPTIANS ARE CONSULTING THEIR GOVERNMENTS.

THE GA,

HAVING RECEIVED THE REPORT OF THE SYG. OF JANUARY 24, 1957 (A/3512),

RECOGNIZING THAT WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES MUST BE FOLLOWED BY ACTION WHICH WOULD ASSURE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE CREATION OF PEACEFUL CONDITIONS IN THE REGION.

(1) NOTES WITH APPRECIATION THE SYG'S REPORT AND APPROVES THE MEASURES PROPOSED BY THE SYG THEREIN, TO BE CARRIED OUT UPON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES;

(2) CALLS UPON THE GOVERNMENTS OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL SCRUPULOUSLY TO OBSERVE THE PROVISIONS OF THE 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT; AND ACCORDINGLY

(3) URGES THAT THE MEASURES CONTAINED IN THE SYG'S REPORT BE OBSERVED, RESPECTED AND GIVEN EFFECT TO AFTER FULL ~~WITH~~ WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND GAZA AREAS, SO THAT THE SYG WILL BE THUS ASSISTED TO ACHIEVE SITUATIONS ENVISAGED IN HIS REPORT CONDUCTIVE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF QUIET

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

PA

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- D.L.G.A. 618, JANUARY 30, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK

AND PEACEFUL CONDITIONS THERE;

REQUESTS THE SYG, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED, TO TAKE STEPS TO CARRY OUT THESE MEASURES AND TO REPORT, AS APPROPRIATE, TO THE GA."

PRINCIPAL DIFFICULTY HAS BEEN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 3, WHICH WAS ORIGINALLY DRAFTED PURSUANT SUGGESTIONS RECEIVED FROM HAMMARSKJOLD. HE FELT THAT LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH 3 WOULD TRAMPHEN HIS HAND TO ACHIEVE DEPLOYMENT OF UNEF ENVISAGED IN HIS REPORT WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING 2/3 VOTE IN GA. WHILE FAWZI HAS ACCEPTED ABOVE RESOLUTION INCLUDING PARAGRAPH 3, SUBJECT TO HEARING FROM CAIRO, PEARSON STILL NOT SATISFIED. PRINCIPAL WEAKNESS IN RESOLUTION FROM PEARSON'S POINT OF VIEW IS THAT NO EXPLICIT REFERENCES ARE MADE TO DEPLOYMENT OF UNEF. MOREOVER, HE IS STILL CLINGING TO POSITION THAT RESOLUTION SHOULD STATE, CATEGORICALLY THAT UNEF SHOULD BE DEPLOYED IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH, GAZA AND ON BOTH SIDES OF THE DEMARCATION LINE. WE POINTED OUT THAT OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 GIVE US WHAT PEARSON WANTS WITHOUT GOING INTO SPECIFICS. WE ALSO READ TO HIM FIRST SENTENCE IN PARAGRAPH 29 OF SYG'S REPORT WHICH STATES: "ISRAEL TROOPS, ON THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SHARM-AL-SHAIKH AREA, WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY THE UNEF IN THE SAME WAY AS IN OTHER PARTS OF SINAI."

WE ARE NOT CERTAIN WHETHER PEARSON WILL AGREE TO CO-SPONSOR. HE SAID CABINET WAS DISCUSSING THIS MATTER AND HE WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT OTTAWA TONIGHT. AS LODGE SAID TO SECRETARY TONIGHT, BELIEVE IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IF DEPARTMENT CONSULT WITH CANADIANS ALONG ABOVE LINES. WE ARE MAKING AVAILABLE ABOVE TEXT TO MENON TONIGHT AND LODGE WILL CONSULT WITH HIM AND EBAN THURSDAY A.M. OUR AIM IS TO TRY TO GET A RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE END OF THE DAY THURSDAY SO THAT WE CAN PUSH AHEAD WITH DEBATE ON FRIDAY AND WEEK-END, IF NECESSARY, TO COMPLETE ACTION.

IF PEARSON CONTINUES TO INSIST, WE INTEND SUGGEST ADDITION OF THE PHRASE "INCLUDING THE SUGGESTED DEPLOYMENT OF UNEF" AFTER THE WORD "THEREIN" IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1. WE, OF COURSE, WILL HAVE TO CONSULT WITH OTHERS ON THIS PHRASING AND DO NOT WANT TO PROVIDE FAWZI WITH PRETEXT TO RETURN FROM HIS ACQUIESCENCE TO ABOVE RESOLUTION.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- DELGA 618, JANUARY 30, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK

DEPARTMENT WILL ALSO NOTE THAT WORD "RECOMMENDATION" HAS BEEN DELETED FROM OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 4. WE DROPPED REFERENCE TO THIS WORD IN DEFERENCE TO PEARSON'S VIEW THAT NOWHERE IN THE SYG'S REPORT DOES HE MAKE A SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATION EVEN THOUGH A NUMBER OF THE PROPOSALS OR SUGGESTIONS HE MAKES ARE, IN EFFECT, RECOMMENDATIONS. PEARSON FELT USE OF THIS WORD MIGHT GIVE RISE TO QUESTIONS IN GA.

LODGE

CC

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION
is assigned to



United States Senate

Washington, D. C., January 30, 1957

Respectfully referred to

Honorable Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

For your information.

674.84A/1-3057

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JAN 31 PM 1 20

RM/R
CURRENT RECORDS
BRANCH

NO. 10
NO. 10
REP: 10 AINE

FEB 1 1957

FILED

A/29

*Encl. att.
a.c.
†*

322499

Charles E. Potter
CHARLES E. POTTER, U.S.S.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-45102-2

DC/R
ansd 29
Rev 1
Class
Not Made

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS

DL=Day Letter

NL=Night Letter

LT=International Letter Telegram

1201

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

BA004

1957 JAN 26 AM 1 18

B CAA007 LONG NL PD 6 EXTRA=CAMBRIDGE MASS 25=

SEN POTTER SENATE OF ICE BLDG=

WASHDC=

AS A VOTER IN MICHIGAN AND A GRADUATE STUDENT NOW IN BOSTON, I URGE YOUR ATTENTION TO HELP SEE THAT JUSTICE IS DONE IN THE UNITED NATIONS BY THE UNITED STATES. THE STATE OF ISRAEL SHOULD BE GIVEN GUARANTEES WITH ALL OTHER NATIONS FOR PASSAGE THROUGH SUEZ AND THE GULF OF AQUABA BORDER GUARANTEES, AN THE RIGHT TO HAVE THE ARAB NATIONS NEGOTIATE THANK YOU=

RICHARD H JONES 375 HARVARD ST CAMBRIDGE 38 MASS=.

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

44

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Action

Control: 61

NEA

Rec'd: February 1, 1957
2:57 a.m.Info
RMR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 904, January 31, 4 p.m.

G

SP

C

L

IO

P

WOP

O

SCA

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

SENT DEPARTMENT 904 REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 157, AMMAN 158, JERUSALEM 66, NEW YORK 41.

All Israeli papers front-paged reported wounding two Israeli soldiers one seriously, east of Rafah Wednesday morning when their patrol car hit "number of mines".

Papers stated it obvious mines laid only night before because road in every day use. Tracks of persons allegedly found leading to area under UNEF control.

Commentators dealing incident underscored point GOI making all along: That if UNEF charged with maintaining inviolability of international frontier they would not be capsule of guarding against trespasses by such small groups of infiltrators.

Comment: Responsive to Embassy inquiry Foreign Ministry made same point add: as well incident demonstrated unreliability assurances Hammarskjold reported he had received from Egyptians (numbered paragraph 22 of Hammarskjold's report to United Nations January 25) to effect GOE wanted all incursions across armistice lines "in both directions be brought to end". Officials said Ministry now considering whether incidents should not be brought to attention UNGA in New York perhaps by letter for circulation among delegations.

LAWSON

VH:LMB

674.84A/1-3157

HBS

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS

57-D

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

IO

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

NEA

ARA

FE

L

P

UOP

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 639, February 1, 9 p.m.

Control: 839

Rec'd: February 1, 1957
9:29 p.m.

PRIORITY

Re SYG report Israeli withdrawals.

Draft resolutions contained in DELGA 629 submitted by US, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, India, Norway, and Yugoslavia Friday 5 p.m. Only change is substitution of words "in the area" for "there" in operative paragraph 3 of Resolution II.

Menon and other co-sponsors accepted this change, but Menon resisted substitution of word "effective" for "other" in same paragraph. Pearson (Canada) decided not co-sponsor. He has prepared amendments which would: (A) add phraseology to operative paragraph 2 referring to non-exercise of belligerent rights by parties, and (B) make specific reference to deployment of UNEF in Sharm-el-Sheikh and Gaza in paragraph 3.

Lodge urged Pearson not to submit these amendments since they would not get 2/3 vote and would thus result in clouding interpretation of our paragraph 3.

When Fawzi informed of change in our paragraph 3 to include phrase "in the area", he expressed hope this would not cause concern in Cairo. Fawzi said he wished to speak first before resolutions were submitted so that he would not have to address himself to them. We held off having resolution circulated to 5 p.m. in order permit Fawzi first make his speech.

Lodge met with LA group who reacted most favorably. Number of LA spoke in supporting.

Lodge also met with European and old Commonwealth whose reaction was mixed. Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands, and UK expressed preference more precise formulation paragraph 3. Norway reported that SYG felt resolution was constructive and provided good basis for him to carry forward. Ireland and Italy made favorable statements emphasizing that it was, on balance, as good a compromise formula as could be expected in light conflicting views in LA. UK took line that course of GA debate and explanation of sponsors would give

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action to

UNCLASSIFIED
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

674.34A/2-157

PA

CLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

100-311722

-2- DELGA 639, February 1, 9 p.m., from New York

would give meaning to paragraph 3 and would help member countries determine their voting position. Europeans and Commonwealth are aware Pearson's amendments and fact no decision yet made by him whether to submit them pending development of debate. Our impression is that, while not entirely satisfied, fair number of European and Commonwealth will support resolution.

Member USGADEL staff spoke with Engen (Norway) concerning possible Canadian amendments to second draft resolution which would specify functions of UNEF in Gaza and Sharm-el-Sheikh. We pointed out if amendments were defeated for lack of two-thirds, as is undoubtedly the case, there would be considerable doubt cast upon authority of SYG to take those very measures which he otherwise could do under terms of our draft resolution. Engen went at once to Pearson (Canada). Engen told him while he (Engen) under present instructions would have to support amendments, he felt they could not pass (which Pearson seemed to agree was the case) and by being defeated would make it appear GA did not approve of UNEF in Sharm-el-Sheikh and Gaza. Pearson suggested that maybe the way to handle this problem would be to request clarification from sponsors.

Similar point has been made as above to Mackay (Canada) and Cordier (Secretariat) for SYG to make to Pearson. Our feeling is result these contacts will convince Pearson of wisdom of submitting amendments.

JB-6

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

43-48

SECRET

Action
IOControl: 871
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 1, 1957
9:54 PMInfo
RMR

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

SS
G

NO: DELGA 641, FEBRUARY 1, 9 PM

SP
C
EUR
NEA
L
R
O

PRIORITY

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

RE PALESTINE/SUEZ

MEMBER NORWEGIAN DELEGATION GAVE US, IN GREATEST CONFIDENCE, THINKING OF HIS DELEGATION AS IT HAD EMERGED AFTER NEGOTIATIONS ON TWO RESOLUTIONS, WHICH APPEARS TO US SIGNIFICANT.

HE SAID THEY HAD TALKED WITH EBAN (ISRAEL) YESTERDAY. EBAN HAD MAINTAINED IF ISRAEL COULD HAVE JUST TWO MORE WEEKS WITHOUT ANY DEFINITIVE GA ACTION, THEY BELIEVED WORLD OPINION WOULD HAVE SWUNG AROUND TO THEIR POINT OF VIEW. NORWEGIAN DELEGATION FEARED THERE WAS GROWING IN NORWAY AND US, AND IN MANY WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES BODY OF OPINION WHICH, IF IT CONTINUED, WOULD EVENTUALLY CONCLUDE THAT STAND AGAINST UK-FRENCH-ISRAELI ACTION IN EGYPT TAKEN BY US, NORWAY AND OTHERS HAD BEEN IN ERROR. NORWEGIANS CONCLUDED THIS WAS, IN FACT, WHAT BRITISH, FRENCH, ISRAELIS AND CERTAIN WESTERN EUROPEANS HOPED WOULD BE DEVELOPMENT IN NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS.

REASONING RAN SOMEWHAT AS FOLLOWS:

IF ISRAEL STAYS IN GAZA AND SHARM-EL-SHEIKH FOR TWO MORE WEEKS CANAL WILL BY THEN BE OPEN TO LIMITED AMOUNT TRAFFIC. THERE WILL NOT HAVE BEEN ANY SETTLEMENT OF STATUS OF CANAL BY THAT TIME. EGYPT MAY WELL REFUSE, IN THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES, TO PERMIT PASSAGE OF BRITISH, FRENCH, OR OTHER WESTERN VESSELS, SINCE IT IS CLEAR EGYPT WILL INSIST TOLLS BE PAID TO EGYPT WHICH BRITAIN AND FRANCE WILL NOT PERMIT. IT IS POSSIBLE, IN SUCH SITUATION, THAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE MIGHT THEN REINSTITUTE

ACTION,

SECRET

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.PERMANENT
RECORD COPY

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

674.34A/2-157

SECRET

SECRET

-2- DELGA 641, FEBRUARY 1, 9 PM, FROM NEW YORK

ACTION, CLAIMING THEY HAD IN EFFECT ACTED IN GOOD FAITH UPON THEIR EARLIER WITHDRAWAL AND GIVEN UN CHANCE TO WORK. THIS HAD FAILED, AND THEY MUST NOW RETURN TO ACHIEVEMENT THEIR ORIGINAL OBJECTIVE OF KEEPING CANAL OPEN AND, TO DO THIS, TO FORCE CAPITULATION OF NASSER REGIME?

THEY SAID THEY COULD NOT, OF COURSE, BE SURE BRITAIN AND FRANCE WOULD BEGIN MILITARY ACTION AGAIN, BUT THEY SHARED SECRETARY-GENERAL'S CONCERN THAT, IF ISRAEL STAYED IN EGYPTIAN TERRITORY, EGYPT WOULD BE SORELY TEMPTED TO MOVE ITS FORCES INTO THOSE AREAS OF SINAI AND THEREBY BLOW LID OFF EVERYTHING. PARENTHETICALLY, THEY SAID, 6TH FLEET WOULD THEN HAVE BIG JOB IN EVACUATING UNEF WHOSE NORWEGIAN COMPONENT, AT LEAST, HAD NOT ENVISAGED GETTING INVOLVED IN ACTUAL FIGHTING.

ENGEN (NORWAY) IS FLYING TO OSLO SUNDAY AFTERNOON FOR TWO DAYS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH FOREIGN OFFICE BECAUSE OF POTENTIALITIES IN THIS SITUATION OUTLINED ABOVE. THEY ARE ALSO CALLING BACK THEIR PEOPLE FROM LONDON WHO ARE INVOLVED WITH SCUA NEGOTIATIONS THERE IN LIGHT THEIR WORRIES IN THIS CONNECTION.

LODGE

CC

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE FILE39
Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

E

O

~~TOP SECRET~~Control: 9384
Rec'd: March 15, 1957
12:02 a.m.

FROM: Cairo

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2899, March 15, 2 a.m.

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 2899, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV NIACT 159,
USUN NIACT 120.

Have just returned from seeing Nasser (11:30 p.m.) and delivering message contained Department telegram 3030. He received it soberly and thoughtfully but seemed at loss to know what to reply except to repeat statements of last night to effect he had thought his action was within his rights and also justified by circumstances, both immediate (preserving calm in Gaza) and longer range (removing uncertainty re internationalization of Gaza). He referred repeatedly to effect of provocative and challenging statements of Ben Gurion and also mentioned declaration of Selwyn Lloyd today as being indicative of problems GOE facing.

However, burden of conversation tonight was on fact that matters have progressed to point where difficult reconcile with admonition of "utmost caution." Not only did Governor of Gaza actually enter city this afternoon but (Nasser volunteered this) Egyptian troops have been moved into Sinai (but not into Gaza) and are now as far forward as El Arish. Nasser repeatedly maintained that these actions were entirely normal and had been taken without provocation or aggressive intent but, by dint of considerable argument, he finally admitted that others might view them in another light and that this was fact to be seriously considered as far as world opinion, especially as formulated in UN, concerned. He would not concede, however, that there was much point in trying to court Israeli opinion.

I then referred to the deep concern of President Eisenhower in this matter and asked what I might report to him regarding his (Nasser's) intentions. He said he wanted to express his appreciation for the President's advice and to give assurance that he had no aggressive intentions. I asked if that was all. He looked rather helpless and asked what more could be said in the circumstances. I replied that it was not merely question of assuring the President of what he had in mind but also a question of

~~TOP SECRET~~UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

74.344/2-157

~~TOP SECRET~~ FILE

Copy No(s) 6
Destroyed in RM/R
Name *March* Date *10/18/57*

TOP SECRET

-2- 2899, March 15, 2 a.m., from Cairo.

question of taking some action to reduce tension and apprehension. To be specific, would he withdraw the Governor from Gaza and his troops from Sinai or both. Nasser said he did not see how this could be done. Would he then undertake to act as prudently as possible and also to make a public statement himself in which he would clearly state his good intentions to reduce pressure pending arrival of Hammarskjold? Nasser replied would certainly attempt follow cautious line but hesitated make statement for fear of becoming embroiled in argument with Ben Gurion. I replied that, if one's intentions good, there is no reason become involved in dispute. He said he would think it over and mentioned that he had already instructed the Director of Information, Hatem, to issue a statement as result of our conversation last night.

Despite fact that Nasser had already taken action which we sought to prevent before this message delivered, I believe that it made real impression on him re gravity of situation and there is some reason to hope that he will think twice before he makes any further moves. As a consequence, message certainly served useful purpose despite being largely repetitive of that delivered night before and fact that possible use President's name seemed have telling effect.

HARE

EOC:OKY

TOP SECRET

37
INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

D
Action

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 1291
Rec'd: February 3, 1957
7:29 p.m.

SS
Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 912, February 3, 8 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

NIACT

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

Re DEPTTEL 760 - 614.84a
320.5784a

Ben Gurion received me in bedroom his Tel Aviv residence at 5:30 this afternoon at which time he read President's letter with great care. He did not (repeat not) reply formally or at length but indicated considerable dis-appointment with letter and especially with United Nations resolutions and General Assembly debate, particulars of which he seemed be informed of. He apparently desired reserve major comment for his formal reply which I expect Tuesday. Nothing he said leads me to believe he weakening in any degree on Tiran Straits or Gaza.

Prime Minister clad in heavy dressing gown sat in chair and rose to meet me. Obviously he not (repeat not) fully recovered from his bout with pneumonia but was vigorous in his speech and firm in his movements.

LAWSON

AAL/7

Note: Messrs. Maestroni (SS-DO) and Wilkins (NE) informed, 8 p.m., 2/3/57, CWO-FED.

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

Tel Aviv-912

674.84a/2.357

784a.11

(2)

100 copies received

13
10

Master File - Copy No. 8

TEL AVIV

1000 XX

OUTCOME

NUMBER 912

DATE February 3, 1957

CONTROL 1291

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

S ✓ ~~3~~

U ✓ ~~4~~

G ✓ ~~113~~

O ✓ ~~113~~

E ✓ ~~113~~

C ✓ ~~112~~

L ✓ ~~11~~

P ✓ ~~11~~

S/AE ✓ ~~11~~

S/P ✓ ~~11~~

U/MSA ✓ ~~11~~

H ✓ ~~11~~

R ✓ ~~11~~

IO ✓ ~~11~~

EUR ✓ ~~11~~

ARA ✓ ~~11~~

FE ✓ ~~11~~

NEA ✓ ~~11~~ Action #1

U/OP (Higgs)

(Richards)

President #2

Ben Huron
reaction to Pres
message on
Suez

Stassen

Jackson

Category C

CIA

ICA

USIA

USUN-Lodge

SEC. DEFENSE

ISA

JCS

OTHER

EYES ONLY

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

31

Action
10

Info
RMR

SS
G
SP
C

EUR
NEA
ARA
FE
L
R
O

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CORRECTION ISSUED
2/4/57 6 p.m.

Control: 1277
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 3, 1957
12:52 PM

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 645, FEBRUARY 3, 12 AM

RE: PALESTINE/ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

FOLLOWING MEETINGS REPORTED IN DELGA 647.
RIFAI (JORDAN) INFORMED LODGE THAT ARAB DELEGATIONS HAD MET AND
HAD DECIDED TO STAND ON INTERPRETATIONS OF RES. GIVEN BY MENON
AND LODGE AND WOULD NOT REPLY TO OTHERS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE IN
DEBATE. THEY INTENDED TO ABSTAIN IN VOTE ON SECOND RES., BUT
WOULD URGE THEIR FRIENDS TO SUPPORT IT. HE SAID LODGE HAD ALWAYS
BEEN HONEST WITH HIM AND HE WAS GLAD TO GIVE HIM THIS INFORMATION.

LODGE

MGG:GEV/14



Correction made
by RM/R

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PERMANENT
RECORD COPY

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED FILE

FILED

MAY 5 - 1959

674.84A/2-357

674.84H/2-357

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

31

Action

IO

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

NEA

ARA

FE

L

R

O

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Control: 1277
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 3, 1957
12:52 PM

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 645, FEBRUARY 3, 12 AM

RE: PALESTINE/ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

RIFAI (JORDAN) INFORMED LODGE THAT ARAB DELEGATIONS HAD MET AND HAD DECIDED TO STAND ON INTERPRETATIONS OF RES. GIVEN BY MENON AND LODGE AND WOULD NOT REPLY TO OTHERS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE IN DEBATE. THEY INTENDED TO ABSTAIN IN VOTE ON SECOND RES., BUT WOULD URGE THEIR FRIENDS TO SUPPORT IT. HE SAID LODGE HAD ALWAYS BEEN HONEST WITH HIM AND HE WAS GLAD TO GIVE HIM THIS INFORMATION.

LODGE

JS

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

This Document Must Be Returned to
RM/R
Central
Files

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIAL

57

Action

IO

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

NEA

L

P

UOP

O

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 647, FEBRUARY 3, 3 PM

Control:

Rec'd:

1287

FEBRUARY 3, 1957

4:45 PM

RE PALESTINE/ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

TOWARD END OF MORNING FEBRUARY 2, MENON TOLD LODGE THAT FAWZI WAS WORRIED ABOUT VARIOUS PARTS OF US STATEMENT AS THEY INTERPRETED HOW US EXPECTED SEE RESOLUTION 11 IMPLEMENTED. IN PARTICULAR FAWZI OBJECTED TO PART OF STATEMENT QUOTING JANUARY 28 STATEMENT RE STATIONING UNEF AT SHARM EL SHEIKH. ALSO OBJECTED TO LATTER PART WHERE WE STATED UNDERSTANDING RESOLUTION 11 TO BE VOTED IMMEDIATELY AFTER RESOLUTION 1, THEREBY GIVING APPEARANCE WITHDRAWAL WAS CONDITIONAL. MENON SAID FAWZI'S ATTITUDE REFLECTED PRESSURES OF OTHER ARABS.

LODGE AND MENON THEN MET WITH FAWZI WHO SAID ABOVE PARTS US STATEMENT HAD INTRODUCED NEW ELEMENT IN PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION. HE EXPRESSED DOUBT HE SHOULD EVEN TRY TO WORK ON ARABS TO SUPPORT RESOLUTION 11 IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. MENON AND LODGE POINTED OUT IMPORTANCE TO ARABS OF NOT PUTTING THEMSELVES IN WRONG. THEY AGREED FAWZI HAD PROBLEM WITH ARAB COLLEAGUES WHICH MUST BE FACED. THEY DECIDED MEET AFTER LUNCH.

LODGE MET AT TWO P.M. WITH FAWZI AND LOUTFI (EGYPT), MENON AND LALL (INDIA). MENON SAID, AS HE VIEWED SITUATION, RESOLUTIONS BEFORE GA HAD ONLY TWO PURPOSES: (A) TO ACHIEVE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL ISRAELI FORCES; (B) TO BEGIN NOW TO REINSTITUTE FULL OBSERVANCE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. ISRAEL HAD NEITHER WITHDRAWN NOR OBSERVED ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. ON OTHER HAND, EGYPT HAD ASSURED SYG ITS WILLINGNESS HAVE NO MORE INCURSIONS OR FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES.

MENON SAID HE WOULD LEAVE ASIDE DISCUSSION GAZA SINCE IT WAS MORE

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

674.84A/E-357

P-A

FILED
MAY 28 1959
UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED
674.84A/E-357

CONFIDENTIAL

2. LICA 64, FEBRUARY 3, 3 PM, FROM NEW YORK

WAS MORE OR LESS AGREED.

FAWZI SAID HE WOULD STATE IN CA RESOLUTION ON DEALT ONLY
WITH MEASURES IN SMOKE REPORT, WHICH WERE COVERED BY
PARAS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100. HE WOULD SAY UNEF COULD NOT GO
ANYWHERE EXCEPT WITH THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES. HE WOULD SAY ALSO
THAT THE QUESTION OF STRAITS OF TIRAN WAS SEPARATE QUESTION FROM ONE
OF THE QUESTION OF WHAT S.G. HAD SAID IN HIS REPORT.

FAWZI AS AN ADVISOR TO THE RESOLUTION OF RESOLUTION, IT WAS THAT
HE WAS ASKING MEMBERS OF UNEF ON ARMISTICE LINE. HE
WENT ANYWHERE IN STRAITS OF TIRAN. HE COULD ONLY BE ON SAME
BASIS AS IN S.M.A. TO REMOVE AGGRESSORS. HE
RESISTED THIS AS A SUGGESTION TO SAY "WITNESS REMOVAL OF
ISRAELIS" OR "SECURE AND SUPERVISE WITHDRAWAL".

FAWZI SAID HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE EMMA. HE WAS CONCERNED AT
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF S.M.A. ON STATE OF M.P. THAT UNEF
WOULD GO IN ON IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL AND
NOT REMAIN FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME. HE WOULD BE ENCOURAGED
MENT FOR ISRAEL TO REMAIN.

FAWZI SAW CERTAIN PROCEDURAL WAYPOINTS OF D. EMMA. ONE WOULD
BE NOT TO PRESS FOR VOTE ON RESOLUTION AT THIS TIME AND
ALLOW CERTAIN MATERIAL TO PASS. OTHER WOULD BE TO ADJOURN
DEBATE NOW AND NOT PERMIT DIVERGENCE OF OPINIONS. HE WOULD
DEVELOP UNTIL DIVERGENCE OF OPINIONS.

FAWZI STATED EGYPT'S POSITION TO BE THAT UNEF, ACCORDING
TO RESOLUTION 1948, CAN BE PLACED ONLY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON BO
SIDES ARMISTICE LINE. NO UNITS COULD BE PLACED ANYWHERE
ELSE EXCEPT WITH APPROVAL OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL ACCORDING TO
THE CASE. THEN FAWZI SAID WE MUST NOW BE PREPARED FOR
LIMIT ON ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL AND WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO
FACE QUESTION OF S.M.A. ONE.

LODGE POINTED OUT IF THINGS SHOULD NOW GO UP IN SMOKE,
WOULD REMOVE STIGMA OF GUILT ON ISRAEL AS WELL AS DESTROY
STRONG MORAL POSITION OF EGYPT AND SUPPORTERS OF UN ACTION
IN EGYPT.

FAWZI THEN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3- D LCA 647, FEBRUARY 3, 3 PM, FROM NEW YORK

FAWZI THEN CHANGED EMPHASIS OF DISCUSSION BY STATING THAT PHASE "WITHOUT DELAY" MEANT "IMMEDIATE". HE SAID IN THE NEW ELEMENT INTRODUCED INTO SITUATION, TIME LIMITS AND MAYBE SANCTIONS MIGHT HAVE TO BE INTRODUCED. LODGE POINTED OUT TO FAWZI THAT WITHDRAWAL "ISRAELI" FORCES WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE PHASED WITH ARRIVAL UN FORCES, THAT HE INTERPRETED "WITHOUT DELAY" AS MEANING FIRST SOLDIERS SHOULD BEGIN LEAVE IMMEDIATELY. HE SAID WHOLE PROCESS SHOULD BE MUCH FASTER THAN THAT AT TIME OF 1948 FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM CANAL AREA IN THAT IT NOW IS NOT NECESSARY TO WAIT CREATION OF EFFECTIVELY FUNCTIONING UN.

LODGE THEN SUMMED UP SITUATION AS HE SAW IT IN FOLLOWING TERMS: (1) MENON COULD IN HIS STATEMENT SPEAK OF MEANING OF RESOLUTION IN TERMS WHICH IT WAS HOPED WOULD SATISFY FAWZI AND HIS COLLEAGUES, WHO WOULD THEN SEEK IN SOME MANNER TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS INTERPRETATION; (2) LODGE WAS WILLING PUBLICLY TO STATE THAT "WITHOUT DELAY" MEANT "IMMEDIATE" OR "AT ONCE" AND THAT IT WOULD BE A MUCH QUICKER PROCESS THAN ANGLO-FRENCH WITHDRAWAL. HE MIGHT HAVE SAID THAT ISRAEL DID NOT WITHDRAW, HE COULD NOT BEAR OF CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH NON-COMPLIANCE. HE FELT SUCH STATEMENT WOULD GO QUITE FAR AND SHOULD SERVE TO ASSURE ARABS OF US STANDING IN SPONSORING RESOLUTION. IN CALLING FOR THEIR BELIEF AND TOGETHER AND IN DEFINING TIME LONG AS WAS DONE IN 1948-49.

KRISHNA MENON THEN SAID TO FAWZI HE HAD INFORMATION THAT ARAB HAD TURNED AGAINST EGYP. AND WESTERN WORLD WAS RE-THINKING ITS POSITION. WHILE IT HAD SEEMED INCONCEIVABLE THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH COULD HAVE DONE WHAT THEY DID, HE FELT ARAB HAD TURNED FULL CIRCLE AND WE MIGHT BE DEALING WITH SITUATION AS DANGEROUS AS ONE OF EAST FALL. LODGE SAID HE HAD HEARD SIMILAR REPORTS.

FAWZI SEEMED AT REAL LOSS TO KNOW WHAT TO DO AND SUGGESTED IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL FOR LODGE AND MENON TO SPEAK TO ARAB GROUP WHICH WOULD MEET WITH HIM MOMENTARILY.

FEW MINUTES LATER LODGE AND MENON MET WITH FAWZI, MAMGO B (SUDAN), RIFAI (JORDAN), AZKOL (LEBANON), ZEIN EDDINE (SYRIA),

JAMAL (IRAQ),

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

13. DTICA 64, FEBRUARY 3, 3 PM, FROM NEW YORK

JAMAL (IRAQ), OTHMAN (YEMEN), AND REPRESENTATIVE OF SAUDI ARABIA.

LAWEI RESTATED FOR BENEFIT OF GROUP EGYPT'S POSITION AS HE HAD PUT IT TO LODGE AND MENON. AS FAR AS UNEF CONCERNED, HE SAID, IT SHOULD BE EXCLUSIVELY ON BOTH SIDES OF ARMISTICE LINE. IT SHOULD NOT BE PLACED OR STAY ANYWHERE WITHOUT EGYPTIAN CONSENT. IT HAD NO FUNCTIONS BUT WHAT HAD ALREADY BEEN GIVEN TO IT BY GA. UNEF WAS NOT THERE TO RESOLVE ANY QUESTION.

MENON STATED INDIA'S POSITION WAS THAT UNEF WAS TO OVERSEE EVACUATION OF ALL EGYPTIAN-CONTROLLED TERRITORY BY ISRAELI FORCES. INDIAN TROOPS IN UNEF WOULD NOT GO ANYWHERE WITHOUT EGYPT'S CONSENT. HE HAD FOUND TO HIS DISMAY THAT NOT EVERYONE AGREED WITH THIS PROPOSITION AND STATED HIS MISGIVINGS THAT UNEF WAS DEEMED BY SOME TO BECOME A POLITICAL MISSION FOR RESOLVING DISPUTES. INDIA FELT IT WAS ALL GOVERNED BY PARAGRAPHS (A), (B), AND (C) OF SGG'S REPORT WHICH CALLED FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN SGG AND EGYPT.

INDIA FELT UNEF SHOULD BE PUT ON BOTH SIDES OF ARMISTICE LINE WITH "EQUITABLE CONTRIBUTION OF TERRITORY" FROM BOTH SIDES. THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE A PROTECTION AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACKS FROM ISRAEL. HE WOULD SAY IN GA ONE SHOULD ONLY PLACE UNEF WHERE IT CAN ASSIST IN MAINTENANCE OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, I.E., ON BOTH SIDES OF LINE. IT WOULD FUNCTION THERE AS SUPPLEMENT TO TSC.

AS FOR SHARM EL-SHEIKH, MENON SAID IT SHOULD BE SAME AS SINAI. THIS WAS UNFINISHED JOB AND UNEF COULD ONLY GO THERE AS IT HAD ELSEWHERE -- TO SURVEIL AND SECURE EVACUATION.

MENON THEN SPOKE OF QUESTION OF MILDNESS OF RESOLUTION. HE NOTED PHRASE "WITHOUT DELAY" COULD BE INTERPRETED BY US AND INDIA AS "FORTHWITH" ALLOWING ONLY ENOUGH TIME TO GET UNEF IN. LODGE POINTED OUT THIS WOULD BE LESS THAN FOR SOME OF EVACUATION OF PORT SAID.

MENON DID NOT THINK ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW. BUT, HE SAID, IF THEY DID NOT,

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-5- DELGA 647, FEBRUARY 3, 3 PM, FROM NEW YORK

THEY DID NOT, US WOULD BE PUT ON HIS HONOR AFTER PASSAGE THESE RESOLUTIONS. HE FELT ARABS WOULD RALLY GREATER SUPPORT TO WHATEVER OTHER STEPS ARE THEN POSSIBLE IF THEY WENT ALONG. TO DO OTHERWISE, WOULD PLAY INTO ISRAELI HANDS.

LODGE AID HE AGREED WITH FAWZI THAT UNEF SHOULD NOT BE USED TO SETTLE ANY QUESTION, AND WHEREVER IT WENT, IT WAS ONLY WITH CONSENT OF EGYPT. PARENTHETICALLY, HE STATED, HE HAD STRESSED EGYPTIAN SOVEREIGNTY TO EUROPEANS WHO HAD NOT BEEN HAPPY AT THIS STATEMENT. HE HAD, HOWEVER, SLUNG TO POINT WITH THAT GROUP THAT GA AND ITS MEMBERS MUST RESPECT EGYPT'S SOVEREIGNTY AS FIRST CRITERION. REGARDING WITHDRAWAL, LODGE SAID HE FELT IT SHOULD START IMMEDIATELY, THAT IT SHOULD BE PHASED, AND THAT IT WOULD TAKE LESS TIME THAN EARLIER EVACUATION. IN EVENT FAILURE ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW, HE COULD NOT PREDICT CONSEQUENCES WHICH MIGHT RESULT AND WAS WILLING TO STATE ALL OF ABOVE PUBLICLY.

LODGE THEN SPOKE OF PRACTICAL REQUIREMENTS OF SITUATION. IF RESOLUTION II "FIZZLED OUT" IT WOULD BE HANDING GREAT ADVANTAGE TO ISRAEL ON SILVER PLATTER. IT WOULD WIPE OUT STIGMA NOW ATTACHED TO ISRAELI AGGRESSION. ISRAELIS HAD SAID THEY WOULD NOT WITHDRAW, AND THIS WAS PROBABLY THEIR PRESENT INTENTION. BUT UN WOULD BE IN STRONG POSITION TO DO SOMETHING ELSE ONLY IF IT HAD ADOPTED RESOLUTION II. IF THAT WERE NOT TO HAPPEN, WE WOULD HAVE LOST OUR POSITION. HE HOPED GROUP WOULD SUPPORT RESOLUTION II. THEY HAD NOTHING TO LOSE AND MUCH TO GAIN, EVEN IF ISRAEL DID NOT AT THIS TIME WITHDRAW.

JAMALI SAID HE FELT RESOLUTION II SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PRESENTED UNTIL AFTER ISRAEL'S TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. SINCE IT HAD BEEN INTRODUCED, IT APPEARED UN WAS GIVING IN TO ISRAELI DEMANDS. HE REFERRED TO FACT AQABA HAD BEEN BLOCKADED 8 YEARS AND EFFECT OF THIS RESOLUTION WOULD BE TO GIVE UP THAT BLOCKADE WITHOUT ANY RETURN AND AS A PRICE FOR ISRAEL'S AGGRESSION. LODGE POINTED OUT NOTHING COULD HAPPEN IN GULF OF AQABA WITHOUT EGYPT'S CONSENT.

RIFAI SAW NO JUSTIFICATION FOR DISCUSSING ANYTHING OTHER THAN WITHDRAWAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

$\alpha = 0.05$

will be F

o. 44. 7. 4. 1.

1. *Acid*

0.1% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.0%

Journal of Management Education 30(6)

100, 100, 100

$$\text{H}_2\text{N}-\text{C}_6\text{H}_4-\text{NH}_2$$

12

1997

\mathcal{U}_{max}

15. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1990; 263: 1025-1028.

1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 26

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* contents were determined by spectrophotometry using the method of Lichtenthaler and Whistler (1987).

2010

27

1

100

1. A

M.M. **

1. *Chlorophyll a*

100

.....

10. $\frac{1}{2} \log 2$

... ..

16. *Chrysomelidae* (100)

... ..

57. 1911

0

1. *Chlorophyll a* and *Chlorophyll b* were determined by the method of Arar and Collins (1971).

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1039-1043.

Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

1958-1959

1. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 1997; 277: 1033-1038.

1. *Chlorophyll a* (Chl *a*)

1000

100

4/14

19

1990

the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are illiterate has increased from 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion. The number of illiterate people in the world is expected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015.

CONFIDENTIAL

-7- DELGA 647, FEBRUARY 3, 3 PM, FROM NEW YORK

FAILURE TO WITHDRAW WOULD BE ENHANCED BY PRESENT OPERATION. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF TYING TWO RESOLUTIONS AS CAUSE AND EFFECT.

MAHGOUB STATED RESOLUTION 11 INTRODUCED NEW ELEMENTS ON WHICH ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL HAD NEVER BEFORE DEPENDED. HE TRIED TO MAKE SOMETHING OUT OF FACT ONLY ONE MEASURE HAD BEEN SINGLED OUT OF SYG'S REPORT. HE QUESTIONED WHETHER SYG HAD BLANKET AUTHORITY UNDER PHRASE "OTHER MEASURES, ETC.". HE AND MENON EXCHANGED FEW SHARP WORDS ON THIS SUBJECT, MENON DENYING SYG WOULD HAVE BLANKET AUTHORITY AND MAHGOUB AFFIRMING HE WOULD.

MAHGOUB THEN COMPARED SYG'S LANGUAGE ON STRAITS OF TIRAN WITH LODGE'S QUOTE TODAY FROM HIS JANUARY SPEECH. LODGE AGAIN REPLIED THAT NOTHING COULD BE DONE UNDER RESOLUTION 11 UNTIL WITHDRAWAL AND REPEATED THAT UNEF CANNOT STAY AT SHARM EL SHEIKH OR ELSEWHERE WITHOUT EGYPT'S CONSENT.

JAMALI, ON QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL RESOLUTION, URGED AN ADDITIONAL PARA FOR SYG TO REPORT IN THREE DAYS ABOUT ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL. LODGE SAID HE LIKED THIS IDEA ON ITS MERITS AND WOULD SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. IF, HOWEVER, IT WERE ONLY AMENDMENT OFFERED, HE FELT IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ACCEPT AMENDMENTS.

IN RESPONSE TO RIFAI, MENON POINTED OUT HIS CONCERN THAT US AND WEST BE BROUGHT ALONG. NO GOVERNMENT, HE SAID, OF STATURE OF US COULD SIT BACK IF ISRAEL AGAIN REFUSED WITHDRAWAL AFTER ADOPTION BOTH RESOLUTIONS. RIFAI ARGUED PUBLIC OPINION IN ARAB STATES COULD NOT ACCEPT UN'S MODERATE ATTITUDE IN FACE ISRAEL'S FAILURE WITHDRAW.

MAHGOUB AGAIN RAISED QUESTION OF FUTURE INTENT IN EVENT ISRAEL CONTINUED REFUSE COMPLY. HE POINTED OUT IT HAD BEEN UNDERSTOOD DURING NEGOTIATIONS PRIOR TO LAST RESOLUTION THAT ARABS HAD DROPPED STRONG LANGUAGE DEPLORING ISRAEL'S NON-COMPLIANCE AND ASKING SANCTIONS ON UNDERSTANDING THAT RESOLUTION WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A STRONGER ONE IF NECESSARY TO OBTAIN COMPLIANCE. NOW THEY WERE OFFERED ANOTHER RESOLUTION ON WITHDRAWAL WEAKER THAN EARLIER ONE. HOW COULD ARABS, HE

ASKED, THAT, IF

CONFIDENTIAL

8 PM, OCT 10, 1948, FROM NEW YORK

ASKED, THAT THE AGREEMENT AND STATE
MENT BE ADOPTED, BUT NO LONGER WOULD BE ADOPTED?

AT ONE POINT, THAT IN REGARD TO QUESTION OF EGYPT'S
CONSENT TO THE AGREEMENT, THE EGYPTIAN WOULD HOLD ITS CONSENT,
IT COULD BE SEEN AN APPEARANCE THAT EGYPT HAD DELETED
IN ITS STATEMENT NOW STANDING IN POSITION OF REFUSANCE. LODGE
SAID EGYPT'S CONSENT WAS NOT ONLY NECESSARY TO STATIONING

IN THE EGYPTIAN EGYPTIAN WOULD HOLD ITS CONSENT AND WOULD NOT
BE NECESSARY TO STATIONING IN THE EGYPTIAN AND EGYPTIAN
COMPLAINT IN THE CASE OF EGYPTIAN WOULD BE IN THE EGYPTIAN

LODGE REITERATED THE RESOLUTION WOULD BE GAIN FOR ARABS
ALTHOUGH THE ARABS WAS NOT EVERYTHING THEY WISHED TO HAVE.
LODGE THEN THANKED ARABS FOR COURTESY OF HEARING HIS VIEWS AND
WITHDREW FROM MEETING.

LODGE

PAC

NND 897403
BOX 2677

10A
1/3/C

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 674,84A/2-357
Tel 760
Date 2/2/57
From State
To Tel Aviv

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☒ Security-Classified Information
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

NSC
Authority

1/4/89
Date

10A

INCOMING TELEGRAM

16
Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

32-H

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

R

O

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 914, February 4, 1 p.m.

Control: 3373

Rec'd: February 6, 1957
11:34 a.m.SENT DEPARTMENT 914; REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 159,
BEIRUT 140, CAIRO 159, DAMASCUS 112, JERUSALEM 67, USUN 48.

In meeting called to discuss UNGA's February 2 resolutions, Cabinet Sunday reaffirmed GOI's determination (1) to hold Sinai's east coast until freedom of navigation Tiran Straits is guaranteed and (2) to retain Gaza strip. Meeting was chaired by Finance Minister Eshkol and decision then taken to Ben Gurion, confined in his home Tel Aviv, who apparently approved it because its general outline does not conflict with his apparent attitude on same issues as I interpreted it last night (EMBTel 912).

At midnight Foreign Minister released supporting communiques which made following points.

1. "Israel has noted with appreciation growing understanding of UN reflected both in debate and in second of yesterday's resolutions, that status quo ante of violence and blockade on part of Egypt must not be restored. At same time it expresses its regret Assembly failed to touch on root of tension in area which is Egypt's continuing maintenance of state of war against Israel and her infringement in this connection of charter and of Security Council's resolutions".

2. "In interest its own morality, UN cannot ignore Egypt's infringements of Security Council's resolutions and of her primary international obligations by her blockade of Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba, and at same time calls Israel to withdraw from western coast of Gulf of Aqaba without providing adequate guarantees that present freedom of navigation shall not be upset by Egypt".

3. "There cannot be two laws, one for Israel and one for Egypt".

4. "Israel adheres firmly to position adopted by Knesset January 23 resharm* Sheik and Gaza (EMBTel 889). Solution these two questions, involving as they do termination

CONFIDENTIAL

hostile

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

674.84A/2-457

HBS

Confidential file

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 914, February 4, 1 p.m. from Tel Aviv

hostile action by Egypt at sea and on land, are pre-requisites for peace in ME and vital to Israel's very existence".

All early press comment endorsed government's determination to stand firm. It was announced Herut and General Zionists, both opposition parties, have made statements supporting coalition's position. Saper, member of Knesset, and leading member of General Zionist Party, and Abramov, President Israel-America friendship league (in private conversation I had with them Friday, February 1 at their request) predicted this firm attitude on part of GOI with general support of public. They were convinced that GOI resistance to withdrawal IDF from Sinai and Gaza can be expected despite real or implied threats of sanctions but emphasized their opinions not based on any official information.

LAWSON

EE:DT

*As received. Verification upon request.

Note: Message delayed in transmission.

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

Control:
Rec'd:

3328

FEBRUARY
10:55 AM

1957 FEB 6 PM 2 10

MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

674.84A/2-457 HBS

FROM: TEL A-IV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 9.1. FEBRUARY 4

EDITORIAL COMMENT FEBRUARY 3-4 UNANIMOUSLY CONDEMNS
UN RESOLUTIONS RE ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL FROM SINAI AND GAZA
AND STRONGLY SUPPORTS CABINET REAFFIRMATION FEBRUARY 3
OF INTENT REMAIN THESE AREAS UNTIL ADEQUATE GUARANTEES
RECEIVED ON TIRAN STRAIT AND CONTINUATION ISRAEL ADMIN-
ISTRATION IN GAZA ASSURED. US EFFORTS TO WIN ARAB FRIEND-
SHIP (SABD VISIT) FREQUENTLY NOTED AS REASON US UNWILLING
PRESS FOR MORE REASONABLE ASSURANCES TO ISRAEL.

HAARETZ (INDEPENDENT) SAYS NON-COMPLIANCE WILL HARM
ISRAEL VIS-A-VIS US AND AFRO-ASIAN BLOC AND US-ISRAEL
TENSION "WILL CONSTITUTE MAJOR DIFFICULTY" BUT URGES STEAD-
FAST STAND ON GUARANTEES. OTHER PAPERS DERIDE IN CAPABILITY
SOLVING ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEMS AND SOME BITTERLY ATTACK US
ATTITUDE IN UN. (DAVAR HISTADRUT) SAYS "IT WOULD BE
HYPOCRISY TO SAY EVACUATION WOULD PAVE WAY TO PEACE OR
CAUSE BASIC CHANGE IN ARAB ATTITUDE TO ISRAEL AS US DELEGATE
HINTED IN UNGA." HATSOFE (MIZRAHI) SAYS "NOT ONLY HAS
AMERICAN DELEGATE USED ENTIRE FORCE UN PRESSURE AGAINST
ISRAEL BUT HE HAS ALSO MENTIONED POSSIBLE THREATS TO
ISRAEL ...". PRESIDENT EISENHOWER RECEIVES PERSONAL CRITICISM
FROM SOME WRITERS.

VARIOUS PAPERS PRINT ARTICLES FROM NY INDICATING
USUN NOT ENTIRELY HAPPY WITH WORDING SECOND RESOLUTION
BUT FORCED ACCEPT IT AS MAXIMUM OBTAINABLE. AT SAME TIME
DAVAR WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT QUOTES "RELIABLE STATE
DEPARTMENT SOURCE" SAYING US WILL CONTINUE "PRIVATE
SANCTIONS" AGAINST ISRAEL UNTIL WITHDRAWAL COMPLETED.

LAWSON

PERMANENT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

NO. 16 TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRSControl 2031
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 4, 1957
9:20 PM

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State MESSAGE CENTER

SUBJECT: DEBATE (51), FEBRUARY 4, 8 PM

PRIORITY

FORWARDED WITHIN 48 HOURS



IN MEETING THIS MORNING HAMMARSKJOLD SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE CONTINUE TO KEEP EACH OTHER WELL INFORMED PARTICULARLY IN THIS NEXT DIFFICULT PHASE. HAMMARSKJOLD ALSO THANKED EBAN FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH US HANDLED RESOLUTIONS. HAMMARSKJOLD THEN DESCRIBED IN DETAIL HIS PLANS FOR NEXT FEW DAYS. HE WOULD MEET WITH EBAN AT 3:30 P.M. TODAY. HE BELIEVES HIS TO BE A MATTER OF UTMOST GRAVITY AND GA IS DEEPLY INVOLVED. HAMMARSKJOLD PLANS TO CONDUCT DISCUSSIONS WITH PARTIES WHILE KEEPING CLOSEST CONTACT WITH ADVISORY COMMITTEE IN ORDER TO CONTINUE TO BRING GENERAL ASSEMBLY TO BEAR ON THIS MATTER. USE OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE, IN HAMMARSKJOLD'S VIEW, IS ANOTHER DEVICE FOR HELPING TO "CARRY WITH US" INDIA.

HAMMARSKJOLD WOULD TELL EBAN THIS AFTERNOON THAT FROM NOW ON DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE "RECORD DISCUSSIONS", AND IT WOULD BE HIS INTENTION TO MAKE THEM PUBLIC IN FUTURE REPORTS. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THERE HAD BEEN ENTIRELY TOO MUCH "SLIPPERINESS", AND HE HOPED TO AVOID THIS BY MAKING IT CLEAR THAT DISCUSSIONS ARE "ON THE RECORD". HE INTENDS TO ASK ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO ASSIGN ONE OF ITS MEMBERS TO SIT WITH HIM IN DISCUSSIONS. HE HAS ASKED ENGEN (NORWAY) WHO LEFT FOR OSLO SUNDAY AND IS CHECKING THIS WITH PLANGE. HAMMARSKJOLD WANTS ENGEN CHOSEN BY ADVISORY COMMITTEE SINCE HE IS VERY SOUND AND NORWAY IS CONSIDERED PRETTY MUCH OF NEUTRAL AS FAR AS ISRAEL IS CONCERNED.

HE EXPECTS EBAN TO INSIST FIRST ON DISCUSSING MEASURES ENVISAGED UNDER RESOLUTION 11. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT HE FELT OBLIGED IN FIRST INSTANCE TO ASK FOR CLEAR-CUT DECLARATION BY ISRAEL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

674.84A/2-457

SECRET FILE

PA

This document must be returned
to the RM/R Central Files

Xm/4

674.84A/2-457

SECRET

-2- DECCA 651, FEBRUARY 4, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK

AS TO WHAT IT INTENDS TO DO REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF FIRST RESOLUTION. HE WOULD TELL ISRAELIS THAT INTENTION OF SPONSORS OF SECOND RESOLUTION IS THAT UNEF SHOULD BE DEPLOYED IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH BUT AT SAME TIME THAT THIS IS SUBJECT TO ASSENT OF EGYPT. HE EXPECTED EBAN TO SAY THAT UNLESS EGYPT ORDERS STATIONING UNEF IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH, ISRAELIS WILL NOT PULL OUT. WHILE STATING THAT IT IS INTENTION OF SECOND RESOLUTION TO GET UNEF IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH AREA, SECRETARY GENERAL WOULD ASK ISRAELIS AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE TO AGREE THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT UNEF ON BOTH SIDES OF DEMARCATION LINE AND RECOGNIZE THAT COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL INCLUDES WITHDRAWAL OF ITS CIVIL ADMINISTRATION IN GAZA.

HAMMARSKJOLD ALSO INTENDS TO USE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SUEZ SETTLEMENT MATTER. SUBCOMMITTEE OF LALL (INDIA), ENGEN (NORWAY) AND TREITAS-VALLE (BRAZIL) HAS BEEN APPOINTED AND THIS SUBCOMMITTEE WILL BE BROUGHT INTO DISCUSSIONS, THOUGH HAMMARSKJOLD DID NOT STATE PRECISELY HOW THIS WOULD BE DONE.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT HE HAD RECEIVED MESSAGE FROM NASSER INDICATING EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT A FORMULA WHICH WILL "AVOID COLLISION". PROVIDED TOLLS ARE LEGALLY PAID TO EGYPT, EGYPTIANS WILL ACCEPT ANY CONDITIONS ON THEM. IN THIS CONNECTION, HAMMARSKJOLD MENTIONED HIS IDEA OF SUSPENSE ACCOUNT (LEGAL PAYMENT TO EGYPT, BUT BLOCKED PENDING SETTLEMENT). IN DESCRIBING FRENCH POSITION HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THEY DO NOT AGREE. TOLLS SHOULD BE PAID LEGALLY TO EGYPT. EVEN THOUGH SUCH PAYMENT TO EGYPT COULD BE PLACED IN BLOCKED ACCOUNT PENDING FINAL SETTLEMENT FRENCH ARE OPPOSED. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID FRENCH WANT TOLLS PAID TO AN INTERNATIONAL AGENCY (NOT EGYPT) ON UNDERSTANDING THAT QUESTION OF TO WHOM TOLL MONEY BELONGS IS SUBJECT TO FUTURE DETERMINATION.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID THAT EGYPT HAS NOW LINKED QUESTION OF SUEZ SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS WITH WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. NASSER HAS NOW REPLIED FORMALLY TO SECRETARY GENERAL'S LETTER OF JANUARY 20 STATING EGYPTIAN WILLINGNESS TO BEGIN FORMAL CONVERSATIONS IMMEDIATELY UPON FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID NASSER HAS NOT LINKED SUEZ SETTLEMENT

SECRET

SECRET

DELGA 651, FEBRUARY 4, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK

TALKS WITH CLEARANCE OF CANAL, TRAFFIC THROUGH CANAL OR DEPLOYMENT OF UNEF IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH.

INQUIRED AS TO HAMMARSKJOLD'S PLANS REGARDING TRIP TO CAIRO. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES HE COULD NOT GO TO CAIRO. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID HE CANNOT GO TO CAIRO UNLESS ISRAELIS WITHDRAW OR HE HAS AN ADVANCE COMMITMENT THIS WILL BE DONE. HE SAID EBAN HAS STRESSED THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO TAKE PLACE IN JERUSALEM. SYG SAID HE WILL NOT GO TO JERUSALEM UNLESS ISRAELIS GIVE COMMITMENT TO COMPLY WITH RESOLUTION I. HE SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING TO GO TO JERUSALEM TO NEGOTIATE SUBSTANCE OF RESOLUTION II ONCE RESOLUTION I HAD BEEN COMPLIED WITH.

HAMMARSKJOLD ADDED AS FOOTNOTE AT CONCLUSION OF DISCUSSION THAT DURING COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH PARTIES HE INTENDS TEST IDEA OF OBSERVERS IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH AS STATED IN HIS LAST REPORT.

WHEN HAMMARSKJOLD WAS INFORMED THAT FAWZI IS PRESSING FOR ANOTHER GA MEETING ON WEDNESDAY TO CONSIDER QUESTION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, HAMMARSKJOLD EXPRESSED CONCERN AND FELT THIS WAS OMINOUS AND THREATENING.

THIS EVENING CORDIER INFORMED US EBAN HAD GENERALLY TAKEN LINE SYG EARLIER ANTICIPATED. IN HANDING SYG AIDE-MEMOIRE (REPORTED IN DELGA 652) EBAN REQUESTED ASSURANCES RE MEASURES CALLED FOR BY SPONSORS OF SECOND RESOLUTION BEFORE ISRAEL COULD WITHDRAW. EBAN URGED HAMMARSKJOLD TAKE UP MATTERS UNDER RESOLUTION II DIRECTLY WITH BEN GURION. ACCORDING CORDIER, SYG STATED HE COULD NOT DO SO UNTIL ISRAEL AGREED WITHDRAW. CORDIER SAID EBAN TOLD HAMMARSKJOLD HE WOULD PROVIDE HIM WITH A "SUPPLEMENTARY INTERPRETATION" TUESDAY. EBAN MENTIONED TO HAMMARSKJOLD RECEIPT PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO BEN GURION, AND THAT THEY (ISRAELIS) "WERE GRATIFIED" AT PART OF LETTER DEALING WITH SHARM EL-SHEIKH.

CORDIER EXPRESSED VIEW IT WILL NOW BE DIFFICULT AVOID EXTREME MEASURES. HE INFORMED US FAWZI HAS MADE FORMAL REQUEST FOR GA MEETING TO CONSIDER ISRAELI COMPLIANCE. LETTER DID NOT

SECRET

SECRET

1- DE SA 051, FEBRUARY 4, 8 P.M. FROM NEW YORK

SPECIFY DATE, BUT REQUESTED "EARLIEST POSSIBLE" MEETING.
COORDINATOR IS HOLDING UP CIRCULATION FAWZI LETTER PENDING SYG-
ALLET DISCUSSION THIS AND OTHER MATTERS TUESDAY.

WADSWORTH

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

55-D
Action

IO

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

NEA

L

P

UOP

O

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 652, FEBRUARY 4, 8 P M

PRIORITY

VERBATIM TEXT

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

FOLLOWING IS TEXT NOTE HANDED BY EBAN (ISRAEL) TO SYG THIS AFTERNOON:

THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TAKES NOTE OF THE ADOPTION BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF TWO INTER-RELATED RESOLUTIONS (A/3517 (I) AND A/3518 (II)).

ISRAEL WILL COOPERATE WITH ANY UNITED NATIONS EFFORT DESIGNED TO ESTABLISH PEACE IN THE AREA, BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

I AM INSTRUCTED URGENTLY TO REQUEST THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ASK THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT WHETHER EGYPT AGREES TO THE MUTUAL AND FULL ABSTENTION FROM BELLIGERENT ACTS BY LAND AIR AND SEA ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL TROOPS. THIS MATTER IS OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO ALL THE QUESTIONS AT ISSUE.

IN CONSIDERING THE WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE, I AM INSTRUCTED TO REFER TO THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH AREA, AND THE RELATED QUESTION OF MEASURES DESIGNED TO PREVENT HOSTILE ACTS, SUCH AS INTERFERENCE WITH FREE NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND IN THE GULF OF AQABA. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ITS RESOLUTION HAS RECOGNIZED "THAT WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL MUST BE FOLLOWED BY ACTION WHICH WOULD ASSURE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE CREATION OF PEACEFUL CONDITIONS".

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

Control: 2045
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 4, 1957
9:38 P M



674.84A/2-457

PA

MAY 23 1959

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DELGA 652, FEBRUARY 4, 8 P M, FROM NEW YORK

A RENEWAL OF INTERFERENCE WITH SHIPPING BOUND TO AND FROM ELATH WOULD CLEARLY LEAD TO HOSTILITIES AND THUS PREJUDICE THE DECLARED OBJECTIVE OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. ACCORDINGLY, I AM INSTRUCTED TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATION WITHOUT DELAY, WHETHER IMMEDIATELY ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES FROM THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH AREA, UNITS OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE WILL BE STATIONED ALONG THE WESTERN SHORE OF THE GULF OF AQABA IN ORDER TO ACT AS A RESTRAINT AGAINST HOSTILE ACTS; AND WILL REMAIN SO DEPLOYED UNTIL ANOTHER EFFECTIVE MEANS IS AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED FOR ENSURING PERMANENT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND THE ABSENCE OF BELLIGERENT ACTS IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN AND THE GULF OF AQABA.

A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS FROM ALL CONCERNED WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE THE EARLY FULFILMENT OF UNITED NATIONS OBJECTIVES AS SET FORTH IN THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS TAKEN AS A WHOLE.

WADSWORTH

MGG

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

55-D

Action

CONFIDENTIAL

1

Control: 2050

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 4, 1957

9:58 PM

To be read only with the permission
of the Director of S/S

SS **FROM: NEW YORK**

Info

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 654, FEBRUARY 4, 8 PM

PRIORITY

RE DEPTTEL 760 TO TEL AVIV (PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING), LODGE INFORMED HAMMARSKJOLD THAT HE FELT HE SHOULD KNOW IN STRICT CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT HAD SENT MESSAGE TO BEN GURION IN VIEW IMPORTANCE SYG'S DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELIS. HAMMARSKJOLD WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THIS, EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE CONTINUED CLOSE CONSULTATION BETWEEN US AND SYG, AND THEN PROCEEDED TO OUTLINE HIS PLANS RE DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELIS ON MONDAY (DELGA 651).

WADSWORTH

CC

To be read only with the permission
of the Director of S/S.

CONFIDENTIAL

**PERMANENT
RECORD COPY**

• This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

CONFIDENTIAL

This Document must be kept
in the S/S Central Files.

CTA. 244/2-437

N/ 33

NO. Copies Received 11

Master File - Copy No. 8

To be read only with the permission
of the Director of S/E.

NEW YORK

INCOMING XX

OUTGOING

NUMBER DELGA 654

DATE February 4, 1957

CONTROL 2050

3-10 Inc.
destroyed 3/23/59
P. Hall

S ✓ #3

U ✓ #4

G ✓ #1

O

E

C ✓ #1

L ✓ #10

P ✓ #9

S/AE

S/P ✓ #10

U/MSA

H

R

IO ✓ #11

EUR

ARA

FE

NEA ✓ #1

U/OP (Higgs)

(Richards)

President 2

Stassen

Jackson

Re Pres
message
to Ben
Muirson on
Suez
Category B CIA
Arag

ICA

USIA

USUN-Lodge

SEC DEFENSE

ISA

JCS

OTHER

~~Mr. Tolson #5~~

To be read only with the permission
of the Director of S/E.

EYES ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

To be read only with the permission
of the Director of S/S.

February 5, 1957

THE SECRETARY

Copies are being sent to

The Under Secretary

Mr. Herter

Mr. Murphy

Mr. MacArthur


Mr. Phleger


Mr. Bowie

Mr. Wilcox

Mr. Rountree

I recommend you authorize a
copy to the White House.

 Fisher Howe

Approve 

Disapprove _____

To be read only with the permission
of the Director of S/S.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 4, 1957

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Copy of President's Message to Israel Prime Minister

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
NEA - Mr. Berry
NE - Mr. Bergus

COPIES TO: S/S (2cc), NEA (2cc), NE (2cc)

This document is classified as
CONFIDENTIAL
674.34A/2-457
Central
Files

Mr. Berry referred to the Israel Embassy's request for a copy of the President's message of February 3 to Prime Minister Ben Gurion and handed Mr. Shiloah a copy of the message. After reading it, Mr. Shiloah said he would not presume to reply to a message to his Prime Minister. He was impressed by its friendly tone. One of the difficult factors affecting Israel's position on the United Nations General Assembly resolutions was the diametrically opposed interpretations of them given by Mr. Lodge in the morning of February 2 and Mr. Krishna Menon that same afternoon.

DC/A
Ampl SD
Rev _____
Cat _____

NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 2/5/57

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL FILE
CS/R

GPO 912677

February 14 1957

In reply refer to
NEA:NE

Dear Mr. Hulas:

Thank you for your letter of February 4. I appreciate your kind expression of willingness to be of assistance to us.

We have found Commander Hutchison's telegram and Dr. Johnson's letter very interesting and have circulated them to a number of officers in the Department.

Sincerely yours,

Langston Berry
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern, South Asian
and African Affairs

Mr. Charles R. Hulas,
Executive Secretary,
American Friends of the Middle East, Inc.,
47 East 67th Street,
New York 21, New York.

NEA:NE:RB Parker:rej - 2/11/57

S/SCR
FEB 14 1957 P.M.

AMERICAN FRIENDS OF THE MIDDLE EAST, INC.

MIDDLE EAST HOUSE: 47 East 67th Street, New York 21, New York

Cable Address: Amideast

Telephone: LEhigh 5-0030

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

DOROTHY THOMPSON
President
GARLAND EVANS HOPKINS
Vice President
CORNELIUS VAN H. ENGERT
Secretary-Treasurer
ELMER BERGER
EDWARD L. R. ELSON
HAROLD LAMB
HAROLD B. MINOR

NATIONAL COUNCIL

EDWARD L. R. ELSON
Chairman
WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING
Vice Chairman
DANIEL BLISS, Eastern
ROBERT ANDRUS, Midwestern
HAROLD LAMB, Western
W. F. STINESPRING, Southern
Regional Vice Chairmen
WILLIAM A. AIKEN
Secretary

HAROLD B. ALLEN
MRS. DAVID D. BAKER
GEORGE M. BARAKAT
MRS. BRANNDON BARRINGER
ANTONY BASHIR
F. LAMMOT BELIN
ELMER BERGER
ROBERT WOODS BLISS
GEORGE BRITT
DAVID M. BRYAN
MILLAR BURROWS
I. C. G. CAMPBELL
ALFORD CARLTON
MRS. SHANNON CHARLTON
HOWARD CONN
CARLETON S. COON
DOUGLAS D. CARY
C. SUYDAM CUTTING
BENJAMIN P. DEWITT
MICHAEL FRANCIS DOYLE
LOUIS G. DREYFUS, JR.
MRS. WALTER G. DUNNINGTON
WILLIAM A. EDDY
CORNELIUS VAN H. ENGERT
MRS. MARK ETHRIDGE
JAMES A. FARLEY
HAROLD H. FISHER
HARRY EMERSON FOSDICK
VIRGINIA GILDERSLEEVE
FRANKLIN HARRIS
PHILIP K. HITT
ROBERT L. HOGUET
GARLAND EVANS HOPKINS
DOUGLAS HORTON
RALPH C. HUTCHISON
ABDALLAH IGRAM
JOHN H. JAMISON
DOROTHY KENYON
MORRIS S. LAZARON
EDWIN A. LOCKE, JR.
ALI MAHADEEN
FRANK MARIA
R. L. MAXWELL
JOHN J. McDONOUGH
HAROLD B. MINOR
WALLACE MURRAY
MRS. LOUIS NASSIF
CECIL G. OSBORNE
HENRY REGNIERY
ENSWORTH REISNER
W. HAROLD ROW
GEORGE W. SADLER
JOSEPH S. SADO
FRANK C. SAKRAN
OVID R. SELLERS
VINCENT SHERAN
RUSSELL STEVENSON
MRS. WILLIAM STEVENSON
LOWELL THOMAS
DOROTHY THOMPSON
ROBERT WARING
LEIGH WHITE
W. L. WHITE
JOHN A. WILSON
WM. ARCHER WRIGHT, JR.
Executive Secretary

PERSONAL

Mr. Lampton Berry
State Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Berry:

Many thanks for the cordial reception which you and Mr. Rockwell accorded to Dr. Elson, Dr. Berger, and myself last week. I must say that I was favorably struck by the fact that we were able to uncover so many areas of common interest. I trust that it will be possible for us to be of mutual assistance in the future.

Enclosed is a copy of another cable which has come to us from our Middle East Director. This may be of interest to you. I am also taking the liberty of sending you a copy of excerpts from a recent letter written by Dr. Park Johnson, who is the Secretary in charge of the Middle East for the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions. He states his concern for the future of that area with such eloquence that I felt certain that you would be interested in receiving this information.

I know that you will feel free to call upon us at any time when you think we might be of assistance.

Sincerely yours,

Charles R. Hulac

Charles R. Hulac
Executive Secretary

CRH:ps
Enclosures 2

February 4, 1957

Document Must Be Returned to
RM/R
Central
Files
074.348/1-457

FILED
1957

CS/HHH

copy

FEB 1-1957

LT AMIDE ST NEW YORK

HULAC HOW CAN UN BE GIVEN CONTROL GAZA WHEN IT HAS LOST CONTROL AL
AUJA COMMA MOUNT SCOPUS COMMA DEMILITARIZED ZONES TO ISRAEL DURING
SHORT ARBITRARY HISTORY STOP UN SHOULD ASSUME ORIGINAL RESPONSIBILITIES
BEFORE REACHING FOR MORE STOP IF GAZA TO BE INTERNATIONALIZED WHY
NOT SAME TREATMENT FOR ALL AREA OUTSIDE FORTYSEVEN PARTITION PLAN
NOW IN DISPUTE STOP HAVE OUR UN DELEGATE ASK IF ISRAEL AGREEABLE HAVE
SUGGESTED SUFFER ZONE HALF IN ISRAEL HALF IN ARAB STATES STOP
PUBLISH ANSWER IT WILL BE REVEALING STOP SPOILS TO WINNER ATTITUDE
REGARDLESS HOW CAMOFLAGED SETTING DANGEROUS PRECEDENT STOP UN MUSTNT
FORGET ISRAEL HAS UN RECORD AGGRESSION COMMA WAS AGAIN UP FOR CON-
DEMNATION AT TIME SHE ATTACKED EGYPT STOP SAVE UN AND WORLD PEACE
BY FIRMNESS JUSTICE NOW STOP PUSH THIS SOONEST

HUTCHISON

JOHNSON'S JOURNALS
(Excerpts)

P.O.B.1505
Teheran, Iran
January 1, 1957

...Our last letter was written during the month of August when we were in Beirut. The Suez problem had begun to simmer by then, and it appeared that not much was necessary to bring the whole superheated Middle Eastern pot to the boil. However, this situation seemed little more than normal, for ever since 1947-48 the mixed-up brew concocted of western intervention aiding in the establishment of Israel in the land of Palestine and the resentment of Arab nationalism against the injustice done to the Palestinian Arabs has kept steaming at a point just under the boiling mark. The result was that all of us went about our business as usual.....

In mid-October I started off on a journey that proved to be more adventurous than I foresaw at the outset. I flew south to the great oil center of Abadan, which is again humming with activity aided by several hundred Americans. This has resulted in our sending one of our missionaries as chaplain and pastor to both English-language and Persian-language congregations. I had the opportunity of going back up to the oil producing center of Masjid-i-Suleiman in the hills to see the whole process from the producing wells and pipeline pumping stations to the immense refinery and the Esso and Caltex tankers tied up along the river at Abadan close to the head of the Persian Gulf. Alice joined me as we crossed the river and drove up through the date palm groves to Basrah, the port city of southern Iraq. Here we inaugurated the new extension of our service as field representative by attending the annual meeting of the Arabian Mission of the Reformed Church in America.....

I flew down to Bahrain to begin a survey of the educational work of the Arabian Mission and the United Mission in Iraq (schools in Bahrain, Basrah, and Baghdad). While in Basrah I received an urgent plea to come to Beirut for a couple of days for a special Mission executive committee meeting about the developments in the expanded student center program. So, planning to hurry back to Basrah two days later, I flew from Bahrain early on the morning of October 30, and arrived in Beirut later that morning simultaneously with the arrival of the news of Israel's full-scale military invasion of Egypt. We went ahead with our executive committee meeting that afternoon despite the atmosphere of grave uncertainty as to what was going to happen. Since in May 1950, Britain, France, and America had joined in a solemn tri-partite agreement to resist any aggression by Israel or the Arab States who were parties to the 1949 armistice, it appeared that the chance had come to intervene and perhaps bring about some basic solution to the whole long-smoldering Palestine problem. Since it has been plain that the Suez Canal problem was a mere subsidiary by-product of this main issue, the chance looked good of attaining a satisfactory solution of this problem too. A further result, of course, would be in the circumvention of Russia's efforts to capitalize on the seething unrest in the Middle East. It was, accordingly, a dismaying development to discover later that day that Britain and France, ignoring the solemn obligations of the tripartite agreement and their peaceful undertakings in the United Nations, had turned to a sudden military attack in conjunction with Israel against Egypt. One could hardly believe Eden's ultimatum telling the Egyptians to retreat 130 miles and the Israelis to advance 110 miles, so that Britain could "separate the combatants" right at the Suez Canal, and it was amazing to hear Eden talking of "promoting peace in the area, dispelling Russian influence, keeping the Suez Canal open, assuring the oil supply from the Middle East, and keeping the forest fire from spreading" while sending British and French bombers to shower destruction on Port Said and a wide variety of other objectives in Egypt - with the result all along the line, as any sensible person acquainted with the Middle East could have predicted, the exact opposite of the stated aims. Undoubtedly this sudden aggression vastly encouraged Russia's stringent repression of the freedom fighters in Hungary.

The following week was one of great uncertainty. American families had been evacuated from Syria to Beirut. Everything remained outwardly calm and normal in Beirut, but no one knew what was going to happen. Syria had closed off its air, so I could not return immediately to Basrah, and decided to wait out the crisis in Beirut. There was not only the immediate question of whether the fighting could be stopped or would start spreading, but the larger question of the kind of world we were now living in, when Britain and France, our fellow-architects of a moral order in the world through the organizations of the United Nations -- or so we thought -- suddenly kicked out the supports of the whole structure, and turned back to the outdated concepts of 19th century imperialism-- the attitude that Great Powers sometimes have to reinforce their importance by a show of force against "inferior and subject peoples" - whether Hottentots or Egyptians or Hungarians. One of the attendant tragedies of the situation was that the whole devastating effect of the spectacle of Russian brutality in Hungary was entirely lost on the people of the Middle East, who were too busy being shocked at the nearer spectacle of British and French brutality in Egypt.

As soon as word of the cease fire in Egypt came on the evening of November 7, I decided to start moving, and the next day took the Na'aim bus across to Baghdad. There was no chance to go on with the educational survey (we hope to resume it in April if all goes well), but I went down to Basrah for a day, and then flew from Abadan back to Tehran on November 10. Iran is outside the Arab orbit, and not directly concerned with the Palestine problem, but she is a Baghdad-adjacent neighbor of Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan, and would be very quickly involved in widespread hostilities in the Middle East... On December 5, I took off again, and spent a week in Baghdad at the Annual meeting of the United Mission in Iraq and a week back in Beirut. It was only after I had been in Baghdad several days that Syria finally opened up its air again, reacting to the threats of all the airlines to circumnavigate Syria and cut it off permanently from all international air transport. The whole situation in Syria remains fluid and unstable. Communist influence seems to be strong but not irretrievably fixed, and much still depends here and elsewhere in the area on whether America and the United Nations come through with some positive and constructive policies.

Although the United Nations Emergency Force has been constituted, and the British and French troops have left Egypt, the major problems of the Middle East remain to be solved, with additional complications brought on by recent events. The Suez Canal, Russian influence, and the oil supply are all subsidiary problems, stemming from the major and basic problem of the implantation of the Zionist political and territorial entity of Israel in the Arab land of Palestine, with the resultant injustice of exile and suffering visited upon almost a million Palestinian Arabs. This is the real sore spot, and a genuine remedy to it would quickly take care of the subsidiary problems. In the present circumstances it is definitely America that holds the key to the future of the Middle East, whether it shall be peace and progress or conflict and chaos. Russia's aim is to foment the latter in her own ultimate interest. Britain and France are discredited and are through as far as any moral respect goes. Their only hope is a gradual rehabilitation in the wake of constructive solutions arrived at by the United Nations with American leadership. If America continues to cringe in fear of the vociferous Zionist propagandists and continues to do nothing, one can only be gloomy about the future. Israel's future, in fact, is the gloomiest part of it. The only hope for Israel and her oft-misused people is in an American policy that would include a certain degree of humbling of Israeli ambitions and a certain reduction of Israel's territory. For the only hope of engaging the Arab countries in a peace settlement is for some redress of their moral grievances and some righting of the injustices done to their people to be set in motion, and this involves concessions by Israel. Until Ben Gurion quickly changed his belligerent claim to retention of Sinai after being talked to by President Eisenhower, Israel had never been compelled to give up anything. Israel's recent military aggression opens the way for enforcing from her some substantial concessions and withdrawals. Of course there was great provocation on both sides, but the fact remains that it was Israel

which broke down first and made the military attack. Incidentally, in the light of the long series of piteous appeals for arms from America during this last year by Israel and by American Zionists or victims of Zionist propaganda, it is instructive to read in the November 12 issues of Newsweek that last summer Israel told France that she had spent so much money on arms that she was forced to the dilemma of starving in the midst of her war material or of using it!

A strong American policy calling for compromises by both Israel and the Arabs might not work, but until it is tried no one will know whether the Arab countries would actually respond favorably to some genuine concessions, voluntary or enforced, by Israel. It is the only policy that stands a chance of bringing peace, and the alternative is certain, namely, continued unrest, the outbreak of further conflict, the disappearance of American interests in the Middle East, the annihilation of Israel, and the domination of the entire region and its resources by Russia. It will be tragic irony indeed if subservience to a small, articulate group of Zionist propagandists by the American government results in this disastrous alternative.

There is no doubt that the Arab peoples want peace. They stand at the threshold of progress and the possible gradual solution of their serious economic and social problems. Their response to a positive American policy designed to bring about a settlement to the basic Arab-Israel problem might be surprising. Surely it is a policy worth trying.....

PAUL JOHNSON

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

35
Action
EUR

Control: 2585
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 5, 1957
12:00 PM

Info
RMR

FROM: THE HAGUE

TO: Secretary of State

*Emf
File*

SS
G
SP
C
NEA
IO
P

NO: 1152, FEBRUARY 5

DEPT PASS USIA

UOP
OLI

EDITORIALIZING ON NEAR EAST, LIBERAL NIEUWE ROTTERDAMSCH
COURANT CONTENDS ANY ASSUMPTION STORY UN SUPPORT FOR RECENT
US RESOLUTION INDICATIVE PROGRESS SETTLEMENT ISREAL. EGYPTIAN
PROBLEM IS ERRONEOUS. PAPER WRITES: "IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE
TO BREAK IMPASE UNLESS PRESSURE IS BROUGHT TO BEAR ON BOTH
PARTIES TO DISPUTE. ISREAL IS GETTING ITS SHARE OF THIS PRESSURE,
BUT NONE HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO BEAR UPON EGYPT THUS FAR." THIS
LATTER ATTITUDE STRONGLY PREDOMINANT DUTCH PRESS AND WIDESPREAD
ALL SEGMENTS POPULATION.

OCB
USIA
CIA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

MATTHEWS

JS

HBS



PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNCLASSIFIED

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

674.84A/2-557

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

Not to May Cable

D
ActionSS
Info

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 660, FEBRUARY 5, 5 P M

SECRET

EYES ONLY

Control: 2814
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 5, 1957
5:37 P M

1

UNITED NATIONS
UNITED STATES MISSION

Delga - 660

NIACT

EYES ONLY FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LOUSE

CONFIRMING MY CONVERSATION WITH YOU AND THE PRESIDENT AT THE WHITE HOUSE LAST NIGHT, LET ME SUBMIT THIS:

THE TIME HAS COME FOR THE US TO PUT ENOUGH PRESSURE ON JORDAN SO THAT SHE WILL WITHDRAW COMPLETELY AND IMMEDIATELY FROM EGYPTIAN SOIL. I ADVOCATE SUCH ACTION FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

1. IT IS IN ISRAEL'S OWN BEST SHORT-RANGE INTERESTS SINCE IT IS CLEAR THAT EGYPT WILL NEVER GIVE THE ADVANCE ASSURANCES WHICH ISRAEL SEEKS SO LONG AS ISRAEL'S "FOOT IS IN EGYPT'S FACE", TO USE FAWZI'S PHRASE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HAMMARSKJOLD BELIEVES (AND I CONCUR) THAT, AFTER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, THERE IS A GOOD CHANCE THAT EGYPT WILL NOT OBJECT TO PLACING UNEF AT THE STRAITS OF TIRAN.

2. IT IS IN ISRAEL'S LONG-RANGE BEST INTERESTS (ALTHOUGH CONTRARY TO HER PRESENT FOREIGN POLICY) BECAUSE CONTINUED VIOLATION OF THE UN CHARTER BY ISRAEL CAN BUT INCREASE THE RISK OF WAR IN WHICH ISRAEL WOULD SURELY ULTIMATELY SUFFER MORE THAN ANY OTHER NATION.

3. IT IS REQUIRED BY THE US POSITION, EXPRESSED IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ON OCTOBER 30, THE DAY AFTER THE ISRAELI INVASION OCCURRED. IN THE COUNCIL, THE US SPONSORED A RESOLUTION SPECIFICALLY INVOKING SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL IF THEY DID NOT WITHDRAW. WE VOTED FOR THIS RESOLUTION. IT WAS VETOED

EYES ONLY

PERMANENT

SECRET

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

674.842/2-5-57

SECRET

-2-, DELGA 660, FEBRUARY 5, 5 P.M., FACT. DEL. 1000.

VETOED BY THE UK AND FRANCE. THE SITUATION TODAY, AS FAR AS ISRAEL'S VIOLATION OF EGYPTIAN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IS CONCERNED, IS IDENTICAL WITH THAT EXISTING THEN. OUR OWN WORDS WILL PROBABLY BE RE-ENACTED IN A NEW GA RESOLUTION. WE CAN GIVE NO SOLID REASON FOR ABANDONING OUR POSITION WHICH WON US UNIVERSAL RESPECT AND ACCLAIM FROM THE AFRO-ASIAN WORLD.


4. IF WE DID ABANDON OUR POSITION, THE UN WOULD BE DEALT A BODY BLOW. IT WOULD BE SAID - AND BELIEVED - THAT WE WERE WILLING TO USE SANCTIONS AGAINST FRANCE AND THE UK, BUT THAT ISRAEL INFLUENCE WAS TOO STRONG FOR US TO ADHERE TO THE POLICY OF "ONE LAW FOR ALL", WHICH THE PRESIDENT ENUNCIATED AT THE TIME.

LODGE

MGG

Note: Advance copy to Mss Roberts (SS) 6:15 p.m.; 2-5-57, CWO_FED.

SECRET



10. Copy of received 10

Master File - Copy No. 8

S ~~#2~~

U

G ~~#9~~

O ~~#4~~

E

C ~~#5~~

L ~~#6~~

P ~~#7~~

S/AE

S/P ~~#8~~ 3

U/MSA

H

R

IO ~~action #~~

EUR

ARA

FE

NEA ~~#10~~

U/OP (Higgs)

(Richards)

Lodge message to Secretary re Secy

Category C

Keep copy 2 if not available

Advance by 2/15/57

NEW YORK

INCOMING XX

OUTGOING

NUMBER DELGA 660

DATE February 5, 1957

CONTROL 2814

President

Stassen

Jackson

CIA

ICA

USIA

USUN-Lodge

SEC DEFENSE

ISA

JCS

OTHER

Def 3

EYES ONLY

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
CONFIDENTIALRM/R
Central
Files32
Action *UNW / De Palma*

IO FROM: NEW YORK

Info
RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: DELGA 664, FEBRUARY 5, 8 PM

G
SP
C
NEA

RE PALESTINE/ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL

L
R
P
OControl: 2877
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 5, 1957
9:13 PM

Returned to 674.84A/2-557

HBS

Confidential File

FAWZI (EGYPT) CALLED ON LODGE AT HIS REQUEST. HE HAD JUST COME FROM CONVERSATION WITH SYG. FAWZI SAID IN VIEW ISRAELI NEGATIVE ATTITUDE REGARDING WITHDRAWAL, HE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO INSIST ON AN IMMEDIATE MEETING OF ASSEMBLY, EVEN IF IT WERE ONLY TO RECEIVE REPORT THAT ISRAELIS HAD NOT COMPLIED. HE SAID HE WAS UNDER GREAT PRESSURE FROM MANY SOURCES, PARTICULARLY CAIRO, TO MAKE SOME MOVE SINCE IT WAS KNOWN EVEN BEFORE RESOLUTIONS WERE PASSED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT COMPLY.

FAWZI THEN SAID HE FELT IT DESIRABLE TO MAINTAIN STEADY PROGRESS IN DIRECTION OF BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN U.S. AND ARAB WORLD. AS EXAMPLE OF THIS, 10 DAYS AGO THEY COULD NOT HAVE BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE SUCH STATEMENTS AS HAD BEEN MADE BY KING SAUD DURING HIS WASHINGTON VISIT. FAWZI SAID HE REFERRED TO BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS. FAWZI EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION AT SAUD'S STATEMENTS, SAYING WASHINGTON SHOULD GET EVERY CREDIT FOR PART IT HAD PLAYED IN THESE. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO SEE MOMENT ARRIVE WHEN THINGS FAILED IN UN, REGARDLESS OF WHERE BLAME MIGHT LIE. HE FELT IT USEFUL TO CONTINUE APPROACH FOLLOWED THUS FAR, SAYING THIS WAS QUESTION BELONGING TO WHOLE OF UN. HE SUGGESTED SPONSORS OF LAST 2 RESOLUTIONS SHOULD CONSULT REGARDING FURTHER STEPS, SHOULD ISRAEL CONTINUE NOT TO COMPLY. EGYPT, IF IT WERE ACTING ON ITS OWN, WOULD HAVE TO PROPOSE ACTION SUCH AS THAT TAKEN IN THE CASE

OF

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DELGA 664, FEBRUARY 5, 8 PM, FROM NEW YORK

OF RED CHINA'S AGGRESSION IN KOREA, NAMELY SANCTIONS. THEY COULD NOT DO OTHERWISE WITH REGARD TO ISRAEL.

FAWZI SAID HE MERELY WANTED TO PUT THESE IDEAS BEFORE US. HE REALIZED KING SAUD AND HIS ADVISERS WERE IN TOUCH WITH DEPARTMENT AND SECRETARY IN WASHINGTON, BUT THERE WAS, HE SAID, INTERDEPENDENCE OF 2 OPERATIONS.

IN REPLY, LODGE SAID BEFORE WE CONSULTED WITH SPONSORS U.S. HAD TO MAKE UP ITS OWN MIND. HE SAID HE COULD ASSURE FAWZI THAT WHOLE QUESTION WAS UNDER VERY ACTIVE STUDY IN WASHINGTON AND IN FOREFRONT OF WASHINGTON'S MIND. HE SAID HE WOULD REPORT FAWZI'S VIEWS BUT COULD SAY NOTHING MORE FOR TIME BEING.

AS HE TOOK LEAVE, FAWZI SAID THERE WAS GOOD SOLID BRIDGEHEAD ESTABLISHED BY U.S. AND UN, BUT COMPETENT GENERAL CANNOT STOP MERELY AT BRIDGEHEAD. HE MUST SPREAD OUT OR IT MIGHT BE BETTER NEVER TO HAVE ESTABLISHED HIS BRIDGEHEAD. FAWZI CONCLUDED BY SAYING THIS WOULD BE IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST. IT EVEN IN ISRAEL'S LONG-RUN INTEREST FOR HER EXISTENCE "IN THE AREA".

LODGE

AAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 5 1967

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

44

Action

IO
Info
RMRSS
G
SP
C
EUR
NEA
ARA
FE
L
R
O

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 666, FEBRUARY 5, 9 PM

PRIORITY

RE: PALESTINE - ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, SUEZ

1. NAEVDAL (NORWAY) INFORMED US OF SYG'S MEETING TODAY WITH UNEF ADVISORY COMMITTEE. SYG TOLD ADVISORY COMMISSION HE DID NOT WISH PROCEED FURTHER IN THIS MATTER SOLELY ON HIS OWN. HE THOUGHT IT ADVISABLE KEEP ADVISORY COMMISSION INFORMED AND SEEK THEIR VIEWS AT EVERY STEP OF WAY IN PRESENT DIFFICULT COURSE OF EVENTS.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID EBAN (ISRAEL) HAD MADE TWO REQUESTS OF HIM YESTERDAY:

A. THAT SYG OBTAIN COMMITMENT FROM EGYPT TO RENOUNCE BELLIGERENCY; AND

B. THAT SYG CONFIRM THAT UNEF WOULD MOVE INTO AREA NOW OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL ALONG SHORES OF GULF OF AQABA AND REMAIN THERE UNTIL FINAL SETTLEMENT.

HAMMARSKJOLD INFORMED ADVISORY COMMISSION EBAN HAD ASKED PERMISSION PRESENT ISRAELI'S POSITION TO ADVISORY COMMISSION. HAMMARSKJOLD PASSED ALONG THIS REQUEST WITH COMMENT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE. COMMITTEE UNANIMOUSLY AGREED ONLY PURPOSE IN HEARING EBAN WOULD BE IN CONNECTION IMPLEMENTATION RESOLUTION II, AND THAT THIS STAGE WAS NOT YET REACHED. ACCORDING TO NAEVDAL, BRAZIL, CEYLON AND CANADA HAD PUT FORWARD IDEA THAT SYG, IN ORDER AVOID DANGERS THAT WOULD RESULT FROM CONTINUATION OF DEADLOCK, MIGHT USEFULLY SEEK "CLARIFICATIONS" FROM EGYPT ON POINTS EBAN HAD RAISED. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION, ADVISORY COMMISSION CONCLUDED THAT FINE LINE BETWEEN CLARIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

674.34A/2-557

CLASSIFIED
674.34A/2-557

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DELGA 666, FEBRUARY 5, 9 PM, FROM NEW YORK

AND "COMMITMENT" COULD BE SO EASILY DESTROYED IN SUCH OPERATION IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR HAMMARSKJOLD PURSUE THIS SUGGESTION.

DURING COURSE OF MEETING, LALL (INDIA) HAD TRIED URGE UPON ADVISORY COMMISSION NECESSITY OF PROCEEDING TO SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL IF LATTER DID NOT COMPLY WITH RESOLUTION 1. LALL DID NOT REFER, HOWEVER, TO FAWZI'S LETTER ASKING GA RECONVENE VERY SOON, AND NAEVDAL SAID HAMMARSKJOLD HAD APPARENTLY WITHHELD THIS LETTER FROM CIRCULATION IN HOPES BUYING AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE. BRYN (NORWEGIAN MINISTER OF STATE) AND FREITAS VALLE (BRAZIL) AND CANADIAN REPRESENTATIVE HAD POINTED OUT TO LALL THAT SANCTIONS RESOLUTION COULD NOT OBTAIN NECESSARY 2/3 AT THIS TIME. NAEVDAL TOLD US THAT, AS FAR AS NORWEGIAN REPRESENTATIVE TAKING THIS LINE WAS CONCERNED, IT WAS TACTICAL MOVE VIS-A-VIS INDIANS TO GAIN MORE TIME BEFORE INEVITABLE WAS FACED.

NORWEGIAN DELEGATION HAD CAREFULLY CONSIDERED SITUATION IT WOULD BE FACED WITH IF SANCTIONS RESOLUTION SUBMITTED. THEY CONCLUDED THAT, UNLESS U.S. SHOULD VOTE IN FAVOR, NORWAY COULD NOT SUPPORT. THEY FELT, WITH U.S. SUPPORT, PROBABLE FIVE NORDIC COUNTRIES WOULD ALSO SUPPORT. PRINCIPLE POINT OF DIFFICULTY IN SUCH SITUATION FOR NORWEGIANS WAS FACT NATO POWERS WOULD BE WIDELY SPLIT ON SUCH ISSUE. THEY DID NOT BELIEVE BENELUX WOULD EVER VOTE FOR SANCTIONS. FRANCE WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT. ITALY MIGHT, AND SPAIN AND PORTUGAL PROBABLY WOULD. IRELAND, THEY FELT, WOULD SUPPORT AND THIS WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL. THEY DOUBTED U.K. COULD GO ALONG WITH SANCTIONS AND THIS WOULD HAVE EFFECT OF PREVENTING AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND CANADA FROM SUPPORTING SANCTIONS. THEY FURTHER ESTIMATED IF U.S. SHOULD ABSTAIN, NO LATIN AMERICAN WOULD VOTE IN FAVOR. CONSEQUENTLY U.S. POSITION WAS CRUCIAL.

NORWEGIANS INDICATED GREAT INTEREST IN KNOWING AS SOON AS POSSIBLE - PREFERABLY BEFORE UN IS EVEN FACED WITH SANCTIONS RESOLUTION - WHAT ATTITUDE U.S. IS TO BE. THEY FEEL TIME IS GETTING VERY SHORT AND THAT ONLY VERY FIRM STAND BY U.S. WITH ISRAELIS COULD CHANGE ISRAELI POSITION.

2. WITH REGARD FINANCING CANAL CLEARANCE, NAEVDAL SAID SYG FEELS IT ESSENTIAL PRESENT GA REPORT IN ABOUT ONE WEEK'S TIME.

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- DELGA 666, FEBRUARY 5, 9 PM, FROM NEW YORK

PRIOR TO THEN, HOPES FOR CONCURRENCE PRINCIPALLY INTERESTED STATES PLUS EGYPT IN PLAN WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR FINANCING CLEARANCE OPERATION. HAMMARSKJOLD DOES NOT INTEND MAKE PUBLIC ANY FURTHER REPORTS FROM GENERAL WHEELER RE VERY SATISFACTORY PROGRESS ON CANAL CLEARANCE UNTIL AFTER HE HAS OBTAINED AGREEMENT ON FINANCING OPERATION. SYG HAS APPARENTLY GIVEN UP IDEA OF TRYING OBTAIN FURTHER ADVANCES FROM GOVERNMENTS BEYOND TWELVE MILLION DOLLARS TO MAKE UP DIFFERENCE OF EIGHT MILLION NEEDED FOR TOTAL CLEARANCE OPERATION. HE INTENDS, AFTER GA APPROVAL OF PLAN FOR FINANCING CLEARANCE, OBTAIN REMAINING EIGHT MILLION AS LOAN FROM INTERNATIONAL BANK.

NORWEGIANS HAVE BEEN EMPHASIZING DURING DISCUSSIONS OF FINANCING PROBLEM, PARTICULARLY WITH INDIANS, THAT LOSS THROUGH BLOCKING CANAL IS TWENTY MILLION DOLLARS A MONTH DIRECT LOSS ON DRY CARGO AND FURTHER TWENTY MILLION DOLLARS PER MONTH ON OIL. THIS, OF COURSE, DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT INDIRECT LOSS THROUGH PRICE INCREASES, ETC. COMPARED WITH THIS, SAY NORWEGIANS, THREE YEAR AMORTIZATION OF COST CANAL CLEARANCE ON BASIS SURCHARGE ONE CENT PER GALLON OIL IS SMALL PRICE INDEED TO PAY.

NAEVDAL SHOWED US COPY OF NOTE BRITISH EMBASSY OSLO HAD GIVEN FOREIGN OFFICE WHICH EXPRESSED GREAT CONCERN AT POSSIBILITY CANAL BEING REOPENED AND IN FULL CONTROL OF EGYPT. THEY HOPED INTERIM FINANCING MEASURES COULD BE WORKED OUT WHICH WOULD HAVE INTERNATIONAL BANK AS RECEIVING AGENT. NORWEGIANS EXTREMELY HOPEFUL EARLY AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED. THEY ARE CONCERNED AT SITUATION WHICH COULD DEVELOP WHEN CANAL IS OPENED IF THERE IS NO AGREEMENT. NORWEGIAN SHIPS ARE CHARTERED TO FIRMS IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES WHERE DIFFERENT POLICIES ARE PURSUED. THIS COULD RESULT IN CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTIES FOR NORWEGIAN SHIPS. AS EXAMPLE, HE SAID, IF THERE WERE NO PLAN, SHIP CHARTERED BY INDIAN FIRM WOULD GO THROUGH CANAL PAYING TOLLS DIRECT TO EGYPT; SHIP CHARTERED TO AMERICAN FIRM WOULD PRESUMABLY GO THROUGH PAYING TOLLS TO EGYPT WITH RESERVATIONS; WHILE SHIPS CHARTERED TO BRITISH OR FRENCH CONCERNS WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED THROUGH SINCE THEY WOULD REFUSE PAY TOLLS TO EGYPT.

NORWEGIAN DELEGATION INCLINED BELIEVE ONLY SYSTEM WHICH COULD SUCCEED WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE PAYMENT OF TOLLS TO EGYPT UNDER SUITABLE CONDITIONS SUCH AS THOSE IMPLIED IN SUSPENSE ACCOUNT

CONFIDENTIAL

-4- DELGA 666, FEBRUARY 5, 9 PM, FROM NEW YORK

SCHEME. THEY ARE APPARENTLY REASONABLY SATISFIED WITH NASSER'S POSITION IN WHICH HE HAS TOLD SYG HE IS WILLING "AVOID COLLISION" AND AGREEABLE DISCUSSING ARRANGEMENTS.

LODGE

CC

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

58-D

Action

IC

Info

RMR

SS

G

SF

C

ETR

NEA

ARA

FE

I

R

P

C

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 673, FEBRUARY 6, 9 P.M.

PRIORITY

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

SPENDER (AUSTRALIA) INFORMED LODGE THAT HE HAS BEEN TALKING TO MEIR (ISRAEL). HE REPORTED MEIR AS SAYING THAT ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW IF THERE WERE SOME FORM OF PUBLIC ASSURANCE IN ADVANCE BY LOYFT THAT UNEF WOULD BE PERMITTED IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH AREA AND THAT EGYPT WOULD NOT DISCRIMINATE AGAINST ISRAELI SHIPPING THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL.

SPENDER BELIEVES IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND SOME FORM OF WORDS WHICH EGYPTIANS COULD AGREE TO IN PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH WOULD PROVIDE NECESSARY ASSURANCES WITHOUT MAKING IT APPEAR THAT EGYPTIANS WERE DOING THIS "WITH THE ENEMY'S FOOT IN THEIR FACE". SPENDER EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT IF SUCH A FORMULA CANNOT BE FOUND WE WILL ALL BE CONFRONTED WITH AN UNMANAGEABLE SITUATION WHICH COULD LEAD TO WAR.

WE HAVE CONVEYED SUBSTANCE OF ABOVE TO SYG. IF DEPT DESIRES WE DO ANYTHING FURTHER HERE RE ABOVE, WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SUGGESTIONS.

EBAN LATER SPOKE TO BARCO ALONG SIMILAR LINES. HE SAID HE HAD REQUESTED SYG TO ASK EGYPTIANS WHAT THEIR POSITION ON BELLIGERENCY WOULD BE UPON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES. SYG SAID THAT HE COULD NOT PUT QUESTION TO EGYPT UNTIL HE KNEW WHAT ISRAELI POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL ACTUALLY WAS. EBAN SAID THAT THIS ATTITUDE OF SYG DRIED UP A POSSIBLE AVENUE FOR NEGOTIATION. IN RESPONSE TO QUERY, HE ALSO SAID THAT HE BELIEVED, ALTHOUGH HE COULD NOT SAY SO FOR ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, THAT ISRAEL WOULD AGREE TO WITHDRAW FROM GAZA IF OTHER QUESTIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE CENTER

Control: 3687

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 6, 1957

9:43 P.M.



RM/R
Central
files
This Document Must Be Returned to

674.84A/2-657

HBS

FILED

FEB 27 1957

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DELGA 673, FEBRUARY 6, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

WERE DETAILLED. RAFAEL ADDED THAT UNLESS SYG WERE WILLING QUESTION EGYPTIANS AND THEY WERE WILLING GIVE UNDERTAKING REFRAIN FROM ACTS OF BELLIGERENCY, ISRAEL WOULD NOT WITHDRAW AND FURTHER OUTBREAK OF WAR WOULD BE RESULT. EBAN SAID SANCTIONS WOULD SIMPLY STIFFEN ISRAELI ATTITUDE. (WE INTEND CHECK WITH SYG ABOVE ACCOUNT EBAN'S EXCHANGE WITH SYG.)

EBAN ALSO SAID THAT IF SYG CONTINUED REFUSE PUT ISRAELI'S QUESTIONS TO EGYPTIANS, THIS WOULD BE SERIOUS ABDICATION RESPONSIBILITY AND ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ISSUE WITH HIM PUBLICLY. WE ASSUME DEPT HAS SEEN ISRAELI PRESS RELEASE TODAY, WHICH MAY BE FIRST STEP THIS DIRECTION.

ACCORDING TO NAEVDAL (NORWAY), HAMMARSKJOLD TOLD EBAN YESTERDAY HE WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE, IN ABSENCE CLEAR INDICATION ISRAELI INTENTION WITHDRAW, OBTAIN ASSURANCES, OR CLARIFICATIONS, FROM EGYPT AS ISRAELIS HAD REQUESTED. SYG ASKED EBAN, HOWEVER, WHETHER ISRAEL WOULD HERSELF AGREE TO HAVING UNITS OF UNEF STATIONED "ON BOTH SIDES OF ARMISTICE LINE". SYG SAID UNLESS ISRAEL AGREEABLE TO THIS, THERE IS NO SENSE EVEN DISCUSSING IMPLEMENTATION "OTHER MEASURES". SYG ALSO ASKED EBAN WHETHER, IF THEY WITHDRAW, ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL WOULD INCLUDE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION LEAVING GAZA. (UNDERSTAND FROM NAEVDAL SYG HAS VERY PESSIMISTIC REPORT FROM HIS REPRESENTATIVES IN GAZA SAYING THERE IS VIRTUAL "REIGN OF TERROR" GOING ON AGAINST ARABS THERE.) EBAN SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO REFER QUESTIONS TO HIS GOVT. NAEVDAL SAID HIS IMPRESSION AFTER CONVERSATION WITH SYG LAST NIGHT WAS THAT HAMMARSKJOLD WAS VERY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT SITUATION.

NAEVDAL ALSO REPORTED CONVERSATION WITH RIAD (EGYPT). RIAD SAID EGYPT WAS INSISTING ON PLENARY MEETING THURSDAY AND THAT FAWZI HAD SO INDICATED TO HAMMARSKJOLD. EGYPT FELT US AND SIX OTHER CO-SPONSORS OF LAST TWO RESOLUTIONS MUST NOW TAKE LEAD IN MOVING ON TO FURTHER NECESSARY STEPS. THIS, SAID RIAD, WOULD BE TEST OF GOOD FAITH OF US INTENTIONS UNDER EISENHOWER DOCTRINE. (COMMENT: THIS IS SECOND INSTANCE IN WHICH EGYPTIANS HAVE MADE REFERENCE TO EISENHOWER DOCTRINE IN CONNECTION ACTIVITIES IN UN ON PALESTINE.)

NAEVDAL COMMENTED THAT WHILE NORWAY WAS AWARE IN CO-SPONSORING TWO RESOLUTIONS LAST WEEK THEY WERE IN A SENSE COMMITTING

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-3- DECCA 63, FEBRUARY 6, 9 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

THEMSELVES TO CARRY ON, THEY HAD NOT EXPECTED TO BE PRESENTED WITH REQUEST TO CO-SPONSOR RES ON SANCTIONS. MURRAY (CANADA) REVEALED SIMILAR IMPLICATION OF COMMITMENT TO FUTURE ACTION HAD WEIGHED HEAVILY WITH PEARSON IN HIS DECISION NOT TO CO-SPONSOR. NORWEGIANS RECOGNIZED, HOWEVER, THAT FROM EGYPTIAN POINT OF VIEW IT WAS LOGICAL FOR THEM TO EXPECT SEVEN CO-SPONSORS TO FOLLOW UP ON THEIR RESOLUTIONS IF ISRAELIS DID NOT COMPLY, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW RELUCTANT ACQUIESCENCE OF FAWZI IN AGREEING NOT TO OPPOSE RES 11. IN SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION, NAEVDAL REPORTED EGYPTIANS WERE NOW WILLING HOLD OFF MEETING TILL NEXT WEEK BUT CONSIDERED THAT 7 CO-SPONSORS MUST TAKE LEAD IN NEXT STEPS.

RE QUESTION OF US POSITION ON SANCTIONS, BELIEVE DEPT SHOULD CONSIDER NOT ONLY WHETHER WE ARE ABLE TO SUPPORT RES ON SANCTIONS BUT ALSO HOW WE ARE TO DEAL WITH PRESSURE TO CO-SPONSOR SUCH RES WITH SIX OTHER STATES.

MURRAY (CANADA) INDICATED TO US CORDIER'S (SECRETARIAT) ASSESSMENT TWO-THIRDS VOTE FOR SANCTIONS IS NOW POSSIBLE. MURRAY INCLINED AGREE ON BASIS MOST STATES WOULD FIND IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT OPPOSE SANCTIONS IN FACE DISREGARD BY ISRAEL OF GA RESOLUTIONS AND WOULD ABSTAIN RATHER THAN VOTE AGAINST.

LATE THIS EVENING, LALL (INDIA) CALLED TO INFORM US ASAF'S MEETING TOMORROW ON PALESTINE. OUT OF DEFERENCE OUR VIEWS EGYPTIANS HAD AGREED HOLD OFF PLENARY UNTIL MONDAY. QUESTION, HOWEVER, IN INDIANS' VIEW, WAS WHAT DO WE DO THEN. HE, TOO, BELIEVES SEVEN CO-SPONSORS SHOULD CONSULT ON NEXT STEPS.

LODGE

MAA

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

SECRET

DATE: February 6, 1957

SUBJECT: Question of Israeli withdrawal from Egypt

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Heeney, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Rae, Canadian Embassy
Mr. Phleger, L
Mr. Wilkins, NEA
Mr. Meeker, L/UNA
Mr. Nugent, BNA

COPIES TO:
L (2)
NEA (3)
IO (3)
EUR (1)
BNA (2)
Embassy Ottawa

Ambassador Heeney said today that he understood the Secretary General was very discouraged by the results of discussions in the Advisory Committee concerning the desired Israeli withdrawal. The Israelis seem determined to maintain their position. The outlook is dark. In this regard, the Canadian Delegate to the UN has reported that he can see no way out of the dilemma, unless Israel agrees to withdraw. However, Canada's Delegate believes that the withdrawal could be made easier for Israel, if a number of Governments, particularly the United States, would give direct assurances that they would strive to make effective the various suggestions contained in the Secretary General's report. Consequently, the Ambassador was interested in knowing our thoughts in this regard. What did we think would be the next move? What would we do, for example, if a resolution for sanctions against Israel were introduced? The Ambassador stated his belief that the Israelis would move out, if pressed by the United States.

Messrs Phleger and Wilkins then reminded the Ambassador that Israel had not yet made any decision, although its reactions thus far had been largely negative. The President stated in a press conference this morning his belief that Israel would comply with the 1st Resolution, and further expressed the United States' commitment to support the U.N. Such a remark was a form of persuasion, if not pressure. It was certainly a way of emphasizing also that the United States, as a member of the U.N., will do its utmost to insure that the General Assembly Resolutions are fulfilled in every respect. We fully expect, furthermore, that Israel will ask us what we would do to back up the 2nd Resolution, but we have not yet decided on an answer.

SECRET


FILED
1957
Phleger

SECRET

-2-

Mr. Phleger pointed out that Egypt has not yet said it would not comply with the 2nd Resolution. It has simply said it can not be compelled to do so. There is a good possibility that if Israel withdraws, Egypt will be constrained by world opinion to accept deployment under the 2nd Resolution as a de facto situation. At the same time, in view of what has transpired during past years, the United States would be undertaking a terrific obligation, if it pressed Israel to withdraw without being entirely confident that the situation would not thereafter deteriorate.

The Ambassador said it would be both tragic and ironic, if there were a good chance that Egypt would behave properly and this were not borne home to Israel. Difficult though it might be for us, Israel would move if pressed by the United States. In the event Israel can not be made to move out in this way, the U.N. will inevitably have to deal with the thorny question of sanctions. The Ambassador hoped we would let him know of any further development of our thoughts.


EUR:BNA:JLNugent:md
2-6-57

SECRET

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

CONFIDENTIAL

35-39
Action

Control: 4042
Rec'd: February 7, 1957
9:08 a.m.

SS-1-177
Info FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR TO: Secretary of State

NO: 925, February 7, 2 p.m.

Chief American Section Foreign Office informed Embassy Officer Prime Minister working on reply to President's letter (EMBTel 912) and that following Cabinet meeting held Ben Gurion's Tel Aviv residence late afternoon February 6 further drafting could be done February 7. Embassy could expect official reply morning February 8 he said.

LAWSON

CWD: JHF/14

674.84A/2-757

CAA

CONFIDENTIAL

FILED

MAY 20 1959

UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

INCOMING TELEGRAM

16
Department of State

ACTION CO-1

CONFIDENTIAL

31

Action

NEA

RM

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

USUN

E

R

O

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 929, February 7, 4 p.m.

NOFORN

Control: 4690

Rec'd: February 8, 1957
3:15 a.m.Full
accB
NE
3-14-57MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

8 AM 11 1

In conversation with Embassy officer February 6 Kollek, Director General Prime Minister's office, said GOI currently working overtime in attempt cut proposed budget by IL 150 million in anticipation application by UN, with US support, of sanctions against Israel. Ben Gurion's determination maintain present policy re Gaza and Straits of Tiran despite UN pressure for immediate withdrawal to armistice lines, he stated, enthusiastically and unanimously backed up by Israeli public and all elements of government except Communists. He expressed opinion Israel had one thing to lose and perhaps much to gain by this course of action. Sanctions already in effect de facto but not de jure and he thought Israel could hold out against UN sanctions for 3 to 6 months. Perhaps during that period justice of Israel's modest demands for assurances of free passage in the Gulf of Aqaba and removal threat of Egyptian aggression through Gaza strip would be recognized by rest of world and some satisfactory solution worked out. If not, there would be nothing ignominious in small country like Israel having to buckle under to pressure from all rest of world. Of course, he continued, Israel might finally be brought to its knees and eventually forced to accept return to unsatisfactory status quo ante. However, it could never forgive itself if it did not now make bold and determined attempt prevent such an outcome when it holds positions to which it could never return if they should be abandoned at this time. He expressed further opinion that short period of belt tightening and austerity might not be bad thing internally, as it would have effect of bringing home to Israeli public stark economic realities and recognition that greater efforts must be made within Israel to achieve standard of living which has been possible only because of outside help. Please protect source.

LAWSON

EOC: LMB

674.84A/2-757

HBS

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

NEA

Info

RME

SS

ST

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

EIP

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 931, February 7, 6 p.m.

Control: 4710

Rec'd: February 8, 1957
3:46 a.m.

Press comment February 7 on present position of Israel vis-a-vis UN demand for withdrawal from Sinai and Gaza unanimously supports determination accept sanctions rather than back down on "minimal" security demands. Most papers declare US sanctions already exist and appear to be fostering impression UN sanctions are inevitable. HAARETZ (Independent) reports Ben Gurion told Cabinet that US and Soviet sanctions, "which in fact already imposed, may assume graver proportions in very near future when small nations join them".

Inevitability of sanctions is obvious implication of editorial treatment accorded press conferences February 5-6 by Secretary and President. Using harshest language Embassy has encountered for many months, several papers bitterly attack Secretary for "hiding behind UN" with statement US would not apply sanctions unilaterally while in fact US sanctions already in effect. President's remarks on sanctions are interpreted by newspapers to mean "Ike would support UN move to impose sanctions on Israel" (Jerusalem POST headline).

POST's distortion President's reply INS Clark's question re sanctions fairly typical. It read: "President said he did not want to speculate on such possible future action by UN or US as application of sanctions against Israel to compel withdrawal. But he could say America would support UN in this connection".

In general press also blames US for firm UN stand and likelihood of UN sanctions resolution. As AL HAMISHMAR (Mapam) puts it "all anti-Israel resolutions in UN were result of action initiated by US". US interest in Arab oil is usually suggested as basis US policy.

General pessimism over possibility working out acceptable agreements with UN is implicit in most editorial comment with US, blamed for situation. AL HAMISHMAR says "what US President and Secretary of State said in recent press conferences put end to rumors Israel's position had improved".

Embassy notes

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

674.34A/2-757

HBS

CONFIDENTIAL

- - 931, February 7, 6 p.m. from Tel Aviv

Embassy notes that government coalition party newspapers as well as rest seem intent on placing blackest possible interpretation on US actions. While precise purpose this probably inspired propaganda remains obscure, there is no doubt most Israelis today believe US has already imposed sanctions and is exerting threats of further sanctions against Israel. It is equally clear that public is overwhelmingly in support government stand in East in present positions.

LAWSON

FC: LMB

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

43-48

SECRET

001

Action

Control: 4823

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 8, 1957
6:08 A.M.

NEA FROM: BEIRUT

Info TO: Secretary of State

RMR

SS NO: 1907, FEBRUARY 7, 6 P.M.

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

UMSA

E

P

UOP

O

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

DCL

ICA

IN CONVERSATION WITH USIA DIRECTOR LARSON AND ME YESTERDAY
PRIME MINISTER SOLH (REPEAT SOLH) COVERED MOST OF SAME SUBJECT
DISCUSSED MORE ARTICULATEDLY EARLIER IN DAY WITH PRESIDENT.
IN ADDITION HE INQUIRED ABOUT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM GAZA.
HIS PRINCIPAL INTEREST APPEARING TO RELATE TO THE FAVORABLE
EFFECT WITHDRAWAL WOULD HAVE ON IPC PIPELINE REPAIR AND ON
OUTCOME OF RECENT IPC DISMISSALS IN LEBANON. HE ALSO SPOKE
FAVORABLY OF THE EISENHOWER PROPOSALS, URGED EARLY AND FAVORABLE
CONSIDERATION BY WASHINGTON OF NEW AID PROGRAMS, AND GAVE
EQUAL STRESS TO THE HIGHWAY IMPROVEMENT AND LOW COST HOUSING
PROJECTS.

RVH

HEATH

1957 FEB 8 PM 12 11
MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/R CENTRAL FILES
674.34A/2-757

SECRET FILE

PERMANENT

SECRET

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

58-D

Action

TO

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

NEA

APA

FE

L

R

P

C

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 679, FEBRUARY 7, 2 PM

PRIORITY

VERBATIM TEXT

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

FOLLOWING IS TEXT MADE PUBLIC BY SPOKESMAN FOR SYG YESTERDAY WHICH HELPS CLARIFY CONTEXT IN WHICH ISRAELI QUESTIONS AND SYG'S COUNTER QUERIES WERE PUT.

SYG TOLD GADEL OFFICER THAT FACT THAT ISRAELIS HAD FORMALLY REQUESTED HIM TO PUT QUESTIONS TO EGYPTIANS AND THEN MADE THIS PUBLIC RESTRICTS HIS FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT IN NEGOTIATIONS AND MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO PUT THESE QUESTIONS "ON HIS OWN" TO EGYPTIANS. NOW THAT ISRAELIS HAVE PUT QUESTIONS TO EGYPTIANS PUBLICLY, EGYPTIANS CANNOT, WITHOUT APPEARING TO BE CONCEDED TO CONDITIONS LAYED DOWN BY ISRAELIS AS PRICE FOR WITHDRAWAL, MAKE RESPONSE.

BEGIN TEXT QUOTE

AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 2 FEBRUARY, PASSED TWO RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE FIRST RESOLUTION REQUESTED ISRAEL WITHDRAWAL BEHIND THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. THE SECOND RESOLUTION REFERRED TO MEASURES TO BE UNDERTAKEN UPON ISRAEL'S COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL BEHIND THAT LINE.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL, 3 FEBRUARY, IN TRANSMITTING THE TWO RESOLUTIONS TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL, ASKED FOR A MEETING, MONDAY 4 FEBRUARY, AT WHICH TIME HE HOPED TO LEARN THE POSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, PARTICULARLY, AS A MATTER OF SPECIAL URGENCY, ON THE FIRST RESOLUTION.

PERMANENT

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

Control:

4485

Rec'd:

FEBRUARY 7, 1957

5:26 PM



674.84A/2-757

PA

CLASSIFIED

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED

-2- DELCA 679, FEBRUARY 7, 2 PM, FROM NEW YORK

ON 4 FEBRUARY, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL IN REPLY TO THIS REQUEST, PRESENTED AN AIDE-MEMOIRE IN WHICH CERTAIN POINTS WERE SUBMITTED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

IN ONE OF THE POINTS THE GOVT OF ISRAEL REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ASK THE GOVT OF EGYPT WHETHER EGYPT AGREES TO THE MUTUAL AND FULL ABSTENTION FROM BELLIGERENT ACTS, BY LAND, AIR AND SEA, ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL TROOPS. THIS POINT OBVIOUSLY REQUESTS ACTION UNDER THE SECOND RESOLUTION. THE SECRETARY GENERAL ASKED THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL RECOGNIZES THAT THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY REQUEST A WITHDRAWAL, NOT ONLY OF TROOPS, BUT ALSO OF ISRAEL ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS ESTABLISHED ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE OF THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE.

IN A SECOND POINT CLARIFICATION WAS SOUGHT BY ISRAEL 'WHETHER, IMMEDIATELY ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL FORCES FROM THE SHARM EL-SHEIKH AREA, UNITS OF THE UNEF WOULD BE STATIONED ALONG THE WESTERN SHORE OF THE GULF OF AQABA' AND 'WOULD REMAIN SO DEPLOYED UNTIL ANOTHER EFFECTIVE MEANS IS AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE PARTIES CONCERNED FOR ENSURING PERMANENT FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION'. IT FOLLOWS FROM THE STATEMENTS IN THE DEBATE IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE REPORT ON WHICH IT WAS BASED, THAT A STATIONING AT SHARM EL-SHEIKH OF THE FORCE UNDER THE TERMS MENTIONED IN THE ISRAEL QUESTION WOULD REQUIRE EXPLICIT CONSENT FROM EGYPT. THE SECRETARY GENERAL ASKED THE REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER ISRAEL WAS PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO GIVE ITS CONSENT TO THE STATIONING OF UNITS OF THE FORCE ON THE ISRAEL SIDE OF THE DEMARCATION LINE IN ORDER TO ENABLE IT TO FULFILL THE FUNCTIONS WHICH FOLLOW FROM THE SAME RESOLUTION, TO WHICH THE POINT RAISED BY ISRAEL REFERS.

THE SECRETARY GENERAL IS AWAITING CLARIFICATION OF THE POINTS HE SUBMITTED AS A PREREQUISITE TO FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE ISRAEL AIDE-MEMOIRE. END TEXT UNQUOTE

LODGE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

45-48

Action

IO

Info

RMR

SS

G

SF

C

EUR

NEA

ARA

FE

L

R

P

O

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 683, FEBRUARY 7, 8 PM

PRIORITY

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

IN CONVERSATION WITH MURRAY (CANADA) WE LEARNED CANADIAN DEL INCLINED AGREE WITH ESTIMATE OF BUNCHE (SECRETARIAT) THAT ISRAELI ARE TRYING FORCE NEGATIVE ANSWER OUT OF EGYPT ON UNEF DISPOSITION ETC., WHILE AT SAME TIME PUTTING SYG IN AS BAD LIGHT AS POSSIBLE LALL (INDIA) IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION SAID HE THOUGHT SYG HAD BECOME "STUCK" IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH PARTIES ON THIS MATTER.

IT IS VIEW OF SECRETARIAT AND CANADIAN DEL THAT CLEARER LANGUAGE IN TERMS CANADIANS HAD DRAFTED FOR RES II WOULD NOT HAVE MADE ANY DIFFERENCE IN ISRAELI ATTITUDE, AND THAT THEY WOULD HAVE REFUSED WITHDRAW EVEN IF SUCH LANGUAGE HAD BEEN ADOPTED.

ACCORDING TO MURRAY, SPENDER (AUSTRALIA) HAS BEEN PUT UP BY ISRAELIS TO GOING AROUND TO VARIOUS DELS TALKING IN TERMS OF NEED FOR EGYPTIAN "DECLARATION" ON NON-BELLIGERENCY. IT WAS POINTED OUT ISRAELIS HAD EARLIER TAKEN LINE ANY DECLARATION BY EGYPT WOULD NOT BE WORTH PAPER IT WRITTEN ON, SINCE EGYPT COULD NOT BE RELIED UPON.

IT WAS FEELING OF SECRETARIAT, AND CANADIANS, AFTER DISCUSSION FOLLOWING MEETING OF SYG'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE TODAY, THAT ISRAEL WOULD STICK ON ITS PRESENT ATTITUDE UP TO POINT WHERE SANCTIONS WERE VOTED. THEREAFTER THEY WOULD PROBABLY WITHDRAW FROM SHARM EL-SHEIKH BUT REMAIN IN GAZA.

CC


PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 4602

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 7, 1957



674.844/2-757

PA

LODGE

MAY 28 1959

FILED

CLASSIFIED

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROMPTED

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

SECRET

Classification

VERBATIM TEXT

SENT TO: USUN NEW YORK GADEL ~~PROBABLE~~ NIACT

For DCIT use only.

Origin

RPTD INFO: Amembassy CAIRO

Info

RE: Israeli Withdrawal, DELGA 673

Request you ascertain soonest SYG's reaction to your conveying following ^{oral} message from me to Fawzi. If SYG has no objection please give message to Fawzi stressing importance earliest possible reply.

1. In view seriousness present situation US is continuing urge Israel withdraw all of its forces behind armistice line without further delay. We shall continue maintain this position but convinced as practical matter that earliest possible announcement by SYG of his readiness and capacity carry out effectively measures he proposed in his Jan 24 report which endorsed by GA constitutes best possible means achieving prompt Israeli withdrawal. Such announcement would strengthen capacity SYG and GA to press for achievement this objective.

Desired
(Office
Only)

2. US has taken note position certain UN delegations that GA take additional measures bring about Israeli withdrawal behind armistice line. Additional measures against Israel for failure comply with GA recommendations would, even if necessary majority obtained in GA, raise question in minds many delegations as to position in which GOE would find itself if, following Israeli withdrawal, Egypt continued in default UN resolutions (i.e. attitude toward Israeli shipping in Canal and assertion claimed belligerent rights

Drafted by:

IO:UNP:SDP:rs:ajh 2/7/57

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

The Secretary

Clearance:

IO *fw*

NE

Mr. Rockwell

SECRET

Classification

L
Mr. Meeker

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

SECRET

Classification

generally). We foresee pressure in such circumstances for imposition similar measures against Egypt. In conformity firm position taken to uphold Charter principles and respect for SC and GA decision, ~~many UN~~ ^{might} ~~US and other~~ Members ~~could~~ find it extremely difficult oppose such measures against Egypt.

3. Accordingly, we believe desirable GOE consider matter in light above. US believes ~~GOE~~ ^{GOE} prepared cooperate fully with SYG in giving effect to measures suggested his report. However, there is some doubt among GA delegations whether SYG is in fact in position effectively to implement all measures he has proposed and which GA wishes see put into effect. While decision must rest with GOE, would venture suggest that as minimum GOE position might be protected by placing Hammarskjold in position make clear to GA that he will be able carry out effectively measures proposed his last report immediately upon withdrawal Israeli forces.

We recognize that attitude Israel toward some of proposed measures (e.g. deployment UNEF both sides armistice line) would have to be taken into account in any announcement SYG might make.

DULLES

SECRET

Classification

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

February 10, 1957

IO - Mr. Wilcox ✓
NEA - Mr. Rountree

In view of subsequent developments, I return herewith, unsigned, the cable to Lodge suggested by your memorandum of February 7, 1957.

(Demarche to Fawzi re Israeli withdrawal)

JFD
wm

S:JFDulles:cjp

(11)

SECRET

This document consists of 1 pages.
Number 1 of 12 copies. Series A.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

February 7, 1957

900
Rm/K 7713
5/5/64

TO : S - The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : IO - Mr. Wilcox
NEA - Mr. Rountree
SUBJECT: Proposed Demarche to Fawzi in Connection with Israeli Withdrawal

Discussion:

In our judgment the imposition of sanctions against Israel for noncompliance with General Assembly resolutions could have a number of highly undesirable practical consequences for U.S. policy, arising from such problems as the need to close off private U.S. remittances if sanctions are to be effective, possible pressure for equivalent sanctions against USSR regarding Hungary, and the precedent established which might affect other Members in default of U.N. recommendations (e.g. South Africa, India re Kashmir, etc.).

At the same time the United States would be under strong pressure to support sanctions if Israel continues to refuse to withdraw. Thus, an urgent problem faces us of ascertaining whether there are any further steps which the United States might properly take to bring about Israeli withdrawal before a sanctions resolution is submitted to the General Assembly.

It seems to us that Egypt should be approached urgently to see if she could see her way clear to doing anything now that will be helpful in resolving the present impasse. We believe Ambassador Lodge should be instructed, after ascertaining that the Secretary General has no objection, to suggest to Fawzi that Egypt make it possible for the Secretary General to inform the General Assembly that, immediately upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces, he will be in a position to implement effectively the measures proposed in his report. This would mean that Egypt intends to comply with the measures set forth in the Secretary General's report which were referred to in the second resolution adopted February 2 by the General Assembly and would have the effect of giving at least this minimum assurance to Israel.

Ambassador Lodge in the course of his approach could point out to Fawzi the difficulty the United States and other U.N. Members would have in avoiding the application to Egypt of the same standards applied to Israel if Egypt should be in contempt of any relevant U.N. resolutions after Israel withdraws.

Fawzi should be given our realistic estimate that the immediate objective of bringing about Israel's withdrawal can most readily be achieved if Egypt recognizes that a practical problem exists, and enables the Secretary General to assure the General Assembly of his capacity to carry out effectively the measures he has proposed in his report.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached telegram to Ambassador Lodge.

Concurrence:

L - Mr. Meek
IO:LBloomfield; IO:UNP:SDPalma:rs

SECRET

NE - Mr. Rockwell

674.842/2-757

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

his Document must be Returned
to RM/R Central Files

CONFIDENTIAL

31

Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

RMR

L

TO

P

UOP

O

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 932, February 8, 1 p.m.

Control: 5696

Rec'd: February 9, 1957
10:25 a.m.MESSAGE CENTER
NEA
11 AM 7:48

SENT DEPARTMENT 932, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 184, PARIS 153, ROME 84, AMMAN 161, BEIRUT 141, CAIRO 160, DAMASCUS 114, JERUSALEM 68, USUN 44

In move obviously designed bolster GOI's apparent decision reject United Nation's resolutions re final evacuation Sinai-Gaza strip four major coalition parties have issued calls for mass demonstrations Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa Saturday February 9. Participants Ben Gurion's Mapai; two left wing labor parties Achdut Avoda and Mapam; and progressives. Religious parties among coalition partners will not participate in public rallies "for desecrating Saturday's Sabbath" but supporting move by calling on Rabbis to permit special addresses on subject in synagogues before start of formal services. Opposition General Zionists which invited to join government partners declined according to government controlled newspapers only because they would not have "sufficient time to rally followers".

Battery of speakers drawn from Cabinet, Knesset, war heroes, civic leaders and high ranking civil servants will exhort audiences in all three cities.

Meetings advertised in all newspapers as demonstrations "against strangulating policy of United Nations." Public urged to "come in numbers to protest against return Egyptian murderers to Gaza; against yielding to Arab interests; to demonstrate in favor of free sea passage to Eilat and through Suez; and for Middle East peace".

Comment: Embassy believes this concerted effort by principal coalition parties to arouse public opinion on foreign affairs issue has no precedent in Israel's brief history. Demonstrations probably will attract thousands because emotions have been rising steadily both spontaneously and as whipped by all public media for past fortnight and public will welcome opportunity

reveal

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

674.84A/-857

CAA

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 20 1957

FILED

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 932, February 8, 1 p.m. from Tel Aviv

reveal its tempers.

Government probably has several motives including following but not necessarily in this order:

1. To solidify public support which appears virtually unanimous already but which may be "clinched" by emotional appeals of pitch and fervor not heard since Palestine war.
2. To demonstrate for world breadth and Department government's local support for position it will take in defiance pending and anticipated United Nation's demands.
3. To sharpen up public attitudes so as better to acquaint world Jewry with line of argument to be taken in support Israel.
4. To prevent government's assessment of what possible sanctions will mean translated into Israelis manner of living and to prepare them psychologically for "belt tightening" which may be necessary.

If as Embassy anticipates government's resistance expressed in Ben Gurion's reply to President's letter of February 2 and if reply has been transmitted before tomorrow rallies may be used as supercharged means of justifying reply as well as making its terms known to world in general

LAWSON

SW:DT

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Action

NEA

Info

PER

SS

SP

L

IO

NSUM

F

UOP

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FROM: Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 937, February 8, 4 p.m.

5678

February 9, 1957

9:46 a.m.

*File
OCB
NE-3-14-57*

SENT DEPARTMENT 937, REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 161, AMMAN 162.

IDF announced February 7 that five Arabs killed and 11 captured early that morning in encounter with army patrol eight kilometers west of Beersheba. Victims were described as among 16-man group with pack train of 12 donkeys loaded with arms and ammunition moving from Khan Yunis to Hebron. Prisoners said arms had been collected from abandoned Egyptian military positions in Gaza Strip but that only their leader, who was among those killed, knew for whom the arms were intended.

Foreign Ministry official said party might be just as it described itself as scavengers attempting to supply arms to Redoubt market in Jordan but on other hand ex-fedayeen, attempting to escape from dunes, where some have been hiding out since occupation of Gaza by IDF to safehaven in Jordan.

LAWSON

TT:DMB/16

NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

1957 FEB 11 AM 7 47

MAK 15 57

HBS

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

674.84A/2-357

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

This Document must be returned
to the RM/R Central Files

C74.84A/2-857

CAA

31-H

Action

SS

Info

RMR

CONFIDENTIAL

Control:

Rec'd:

5677

FEBRUARY 9, 1957

9:45 AM

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 940, FEBRUARY 8, 6 PM

PRIORITY

REFERENCE: EMBTELS 925, 912.

AT CLOSE OF BUSINESS TODAY EMBASSY STILL HAS NO (RPT NO) DEFINITE WORD WHEN IT MAY EXPECT BEN GURION'S REPLY. PRESIDENT'S LETTER WHICH FOREIGN MINISTER HAS LED US BELIEVE COULD BE EXPECTED DAILY SINCE TUESDAY. DELAY, AS MEASURED AGAINST BEN GURION'S CUSTOMARY PRACTICE ANSWERING PRESIDENT'S LETTERS WITHIN 48 HOURS OR LESS OF THEIR RECEIPT, INDICATIVE IMPORTANCE HE AND GOI PLACE IN ISRAEL'S PRESENT FOREIGN AFFAIRS SITUATION AND US INFLUENCE THEREON.

FOREIGN MINISTER OFFICIAL ADVISED EMBASSY INFORMALLY THAT BECAUSE IMPORTANCE BEN GURION PLACED ON REPLY AT THIS JUNCTURE EVERY RESPONSIBLE STATESMAN IN AND OUT CABINET WAS BEING GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS HIS VIEWS. TODAY MINISTRY SAID THAT BEN GURION'S TOP AIDES HAD WORKED ON DRAFT UNTIL EARLY HOURS THIS MORNING.

EMBASSY BELIEVES REPLY WILL EXPRESS GOI'S DETERMINATION NOT (RPT NOT) TO WITHDRAW FROM SHARM EL-SHEIKH AREA OR GAZA STRIP WITHOUT "MINIMAL ASSURANCES".

LAWSON

DMB

MAY 20 1959

CONFIDENTIAL
FILED

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

53
Action
10/


LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Control: 5825
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 9, 1957Info
RMR

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: D. GA 698, FEBRUARY 8, 8 P.M.

SS
G
SF
C
EUP
NEA
ARA
FE
L
F
TOP
CIE
TOP
COR
CIA

RE PALESTINE - ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

ALL OFFICER SHOWN COPY OF EXCHANGES BETWEEN SYG AND EBAN
RE: BY NAEVDAL (NORWAY). COPIES NUMBERED AND MARKED "SECRET"
BY SMC. EXCHANGES CONSIST OF A) ISRAELI AIDE MEMOIRE (SEE DELGA
652), B) ISRAELI PRESS RELEASE REFERRED TO IN DELGA 673,
C) LETTER FROM EBAN TO SYG OF 5 FEBRUARY, SENT AS FOLLOWUP
TO THEIR CONVERSATION ON 4 FEBRUARY, D) REPLY OF 6 FEBRUARY,
AND E) SYG'S NOTE TO CORRESPONDENTS (SEE DELGA 679).
ELEMENTS PORTIONS C) AND D) CONDENSED AND PARTIALLY PARAPHRASED
FOLLOW:

C) LETTER REFERRING TO QUESTIONS HE PUT TO SYG RE STATEMENT BY IG.F.
EBAN AND "AN AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE FROM EGYPT TO THE FIRST QUESTION"
ON BELLIGERENT ACTS, WILL AFFECT MY GOVERNMENT'S POLICIES ON
OUTSTANDING ISSUES. A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE SECOND WOULD
GREATLY ASSIST US TO UNDERSTAND THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF UNEF....
ACCORDINGLY, ON CLARIFICATION OF THESE BASIC MATTERS, A POSITION
WOULD BE CREATED IN WHICH THE OTHER QUESTION WHICH YOU RAISED
AT YESTERDAY'S MEETING COULD BE CONSIDERED IN A MORE PRACTICAL
WAY."

D) REFERRING TO THEIR CONVERSATION OF 4 FEBRUARY AND EBAN'S
LETTER TO HIM OF 5 FEBRUARY, SYG THEN NOTES THAT IN RESPONSE
TO A QUERY BY UNDER SECRETARY BUNCH, EBAN ANSWERED "THAT THE ANSWER
OF YOUR GOVERNMENT ON THE TWO POINTS IS AS SET FORTH IN HIS PREVIOUS
AIDE MEMOIRE (A/3511) AND IN HIS ADDRESS (TO GA) OF 28 JANUARY.
IN THESE TWO DOCUMENTS (SYG CONSIDERS THAT) ... THE ANSWER TO THE
FIRST QUESTION (RE REMOVING CIVIL ADMINISTRATION FROM GAZA)"
IS NEGATIVE. "THERE IS NO REFERENCE IN THESE TWO DOCUMENTS TO
ISRAEL'S POSITION ON STATIONING UNEF ON ISRAEL'S SIDE OF THE
ARMISTICE LINE. YOUR LETTER SAYS ABOUT THE TWO QUESTIONS

PERMANENT
RECORD COPY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

674.84A/2-857

PA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-2- DELGA 698, FEBRUARY 8, 8 P.M. FROM NEW YORK

"ONLY THAT IF 'AFFIRMATIVE' AND 'POSITIVE' RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS PUT BY ISRAEL WERE FIRST OBTAINED, THEN 'A POSITION WOULD BE CREATED IN WHICH MY QUESTIONS COULD BE CONSIDERED IN A MORE PRACTICAL WAY.'" "IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I MUST ASSUME, AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, THAT ISRAEL'S REPLY IS SPECIFICALLY NEGATIVE IN ONE INSTANCE AND ESSENTIALLY SO IN THE OTHER."

LODGE

-30-

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COUNCIL
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

~~SECRET~~
Classification

04539

1957 FEB 8 PM 8 06

DC/T

This document must be returned to
for DC/T use only.

SENT TO: Amembassy CAIRO
FOR AMBASSADOR

2627

a 74. 73
611
1862.11

Files
Central
RM/R

674.84A/2-857

This document must be returned to

FYI Following are developments on important issues involving NE for background.

Arab-Israeli Situation: According to USUN Israelis have publicly stated their conditions for withdrawal (i.e. assurances re Gulf of Aqaba and Fedayeen), and have made public fact they have requested SYG ask for expression of Egyptian attitude on these points. SYG feels that he cannot approach Egyptians in this sense since Israeli publicity has created situation whereby affirmative Egyptian response would appear to be capitulation by GOE to Israeli conditions. SYG believes under these circumstances unlikely GOE would feel able give affirmative reply. Israeli opposition to withdrawal means that move for GA-sanctions against Israel will gain momentum.

Suez: We have informed SYG we believe in view possibility early opening Suez Canal, time has come for him to secure Egyptian agreement to interim arrangement pending final settlement. Such interim arrangement might include elements along following lines:

1. Payment of tolls to neutral agency such as IBRD or UN, with at least 1/2 held to be disposed of according agreement which will implement six principles and constitute definitive settlement. Designation of IBRD or UN by Egypt as agent to receive tolls as above should satisfy Egyptian point

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:SWRockwell:crc 2/8/57

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NE - Fraser Wilkins

FEB 8 1957 P.M.

~~SECRET~~
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

CS/R

674.84A/2-857

~~SECRET~~
Classification

[that tolls be QUOTE legally paid to Egypt UNQUOTE.

2. Approximately 1/2 of tolls could ~~be~~ at same time be turned over by such Agency to Egypt.

3. This arrangement should cover all tolls pending final agreement so that all users treated alike.

Eisenhower Doctrine: President's proposals still under consideration in Senate which due shortly end its discussion of them.

Saud Visit: This visit has provided opportunity for wide and fruitful discussion of developments in Near East and US-Saudi relationships. Atmosphere has been extremely cordial and accord was reached on five-year extension Dhahran Airfield agreement. US agreed provide military items requested by Saudis in accordance with 1951 agreement as well as various types training assistance. US also agreed provide some economic assistance on projects connected Dhahran Airfield and construct air terminal at Dhahran. King expressed satisfaction with explanation he received of President's proposals and promised convey substance this to Nasser, Hussein and Asali. We provided Saudis with written response to memorandum brought by Saud from Cairo meeting prior his arrival US covering current issues in Near East and relationships between Near East and West. ENDFYI

" DULLES "

Dulles

(RM)

~~SECRET~~
Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 8, 1957

SUBJECT: Israel Withdrawal from Akaka and Gaza

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Meuvien Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel

G - Mr. Robert Murphy
ME - Mr. Donald C. Lergus

COPIES TO: S/S(2 cc), S(cc), C(cc), IMA(cc), IO(cc), ME(2 cc), USUN(cc)

RMR
file

Mr. Eban stated that he had conveyed a reply to the President's message to Prime Minister Ben Gurion. He would appreciate our comments when we had studied it. The key sentences were those stating Israel's willingness to withdraw from Sharm el Shaikh and to evacuate military forces from Gaza.

Israel appreciated American efforts for constructive discussion in the UN. Mr. Eban had hoped that an opening could be found in the recent resolutions. The Israelis had been deeply moved by what the President and Secretary had said about Israel being a nation with a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind". He noted that these words had been uttered in the American Declaration of Independence at a time when the United States felt impelled to take forceful measures against an established order, and when France was America's only ally. Mr. Eban did not wish to criticize but he deplored statements about sanctions. There was, after all, no formal proposal for sanctions before the United Nations. Israel believed that sanctions were neither legally nor morally justified. He hoped that the United States would show a constructive approach. He stated that when proposals came before the United Nations which were offensive to the dignity and honor of the United States, Israel's representatives did not even bother to consult their Government before opposing them.

Very little time had passed since the passage of the two resolutions on February 2. In that sense the Israelis had approached the Secretary General to ask whether Egypt agreed to mutual and full abstention from belligerent acts by land, air and sea on the withdrawal of Israeli troops. They had also asked the Secretary General to clarify whether immediately on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Sharm el Shaikh, units of the UNEF would be

328800

CONFIDENTIAL

stationed

GPO 912677

674,84A/2-857

674,84A/2-857
A/38

FILED
APR 30 1957

stationed along the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba, in order to act as a restraint against hostile acts and would remain so deployed until another effective means was agreed upon between the parties concerned for ensuring permanent freedom of navigation and the absence of belligerent acts in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

A declaration of non-belligerency by Egypt was necessary. The Secretary-General had indicated the importance of the non-assertion of belligerent rights. If Israel could secure Egyptian non-belligerency then its attitude would change. Israel thought the Secretary-General had an obligation to try to obtain such a declaration. Mr. Murphy asked if Mr. Eban felt that perhaps the Secretary-General might believe that if Israel forces were withdrawn, Egypt would not resist the deployment of the UMF. Mr. Eban replied that the Secretary-General would not tell him this; that the Secretary-General had said he would not answer until Israel had indicated whether it would accept the stationing of UN troops at points over 200 miles away from Aqaba. Egypt's attitude on this question would have a close relationship to the Armistice Agreement. Israel maintained that the Armistice Agreement was inoperative because Egypt had illegally reconciled it with belligerency. If Egypt would now declare non-belligerency a new and broader agreement might be worked out.

Mr. Eban said that Israel had publicly asked the Secretary-General if the UMF would move into the Straits of Tiran area upon Israel withdrawal. The Israelis had told him privately that if he said "yes" to this question, Israel forces would be withdrawn the next day. If the Secretary-General thought that Egyptian consent was necessary, he should at least seek such consent. The Israelis had liked the approach of Ambassador Lodge on this matter in his remarks before the General Assembly.

The next step could be the withdrawal of Israel troops from Gaza, leaving the non-military Israeli elements in the strip. If the UN would come out and investigate the situation in the strip they would not recommend severing the natural ties which existed and were being developed between Israel and the Gaza Strip.

The Secretary-General had insisted that Israel state whether it would accept in principle the stationing of the UMF on Israel soil. The question was so broad that lengthy constitutional consultation would be required in Israel before it could be answered. He could not acknowledge that a reply to this question was a prerequisite to further action.

Mr. Eban recapitulated the four stages in which this matter should be handled: 1) an Egyptian declaration of non-belligerency; 2) withdrawal of Israel forces from Aqaba and their replacement by the UMF; 3) withdrawal of Israel military elements from Gaza; 4) a UN arrangement for Gaza in which Israel civil elements would operate under UN supervision. He had urged that the Secretary-General go to the area and conduct further negotiations on these points in the two interested capitals. The Secretary-General had not rejected this suggestion.

Mr. Murphy stated that we had just received Mr. Ben-Gurion's letter to which the Secretary was giving careful study. Our position has been that Israel was in the breach and should withdraw its forces. A feeling was develop-
ing here

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

anywhere that if Israel withdrew, the United States would want to manifest its intention to do the best it could with respect to the Agaba issue and free passage. Israel's position regarding Gaza was more complicated. He did not see how the United States position would work out. He asked which of these two Israel considered more important. Mr. Eban avoided a clear answer on this point, but said that since Agaba was easier it should be tackled first, and a solution of Agaba would be helpful in Gaza.

Mr. Murphy indicated that the Secretary might wish to discuss this matter further with the Ambassador. Mr. Eban asked that the Secretary consider the schedule he had set forth.

Mr. Murphy asked what would happen in the Knesset if the Israel Prime Minister announced that Israel would withdraw. Mr. Eban thought that this question was hypothetical. If Israel thought that assurances regarding freedom of navigation would be forthcoming, the Prime Minister could withdraw Israel forces. Otherwise, such an action would be frivolous. Mr. Murphy asked what kind of assurances Israel would require. Mr. Eban replied assurances that the UNEF would remain at Sharm el Shaikh until a more permanent arrangement could be found. Mr. Murphy asked on what basis the UNEF could be kept there. Mr. Shiloah interjected that an assurance from the United States that it would act to prevent blockade of the Straits would be adequate. Such an assurance would not even have to be made public, as Ben Gurion would find ways of conveying his resulting feeling of security to the Israel people without mentioning it. Mr. Eban returned to Mr. Murphy's question and said that the matter might be solved by obtaining an Egyptian assurance that it would not remount guns at Sharm el Shaikh and provision for some kind of UN observation to see that they did not in fact do so.

Mr. Murphy asked what Israel would like the United States to do at this point. Mr. Eban replied that we should ask the Secretary General to try to negotiate this matter, to keep it from going back to the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Secretary General should also be persuaded to see the wisdom of handling these problems by stages.

MA:EE:DCBergus:arc
2/8/57

CONFIDENTIAL

February 26, 1957

General
Files

Dear Senator Javits:

I have received the letter of February 8, 1957, signed by you and Senator Ives commenting on the report that consideration is being given in the General Assembly of the United Nations for action calling for economic sanctions against Israel unless it withdraws its forces of occupation from the Gaza Strip and the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba.


As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. Events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that I have felt it exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be accurate or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, that the President and I were anxious to meet last week with Members of the Congressional leadership in order to discuss together, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As I said at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many Members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone this would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist, and that the whole fabric of peace will be torn apart.

I think, also, that the President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the Members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel

that

The Honorable
Jacob Javits,
United States Senate.



574.84A/2-857

CS/J
674.84A/2-857

that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far Israel apparently has felt that those assurances were not sufficient. However, I am still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. I have discussed this further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw in reliance of the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may feel that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated withdrawal resolutions.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

RLO'C
H:RLO'Connor:fg 2-26-57
S:JFDulles:ma:mlr 2-25-57

*Letter held by
H. Kessinger
2/27/57*
Cleared by H. - Mr. Hill

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 11, 1957

NEA - Mr. Oulashin

For preparation by Wednesday,
February 13, of a reply to be signed
by Mr. Hill. Please send me a copy
for S/S files.

R. Sturgill
S/S-RO
Ext. 5261

Att: Ltr fm Senators Ives & Javits
re possibility of sanctions vs.
Israel.

cc: H - Mr. Forsten

*Rept. Ind. Dept.
H.C. Berg
2-15-57*

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

February 6, 1957

Honorable John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

It is clear that the United States is, this very weekend, considering its position with respect to any resolution imposing sanctions on Israel which might be voted by the United Nations. Indeed it is fair to say that the position of the United States is likely to determine whether any such resolution will be voted at all.

We believe that it would be a serious error of policy to vote sanctions against Israel because it will run contrary to the basic principle of enforcing international law upon which we have been proceeding since hostilities first broke out on October 29, 1956.

We are agreed that Israel has basic responsibilities to the United Nations---which indeed was so important in bringing Israel into being---but so does Egypt which is also a member of the United Nations and receiving its help.

It is a basic principle of international law that to be entitled to aid from international organs, a nation must, itself, come in with "clean hands". This is also a fundamental principle of the law in the United States. An especial beneficiary, if sanctions were voted against Israel, would be Egypt, and Egypt is and has been in violation of the letter and spirit of the United Nations' resolutions and of the United Nations' Charter. Hence, our country would be compromising the fundamental principle upon which it proceeded in backing the United Nations General Assembly's Cease Fire Resolution of November 2, 1956; the second Cease Fire Resolution of November 4, 1956, and the resolutions of November 7, 1956, November 24, 1956, January 19, 1957, and February 1, 1957, if it voted for sanctions against Israel while Egypt remained in violation of equally valid United Nations decisions.

Reports which have every indication of being authoritative state that arms shipments by the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc to Egypt have begun again. This is in direct contravention of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution of November 2, 1956, which "recommends that all members refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostility and, in general, refrain from any acts which would delay or

S/S for preparation
1957

74-84712-857

677440/2857

APR 3-1957
FILED

320-51892

WPA
2
C

prevent the implementation of this resolution"; indeed, the Soviet Union and the whole Communist bloc voted for the resolution. The second Cease Fire Resolution on November 4, 1956, authorized the Secretary General immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for "the halting of the movement of military forces and arms into the Area", but the making to and the receipt of arms shipments by Egypt at this time would be clearly in direct violation of these provisions of the United Nations General Assembly resolution.

In addition, Egypt continues its often expressed refusal to comply with the United Nations Security Council's resolution of September 1, 1951, requiring it to cease interdiction of Israel's shipping through the Suez Canal. Reliable reports also make it clear that Egypt refuses to give necessary assurances guaranteeing transit through the Suez Canal to the shipping of France and the United Kingdom, when traffic movements are restored, thereby refusing to comply with the six principles for the operation of the Suez Canal which were adopted by the United Nations Security Council on October 13, 1956 with Egypt's concurrence.

Egypt, in contravention of the United Nations Charter and of the Arab-Israel Armistice Agreements of February, 1949, arranged under United Nations auspices, insists upon the right to maintain a state of belligerency against Israel thereby refusing to give assurances of the passage of shipping of all nations, including Israel's, through the international waters of the Gulf of Aqaba.


The question right now in the Middle East is whether there shall be impartial justice in the enforcement of United Nations resolutions. In addition to the argument made by our colleague, Senator Knowland, which certainly has considerable logic, that United Nations resolutions demanding that Soviet forces withdraw from Hungary should equally be enforced by sanctions, we believe that impartial justice dictates that our government should not back sanctions against Israel so long as Egypt remains in default and defiance of United Nations resolutions.

We believe it clear that impartial justice in the situation of Israel and Egypt dictates that our Government should not back sanctions against Israel. Our Government should insist that there be appropriate and effective guarantees against the interdiction of shipping contrary to international law and against new guerilla raids into Israel territory, striking at its very national survival as an essential condition precedent to enforcement of United Nations resolutions against Israel. After all these were the very conditions so widely regarded as the serious provocations which brought on Israel's original action.

Indeed, there will be no occasion for sanctions if a reasonable plan of this kind is adopted.

The United States should not be pressing the issue of sanctions now. Rather, in the words of the President, we should expect that all parties will have "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind" and we should back to the hilt negotiations to accomplish the results of obtaining those guarantees which France, Britain and Israel should have as to Egypt's future course in Suez and Sinai and which seem generally proper to about everybody except a very few intransigent Arab states.

Respectfully,


Irving M. Ives, U.S.S.


Jacob K. Javits, U.S.S.

February 26, 1957

Dear Senator Ives:

I have received the letter of February 8, 1957, signed by you and Senator Javits commenting on the report that consideration is being given in the General Assembly of the United Nations for action calling for economic sanctions against Israel unless it withdraws its forces of occupation from the Gaza Strip and the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba.


As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. Events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that I have felt it exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, that the President and I were anxious to meet last week with Members of the Congressional leadership in order to discuss together, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As I said at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many Members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to concede this would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist, and that the whole fabric of peace will be torn apart.

I think, also, that the President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the Members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel

that

The Honorable
Irving M. Ives,
United States Senate.



674.84A/2-357

67484A/2-357
CS/R

that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far Israel apparently has felt that these assurances were not sufficient. However, I am still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. I have discussed this further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw in reliance of the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may feel that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated withdrawal resolutions.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

*Lets delete
A. Manning 2/27/57*

Bha'c
H:RLO Connor:fg
S:JFDulles:ma

2-25-57

Cleared with Mr. Hill (H)

February 26, 1957

In reply refer to
IO:UNP 674.84A/2-857

Dear Senator Potter:

I have received your communication of February 8, 1957, acknowledged by telephone on February 15, 1957, transmitting a telegram dated February 7, 1957, from Rabbi Leon Fran, President, Michigan Council, American Jewish Congress, expressing his concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given

important

The Honorable
Charles E. Potter,
United States Senate.

Central
Files

74.84.15-857

Not Be Returned to

C 13

674.84A/2-857

DC/R
2
Anal
Rev
Dat

important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

The telegram from Rabbi Fram is returned for your records, a copy having been made for the files of the Department.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

as stated.

IO:UNP:Beck:lmr 2/26/57

H-WF-X

7717

ACTION
is assigned to



*acknowledged
completes
2-15
B*

United States Senate

Washington, D. C., February 8, 1957

Respectfully referred to

Honorable Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary of State
for Congressional Relations
Washington 25, D. C.

For your information.



674.84A/2-857

MAR 26 1957

FILED

A/29

encl. wire dtd Feb. 7, 1957,
fr Rabbi Leon Fram, Pres.
Mich. Council Am. Jewish
Congress, 163 Madison
Detroit 26, Michigan

Charles E. Hill

U. S. S.

323346

AC/E
29
5
Class
Not Made

*encl att
ac*

JOHN D. DINGELL
15TH DIST., MICHIGAN

7719

COMMITTEES:
PUBLIC WORKS
MERCHANT MARINE AND
FISHERIES

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

ACTION
is assigned to

IO

February 8, 1957

acknowledged
by phone 2/10 7:10
DP

R/R

Honorable John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.


Dear Mr. Secretary:

I urge you to instruct the United States Delegation to the United Nations to oppose the sanctions against Israel. Because Israel seeks to remain in the Gaza Strip and in the Aqaba area until such time as she is given sufficient guaranties against Egyptian attacks from those areas, and is guaranteed peaceful access to the Straits of Tiran an international waterway.

I am sure you can appreciate that to prevent sanctions against Israel for seeking to preserve peace in the area would be immoral. We can consider the fact that the United Nations and the United States have taken no steps to place sanctions against Russia for her action in Hungary, and against India for its ruthless seizure of Kashmir without regard for the wishes of the people who live in those areas.

Sincerely yours,

John D. Dingell
John D. Dingell
Member of Congress



FILED

FEB 7 - 1957

674.84A/2-857

674.84A/2-857
A/35

K

DD/R

Att 1-35

323347

Rev 9

*Good
Sheet*

two copies (and its
micro-
records)

February 26, 1957

Mr.
Dear Senator Dingell:

I have received your letter of February 8 addressed to the Secretary, acknowledged by telephone on February 15, 1957, expressing your concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still

hopeful

DC/R

Anal 2

The Honorable

John D. Dingell,

~~United States Senator~~

House of Representatives

674.84A/2-857

CS/R

674.84A/2-857

hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

IO:UNP:FC:Hayley:scp
2/26/57

H-WF-X

FORM DS-18b

5-19-50

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROUTING & REFERENCE SLIP

DATE

DIV. OR OFFICE

UNP

REMARKS:

INITIAL

TO	NAME
1	ADAMS
2	DE PALMA
	OWSLEY
	SISCO
3	<i>W. J. ...</i>
	BANE
	BAKER
	BOCK
	CRAMER
	GOUGH
	LUDLOW
	MARCUS
	SPIERS
	TYLER
	PEARCE

THADDEUS M. MACHROWICZ
FIRST DISTRICT
MICHIGAN

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.
1957 FEB 11 PM 4 20

7726
7020

COMMITTEE:
WAYS AND MEANS

ACTION
is assigned to



RECEIVED
CURRENT RECORDS
BRANCH

February 8, 1957

Honorable John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.



Dear Mr. Secretary:

It is with great concern that I, as many other members of Congress, hear of the possible support to be given by the United States delegation to the United Nations to sanctions proposed against Isreal for failure to comply with the United Nations request to remove its troops from the Aquaba and Gaza strip areas in Egypt.

Though Isreal has refused to comply with the request, it has clearly indicated its intention to comply upon receipt of safeguards against renewed Egyptian hostility in this area. In view of the record of Egyptian invasions, of anti-Isreal activity in Egypt and of its failure to permit passage of Isreal ships through the Suez canal, the fears of Isreal of the consequences of such removal appear to be justified.

In view of the good faith already shown by Isreal in the withdrawal of its troops from the rest of Egypt, it is difficult to understand why, before contemplating sanctions, pressure is not brought to bear upon Egypt to compel her to give such reasonable and justifiable assurances.

The failure of our government to actively oppose sanctions against Isreal at this time would not only be unwise politically, it would be completely unjust and immoral, not only for the reasons stated above, but because of our failure to demand sanctions against Soviet Russia for its refusal to comply with United Nations decisions in Hungary. Such weakness and vacillation on our part can only undermine our prestige and that of the United Nations. It would increase the doubts of the peoples of small nations fighting for their liberty, in our integrity and sincerity. It would not contribute to the cause of

peace

323348

674.84A/2-857

A/35

674.84A/2-857

Ans 1

Rev

35

9

Chase
Shel

Hon. John Foster Dulles (2)

peace in the Near East or anywhere in the world.

Only by insistence on a fair and full solution of the basic problems undermining peace in the Near East, can we contribute to the cause of justice and world security.

Hoping that our delegation to the United Nations will proceed along such lines, I am,

Yours very respectfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Thaddeus M. Machrowicz'. The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name 'Thaddeus' being more prominent and the last name 'Machrowicz' following in a similar style.

Thaddeus M. Machrowicz, MC

TMM/j

February 26, 1957.

In reply refer to
SEV 674.84A/2-857

Dear Mr. Machrowicz:

I refer to your letter of February 8 to Secretary Dulles concerning sanctions against Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released

on February 17,

The Honorable
Thaddeus M. Machrowicz,
House of Representatives.

Central
Files

This Document is to be Returned to

674.84A/2-357

52

674.84A/2-857
CS/R

on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interest would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

2
P:SEV:CPeterson:DKP:ac

2/27/57

H- ROC

WF-X

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

53-Lf
Action

IO

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

NEA

ARA

FE

L

R

O

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 695, FEBRUARY 9, 4 PM

PRIORITY

RE PALESTINE- ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

LOUTFI (EGYPT) SHOWED US TEXT OF RES EGYPTIANS CONSIDERING WHICH CALLS FOR SANCTIONS IN TERMS SIMILAR TO RES ADOPTED BGA ON KOREA.

HE SAID THEY ARE ALSO THINKING HOWEVER OF USING LANGUAGE BASED ON DRAFT RES INTRODUCED BY US IN SC ON UK, FRENCH, ISRAELI AGGRESSION ON ASSUMPTION SUCH LANGUAGE WOULD BE EASIER FOR US TO GO ALONG WITH.

LOUTFI ASKED WHAT OUR VIEWS WERE ON SPONSORSHIP. WE TOLD HIM WE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS.

LOUTFI SAID IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO HOLD PLENARY ON MIDDLE EAST NEXT TUESDAY AND THAT SYG WOULD PROBABLY SUBMIT REPORT ON MONDAY.

LODGE

GEV



MAY 28 1959

FILED

CLASSIFIED FILE

674.34A/2-957

PA

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED.

Form DS-24
6-21-45

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

INTERDEPARTMENTAL REFERENCE

DATE

2/11

RESPECTFULLY REFERRED TO

RMR

RE:-

WRITER ☐ HAS ☐ HAS NOT BEEN INFORMED
OF THIS REFERENCE


COMMENTS:

Kindly reproduce
and distribute,
including one
additional
copy to UNP.

NE-4Hoffacher

SIGNATURE

DIVISION



CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 9, 1957

SUBJECT: I. I. Interest in Several Middle East Developments

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. J. A. Coulson, Minister, British Embassy

Mr. Lampton Berry, Deputy Assistant Secretary, IIA
Mr. Lewis Hoffacker, III

COPIES TO: A(2 cc), IB(2 cc), IR(cc), IA(cc), UAF(cc), OLI(2), London(1)

6
11 FEB 18 1957

Mr. Coulson, calling at his request, registered British concern over the possibility of a General Assembly Resolution calling for sanctions against Israel. He said that any resolution which dwelt solely with that aspect of the Middle East situation would be most difficult to support, principally because of British public opinion considerations. His Government, therefore, was considering the possibility of encouraging debate which would lead to a more "comprehensive and balanced" resolution. Such a resolution might note once again Israeli non-compliance with previous General Assembly resolutions, might indicate that the General Assembly may be obliged to consider measures beyond those already taken to ensure compliance, might direct that the UNLF be stationed at such points of the Israel-Egyptian frontier as Al Buja, might cite reports of new shipments of Soviet arms to Egypt, and might call on Israel and Egypt to deny their intention to exercise rights of a belligerent.

Mr. Coulson said that the above represented the tentative thinking of his Government on the subject and that the U.K., in any case, would not wish to take the initiative in proposing such a debate or resolution.

Mr. Berry said that this subject was being urgently considered this morning by the Secretary and others and that he therefore was not able to give the U. S. attitude on it. Speaking personally, he said that there was some hope that the Secretary General might find it possible to make a carefully worded statement which would indicate that satisfactory assurances had been given to him by the Israel and Egyptian Governments, thereby creating an atmosphere in which Israel would be able to withdraw with some grace.

Mr. Coulson

CONFIDENTIAL

GPO 912677

674.84A/2-957

CSELK

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

674.84A/2-957

320-5780
774.56

Mr. Boulson asked whether the U. S. had definite information on reports of renewed Soviet arms deliveries to Egypt. Mr. Perry said that he had no hard intelligence which could, for example, be presented to the UN as solid evidence. He had, however, received reports that Soviet ships have recently unloaded at Alexandria cases which might or might not contain arms. Mr. Perry agreed to pass on to Mr. Boulson such positive evidence of renewed shipments as might be available in the future.

Mr. Boulson asked about the status of talks with the Iraqi on their arms requests. It was Mr. Perry's understanding that the Iraqi Vice Chief of Staff was continuing conversations with the Department of Defense and that it was hoped that the members of the Iraqi mission now in the U. S. could be given an encouraging reply prior to their departure, now scheduled for February 16.

Mr. Perry asked whether London had concurred in the tentative U. S. resolution on Kashmir. Mr. Boulson was not informed on the subject, but agreed to look into the matter and communicate with Mr. Perry.

There followed a general review of the Cyprus issue.

W: M: L: Hoffacker:erc

2/9/57

JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA., CHAIRMAN
 RUSSELL B. LONG, LA.
 HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.
 GEORGE A. SMATHERS, FLA.
 JOHN F. KENNEDY, MASS.
 JAMES O. EASTLAND, MISS.
 WAYNE MORSE, OREG.
 EDWARD J. THYE, MINN.
 LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, MASS.
 ANDREW F. SCHOEPPLE, KANS.
 JAMES H. DUFF, PA.
 BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
 THOMAS H. KUCHEL, CALIF.


WALTER B. STULTS, STAFF DIRECTOR
 LEWIS G. ODOM, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS
 (CREATED PURSUANT TO S. RES. 59, 81ST CONGRESS)

February 9, 1957

ACTION
 is assigned to



7716

The Honorable John Foster Dulles
 The Secretary of State
 Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have been very much concerned with the press reports of the last few days to the effect that the United States would most likely recommend in the United Nations the invoking of economic sanctions against Israel because of that country's failure to abide by the provisions of a recent UN resolution.

I strongly believe that UN resolutions should be obeyed by the member nations. However, I believe that the application of the rules should be uniform.

It is my understanding that there has been outstanding for several years a resolution of the UN calling upon Egypt to cease its belligerence and also to permit Israel's ships to pass without molestation. Egypt certainly has not carried out the terms of that resolution. I cannot see the justice or the logic of imposing sanctions on one and not on the other.

Other nations can be named who have disregarded terms of UN resolutions against whom we have not advocated any action. I name Israel and Egypt at the present time, however, for the simple reason that they are two nations involved in the present controversy.

I strongly urge that our position in the United Nations be one of like treatment for all nations.

Sincerely,

John Sparkman
 John Sparkman

This letter (and its enclosures, if any) microfilm for the NCR records

323344

674.84A/2-957

FILED

MAR 11 1957

A/29

674.84A/2-957

OC/R
 29
 5
 class
 Outmade

In reply refer to:
IO:UNP:674.84A/2-957

February 26, 1957

Dear Senator Sparkman:

I have received your letter of February 9 addressed to the Secretary, acknowledged by telephone on February 18, expressing concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was

released

The Honorable
John Sparkman,
United States Senate.

DC/R

Anal 2

Rev

Cat NF

This Document was Returned to
Central
Files

674.84A/2-957

674.84A/2-957
CS/R

released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

The views expressed in your letter are appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

11 - W F - X

IO:UNP:EvPagehardt:rs
2/20/57

7718

*acknowledged
on phone 2/15
- B*

ACTION
is assigned to



HL

RAA

*Letter to
Congressman
Thornberry
Feb 26*

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

February 9, 1957


Secretary
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Sir:

The attached communication
is sent for your consideration.
Please investigate the statements
contained therein and forward me
the necessary information for re-
ply, returning the enclosed corre-
spondence with your answer.

Yours truly,

Homer Thornberry
Homer Thornberry, M. C.
Jim [unclear]



#12

674.84A/2-957

A/29

AC/E
encl 39
rev 9
in class
[unclear]

Encl 39

323345

This letter (and its
enclosures, if any) micro-
filmed for FBI/R records

In reply refer to
IO:UNP: 674.84A/2-957

February 26, 1957

11163

Dear Mrs. Griffiths:

I have received your communication of February 9, 1957, addressed to the Secretary, acknowledged by telephone on February 15, 1957, transmitting a telegram, dated February 7, 1957, from Rabbi Leon Fram, President, Michigan Council, American Jewish Congress, expressing his concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only

The Honorable
Martha F. Griffiths,
House of Representatives.

DC/R

Anal 2

Rev

Cat W

374.84A/2-957

674.84A/2-957

effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

The telegram from Rabbi Fran is returned as requested, a copy having been made for the files of the Department.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

H-WF-X

ACTION
is assigned to



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U. S.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

7880

*acknowledged in
phone call
BY*

February 9, 1957

Respectfully referred to

Honorable John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington 25, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Attached is self-explanatory telegram from Rabbi Leon Fram, President of the Michigan Council American Jewish Congress, 163 Madison, Detroit 26, Michigan, urging you to instruct the U. S. Delegation at the United Nations, to oppose sanction against Israel.

Please reply to me over your own signature, returning the telegram with your reply.

674.84A/2-957

MAR 27 1957

FILED

Very respectfully,

Martha W. Griffiths
MARTHA W. GRIFFITHS, MC.

M. C., 17th District.
(Mich.)



674.84A/2-957

DC/R
Anel <u>39</u>
Rev <u>40</u>
Cat <u>41</u>

323465

This is a micro-
enclosure of records

A/39

NND 897403
BOX 2677

(13A)
1/5/C

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 674.84a/2-1057
Tel 941
Date 2/10/57
From Tel Aviv
To Sec State

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

- ☒ Security-Classified Information
☐ Otherwise Restricted Information

State
Authority

1/4/89
Date

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

(13A)

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION
SECRET AFFAIRS

51-L
Action
IO

Info
RMR

SS
G
SP
C
EUR
NEA
L
R
O

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 700, FEBRUARY 10, 7 P.M.

PRIORITY

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

FOR SECRETARY AND WILSON FROM LODGE

RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

FOLLOWING IS DETAILED REPORT OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN LODGE
AND SYG RE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, MAIN POINTS OF WHICH CONVEYED
TO SECRETARY BY LODGE ON SUNDAY.

LODGE GAVE SYG INFORMAL MEMO CONTAINING MATERIAL TELEPHONED
TO US SUNDAY AFTERNOON. AFTER READING IT ALOUD, HAMMARSKJOLD,
BUNCHE AND CORDIER ALL SAID IT WAS VERY GOOD. CORDIER EMPHASIZED
LAST PARA OF MEMO PARTICULARLY GOOD.

SYG FOCUSED ON PARA 3, SECTION 2. HE ASKED WHAT IT MEANT.
BUNCHE ASKED "DOES IT IMPLY USE OF FORCE BY US IN EXERCISING
RIGHT OF FREE PASSAGE?" LODGE RESPONDED HE WAS NOT AWARE
WE CONTEMPLATED USE OF FORCE. CORDIER SAID NOBODY WILL
INTERFERE WITH US VESSELS AND THEREFORE THIS WAS NOT TEST
CASE; TEST WOULD COME WITH RESPECT OTHER VESSELS.

SYG RAISED QUESTION OF ISRAELI GUN BOATS. HE SAID THERE
ARE THREE GUN BOATS IN GULF NOW. HE HOPED ISRAEL WAS WISE
ENOUGH TO GET THEM OUT BEFORE WITHDRAWAL ITS FORCES FROM
SHARM EL SHEIKH; OTHERWISE, AFTER WITHDRAWAL, PUTTING WARSHIPS
THROUGH STRAITS WOULD NOT BE INNOCENT PASSAGE IN TERRITORIAL
WATERS.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID IF ISRAEL WITHDRAWS FROM BOTH GAZA AND
SHARM

SECRET

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

This document must be returned
to the RM/R central files

674.84A/2-1C57

SECRET FILE

674.84A/2-1C57



FILED
MAY 28 1959

SECRET

22. DELGA TOO, FEBRUARY 10, 7 P.M. FROM NEW YORK

SHARM EL-SHEIKH, EGYPT WILL DO NOTHING IN STRAITS; IT WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH FREEDOM OF PASSAGE OR EXERCISE RIGHTS OF BELLIGERENCE, ALTHOUGH IT WILL NOT SAY SO. (SYG/SAID "PROMINENT ARAB", LATER IDENTIFIED TO BE RIFAI OF JORDAN, HAD TOLD HIM, WHEN RIFAI PRESENTED ARABS' VIEWS TO SYG LAST WEEK, THAT LAST 2 RESOLUTIONS MADE IT, AS PRACTICAL MATTER, IMPOSSIBLE FOR EGPT TO EXERCISE RIGHT OF BELLIGERENCE IN STRAITS.) IF ISRAEL GETS OUT OF SHARM EL-SHEIKH ONLY, THEN EGYPT IS LIKELY TO ASSERT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE UNDER ART 51 OF CHARTER AND RESTRICT ISRAELI PASSAGE.

LOPEC SAID WE FELT US APPROACH CONSTITUTED SUFFICIENT ASSURANCE FOR ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW. HAMMARSKJOLD RESPONDED "I HOPE YOU ARE RIGHT BUT I DOUBT THEY WILL GET OUT". HAMMARSKJOLD HAD SAID EARLIER IN CONVERSATION HE DID NOT BELIEVE ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW AS RESULT OF US DEMARCHE. HE FEELS THAT ONLY BEN GURION'S RESIGNATION WOULD PERMIT ISRAELIS TO GET OUT SINCE BEN GURION'S ENTIRE POLITICAL FUTURE IS DEPENDENT UPON HIS STRONG POLITICAL RESISTANCE. HAMMARSKJOLD DOES NOT BELIEVE ISRAELIS WILL GET OUT EITHER. BUT HE DOES NOT SHARE SYG'S VIEW ON THIS POINT. HE BELIEVES ISRAELIS CAN AFFORD TO WITHSTAND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. IF ISRAELIS THEN DECIDE TO FORFEIT THEIR ECONOMIC ASSETS, THEY WOULD GET OUT NEXT DAY WITHOUT SANCTIONS EVER GOING INTO EFFECT. HE BELIEVES, IF SANCTIONS WERE BY CA AND US SUPPORTS THEM AND WEST GERMANY WITHHOLD REPARATION PAYMENTS, ISRAEL WILL BE FORCED TO WITHDRAW.

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID ATROLAGIANS WANT FLEET MEETING ON WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON. HE SAID HE WOULD SPEAK TO JAWZI TODAY AND INFORM HIM OF US EFFORTS. HAMMARSKJOLD MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE JAWZI OR ATROLAGIANS WOULD AGREE TO FURTHER DELAY IN CA CONSIDERATION SINCE THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL DELAYS THIS PAST WEEK. HE BRIEFLY SHOWED US REPORT WHICH HE INTENDS MAKE TO CA WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS "BRAKES ON" REPORT AND "MILDLY ADMONISHING" CA AS TO SANCTIONS. HE READ IN LANGUAGE WHICH HE SAID REQUIRED FOR ISRAEL SUFFICIENT GUARANTEE TO WARRANT THEIR WITHDRAWAL. HE READ TO US SENTENCE WHICH STATES BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO OBSERVE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND THAT "EGPT HAS REAFFIRMED ITS INTENTION TO OBSERVE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ON ASSUMPTION THAT OBSERVANCE WOULD BE RECIPROCAL". HAMMARSKJOLD

SECRET

SECRET

-3- DELGA 700, FEBRUARY 10, 7 P.M. FROM NEW YORK

HAMMARSKJOLD SAID IF HE CAN GET A POSTPONEMENT OF GA TO THURSDAY THEN HE MIGHT DECIDE TO DELAY MAKING PUBLIC HIS REPORT. AS OF NOW, IF GA MEETS TUESDAY AFTERNOON, HE INTENDS TO MAKE HIS REPORT ON MONDAY. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION, HE LATER SAID IT MIGHT BE GOOD IDEA TO PUT OUT HIS REPORT ON MONDAY IN ANY EVENT, SINCE IT MIGHT PROVIDE FAWZI WITH EXCUSE NOT TO PRESS FOR A MEETING ON TUESDAY ON GROUND THAT SYG'S REPORT NEEDED CAREFUL STUDY. HAMMARSKJOLD FELT IF HE WAS NOT ABLE TO POSTPONE GA UNTIL THURSDAY, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE MEETING ON TUESDAY AFTERNOON LIMITED TO SPEECHES ONLY. WE POINTED OUT THAT EGYPT AND INDIA ARE PRESSING SEVEN CO-SPONSORS TO DEVELOP COMMON APPROACH AND THIS COULD HELP STALL OF INITIATIVE FROM OTHER QUARTERS FOR RESOLUTION ON TUESDAY.

SYG WAS SEEING EBAN, PEARSON AND ENGEN SEPARATELY LATE SUNDAY AFTERNOON. HE REPORTED ON CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH PINEAU YESTERDAY IN WHICH LATTER APOLOGIZED FOR TONE WHICH FRENCH PRESS HAS BEEN TAKING AGAINST SYG AND THAT IN GERMANY FRENCH GOVT HAD INTERFERED IN LATTER STAGE OF ALGERIA CR.

HAMMARSKJOLD MENTIONED TWO OTHER POINTS NOT DIRECTLY RELEVANT TO OUR DEMARCHE. HE SAID IT IS CLEAR MASSER WOULD LIKE TO HAVE TALKS ON CANA SETTLEMENT IN CAIRO BECAUSE HE PERSONALLY WOULD LIKE TO HANDLE THEM. HAMMARSKJOLD REPORTED PINEAU WAS GENERALLY FAVORABLE TO IDEA OF TALKS TAKING PLACE IN CAIRO. HOWEVER, SYG CANNOT UNDERTAKE THIS IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE IN VIEW OF PRESENT PROBLEMS CONFRONTING HIM. DIRECTLY RELATED TO QUESTION OF TALKS IN CAIRO IS INVITATION FOR HAMMARSKJOLD GO TO JERUSALEM. HE SAID MRS. MEIR HAD INVITED HIM IN JANUARY AND EBAN HAD FOLLOWED UP THIS INVITATION BY SPEAKING IT OUT TO PRESS AND BY PRESSING HIM STRONGLY. HE INTENDS TELL EBAN THIS AFTERNOON THAT, IN VIEW OF STATE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND MASS MEETINGS IN ISRAEL, HE COULD NOT ACCEPT SUCH AN INVITATION. HAMMARSKJOLD MADE IT CLEAR HE FELT THAT DEMONSTRATIONS IN ISRAEL HAD BEEN PLACED. PUNCHER PARENTHETICALLY COMMENTED THIS WAS SAME PATTERN WHICH WAS FOLLOWED JUST PRIOR TO ASSASSINATION OF BERENADOFF. SYG SHOWED US BRIEF REPORT FROM COL LEARY WHICH SAID CROWDS WERE NOT AS LARGE AND AS EXHUBERANT AS PRESS MADE THEM OUT TO BE AND THAT, IN FACT, CONSIDERABLE NUMBERS HAD LEFT BEFORE END OF SPEECHES. HE ALSO SHOWED US PRESS TICKER

PCM

SECRET FILE

SECRET

SECRET

DELGA 00, FEBRUARY 10, 7 P.M. FROM NEW YORK

FROM TEL AVIV NOT COVERED IN PRESS STORIES WE HAVE SEEN ON SUBJECT, DIRECTLY ATTACKING SYG IN STRONG LANGUAGE AND CALLING FOR HIS RESIGNATION.

SYG ALSO MENTIONED REASONS WHY HE DOES NOT FEEL HE COULD SUBMIT ISRAELI QUESTION RE FREEDOM OF PASSAGE AQABA TO EGYPTIANS. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID NO GOVERNMENT COULD ANSWER "YES" TO THIS QUESTION WHEN ANOTHER GOVERNMENT IS IN OCCUPATION OF ITS TERRITORY. SUCH A RESPONSE WOULD BE MADE APPEAR AS CONDITION AND RESPONSE UNDER DURESS. HIS CONCLUSION IS THAT ISRAEL WANTED NEGATIVE RESPONSE FROM EGYPTIANS AND THAT, BY ASKING SYG TO PUT QUESTION TO EGYPTIANS, ISRAELIS WERE SEEKING EXCUSE FOR MAINTAINING THEIR POSITION BOTH IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND GAZA. SYG HAS TOLD ISRAELIS THEY CANNOT REQUIRE ACTION UNDER RES 11 WHICH WOULD NEGATE RES 1. SYG BELIEVES THAT SITUATION WOULD BE EVEN WORSE THAN IT IS NOW IF HE HAD PUT QUESTION TO EGYPT AS REQUESTED BY ISRAEL. SINCE THIS WOULD HAVE PROVOKED EGYPTIANS.

FOLLOWING ARE CONCRETE CHANGES SUGGESTED BY HAMMARSKJOLD IN MEMORANDUM:

IN PARA 2 AFTER WORD "UNITED NATIONS" ADD PHRASE "NOT INCLUDING, HOWEVER, STATIONING OF UNEF IN GAZA STRIP;" THIS CHANGE WAS SUGGESTED BECAUSE OUR PARA 2 AS IT STANDS DOES NOT ACCURATELY REFLECT ISRAELI POSITION AS MADE PUBLIC BY ISRAELI PEPs IN GA. ISRAELIS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THEY DO NOT FAVOR UNEF FORCES IN GAZA STRIP.

SEC 2, PARA 4. IT SHOULD READ THAT ISRAEL WOULD WITHDRAW AND NOT MERELY ITS ARMED FORCES. RES 1 CALLED FOR WITHDRAWAL "OF ISRAEL" WHICH WOULD INCLUDE ITS CIVIL ADMINISTRATION FROM GAZA. SUGGESTION WAS THAT SENTENCE READ: "IT IS, OF COURSE, CLEAR THAT THE ENJOYMENT OF A RIGHT OF FREE AND INNOCENT PASSAGE BY ISRAEL WOULD DEPEND UPON ITS PRIOR WITHDRAWAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN RES."

SAME PROBLEM ARISES IN PARA 1 OF SEC 3. IN FIRST SENTENCE CHANGE "ISRAELI FORCES" TO "ISRAEL". IN SECOND SENTENCE DELETE WORD "ARMED" AND ADD PHRASE "AND OCCUPATION" AFTER WORD "INVASION". IN ORDER BE CONSISTENT WE SUGGEST ALSO THAT WORD "MILITARY" BE DELETED IN LAST PARA OF MEMO SO THAT IT WILL READ "AN OCCUPATION IN DEFIANCE..."

LCGE

HSO

SECRET

Department of State
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATION AND
RECORDS

TO: *SA-7*

FROM: DC/R - X

Please mark this paper "File"
(and initial) if action has been
completed, and return to DC/R.
This is required under Departments
Regulations, 421.2 (Nov. 15, 1946).

Thank you,

DC/R - X
SA-7

M-189
3-14-50

ACTION
is assigned to

Los Altos, California
February 10, 1957.

Honorable John Foster Dulles, FEB 13 1957
Secretary of State
United States Government,
Washington, D.C.
RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
RM/R

SEV

674.84A/2-1057

Dear sir:

There is presently being discussed the matter of imposing sanctions against Israel unless she complies with the United Nations resolution to vacate Egyptian territory promptly. Senator Knowland has made a forceful statement in this connection which, in my opinion, reflects the attitude of the vast majority of our citizens. His demand for similar action against Russia for its attack on Hungary is undeniably fair and just.

It is quite obvious that the U.N. is operating under a double standard. It gets real tough with the little fellow who fails to obey its resolutions promptly, but maintains a discreet silence while Russia murders thousands of freedom loving Hungarians and ships thousands of young patriots to slave labor camps, all the while telling the U.N. to mind its own business. Also India and Egypt have recently defied or ignored U.N. resolutions with nothing whatsoever done about it.

I am fully cognizant of the difficult choice our Government is faced with on the question of sanctions against Israel. If we fail to support this measure we stand to lose many friends in the Arab world. However, if we vote for sanctions I fear that we stand to lose the U.N. itself, unless sanctions are also voted against the other offenders. The people of the United States have traditionally stood for fair play and will not long tolerate our membership in an organization that is completely discredited by perpetrating grave injustices born of either fear or favoritism.

Have we forgotten the thousands of young Hungarian patriots who were kidnapped and shipped to Russian slave labor camps? If there has been a single voice raised in the U.N. in their behalf in many weeks I have not read of it. What a high price they paid - and are continuing to pay every day of their tragic plight - for the failure of the U.N. to take action toward enforcing its resolutions.

May I respectfully urge that our U.N. Representative press for a policy of the same justice for the weak as for the strong. May I further suggest that at least twice each month, without surcease, a demand be made before the U.N. for the release and return of these young Hungarian martyrs. And let's urge sanctions against Russia if they are not released in a reasonable time.

Respectfully submitted,

M. M. Montgomery
M. M. Montgomery

AC/R
29
Cat

674.84A/2-1057

CSELK

FILED

674.84A/2-1057

Air Pouch
PRIORITY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

674.842/2-115

FROM : Amconsul, Haifa

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

February 11, 1957

REF : -----

18 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION NEA-4 REC'D 2/16	DEPT. RMIR-2, OLI-8, IO-4, USUN-1, 6-1 CIA-12, OSD-4, ARMY-4, NAVY-3, AIR-3, ASIA-10
-----------------------------	----------------------------------	--

SUBJECT: Demonstration in Haifa Against Evacuation of Gaza and Sharm e Sheik

As part of a country-wide series of demonstrations arranged by the Government coalition parties against U.N. policy on the Gaza Strip and Sharm e Sheik, Haifa was the scene on Saturday morning, February 9, 1957 of a comparatively small demonstration. The Consulate was given the benefit of "police protection" during this demonstration.

Following meetings in the four largest cinemas of central Haifa, a "mass rally" was held in the center of Herzl Street in mid-level Haifa where Mayor Aba KHOUSSHY, Minister of Labor M. Namir, and Minister of Interior Y. BAR-YEHUDA denounced the evil influence of "international oil trade" on U.N. actions and the "unholy alliance" between Secretary Dulles, Indian U.N. Delegate Krishna Menon and Soviet U.N. Delegate, Arkady Sobelev. France's role as an ally of Israel was praised by all speakers and cheered by the crowd. At 12:30 p.m. the crowd was asked to sing the Hatikva and dispersed quietly.

Announcements concerning the time and place of the three main demonstrations in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Haifa appeared in several Israel papers including the Jerusalem Post on Friday, February 8, 1957. (See enclosure) Despite the advance publicity given to the rallies, however, the Haifa demonstration did not appear to develop into the intense mass expression of public feeling that was evidently desired by its organizers. The crowd listening to the speakers in Herzl Street remained for the most part passive and sometimes criticized the speakers when they could not hear them clearly. Although the Jerusalem Post, in its issue of Sunday, February 10, 1957, estimated the demonstrators in Haifa at about 30,000 a member of the Consulate staff who was present believes that the number was closer to 5,000.

As the demonstration was about to begin, the Consulate which is situated nearly a mile from central Herzl Street, was

EWMBryant:mpm
REPORTER

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS

674.842/2-1157

HSS

Page 2 of
Desp. No. 41
From Haifa

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(Classification)

Page _____ of
Encl. No. _____
Desp. No. _____
From _____

surrounded by about eight members of the Israel Police Force who stationed themselves in the street outside the Consulate office and in the garden of the Principal Officer's residence. As stated above the demonstrators dispersed quietly from their gathering point in Herzl Street with no movement toward the Consulate or signs of animosity toward individual Americans.

Comment: The rally in Haifa was part of a continuing propaganda effort by the GOI to demonstrate the unity of public support for its current policy of resistance to U.N. resolutions that Israel evacuate Gaza and Sharm e Sheik. The "police guard" thrown around the Consulate during the demonstration is believed to have been placed there more as a means of impressing the Consulate with the aggressiveness and determination of the Haifa populace which did not wholly exist, than as a protection to Consulate lives and property.

Leonard R. Cowles
Leonard R. Cowles
American Consul

Enclosure: *107*

Jerusalem Post
Clipping.

cc: Amembassy, Tel Aviv

8/1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Against The Strangling Policy of The U.N.

The Government coalition parties — Mapai, Ahdut Ha'Avoda, Mapam and the Progressives — call on the People of Israel to demonstrate their protest against the U.N. resolutions which would stifle Israel, and to show their support for the Government's struggle for our rights and security.

JERUSALEM, Sat., 4.30 p.m.

ZION SQUARE

Speakers: A. Govrin, M.K.; M. Erem, M.K.; R. Arzi; M. Kol, and M. Baram.

TEL AVIV, Sat., 11 a.m.

KIKAR HAMOSHAVOT

Speakers: The Minister of Education, Z. Aranne; Aluf Yigal Alon, M.K.; Y. Yudin and G. Schocken, M.K.

After the meeting, participants will march along Allenby Road to Herbert Samuel Square.

H A I F A , Sat., 10 a.m.

Mass meetings will be addressed by members of the Government and the Knesset and public leaders in the Orah, Armon, Atzmon and Ganim cinemas.

At 11.30 a.m., a mass rally will be held outside Beit Hakranot in Rehov Herzl.

Speakers: The Minister of Labour, M. Namir, the Minister of Interior, Y. Bar-Yehuda, Mayor A. Khoushy, Y. Patish.

Come in numbers to protest against the return of the Egyptian murderers to Gaza, against yielding to Arab oil interests, to demonstrate in favour of free sea passage to Eilat and through the Suez Canal, and for peace in the Middle East.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

39

CONFIDENTIAL

Action
NEAControl: 6196
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 11
10:20 AMInfo
RMR

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

SS
G
SP
C
EUR
L
IO
UMSA
P
UOP
SCA
OLI

NO: 943, FEBRUARY 11, 9 AM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 943, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 187,
PARIS 154, ROME 86, AMMAN 165, BEIRUT 143, CAIRO 164,
DAMASCUS 117, JERUSALEM 70, USUN 45.

REFERENCE EMBTEL 932.

OCB
USIA
CIA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
ICA

CROWDS ESTIMATED BY NEWSPAPERS OF GOVERNMENT COALITION
PARTIES AS NUMBERING "HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS" ASSEMBLED
NATIONWIDE IN ISRAEL CITIES AND RURAL SETTLEMENTS SATURDAY
FOR DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS WHICH
ASK ISRAELI EVACUATION REMAINING TERRITORY TAKEN FROM
EGYPTIANS. ALL RALLIES APPARENTLY ORDERLY AND NO VIOLENCE
OF ANY KIND REPORTED IN PRESS OR OBSERVED BY EMBASSY.

DEMONSTRATION DESCRIBED AS LARGEST EVER HELD IN TEL AVIV
WITH CROWD ESTIMATED BY PRESS AT 80,000 PROBABLY ATTRACTED
NO MORE THAN 30,000 ACCORDING TO EMBASSY OBSERVER WHO SAID
PARADE FOLLOWING SPEECHES TOOK LESS THAN 30 MINUTES TO PASS
HIM. CROWD APPLAUDED GALANT OF SPEAKERS DRAWN FROM GOVERN-
MENT, KNESSET AND WAR VETERANS BUT THEIR BEHAVIOUR WAS THAT
OF SPECTATORS OF PERFORMANCE ARRANGED FOR THEIR BENEFIT
RATHER THAN THAT OF SPONTANEOUS PARTICIPANTS. SPEECHES DOTTED
WITH SUCH PHRASES AS "ISRAEL NOW BEING THREATENED BECAUSE
SHE DARED TO WREST KNIFE FROM MURDERER'S HAND"; "WE CAN NOT
BE COMPELLED TO COMMIT SUICIDE," AND THERE IS "UNHOLY ALLIANCE
BETWEEN SOVIET DELEGATE SOBOLEV, INDIA'S MENON AND DULLES."
THERE WERE BANNERS WITH SUCH SLOGANS AS "ISRAELI KSA# FOR
ARAB OIL?"

RESOLUTION PREPARED IN ADVANCE READ AT ALL GATHERING POINTS

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

574.841/10-1157

Confidential File
CS/R

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

39

CONFIDENTIAL

CORRECTION ISSUED:

2/12/57 1:30 PM

Action

Control:

6196

NEA

Rec'd:

FEBRUARY 11, 1957

Info

10:20 AM

RMR

FROM: TEL AVIV - CORRECTED PAGE ONE

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 943, FEBRUARY 11, 9 AM

G

SP

C

PRIORITY

EUR

L

IO

UMSA

P

UOP

SCA

OLI

SENT DEPARTMENT 943, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 187,
PARIS 154, ROME 86, AMMAN 165, BEIRUT 143, CAIRO 164,
DAMASCUS 117, JERUSALEM 70, USUN 45.

REFERENCE EMBTEL 932.

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

ICA

CROWDS ESTIMATED BY NEWSPAPERS OF GOVERNMENT COALITION
PARTIES AS NUMBERING "HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS" ASSEMBLED
NATIONWIDE IN ISRAEL CITIES AND RURAL SETTLEMENTS SATURDAY
FOR DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS WHICH
ASK ISRAELI EVACUATION REMAINING TERRITORY TAKEN FROM
EGYPTIANS. ALL RALLIES APPARENTLY ORDERLY AND NO VIOLENCE
OF ANY KIND REPORTED IN PRESS OR OBSERVED BY EMBASSY.

DEMONSTRATION DESCRIBED AS LARGEST EVER HELD IN TEL AVIV
WITH CROWD ESTIMATED BY PRESS AT 80,000 PROBABLY ATTRACTED
NO MORE THAN 30,000 ACCORDING TO EMBASSY OBSERVER WHO SAID
PARADE FOLLOWING SPEECHES TOOK LESS THAN 30 MINUTES TO PASS
HIM. CROWD APPLAUDED GALANT OF SPEAKERS DRAWN FROM GOVERN-
MENT, KNESSET AND WAR VETERANS BUT THEIR BEHAVIOUR WAS THAT
OF SPECTATORS OF PERFORMANCE ARRANGED FOR THEIR BENEFIT
RATHER THAN THAT OF SPONTANEOUS PARTICIPANTS. SPEECHES DOTTED
WITH SUCH PHRASES AS "ISRAEL NOW BEING THREATENED BECAUSE
SHE DARED TO WREST KNIFE FROM MURDERER'S HAND"; "WE CAN NOT
BE COMPELLED TO COMMIT SUICIDE," AND THERE IS "UNHOLY ALLIANCE
BETWEEN SOVIET DELEGATE SOBOLEV, INDIA'S MENON AND DULLES."
THERE WERE BANNERS WITH SUCH SLOGANS AS "ISRAELI BLOOD ON
ARAB OIL?"

RESOLUTION PREPARED IN ADVANCE READ AT ALL GATHERING POINTS

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

MESSAGE CENTER

FILED

374.641/2-1157

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 943, FEBRUARY 11, 9 AM, FROM TEL AVIV

AND DESCRIBED BY GOVERNMENT THEREAFTER AS HAVING BEEN ADOPTED BY CROWDS, PRESUMABLY BY ACCLAMATION. IT DESCRIBED ISRAEL PUBLIC AS (1) PROTESTING ATTEMPTS BEING MADE BY UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTIONS TO STRIKE AT ISRAEL'S SECURITY AND EQUALITY OF RIGHTS (2) DECLARING SUPPORT FOR GOI'S EFFORTS TO COMBAT ITS ENEMIES ATTEMPTS TO USE UNITED NATIONS TO REVIVE TENSION AND HOSTILITY OF ISRAEL-EGYPT BORDER AND RESTORE EGYPTIAN AGGRESSORS TO SPRING BOARD POSITIONS FOR ATTACKS ON ISRAEL (3) DECLARING THEIR UNCOMPROMISING OPPOSITION TO ANY ATTEMPT TO RETURN EGYPTIAN GUNS TO AQABA GULF (MOUR) DEMANDING DEMILITARIZATION OF SINAI PENINSULA AND OPENING SUEZ TO ISRAEL SHIPPING. RESOLUTIONS PER ORATION SAID "NO POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC PRESSURE NO THREAT OF SANCTIONS WILL BREAK OUR SPIRIT OR WEAKEN OUR DETERMINATION."

PRESS OBSERVED DEMONSTRATIONS CAME ONE DAY AFTER BEN GURION'S REPLY TO "PRESIDENT EISENHOWER DELIVERED AT STATE DEPARTMENT DECLARING ISRAEL WOULD STAND FIRM ON DEMANDS FOR FREE PASSAGE THROUGH AQABA GULF AND SECURITY ON BORDER."

ON BASIS OF EARLY INCOMPLETE PRESS REPORTS UNITED NATIONS AND HAMMARSKJOLD SPEAKERS PRINCIPAL TARGETS. HOWEVER JERUSALEM POST QUOTED MAPAI SECRETARY GENERAL JOSEPH TAL AS TELLING CROWDS AT NAHAL OZ GAZA BORDER KIBBUTZ THAT "WE WILL BE READY TO LEAVE SHARM EL SHEIKH IF UNITED STATES WILL DECLARE FREEDOM OF AQABA GULF AS SHE HAS DONE IN GUARANTEEING FORMOSA."

DESPITE FACT SPEAKERS MADE FEW EFFORTS TO AROUSE FEELING AGAINST UNITED STATES WE GENERALLY REGARDED BY PUBLIC AND OFFICIAL QUARTERS AS KEY INFLUENCE. AS AUTHOR OF NOVEMBER 2 RESOLUTION UNITED STATES HELD LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR PRESENT UNITED NATIONS PRESSURES. ALSO AS NATION WHICH CAN APPLY SEVEREST SANCTIONS ANY UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION CALLING FOR THEM WILL BRING HEAVY PUBLIC CONDEMNATION OF UNITED STATES.

LAWSON

ALR

#AS RECEIVED. CORRECTION TO FOLLOW.

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

55-L
Action

NEA

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

USUN

P

UOP

C

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

FROM: Jerusalem

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 219, February 11, 4 p.m.

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 219, REPEATED INFORMATION AMMAN 145, CAIRO 68, LONDON 3, TEL AVIV 125, BEIRUT, DAMASCUS, HAIFA UNNUMBERED.

Mass rally called by Israel coalition parties held in Jerusalem Saturday afternoon to support GOI non-complicance UN resolutions regarding withdrawal Gaza and East Coast Sinai. Gathering featured speeches and display half dozen or so banners bearing slogans such as "Nasser bloc or block Nasser, Israel blood or Arab oil, long live Franco-Israel friendship." Crowd appeared mildly interested in speeches but calm and undemonstrative, with many people moving away before completion speeches.

Jerusalem post estimate of total 30,000 demonstrators appears excessive. District commissioner estimates 20,000 present. Says crowd would have been substantially larger had opposition parties been invited participate. Impossible calculate size of crowd, however, since many people in area primarily concerned taking usual Sabbath stroll. Only group showing any especial animation were numerous young men apparently affiliated youth groups.

Israel police were posted in some strength on roads approaching American Consulate General as precautionary measure, but crowd made no effort move that direction nor deviate from streets authorized in permit hold gathering.

Comment: As usual, reactions Jerusalem population to political events appeared rather unemotional at least superficially. Local sources state, however, public support of GOI position somewhat firmer in recent days and is now nearly unanimous, since justice requiring firm assurances as condition for withdrawal must be considered self-evident.

COLE

MGG/HSO/16

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Control: 6408

Rec'd: February 11, 1957
2:47 p.m.

1957 FEB 12 AM 7 53

MESSAGE CENTER

NEA

Central

RM/R 674.84A/2-1157

This Document Must Be Returned to

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

B

Action

EUR

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

NEA

L

IO

USUN

E

P

UOP

OLI

ICP

OCB

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

NIC

DCL

FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3086, FEBRUARY 11, 7 P.M.

Control: 6549-2-1157

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 11, 1957

5:07 P.M.

VON WELCK TODAY TOLD US IN THE EVENT OF UNITED NATIONS VOTING TO TAKE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT CONSIDER THESE SANCTIONS AS BEING APPLICABLE TO REPARATION PAYMENTS (WIEDERGUTMACHUNG) TO ISRAEL AND THE GERMANS WOULD IN ANY CASE CONTINUE TO PAY REPARATIONS IN KIND AT THE AGREED RATE OF 300 MILLION DM'S PER ANNUM.

HE ALSO SAID WHILE THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOT ADOPTED A FINAL POSITION ON THE MATTER OF SANCTIONS THEY WERE ON THE WHOLE RELUCTANT TO ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL.

CONANT

MAA

This Document Must Be Returned to 674.84A/2-1157
320.5784/2-1157

HBS

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

37 H
Action

Control: 6228
Rec'd: February 11, 1957
10:55 a.m.

IO
Info

FROM: New York

INTELLIGENCE CENTER

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: DELGA 703, February 11, 10 a.m.

G

PRIORITY

SP

Further DELGA 700.

C

EUR

NEA

L

R

O

Confirming Wilcox-Sisco conversation, Cordier (Secretariat) informed us late last night Fawzi (Egypt) had agreed to postponing GA consideration of Mid-East beyond Tuesday, but without any firm date set, on basis SYG's report would be coming out on Monday and time would be needed study it, as well as because of Washington's action which Fawzi wanted give chance to succeed.

LODGE

DMB/16



MAY 28 1959

FILED

PA

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

674.84A/2-1157

674.84A/2-1157

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

44
Action *UNO / Delga*

Control: 6702
Rec'd: FEBRUARY 11, 1957
11:43 PM

IO FROM: NEW YORK
Info RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: DELGA 706, FEBRUARY 11, 10 PM

G
SP
C

EUR

NEA

L


E

R

O

PRIORITY

RE: PALESTINE/SYG'S REPORT/ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL



LODGE INFORMED SYG OF SUBSTANCE DULLES-EBAN CONVERSATION AS CONVEYED TO LODGE BY SECRETARY THIS MORNING. SYG SAID IT WAS INTERESTING AND HOPEFUL, AND ISRAELIS "NOW HAVE SOMETHING TO POINT TO IF THEY WISH TO GET OUT".

HE WAS PLEASED THAT OUR POLICY WAS BASED ON FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAEL. WHEN LODGE INFORMED SYG ISRAELIS EXPRESSED CONCERN TO SECRETARY THAT HAMMARSKJOLD WOULD NOT IN FACT MOVE UNEF INTO SHARM EL-SHEIKH IF ISRAELIS WITHDREW, SYG SAID ISRAELIS SHOULD LOOK AT HIS REPORT. HE ONCE AGAIN STRESSED, AS HE DID ON SUNDAY, THAT IF ISRAELIS GOT OUT OF BOTH GAZA AND SHARM EL-SHEIKH EGYPTIANS WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH RIGHTS OF PASSAGE; IF ISRAELIS GOT OUT OF ONLY SHARM EL-SHEIKH AND NOT GAZA, STATE OF BELLIGERENCY WOULD BE CONTINUED BY THEM AND WOULD JUSTIFY CONTINUANCE OF EGYPTIAN ACTION TO OBSTRUCT PASSAGE INTO AQABA. SEE PART I, PARAGRAPH 9 OF SYG'S REPORT (COPIES POUCHED DEPT TONIGHT).

SYG NOTED THAT ANNEX IV HIS REPORT WAS LETTER RECEIVED FROM EBAN AT 12:15 A.M. TODAY. HE REGARDED CONTENTS AS LARGELY PROPAGANDA ADDING NOTHING TO PREVIOUS STATEMENTS. IT TRIED, HE SAID, TO CONVEY IMPRESSION THAT ISRAEL'S NON-WITHDRAWAL WAS DUE SOLELY TO SYG'S FAILURE TO MOVE ON ISRAEL'S REQUESTS -- A POINT WHICH HE HAS SOUGHT TO KNOCK DOWN IN PART I HIS REPORT. SYG ALSO NOTED THAT ISRAEL MADE MENTION FOR FIRST TIME IN HIS LAST MINUTE LETTER OF "TIMETABLE OF WITHDRAWAL".

IN CONCLUSION SYG SAID IF US DEMARCHE STARTED BALL ROLLING
AND IF EBAN'S

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION
COPY IS PROHIBITED

PA

674.84A/2-1157

CLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-DELGA 706, FEBRUARY 11, 10 PM, FROM NEW YORK

AND IF EBAN'S REFERENCE TO "TIMETABLE" HAD ANY MEANING, SO MUCH THE BETTER. HOWEVER, HE WAS STILL DOUBTFUL THEY WOULD BUDGE.

LATE THIS EVENING FAWZI AND LOUTFI (EGYPT) CALLED ON LODGE AT THEIR REQUEST TO OBTAIN REACTION TO DRAFT RES ON SANCTIONS (TEXT CONTAINED DELGA 707) WHICH THEY PLAN GIVE TO AFRO-ASIAN GROUP MEETING THIS EVENING "AS A DRAFT". THEY ASKED IF WE COULD HAVE ANSWER ON THIS TEXT BY TOMORROW. LODGE TOLD THEM WE WOULD NEED INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WE WOULD REQUEST AT ONCE, BUT SINCE IT WOULD REQUIRE CONSIDERATION ON HIGHEST LEVELS, WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE GIVE THEM ANSWER ON TUESDAY.

AFTER BRIEF DISCUSSION REGARDING ALGERIA (BEING REPORTED SEPARATELY), FAWZI REFERRED TO IMPORTANT ASPECT OF TIMING. HE NOTED HE HAD AGREED POSTPONE PLENARY CONSIDERATION MID-EAST SITUATION UNTIL WEDNESDAY. THERE WAS, HE SAID, ANOTHER KIND OF TIMETABLE INVOLVING FORTHCOMING CONSULTATIONS AMONG ARAB LEADERS, ESPECIALLY IN CAIRO. HE SAID KING SAUD WOULD BE STOPPING THERE TO COMPARE NOTES. FROM ALL POINTS OF VIEW-- ESPECIALLY POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL -- FAWZI SAID, IT WAS "DIFFICULT EXAGGERATE IMPORTANCE OF KING SAUD BEING ABLE TO SAY TO OTHER ARAB LEADERS THAT GOOD INTENTIONS IN EISENHOWER DOCTRINE AND ELSEWHERE IN US POLICY WERE MATCHED TO REASONABLE EXTENT BY ACTIONS". FAWZI WENT ON TO SAY IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY HARD FOR SAUD TO OBTAIN ANY REASONABLE REACTION TO US POLICY IF ISRAEL WERE STILL ON EGYPTIAN TERRITORY. LIKEWISE, US POLICY ON ALGERIA WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT BEARING ON RECEPTION BY ARAB LEADERS OF SAUD'S PRESENTATION.

FAWZI CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE DID NOT BELITTLE AMERICA'S DIFFICULTIES IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, EITHER TECHNICALLY OR POLITICALLY.

LODGE

CV

CONFIDENTIAL

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

31

Action
IO

U.S. / 2-11-57

AIRS
CORRECTION

2/13/57, 9:45 a.m.

Control:
Rec'd:

6723
February 12, 1957
12:40 p.m.

Info

FROM: New York

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: DELGA 707, February 11, 10 p.m.

SS
G
SP
C
EUR
NEA
L
E
R
O

The serial number of the LIMITED OFFICIAL USE message, received as 707, should be corrected to read DELGA 707.

LFS/14

Central
files
To

674-849/2-11-57



LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

PERMANENT
RECORD COPY

CORRECTION

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

05601

1957 FEB 11 PM 8 17

DC/T

For DC/T use only.

SENT TO: Amembassy, TEL AVIV (PRIORITY) 778

RPTD INFO: Amembassy, CAIRO 2653
USUN, NEW YORK 612

Following based on uncleared Memorandum of Conversation:

Israel Ambassador called on Secretary February 11. Secretary handed Eban aide-memoire (text of which has been sent you separately) stating both he and President had gone over it.

Eban stated communication was important and he would seek authoritative reply from his Government. Meanwhile he would like make some provisional comments. Stressed economic importance of Gulf Aqaba to Israel and West Europe. Freedom of passage was vital interest to Israel and need for solid assurance such freedom prior to Israel withdrawal. Freedom of passage would not be price of victory but desirable result. Urged US make known its views re freedom of passage to UNSYG.

Re Gaza Eban said return of Egyptian forces would prejudice Israel position and that Israel believed it could convince any international body that present Israel regime in Gaza should not be uprooted. Natural links existed between Gaza and Israel which UN would not wish sever. If Israel remained in Gaza it could make substantial contribution towards settlement of its 200,000 refugees. Gaza was complicated problem which should be handled slowly.

Eban

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 2/11/57

Clearances:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NEA - Mr. Frazer Wilkins

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

This Document must be destroyed 674-844/1157

CS/U

674-844/2-1157

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Eban summarized as follows: 1) Israel withdrawal together with affirmation of free navigation through Straits Aqaba; 2) exchange of affirmations of non-belligerency; 3) withdrawal of military forces from Gaza; 4) discussion of future Gaza area in its non-military aspects. Eban thought US could assist by calming atmosphere, ~~XXXX~~ by stating there no legal basis for proceeding until measures had been arranged re Israel withdrawal. Eban dwelt at length on necessity Egypt making new statement on non-belligerency and not to block Aqaba and the Canal.

Secretary said that in general US had been sympathetic with objectives of UK, France and Israel with respect to Suez Canal but had been dubious about their methods. Secretary felt UK-French objectives could have been reached by other means but there had been no consultation in advance with respect these objectives and means chosen for achieving them. It was our view Israel objectives could be achieved by other means.

Re Aqaba Secretary said result current discussions would be important and US wished to help. Secretary wondered how solid Egyptian assurances would be; they had not been solid with respect to Suez Canal. He doubted they would be more solid than US assurances. To place greater reliance upon Egyptian assurances than upon US assurances seemed to be grasping shadow rather than substance. Israel might under such circumstances remain in Straits of Aqaba but would any shipping pass through these Straits or would any oil pass through Israel pipeline? He hoped Israel would not reject present American suggestion which had serious and far-reaching implication and was more solid in the premises. Eban asked if there would be physical presence of US in Gulf Aqaba. Secretary replied primary responsibility

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

responsibility regarding Aqaba was today being exercised in UNGA through UNSYG. We thought Israel Government could fairly assume US would not interject itself into a matter on which he was negotiating if it would embarrass UNSYG. Secretary would not lightly make statements without having reached conclusion matter could be worked out. We had strong sense moral responsibility take further steps if Israel withdrew and blockade were resumed. Eban noted that UNSYG had thus far not said that UNEF would move into Straits Aqaba as precautionary measure. Israel had not pressed UNSYG regarding UNEF as Israel withdrew from Sinai as Israel had no rights there, but it has pressed UNSYG re Aqaba because Israel felt it had certain rights for passage through its waters. Secretary said UNSYG might feel his mandate from UNGA to handle this question would not permit bargaining with Israel regarding it.

Eban asked what was meant by suggestion future Gaza area be worked out following withdrawal. Reply given that UNSYG had this matter in hand and no details had been worked out. We continued support UNSYG in his handling of matter. No final US attitude had been adopted.

Secretary said that phrase "non-belligerency" which Eban used seemed vague to him and asked what it meant. Eban said Egypt/~~which had~~ held it had certain rights of belligerency under which it could close Gulf Aqaba and Suez Canal. Secretary replied statements couched in generalities resulted in complications. It was our view that 1888 Convention spelled out rights to be enjoyed in Suez Canal and six principles which had been accepted in SC confirmed these rights. Aqaba was a different

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

Different thing and should be differently handled.

Secretary reiterated Israel must realize that by US aide-memoire we were making strong effort find solution. If one could not be worked out resulting situation would spell disaster. Secretary made clear he not talking about sanctions which was word loosely used. What in effect did it mean? Greatest sanction was not vote by SC but consequences of conduct which important governments considered unreasonable. Both Israel and US with their high moral standards should work together. Eban said Israel did not want to withdraw from Gaza and Aqaba and see resumption of hostilities. Secretary did not believe UK-French-Israel action had been justified in October but there was no objection to use of force when it was placed behind a clear principle.

Secretary suggested and Eban agreed that US aide-memoire and previous exchange correspondence between President and Ben Gurion should not ^{repeat not} be made public without prior agreement between US and Israel.

Ambassador Lawson should emphasize to Israel Primin arguments set forth above along lines Secretary's conversation with Ambassador Eban.

J. B. L. L. S.

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO**Department of State**VERBATIM TEXT
CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

1957 FEB 11 PM 8 17

05606

SENT TO: Amembassy, TEL AVIV - PRIORITY 779
Rpt info: Amembassy, CAIRO - PRIORITY 2657
USUN (by punch)

Origin

Info

Following is text of Aide-Memoire handed to Eban by Secretary 10:00 AM
February 11:

Quote UNGA has sought specifically, vigorously, and almost unanimously, prompt withdrawal from Egypt of armed forces of Britain, France and Israel. Britain and France have complied unconditionally. Forces of Israel have been withdrawn to considerable extent but still hold Egyptian territory at Sharm el Shaikh at the entrance to Gulf of Aqaba. They also occupy Gaza Strip which is territory specified by armistice arrangements to be occupied by Egypt.

We understand that it is position of Israel that (1) it will evacuate its military forces from Gaza Strip provided Israel retains civil administration and police in some relationship to UN; and (2) it will withdraw from Sharm el Shaikh if continued freedom of passage through Straits is assured.

With respect to (1) Gaza Strip--it is view of US that UNGA has no authority to require of either Egypt or Israel a substantial modification of Armistice Agreement, which, as noted, now gives Egypt right and responsibility of occupation. Accordingly, we believe that Israeli withdrawal from Gaza should be prompt and unconditional, leaving future of Gaza Strip to be worked out through efforts and good offices of UN.

Dist. Desired
(Offices Only)

DC/R

We recognize

Anal 16

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NE - Fraser Wilkins

Rev

Cat

VERBATIM TEXT
CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

Type on JDS for

This Document Must Be Returned to
RM/R
Central
Files

674.84A/2-1157

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

674.84A/2-1157

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:DCBergus:rej - 2/11/57

Clearances:

VERBATIM TEXT
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

We recognize area has been source of armed infiltration and reprisals back and forth contrary to Armistice Agreement and is source of great potential danger because of presence there of so large a number of Arab refugees--about 200,000. Accordingly, we believe UNGA and SWG should seek UNRRA, in exercise of its mission, move into this area and be on boundary between Israel and Gaza Strip.

US will use its best efforts to help to assure this result, which we believe is contemplated by Second Resolution of February 2, 1957.

With respect to (2) Gulf of Aqaba and access thereto--US believes Gulf constitutes international waters and that no nation has right forcibly to prevent free and innocent passage in Gulf and through Straits giving access thereto. We have in mind not only commercial usage, but passage of pilgrims on religious missions, which should be fully respected.

US recalls that on January 28, 1950, Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs informed US Egyptian occupation of two islands of Tiran and Senafir at entrance Gulf of Aqaba was only to protect islands themselves against possible danger or violation and that "this occupation being in no way conceived in a spirit of obstructing in any way innocent passage through stretch of water separating these two islands from Egyptian coast of Sinai, it follows that this passage, the only practicable one, will remain free as in past, in conformity with international practice and recognized principles of the law of nations".

In absence of some overriding decision to contrary, as by International Court of Justice, US, on behalf of vessels of US registry, is prepared exercise right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.

VERBATIM TEXT
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

It is

VERBATIM TEXT
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

It is of course clear enjoyment of a right of free and innocent passage by Israel would depend upon its prior withdrawal in accordance with UN Resolutions. US has no reason to assume any littoral state would under these circumstances obstruct right of free and innocent passage.

US believes UNGA and SYG should, as precautionary measure, seek UNEF move into Straits area as Israeli forces are withdrawn. This again we believe to be within contemplation of Second Resolution of February 2, 1957.

(3) US observes recent resolutions of UNGA call not only for prompt and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli behind Armistice lines but call for other measures.

We believe, however, UN has properly established an order of events and an order of urgency and first requirement is that forces of invasion and occupation should withdraw.

US is prepared publicly to declare it will use its influence, in concert with other UN members, to the end that, following Israel's withdrawal, these other measures will be implemented.

We believe our views and purposes in this respect are shared by many other nations and that a tranquil future for Israel is best assured by reliance upon that fact, rather than by an occupation in defiance of the overwhelming judgment of the world community. UNQUOTE

DULLES

Dulles

(PW)

VERBATIM TEXT
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

AIR PRIORITY
PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL
(Security Classification)

DO NOT TYPE IN THIS SPACE

674.84A/2-1157
+L 754A 13

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

400

DESP. NO.

February 11, 1957

DATE

FROM : AMEMBASSY, TEL AVIV

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

REF : Embassy Telegram No. 941 and 942; Dept. Telegram No. 760.

123 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION S/S-10	DEPT. IN RM/R-2
	REC'D 2.21	OTHER

SUBJECT: Prime Minister Ben Gurion's reply to President Eisenhower's letter of February 3, 1957.

Presidential Handling.

There is enclosed the original of Prime Minister David Ben Gurion's reply to President Eisenhower's letter of February 3, 1957 which was delivered by the Prime Minister to Ambassador Lawson at the former's Tel Aviv residence on February 10.

To the President's request that Israel complete withdrawal of its forces behind the general Armistice line in compliance with the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, Ben Gurion replied to the effect that Israel would withdraw its forces from the Sharm-e-Sheikh area in the southeast Sinai if it could be assured of freedom of passage through the Straits of Tiran, but while prepared to evacuate its military forces from the Gaza Strip, it would be obligated to leave there a civil administration and police in "suitable relations with the United Nations."

The text of Ben Gurion's reply, complete except for non-essential words, was transmitted to the Department in Embassy telegram No. 941 of February 10, 1957.

For the Ambassador:

William L. Hamilton, Jr.
William L. Hamilton, Jr.
First Secretary of Embassy

Enclosure:

Original reply from Ben Gurion
to President Eisenhower's letter
of February 3.

W.L. Hamilton:jl

REPORTER

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this permanent record copy to DC/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE RETURNED
TO THE RM/R GENERAL FILES

674.84A/2-1157

HEGONFIDENTIAL FILE

1 NEA - Miss Balmer
VRM/12

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

Ne/R
Central
Files

DATE: February 11, 1957

SUBJECT: U.S. Attitude Towards Gulf of Aqaba

PARTICIPANTS: Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, Deputy Foreign Minister, Saudi Arabia
Ambassador Al-Magayyal of Saudi Arabia
Mr. Mamdouh Adib, Saudi Arabia
Mr. William K. Rountree, NEA
Mr. David D. Newsom, TE
Mr. Camille Noufel

COPIES TO: NEA(2cc), NE(2cc), Jidda(1cc), Tel Aviv(1cc), Cairo(1cc)

574.34A/2-1157
turned to

Sheikh Yusuf asked for a special meeting with the Secretary to discuss the problems of Aqaba and Gaza. Mr. Rountree saw Sheikh Yusuf inasmuch as the Secretary had left for the day.

Sheikh Yusuf said that he was very much upset by reports that the Secretary was supporting the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba and Suez to free shipping. He said both the President and the Secretary should realize that this question is one which means life or death to Saudi Arabia.

Mr. Rountree pointed out that there had been no statement on this question by the Secretary, but that newspapers reflected unauthoritative accounts of efforts the United States was making to find a solution to this critical problem. He said that the United States desired that Israel should withdraw from Aqaba and Gaza behind the armistice lines and that the United States efforts were related to the insistence by Israel that Egypt undertake commitments before Israel should withdraw. Mr. Rountree said that in 1950 the Egyptian Government had reaffirmed the right of free passage through the Straits and had stated that it was not the policy or the intention of Egypt to obstruct free passage. Mr. Rountree said that the Department had no thought that Egypt would alter its present policy as long as Israeli forces occupied Egyptian territory. He pointed out that United States actions were being taken in consultation with the Secretary General of the United Nations, who had been in touch with Dr. Fawzi.

APR 12 1957

Mr. Rountree

SECRET

Mr. Rountree said that on exercise of the right of self-defense on the part of either party in this case would bring counter action. The United States hoped for a situation in which neither side exercised this right.

In reply, Sheikh Yusef said he could not comment on the Egyptian note of 1956 since he had not seen it. He doubted, however, that Egypt would allow passage to ships of a state with which she was at war. He said that as a friend he wished to express the hope that the United States would not have a hand in allowing free passage to Israeli ships at the present time and under present circumstances. He said that in South Arabia's view any government which would help Israel to obtain free passage at this time would be as guilty as those countries which invaded Egypt. Sheikh Yusef said he was worried that any indication that the United States had changed its position on this matter would affect adversely the single report to other Arab States of his visit to the United States.

Sheikh Yusef went on to say that the United States had no part in seeking to open up the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships and also asked that either he or the Department issue a statement saying that the newspapers' accounts of the United States policy were misleading.

Mr. Rountree emphasized again that the United States looked at this problem under the criteria of international law. He stressed that the Gulf of Aqaba is considered an international waterway and that this right of free passage had been reaffirmed by Egypt. He said that all he had said about Israeli passage assumed an Israeli withdrawal, and that otherwise there would have been substantial doubt that Israel had any right of passage under international law.

Mr. Rountree said that the United States was seeking results in a very critical situation and he would prefer that there be no statement since such a statement would not be conducive to the achievement of the objectives which both countries had in common.

Sheikh Yusef raised the question of sanctions against Israel and expressed the hope that the United States would support sanctions in accordance with what the Secretary had said at an earlier meeting. Mr. Rountree said that the question of sanctions was very much in the mind of the United States Government but that there was opposition to sanctions in the case when they had not been applied in others. He said that the United States would not exclude the possibility of the use of sanctions, and was in constant touch with other delegations with respect to measures to be taken.

Mr. Rountree

SECRET

- 3 -

Mr. Rountree stressed the importance that the United States attached to the friendship of Saudi Arabia. He said that he appreciated the views which Sheikh Faisal had expressed and assured him that the United States position would be based on principle and on what the United States considers is right, with due consideration for the friendship with Saudi Arabia.

on in
NEA:EL:EDNewscom:aps
2/26/57

SECRET

11-604
CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

97✓
DATE: February 11, 1957

SUBJECT:

Questions Relating to the Israeli Withdrawal from Gaza and The Straits of Aqaba

PARTICIPANTS:

Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel

The Secretary

Mr. Robert Murphy, G

Mr. Fraser Wilkins, NE

COPIES TO:

S/S(2 cc), G(cc), C(cc), R(), NEA(cc), NE() 2

Tel Aviv, Cairo, USUN, OLI(2), IO()

USUN H. C. Ledge - 1 -

permissparkers
2-7-57
7

The Israeli Ambassador called on the Secretary this morning to discuss pending questions relating to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the Straits of Aqaba, which is presently being considered by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Secretary said that we had a number of observations to make which had been incorporated in an Aide Memoire. This Aide Memoire could be considered in substance as a reply to Prime Minister Ben Gurion's recent response to the earlier letter from President Eisenhower. The Secretary said the President and he had gone over the Aide Memoire (Tab A).

The Secretary read aloud the Aide Memoire and noted, with respect to the Israeli position regarding withdrawal, that the Aide Memoire paraphrased Prime Minister Ben Gurion's position as summarized in his letter to President Eisenhower.

Mr. Eban observed the Aide Memoire was an important communication on which he would seek an authoritative reply from his Government. Meanwhile, he would like to make some provisional comments.

With respect to the Straits of Aqaba Mr. Eban said there were great geographic advantages in freedom of passage through the Straits of Aqaba. The Straits gave Israel access to the Indian Ocean. A new pipeline through Israel would be dependent upon the Gulf of Aqaba. This pipeline would reach the Eastern Mediterranean about April 15. There would also be road connections in Israel with the Gulf of Aqaba. For the future Israel should become a bridge for commerce through the Middle East instead of a stunted ghetto dependent upon international relief. It was therefore of supreme national

CONFIDENTIAL

interest 912677

674.84A/2-1157

CSELK

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

interest that the Straits of Aqaba should be free. It was likewise of international interest that the Straits should be free, especially for Europe which drew its oil supplies from the Persian Gulf. For these reasons Israel felt it could not give up the freedom of passage it presently enjoyed. Furthermore, Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Aqaba was illegal. It had been fortified with gun emplacements (Ambassador Eban left several pictures with the Secretary).

Ambassador Eban said Israel believed that if it withdrew from Aqaba Egypt should refrain from establishing a blockade. There should be a simultaneous liquidation by withdrawal and by a cessation of a blockade. Israel had every reason to assume that if Israel left, Egypt would return, as a result of which there would be maritime engagements and a renewal of hostilities. For this reason Israel could not adopt a position of withdrawal and Egyptian return to the area of the Straits of Aqaba. Israel could not abandon this new link with the outside world. The Suez Canal had long been closed to Israeli traffic and would continue closed following its reopening. Israel's present insistence upon freedom of passage was not a frivolous tenacity but a position which was based upon Israel's vital interest. Israel must have solid assurance that freedom of passage through the Straits would be accorded. This freedom should not be regarded as the price of victory but as a desirable result. The status quo ante which had prevailed in the Suez Canal, in the Straits of Aqaba and in the Gaza area prior to October 29 was illegal. Israel's present objective was to seek new solutions for each of these problems. The Secretary's proposal set down in the Aide Memoire would be studied in this light.

With respect to the situation in the United Nations, Ambassador Eban said that Israel had presented a new proposal to the Secretary General which contained a new schedule for withdrawal. Earlier, the Secretary General had been asked when the UNEF would enter the area of the Straits of Aqaba and whether there would be freedom of navigation, but he had declined to answer. This refusal adversely affected Israeli withdrawal. Ambassador Eban observed that Egypt must also desire Israeli withdrawal. Thus there were several incentives for this action. The Government of Israel would welcome United States identification with the question of freedom of passage through the Straits. It might be helpful if the United States would make known its views to the Secretary General who had thus far declined to answer the Israeli questions on this subject.

With respect to Gaza, Ambassador Eban said that Israel envisages that if it withdrew its armed forces and if Egyptian forces returned, the Israeli position would be prejudiced. When the general armistice agreement had been in effect Israel had assumed an absence of belligerency which Egypt denied. Gaza had been Egyptian territory stuck into the heart of Israel. Israel believed it could convince any international body that the present Israeli regime in Gaza should not be uprooted. It was geographically part of the Negev; it had insufficient water of its own as a result of which squalor and destitution prevailed. Israel was now supplying water to the Gaza area.

CONFIDENTIAL

Israel

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

Israel could not believe that the United Nations would want to cut this water supply. The Gaza area had other links with Israel of a similar character. Israel could make a strong case for Israeli administration. Israel did not, however, wish to annex the Gaza area. Ambassador Eban had told Khrishna Menon that Israel did not wish "to Kashmirize" the Gaza area. If Israel stayed in the Gaza area it could make a substantial contribution towards settlement of the 200,000 Arab refugees who were there. It was a complicated problem which should be handled slowly. The matter of the Straits of Aqaba should be handled first. A new structure should be erected between Israel and Egypt on the questions of non-belligerency and withdrawal. The matter of civil administration in Gaza could be handled later.

Ambassador Eban said that in summary Israel had four points:

1. Israeli withdrawal, together with an affirmation of free navigation through the Straits of Aqaba.
2. Exchange of affirmations of non-belligerency.
3. Withdrawal from Gaza.
4. Discussion of the future of the Gaza area in its non-military aspects.

Ambassador Eban said that counter-proposals could be put forward but that there had been no discussions, especially following the adoption of the February 2 resolution of the General Assembly. Israel had asked a number of questions of the Secretary General but there had been no reply.

Ambassador Eban thought that the United States could assist by calming the atmosphere. It could say that there was no legal basis for proceeding until measures had been arranged regarding Israeli withdrawal. The Aqaba question could be quickly solved provided the UNEF was positioned there and assurances regarding freedom of passage were forthcoming. Ambassador Lodge had used this formula in speaking to the General Assembly. The withdrawal of Israeli troops in Gaza should be separate from the withdrawal of the civil administration. Relations between Egypt and Israel should be defined following the withdrawal of Israeli troops. Egypt claimed it was belligerent; Israel was not; hence the general armistice agreement had collapsed. This Egyptian attitude necessarily affected the Suez Canal and Aqaba as well as other problems. Now that the Canal was being cleared this question would arise again. It was therefore necessary to obtain a clarification of the Egyptian attitude. Egypt could not be belligerent and Israel non-belligerent. The United Nations which had helped Egypt in many ways should also ask Egypt for an affirmation of non-belligerency and not to block Aqaba and the Canal. Ambassador Eban said he had sent Mr. Hammarskjold a communication containing a procedural suggestion on February 10. Ambassador Eban thought that a peaceful approach to the present problem would assist in their solution.

The Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

The Secretary said that in general the United States had been sympathetic with the objectives of the United Kingdom, France and Israel with respect to the Suez Canal but had been dubious about their methods. The United Kingdom had been disturbed regarding Nasser's prestige and also regarding the possibility that the Suez Canal might be blocked. It was the fact, however, that following the recent intervention, Nasser's prestige had remained high and the Canal would have continued to be blocked except for the efforts of the United States. The Secretary felt that the objectives of the United Kingdom and France could have been achieved by other means but there had been no consultation in advance with respect to these objectives and the means chosen for achieving them.

It was our view that Israeli objectives could be achieved by other means than those which had been employed. The Secretary said there seemed to be general agreement except for details. The Secretary wished to reserve the United States detailed position regarding Gaza because he did not yet know what it would be.

With respect to Aqaba, the Secretary said the result of current discussions would be important. The United States wished to help. He noted that Ambassador Eban had said that solid assurances were desired. The Secretary wondered how solid Egyptian assurances could be. They had not been solid with respect to the Suez Canal. He doubted that they would be more solid than U.S. assurances. To place greater reliance upon Egyptian assurances than upon U.S. assurances seemed to be grasping shadow rather than substance. Israel might, under such circumstances, remain in the Straits of Aqaba but would any shipping pass through these Straits or would any oil pass through the Israeli pipeline?

Ambassador Eban interjected to remark that Israeli withdrawal together with an Egyptian assurance of freedom of passage was desired rather than continued Israeli occupation.

The Secretary continued that the United States assurances which would be given outside the UN would be supplemental and would be far more valuable than Egyptian assurances. He hoped that Israel would not reject the present American suggestion which had serious and far-reaching implication and was more solid in the premises.

Ambassador Eban expressed full agreement but observed that the answer to the present problem was not to be found in verbal assurances alone. He noted that the American Aide Memoire referred to the exercise of rights with respect to the Straits of Aqaba and the assumption that the littoral states would not obstruct these rights. Ambassador Eban asked if there would be a physical presence by the U.S. in the Gulf of Aqaba.

The Secretary said that primary responsibility regarding the Straits of Aqaba was today being exercised in the UNGA through the Secretary General.

We thought

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

We thought that the Government of Israel could fairly assume that the U. S. would not interject itself into a matter on which he was negotiating if it would embarrass him. We would not lightly make statements without having explored the matter and reached the conclusion that there was a good chance that it could be worked out. We had a strong sense of moral responsibility to take further steps if Israel withdrew and blockade was resumed.

Minister Shiloah observed that American and Egyptian assurances would be as different as day and night. Israel did not wish to imply that United States assurances would be as dubious as Egyptian assurances might be.

Ambassador Eban said he thought the American Aide Memoire was extremely important and that he wished to consult his Government for the purpose of obtaining further views. Meanwhile he wished to clear up one or two additional points. He noted the Secretary General had not thus far said the UNEF could move into the Straits of Aqaba area as a precautionary measure. Israel had not pressed the Secretary General regarding the UNEF as Israel withdrew from Sinai because Israel had no rights there but it had pressed the Secretary General regarding Aqaba because Israel felt it had certain rights for passage through its waters. Hammarskjold had not yet said what the UNEF would do in Aqaba.

The Secretary said Hammarskjold might feel that his mandate from the General Assembly to handle this question would not permit "bargaining" with Israel. Ambassador Eban thought, however, that Hammarskjold might explain his views without placing them in the category of conditions attached to withdrawal.

Ambassador Eban inquired what was meant by the suggestion that the future of the Gaza area might be worked out following withdrawal. Would this mean that the return of a Egyptian regime would be permitted or would there be UN control in the interim?

The Secretary said he understood that the Secretary General had this matter in hand and no details had been worked out, so far as he knew. Mr. Wilkins, in response to the Secretary's question, confirmed that the Secretary General had been discussing the question of administration of Gaza with Israel and Egypt but that we understood that these talks were not concluded and no arrangements had yet been made. We continued to support the Secretary General in his handling of the matter. No final American attitude had been adopted with respect to the Gaza area. Ambassador Eban said that if Egypt returned to this area its future would be difficult.

The Secretary said that the phrase "non-belligerency" which Ambassador Eban had used seemed vague to him and asked what it meant. Ambassador Eban said Egypt held it had certain rights of belligerency under which it could close the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal. The Secretary replied that statements couched in generalities resulted in complications. He recalled

our

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

our experience with respect to the Korean armistice which was designed to end hostilities. However, several problems continued. We forbid trade and if for example, the Communist Chinese should enter New York Harbor, they might not have smooth sailing there.

Ambassador Eban said that although the phrase "non-belligerency" was not precise it meant blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal. It might therefore be preferable to spell out the objectives of freedom of passage through the Straits of Aqaba and the Suez Canal and freedom from attack from the Gaza area.

The Secretary said that the 1888 Convention spelled out the rights to be enjoyed and the six principles which had been accepted in the Security Council confirmed these rights. The matter of Aqaba was a different thing and should be differently handled.

The Secretary reiterated that Israel must realize that in the American Aide Memoire we were making a strong effort to find a solution. If one could not be worked out the resulting situation would spell disaster. The Secretary made it clear he was not talking about sanctions. The word "sanctions" was loosely used. What in effect did it mean? Some say that sanctions were being employed against the Soviet Union today. The greatest sanction was not a vote by the Security Council but the consequences of conduct which important governments considered unreasonable down the path toward peace and progress. The nations of the world had not moved far down this path. It would be a disaster if we turned back at this stage. There was a saying that "the perfect is the greatest enemy of the good". We should not strive for perfection at the expense of good actions. The Secretary thought that we should continue to work in the UN and should go forward step by step. Both Israel and the United States, with their high moral standards, should work together. We believed that the views expressed in the American Aide Memoire recognized the merit of Ambassador Eban's points and were the best method of achieving the results. We believed that we should proceed hand in hand and that if our paths should diverge the resulting situation would not be happy.

Ambassador Eban said that Israel was also endeavoring to work out a solution but that it did not want to withdraw from Gaza and the Straits of Aqaba and then to see the resumption of hostilities. The Secretary did not believe the British-French-Israel action had been justified in October. There was no objection, on the other hand, to the use of force when it was placed behind a clear principle admitted by the UN Charter. But it should not be used otherwise. In making this statement he should not be considered as a pacifist because his record clearly indicated his belief there were circumstances in which the use of force would be justified.

The Secretary suggested and Ambassador Eban agreed that the American Aide Memoire and the previous exchange of correspondence between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Ben Gurion should not be made public without prior

agreement between

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

between the United States and Israel. It was also agreed that, when Ambassador Eban was confronted by the press on leaving the Secretary's office today he would merely state that there had been an exchange of views on UN problems relating to Gaza and Aqaba and how these problems might be solved.

NEA:NE:FWilkins:av:crc

2/11/57

CONFIDENTIAL

AIDE-MEMOIRE

The United Nations General Assembly has sought specifically, vigorously, and almost unanimously, the prompt withdrawal from Egypt of the armed forces of Britain, France and Israel. Britain and France have complied unconditionally. The forces of Israel have been withdrawn to a considerable extent but still hold Egyptian territory at Sharm el Shaikh at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. They also occupy the Gaza Strip which is territory specified by the Armistice arrangements to be occupied by Egypt.

We understand that it is the position of Israel that (1) it will evacuate its military forces from the Gaza Strip provided Israel retains the civil administration and police in some relationship to the United Nations; and (2) it will withdraw from Sharm el Shaikh if continued freedom of passage through the Straits is assured.

With respect to (1) the Gaza Strip -- It is the view of the United States that the United Nations General Assembly has no authority to require of either Egypt or Israel a substantial modification of the Armistice Agreement, which, as noted, now gives Egypt the right and responsibility of occupation. Accordingly, we believe that Israeli

withdrawal from Gaza should be prompt and unconditional, leaving the future of the Gaza Strip to be worked out through the efforts and good offices of the United Nations.

We recognize that the area has been a source of armed infiltration and reprisals back and forth contrary to the Armistice Agreement and is a source of great potential danger because of the presence there of so large a number of Arab refugees -- about 200,000. Accordingly, we believe that the United Nations General Assembly and the Secretary General should seek that the United Nations Emergency Force, in the exercise of its mission, move into this area and be on the boundary between Israel and the Gaza Strip.

The United States will use its best efforts to help to assure this result, which we believe is contemplated by the Second Resolution of February 2, 1957.

With respect to (2) the Gulf of Aqaba and access thereto -- the United States believes that the Gulf constitutes international waters and that no nation has the right forcibly to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto. We have in mind not only commercial usage, but the passage of pilgrims on religious missions, which should be fully respected.

The United States recalls that on January 28, 1950, the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the United States that the Egyptian

occupation of the two islands of Tiran and Senafir at the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba was only to protect the islands themselves against possible damage or isolation and that "this occupation being in no way conceived in a spirit of obstructing in any way innocent passage through the stretch of water separating these two islands from the Egyptian coast of Sinai, it follows that this passage, the only practicable one, will remain free as in the past, in conformity with international practice and recognized principles of the law of nations".

In the absence of some overriding decision to the contrary, as by the International Court of Justice, the United States, on behalf of vessels of United States registry, is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage and to join with others to secure general recognition of this right.

It is of course clear that the enjoyment of a right of free and innocent passage by Israel would depend upon its prior withdrawal in accordance with the United Nations Resolutions. The United States has no reason to assume that any littoral state would under these circumstances obstruct the right of free and innocent passage.

The United States believes that the United Nations General Assembly and the Secretary General should, as a precautionary measure, seek that the United Nations Emergency Force move into the Straits area as the Israeli forces are withdrawn. This again we

believe to be within the contemplation of the Second Resolution of February 2, 1957.

(3) The United States observes that the recent resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly call not only for the prompt and unconditional withdrawal of Israel behind the Armistice lines but call for other measures.

We believe, however, that the United Nations has properly established an order of events and an order of urgency and that the first requirement is that forces of invasion and occupation should withdraw.

The United States is prepared publicly to declare that it will use its influence, in concert with other United Nations members, to the end that, following Israel's withdrawal, these other measures will be implemented.

We believe that our views and purposes in this respect are shared by many other nations and that a tranquil future for Israel is best assured by reliance upon that fact, rather than by an occupation in defiance of the overwhelming judgment of the world community.

Department of State,

Washington, February 11, 1957

S:JFDulles:cjp

JOHN F. KENNEDY
MASSACHUSETTS

7779

COMMITTEES:
LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
SMALL BUSINESS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

ACTION
is assigned to

February 11, 1957

Honorable John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am deeply concerned over the possibility that this Government would recommend United Nations sanctions against Israel for her refusal to abide by the resolution calling for the complete withdrawal of her troops.

Particularly in view of the failure of the United Nations to impose sanctions against Egypt, the Soviet Union, India and other nations who have in the past defied U.N. requests, it seems to me that our efforts should rather be directed toward the establishment of conditions which would make such a withdrawal more equitable and reasonable to all concerned. It is my understanding that Israel asks only that she be given a guarantee of no future raids or blockading of Israeli shipping on the part of Egypt from the territory which Israel will then relinquish. If such a promise is not forthcoming from Egypt, it seems to me that the United States as a leader of world opinion should make it clear that any such action or threat by Egypt from this territory at any future time would be met with prompt and effective action on the part of the United Nations, with recognition by the U.N. that Israel would then be entitled to defend her rights with any means at her disposal against such action from this area in keeping with the provisions of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

I believe such a statement by the United States at this time would do much to reassure Israel and to facilitate an end to the present controversy.

Sincerely yours,

John F. Kennedy



674.34A/2-1157

4346
A/35

323449

JFK:gl

FORM DS-18b

5-19-50

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ROUTING & REFERENCE SLIP

DATE

2/13

DIV. OR OFFICE

UNP

REMARKS:

INITIAL

TO

NAME

~~1~~ ADAMS~~2~~ DE PALMA

OWSLEY

SISCO

3

BANE

BAKER

BOCK

CRAMER

GOUGH

LUDLOW

MARCUS

SPIERS

TYLER

PEARCE

In reply refer to:
IO:UNP:674.84A/2-1157

February 26, 1957

General
Files

Dear Senator Kennedy:

I have received your letter of February 11 addressed to the Secretary, acknowledged by telephone on February 18, expressing concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way

that

DC/R
Anal 2
Rev
71-1157

The Honorable
John F. Kennedy,
United States Senate.

674.84A/2-1157

OS/674.84A/2-1157

that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

The views expressed in your letter are appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

IO:UNP:R/Ragenhardt:rs
2/26/57 

5-19-50

ROUTING & REFERENCE SLIP.

DATE _____

DIVISION OR OFFICE

REMARKS:

INITIAL

TO	NAME
	WILCOX
	WALMSLEY
	PHILLIPS
	TRANSTRUM
	DEMING
	BLOOMFIELD
	STUFFLEBEAM
7	DAVIS
	MESSAGE CENTER
	IO
	OPA
	QES
1	UNP
	OIA
	OTC

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT


February 14, 1957

IO - Mr. Davis

Roy:

IO is requested to prepare a reply to the attached letter, in which Senators Murray and Mansfield urge that our UN delegation not vote for sanctions against Israel, for signature by Assistant Secretary Hill.

Either the reply or an interim letter of acknowledgment should be sent by close of business Friday, February 15. Please send copies of the reply to S/S-EO.


E. K. German
S/S-EO

Att: Ltr to Sec fm Senators
Murray and Mansfield, dtd
2/11/57, re sanctions on
Israel (S/S #1021).

cc: H - Mr. Forsten

WALTER F. GEORGE, GA., CHAIRMAN
 THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, R. I.
 J. W. FULBRIGHT, ARK.
 JOHN SPARKMAN, ALA.
 HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN.
 MIKE MANSFIELD, MONT.
 WAYNE MORSE, OR.G.
 RUSSELL B. LONG, LA.
 ALEXANDER WILEY, WIS.
 H. ALEXANDER SMITH, N. J.
 BOURKE B. HICHENLOOPER, IOWA
 WILLIAM L. RIGER, N. DAK.
 WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND, CALIF.
 GEORGE D. AIKEN, VT.
 HOMER E. CAPEHART, IND.

CARL MARCY, CHIEF OF STAFF
 C. C. O'DAY, CLERK

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

ACTION
 is assigned to

February 11, 1957

7843

Honorable John Foster Dulles
 Secretary of State
 Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Foster:

We are very much disturbed at the possibility that the United Nations, with the approval of this country, would impose sanctions on Israel.

While we recognize that Israel has on occasion refused to honor United Nations resolutions, we also recognize the fact that the same reasoning can be applied to India in the case of Kashmir, to Egypt in the case of forbidding Israeli ships to go through the Suez Canal, and to the Soviet Union on numerous occasions, not the least of which was its recent action in Hungary. We believe that equality should be the rule in the matter of sanctions, resolutions and declarations. We, therefore, urge you to consider carefully the United States position on this matter and to apply the doctrine of equality in all matters affecting the decisions of the United Nations. We specifically urge and request at this time that the American delegation to the United Nations does not vote for sanctions against Israel.

With best wishes, we are

Respectfully yours,

This letter (and its enclosures, if any) micro-filmed for EM/R records

323545

JAMES E. MURRAY, U.S.S.

MIKE MANSFIELD, U.S.S.

MAR 12 1957

FILED

674.84A/2-1157

A/39

DC/R

Encl

Rev

Cat

February 26, 1957

Dear Senator Mansfield:

I have received your letter of February 11, also signed by Senator Murray, expressing your concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. Events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that I have felt it exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be accurate or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, that the President and I were anxious to meet last week with you and other members of the Congressional leadership in order to discuss together, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As I said at our meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condemn this would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist, and that the whole fabric of peace will be torn apart.

I think, also, that the President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations

develop

The Honorable
Mike Mansfield,
United States Senate.

674.84A/2-1157

674.84A/2-1157

DO/R
2
Cat

develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far Israel apparently has felt that these assurances were not sufficient. However, I am still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. I have discussed this further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw in reliance of the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may feel that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated withdrawal resolutions.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

RL01
H:RL01 Connor:fg:alr
S:JFD:lls:ma
2/27/57

Let's Pres by H. Kessinger
2/27/56

February 26, 1957

This Document Must Be Returned to
M/S
674.84A/2-1157

Dear Senator Murray:

I have received your letter of February 11, also signed by Senator Mansfield, expressing your concern over possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. Events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that I have felt it exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, that the President and I were anxious to meet last week with members of the Congressional leadership in order to discuss together, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As I said at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to concede this would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist, and that the whole fabric of peace will be torn apart.

I think, also, that the President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far Israel apparently has felt that these assurances were not sufficient. However, I am still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. I have discussed this

further

The Honorable
James E. Murray,
United States Senate.

DC/R
Anal. <i>[initials]</i>
Rev. <i>[initials]</i>
Cat. <i>[initials]</i>

Delivered by messenger 2/27/57

CSELK

674.84A/2-1157

further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw in reliance of the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may feel that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated withdrawal resolutions.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

RL5'c
H:RLO'Connor:fg
S:JFDulles:ma 2-25-57

Cleared with Mr. Hill (H)

FORM DS-18b
5-19-50

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROUTING & REFERENCE SLIP

DATE

2/13

DIV. OR OFFICE

UNP

REMARKS:

INITIAL

TO	NAME
1	ADAMS <i>Yes</i>
2	DE PAIMA
	OWSLEY
	SISCO
3	Ganley (action)
	BANE
	BAKER
	BOCK
	CRAMER
	GOUGH
	LUDLOW
	MARCUS
	SPIERS
	TYLER
	PEARCE

7778

ACTION
is assigned to



*re knowledge
on phone 2/15
P.H.*

United States Senate

February 11, 1957

Respectfully referred to
Honorable Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

with thanks for such favorable consideration as
the communication herewith submitted warrants,
and for a report thereon, in duplicate to
accompany return of inclosure.

*X2
320 5784a*

By direction of

CHARLES E. POTTER, U. S. S.

Encl aff

(and its
(any) micro-
records

323450



674184A/2-1157

FILED
MAR 11 1957

A/53

DC/R
Anal <i>✓</i>
Rev <i>✓</i>
Cat <i>✓</i>

FEB 26 1957

In reply refer to
IO:UNP 674.84A/2-1157

Dear Senator Potter:

I have received your communication of February 11, 1957, acknowledged by telephone on February 15, 1957, transmitting a telegram dated February 9, 1957, from Mr. Phil Epstein expressing his concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given

important

cc/S The Honorable
Charles E. Potter,
United States Senate.

674:34A/2-1157

674-34A/2-1157
CS/1A

important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

The telegram from Mr. Epstein is returned as requested, a copy having been made for the files of the Department.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

3B
IO:UNP:BBeck:lmr 2/26/57

H-WF-X

CLASS OF SERVICE

This is a fast message unless its deferred character is indicated by the proper symbol.

WESTERN UNION TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SYMBOLS

DL=Day Letter

NL=Night Letter

LT=International Letter Telegram

1220
(R 11-54)

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is STANDARD TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is STANDARD TIME at point of destination

CTA815 DEA757

DE LGA508 NL PD=LANSING MICH 11=

HON JOHN FOSTER DULLES=

SECY OF STATE WASHDC=

THIS IS SIMPLY TO ADD MY VOICE TO THOSE OF THE MANY OTHERS WHO HAVE URGED THAT THE UNITED STATES OPPOSE A DOUBLE STANDARD OF MORALITY IN REGARD TO CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN HUNGARY. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT IT WOULD BE GROSSLY UNJUST FOR THE UNITED

STATES TO SUPPORT ECONOMICS SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL.

WHEN WE HAVE MADE NO PROPOSAL FOR SUCH SANCTIONS

AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION FOR ITS UNQUESTIONED AGGRESSION AND CONTINUED IMPERIALISM IN HUNGARY. IN THE LATTER CASE,

THERE WAS NO QUESTION EITHER OF SELF DEFENSE AGAINST BORDER RAIDS OR OF COUNTER-MEASURES AGAINST ECONOMIC STRANGULATION, BOTH OF WHICH FIGURED IN ISRAEL'S ACTION.

SURELY IT WOULD BE THE HEIGHT OF FOLLY TO SUPPORT UNITED NATIONS ACTIONS AGAINST A FRIENDLY NATION, WHILE CONTINUING TO STAND IDLE IN THE FACE OF FAR GREATER INJUSTICES COMMITTED BY THE SOVIET UNION=

PHILIP A HART LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR LANSING MICH=.

39
Rev
Pat

THE COMPANY WILL APPRECIATE SUGGESTIONS FROM ITS PATRONS CONCERNING ITS SERVICE

1951 FEB 11 PM 7

1008

SS

Central
File

Document must be

draft
2/11/51

674.84A/2-1157

674.84a/2-1157

CST

APR 18 1951

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 13, 1957

SEV - ~~Mr. Meagher~~ *PCB*

Forwarded for appropriate action is a telegram to the Secretary from Philip Hart, Lt. Governor of Michigan, objecting to the imposition of sanctions against Israel.

May we have a copy of the reply in S/S-RO?

AmB
Archer Blood
S/S-RO

Attachment:

As stated above dtd 2/11/57
(S/S-1008)

February 13, 1957

SEV - Mr. Meagher

Forwarded for appropriate action is a telegram to the Secretary from Philip Hart, Lt. Governor of Michigan, objecting to the imposition of sanctions against Israel.

May we have a copy of the reply in
S/S-RO?

Archer Blood
S/S-RO

Attachment:

As stated above dtd 2/11/57
(S/S-1008)

April 1 1957

Dear Mr. Hart:

Secretary Dulles has asked me to reply to your telegram of February 11, 1957 opposing the imposition of economic sanctions on Israel by the United Nations. He appreciated your interest in making your views available, and I am very sorry for the inadvertent delay in this response.

The United States does not now have the question of sanctions against Israel under consideration because of the decision of the Government of Israel to complete her withdrawal behind the Armistice line in compliance with the United Nations Resolution of February 2, 1957. This decision demonstrates once again that the free world nations have a decent respect for the opinions of mankind, as reflected in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Now that this withdrawal has been completed, in the President's words, "The United States, for its part will vigorously seek solutions of the problems of the area in accordance with justice and international law."

Throughout the recent situation, it has been the constant position of the United States that the Israelis withdraw from Egypt without achieving political advantages which Israel did not possess before it invaded Egypt. Soviet disregard of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the ruthless suppression by the Soviet Union of the Hungarian people cannot mean that the United Nations should not take action in situations where such action might prove effective. As the President said, "Perhaps this is a case where the proverb applies that two wrongs do not make a right."

This

The Honorable

Philip A. Hart,

Lieutenant Governor of Michigan,
Lansing.

Ans. 39

Rev.

Cat.

General
File

674.84A/2-1157

CAT

674.84A/2-1157

Not to be returned to

This Government emphasized its intention to take advantage of the fluidity of the situation which was produced by the Israel invasion of Egypt as early as November 3, 1956 when we introduced in the United Nations General Assembly two resolutions stating our determination to come to grips with the basic issues.

We did and continue to recognize that Israel had some very legitimate and genuine concerns for its own security, particularly regarding free passage through the Straits of Tiran and the danger of renewed fedayeen raids from the Gaza Strip. We believe that the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Armistice line, and United States intention to exercise the right of free passage through the Gulf of Aqaba and to join with others securing general recognition of this right will go far to remedy the conditions which led to the outbreak of the recent conflict.

On August 26, 1955 Secretary Dulles outlined the contributions which this Government is prepared to make in assisting the parties directly concerned in efforts to reach a basic settlement in the Middle East. This offer remains valid today. A copy of the Secretary's speech is enclosed for your ready reference.

I am also enclosing, for your personal use, copies of the President's radio and television address of February 20; the United States aide memoire of February 11; a statement by Ambassador Lodge at the United Nations on March 1; and a speech by Deputy Under Secretary Robert Murphy of March 14. These documents embody recent statements of United States policy in the Middle East.

Sincerely yours,

John P. Meagher
Chief
Public Services Division

Enclosures:

As stated.

5107
212
MAR 2 1957 P.M.

P:SV:DMCampbell:bt

From previous cleared by NSA/P 2/28/57

Dear Mr. Hart:

6957
Secretary Dulles has asked me to reply to your telegram of February 11, opposing the imposition of economic sanctions on Israel by the United Nations. He appreciates your interest in making your views available, and I am very sorry for the inadvertent delay in this response.

~~I can assure you that President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles are continuing to give their personal attention to this vital matter.~~

Sincerely yours,

*D copy from
filney*

John P. Meagher
Chief
Public Services Division

I am also enclosing, for your personal use, copies of the President's radio and television address of February 20; the United States aide memoire of February 11; a statement by Ambassador Lodge at the United Nations of March 1; and a speech by Deputy Under Secretary Philip A. Hart, Lieutenant Governor of Michigan, Lansing, March 14. These documents embody recent statements of United States policy in the Middle East.

OK JWP
P:SEV:LMCampbell:bt

2/19/57

NEA/P

*From previous
cleared by NEA/P*

American Jewish Congress

NEW ENGLAND REGION

AARON J. BRONSTEIN, President

7892

7891

ACTION
is assigned to

Past-Presidents

ALBERT HURWITZ
SAMUEL KALESKY
PETER M. LEAVITT
MORRIS MICHELSON
EDWARD L. SCHOENBERG
RABBI JOSEPH SHUBOW

JOSEPH MATISON, Secretary
MILTON BORENSTEIN, Financial Secretary

Vice-Presidents

HENRY C. BERLIN
LOUIS EPSTEIN
MRS. LOUIS FELDMAN
SOLOMON GOOTMAN
MAX KABATZNICK
ISADORE KAGAN

DR. MICHAEL LUCACER
MRS. MAURICE SAPERS
JACOB SCHWOLSKY
HERMAN SNYDER
ADOLPH ULLMAN
DANIEL WEISBERG

SIDNEY STONEMAN, Treasurer
JACOB PROMBOIN, Associate Treasurer

M. JACOB JOSLOW, Executive Director

72 FRANKLIN STREET • BOSTON 10, MASS. • Liberty 2-0266

February 11, 1957

Hon. John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. Dulles:

This is further to our telegram urging the United States delegation at the United Nations to oppose sanctions against Israel. We agree that the United States as well as the United Nations shall leave no stone unturned to preserve peace in the world, but we object violently to what appears to be discriminatory selection of action on alleged violation of United Nations orders. How can a freedom-loving country such as ours establish double standards of morality by which it acts against one nation and closes its eyes to even more guilty parties?

We appeal to you not to allow this government of ours to be involved in action that violates our sense of equity and fair play. We hope that our government will not stand by to permit sanctions against the only democratic country in the Middle East, Israel, simply because of its resistance to evacuation of Gaza and Sharm el-Sheikh, a procedure necessary for the protection of life and limb of its citizens.

Respectfully yours,

Aaron J. Bronstein
President



DC/R	39
Anal	
Rev	
Cat	


APR 12 1957

FILED

674.84A/2-1157

CSELK

674.84A/2-1157



320878

FEB 13 1957

File w/o reply

4/9

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

43-48

UNCLASSIFIED

Action

Control: 8347

NEA

Rec'd: February 14, 1957
2:16 a.m.

Info

FROM: Cairo

RM/R

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 2602, February 12

G

SF

PRIORITY

C

EUR

SENT DEPARTMENT 2602, USUN 77

IC

E

F

GOE Information Department tonight issued two statements as press releases. Texts follow:

UOP

ND

C

GLT

"Official source commented on plan said to have been put forward by Mister Dulles, which aims at meeting Israel's claims for unrestricted navigation in Egypt's territorial waters in Gulf of Aqaba, and stationing of UN forces in Gaza under pretext of protecting Israel from Egyptian aggression.

GOE

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

"This official source said that, were this the case, then it could only be considered as slap to Arabs since it would mean resolving Palestine issue in Israel's favor.

"The Arabs would have expected America to demand Israel's compliance with UN resolutions regarding rights of people of Palestine to their homeland, their homes, and their property. But instead America chooses turn blind eye to claims of original inhabitants of Palestine, and ignores Israel's refusal to implement UN resolutions; and finally encourages Israel's attempt make political capital out of her aggression on Egypt.

"Allegation that Gaza used to be employed as base for military attacks by Egypt utterly unfounded, and Mister Dulles knows very well that military attacks never emanated from Gaza but always came from Israel -- against Egypt, against Syria and against Jordan.

"As for America's backing for Israel's demands of access through Egypt's territorial waters in Gulf Aqaba, at time when rights of the Arabs of Palestine are being violated, that can only be regarded as clear bias in Israel's favor, with view to resolving Palestine issue in Israel's favor and thus achieving all her demands at expense of legitimate rights of Arabs of Palestine."

Text of

PERMANENT

UNCLASSIFIED

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

This Document Must Be Returned to
RM/R
Central
Files
674.84A/2-1257

HBS

UNCLASSIFIED

-2- 2602, February 12, from Cairo

Text of second press release:

"El-Sayed Abdel-Kader Hatem, Director General of Information Department, said today that states that support Israeli claims and strive for their realization are in fact denouncing Arab rights in Palestine as well as UN Charter, for the United Nations had adopted resolutions recognizing rights of Arabs of Palestine but Israel had refused to implement these resolutions, same as she now refuses implementation of UN resolutions regarding withdrawal of her troops from Egyptian territory.

"El-Sayed Hatem added that it was clear that those states aimed at enabling Israel to secure certain gains as result of her tripartite aggression with Britain and France against Egypt.

"Director General of Information Department went on to say: 'Israel has certain requests but Arabs of Palestine also have certain rights. It is indeed very strange that some countries should support Israeli demands and work towards having them realized and forget completely Arab rights in Palestine, rights that were recognized by United Nations in resolutions which Israel had bluntly and openly refused to implement.'"

"Palestine Arabs have rights in their homeland and to their property and possessions, which have been usurped by Israel.

"States at present working for destroying Palestine Arabs rights. This constitutes stab to Arabs as well as to United Nations, and attempt to placate Israel at expense of Arabs.

"Relying on support of certain states, Israel is today trying to realize its claims at time when she refuses to comply with United Nations decisions which emphasize rights of Palestine people, thus jeopardizing forever Palestine Arabs rights, aim which imperialist powers are straining every nerve to attain.

"Sayed Abdel-Kader Hatem also said that 1949 truce agreement stipulated that no political or military gains should be realized by any of signatory parties. Yet Israel continued to violate agreement to realize military gains through assistance of both France and Britain and she is today, through assistance of certain powers, trying realize political gains, fact which will terminate Palestine problem in favor Israel and constitute flagrant violation of Palestine Arabs rights.

"Egyptian Government considers every assistance to Israel in this respect grave violation of Palestine Arab rights and defiance to United Nations decisions which uphold these rights.

"Sayed Abdel

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

-4- 2602, February 12, from Cairo

"Sayed Abdel-Kader Hatem concluded his statement by saying th
Egypt holds fast to all her rights as well as to those of
Palestine Arabs stipulated by United Nations.

HARE

JB-16

UNCLASSIFIED

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 7375

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 12, 1957
6:52 PM

L
Action
S/S

Info

FROM: TEL AVIV

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 942, FEBRUARY 12, 11 PM

PRIORITY

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING.

REFERENCE EMBTEL 941.-674.84a

BEN GURION'S ORAL COMMENTS TO ME IN TRANSMITTING LETTER CLOSELY FOLLOWED ITS PATTERN. IN ADDITION, HE DWELT ON WHAT HE SAID HE CONSIDERS ENIGMA OF HIGHEST WORLD AUTHORITY, SUPPORTED BY US AS WORLDS LEADING STATE, DISCRIMINATING AGAINST "TINY. ISRAEL" AND DEMANDING ADHERENCE BY IT TO UN RESOLUTIONS IN FAVOR OF EGYPT WHICH FOR YEARS HAD DEFIED -- NOT MERELY GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH CAN ONLY RECOMMEND, BUT SECURITY COUNCIL ITSELF.

PURSUING THEME WHICH IS CURRENTLY POPULAR WITH CABINET AND FOREIGN MINISTRY, HE SAID US PROBABLY OWED TO SINAI CAMPAIGN SOME SHARE OF ITS PRESENT SUCCESSES WITH ARAB WORLD. IT WAS HIS VIEW SAUD NEVER WOULD HAVE HAD COURAGE TO DEFY NASSER BY VISITING US IF NASSER HAD NOT FIRST BEEN HUMILIATED BY IDF. SIMILARLY, LEBANON IS EXPRESSING VIEWS WHICH IT HAS ENTERTAINED LONG TIME BUT HAD NOT COURAGE TO EXPRESS OPENLY UNTIL NASSER'S DEFEAT JORDAN WAS ANOTHER. IN OCTOBER, HUSSEIN HAD BECOME PARTY TO ALLIANCE WITH SYRIA AND EGYPT WITH AVOWED PURPOSE DESTROYING ISRAEL. NOW HE WAS EMBOLDENED TO TAKE MORE INDEPENDENT LINE. SAUD'S VISIT AND AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH HIM WERE OF IMPORTANCE TO US WHICH SHOULD NOT ENDANGER THESE GAINS BY GIVING NASSER VICTORY IN PRESENT UN TEST WHICH WOULD THEN ENABLE HIM TO REASERT AUTHORITY OVER ARAB STATES.

I SAID THAT I WAS DISTURBED BY UNVARYING INSISTENCE BY PRESS AND

ISRAEL

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

Tel Aviv 942

674.84a/2-1257

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- 942, FEBRUARY 12, 11 PM, FROM TEL AVIV

ISRAEL OFFICIALS THAT SO MUCH RESPONSIBILITY WAS WITH US AND I POINTED OUT THAT FROM BEGINNING WE HAD THOUGHT UN WAS MOST SUITABLE AUTHORITY TO SEEK SOLUTION. IT WAS UNREASONABLE TO CHARGE US WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR EVERY KNOTTY PROBLEM UN ENCOUNTERED. HIS REJOINDER WAS THAT NEVERTHELESS, US POSITION WOULD DETERMINE FINAL ANSWER.

WE DISCUSSED **REPORT** CARRIED IN PRESS LATE TODAY THAT PRESIDENT HAS ASKED NASSER WHETHER HE IS PREPARED TO EXPRESS INTENTION OF NON-BELLIGERENCE.

IF PRESIDENT HAD DELIVERED SUCH MESSAGE, HE COULD ANTICIPATE NASSER'S REPLY. IT WOULD BE, "NOT UNLESS ISRAEL WITHDREW FROM SHARM EL SHEIKH AND GAZA IN WHICH CASE HE WOULD BE WILLING TO COMPLY". BUT WITH ISRAEL OUT, OLD STORY OF MURDER AND BLOCKAGE WOULD BEGIN AGAIN. NASSER'S WORD WAS NOT TO BE RELIED ON; THAT WAS WHY ISRAEL HAD TO HAVE MORE THAN EGYPT'S GUARANTEES ON FREEDOM OF TRANSIT TIRAN STRAITS.

BEN GURION SAID EBAN HAD TUESDAY APPOINTMENT WITH SECRETARY AT WHICH TIME HE THOUGHT THEY MIGHT EXPECT LATTERS COMMENTS ON REPLY TO PRESIDENT.

HE APOLOGIZED AND BLAMED HIS PERSONAL MISUNDERSTANDING OF CUSTOMARY PROCEDURES THAT VIRTUALLY FINAL TEXT OF LETTER HAD BEEN GIVEN TO MURPHY BY EBAN FRIDAY WITHOUT ADVICE TO ME. I DO NOT KNOW REASON FOR THIS PROCEDURE BUT PRESUME IT MAY HAVE BEEN ARRANGED BY HIS AIDES AT EBAN'S REQUEST IN ORDER TO ENABLE HIM TO GET DEPARTMENT'S EAR AT WHAT THEY REGARD AS CRITICAL JUNCTURE.

BEN GURION IS STILL CONFINED TO BEDROOM BUT IS RECEIVING OFFICIAL VISITORS. IN MY OPINION HE LOOKS NO BETTER THAN WHEN I SAW HIM LAST WEEK. HOWEVER, HE AND AIDE TOLD ME HE CONTINUES TO IMPROVE AND ONLY DOCTORS ARE RESTRAINING HIM. I COULD ELICIT NO COMMENT ON HIS CONDITION FROM MRS. BEN GURION.

LAWSON

AAL

CONFIDENTIAL



3/10
8

PRESIDENTIAL HANDLING

T. Clavin
942 PH

942
2/12/57
7371

✓ ~~#2~~

✓ ~~#3~~

✓ #4

✓ #5

Re Ben Murrison
message to Pres
on Suess

Category C
Academy

~~10A~~

✓ ~~#6~~

✓ ~~#7~~

✓ ~~#8~~

2-5, 7-10 Inc.
destroyed 3/23/59
P. Hall

✓ #9

✓ #1

s/s Committee
1st Session
6th Session

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATION

AIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

58-L

Action

IO

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

EUR

NEA

L

R

O

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: - DELGA 718, FEBRUARY 12, 8 P.M.

PRIORITY

RE PALESTINE (GAZA)

Control: 7421

Rec'd:

FEBRUARY 12, 1957

9:18 PM



SYG ASKED SEE LODGE THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS SITUATION IN GAZA. SYG SAID THAT IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER IT WILL BE NECESSARY TO ADMINISTER GAZA. HE HAD PUT QUESTION TO FAWZI WHETHER EGYPT WOULD PERMIT UN ADMINISTRATION OF GAZA. FAWZI'S ANSWER WAS THE TIMING WAS WRONG AND THAT "WHEN THE RIGHT TIME COMES YOU (SYG) WILL BE ABLE SAY EVEN MUCH MORE THAN THAT". HAMMARSKJOLD HAS TAKEN THIS STATEMENT TO MEAN EGYPT WOULD NOT OBJECT TO STEP UP IN UN ACTIVITIES IN GAZA AND SOME FORM UN ADMINISTRATION "KEEPING AN EGYPTIAN FACE ON IT".

HAMMARSKJOLD REFERRED TO THE 300,000 REFUGEES THAT NEED CARE AND THE ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION AS A SYSTEM OF "VILLAGE ALDERMEN". HAMMARSKJOLD SAID LABOUISSSE BELIEVES, AND HE AGREES, THERE WOULD BE NEED, ONCE ISRAELI FORCES HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN, FOR A UN HIGH COMMISSIONER AND AN EGYPTIAN MILITARY GOVERNOR. HAMMARSKJOLD IS ANXIOUS MAKE PREPARATIONS NOW WITHIN SECRETARIAT FOR UN ADMINISTRATION SHOULD ISRAELIS DECIDE WITHDRAW. "UN TAKE-OVER" WOULD HAVE TAKE PLACE QUICKLY UPON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, HAMMARSKJOLD SAID. HE DESCRIBED FINANCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF CREDITS, ASSETS, SALE OF CITRUS FRUITS, EDUCATION AND HEALTH. HE SAID IN ORDER ADMINISTER GAZA, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY ORGANIZE SOME KIND OF "SHADOW CABINET" WHICH WOULD HAVE CHARGE ALL ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS.

IN ORDER MOVE HIS PLANS ALONG, HE IS VERY ANXIOUS GET GENERAL LUCIUS CLAY AS HIS CONSULTANT TO DEVELOP PREPARATORY PLANS FOR UN ADMINISTRATION OF GAZA. HE WOULD LIKE GENERAL THIMAYIA OF INDIA AS UN HIGH COMMISSIONER.

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED

674.84A/2-1257

PA

CLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DELGA 718, FEBRUARY 12, 8 P.M., FROM NEW YORK

SYG SPOKE VERY HIGHLY OF CLAY AND SAID HE HAD NOT POSED QUESTION TO HIM SINCE HE WANTED SPEAK FIRST TO U.S. IF SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT FELT THIS WAS GOOD IDEA, HE WAS SURE THIS WOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON CLAY IN HIS DECISION. HE SAID IT WAS NOT LONG TERM JOB AND NOT FIELD JOB SINCE AN AMERICAN OPERATION IN FIELD WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE. HE HAS IN MIND THAT CLAY WOULD OPERATE LIKE MCCLOY AS ASST TO SYG, WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING PLANS FOR UN ADMINISTRATION. SYG SAID CLAY COULD DRAW UPON NUMBER OF EXPERTS IN SECRETARIAT WHO COULD CONSTITUTE PLANNING WORK TEAM. HE WOULD LIKE HAVE REACTION OF U.S. TO THIS SUGGESTION AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

IN CLOSING, SYG MENTIONED THAT REACTION TO HIS REPORT ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND RELATED MEASURES HAS BEEN GOOD. HE SAID HE FELT HIS REPORT WAS BALANCED IN THAT IT: (1) EMPHASIZED NEGOTIATIONS; (2) TOOK CLEAR-CUT LINE WITH RESPECT ISRAELIS GETTING OUT ENTIRELY FROM GAZA; AND (3) CAUTIONED THAT THERE ARE ELEMENTS OF CONFLICT IF SANCTIONS ARE PURSUED. SYG SAID "PSYCHOLOGICAL MARKET" IS NOT GOOD FOR SANCTIONS SINCE CASE IS NOT CLEAR-CUT. HE BELIEVES IT IS TOO EARLY MOVE INTO SANCTIONS. BUNCHE ON OTHER HAND STILL MAINTAINS GAZA QUESTION WILL NOT BE SOLVED SHORT OF SANCTIONS. HAMMARSKJOLD SAID DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HIM AND BUNCHE ON SANCTIONS IS ONLY QUESTION OF TIMING.

SYG SAID FAWZI'S REACTION TO REPORT WAS IT WAS ALL RIGHT, CONTAINING BOTH PLEASANT AND UNPLEASANT ELEMENTS.

LODGE

CC

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

FROM: NEW YORK

TO: Secretary of State

NO: DELGA 722, FEBRUARY 12, 10 PM

PRIORITY

RE PALESTINE (SANCTIONS)

PEARSON (CANADA) ASKED SEE LODGE THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS NEXT STEPS ON MID-EAST SITUATION. HIS IDEA WAS THAT IF AND WHEN MATTER AGAIN COMES BEFORE GA, WE SHOULD TRY TO AVOID RES ON SANCTIONS. HOWEVER, IF THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE AS HE FEARED, THEN WE SHOULD TRY AVOID HAVING VOTE ON SANCTIONS RES BY PUTTING FORWARD SOMETHING ELSE. HE SUGGESTED A DETAILED RES SPELLING OUT UN INTENTIONS (I.E. UNEF IN SHARM EL-SHEIKH, GAZA, DEMARCATION LINE, ETC.) COUPLED WITH AN ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE ISRAELIS IN ADVANCE TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO WITHDRAW ON BASIS OF DETAILED PROPOSALS. SUCH PROPOSAL AS HE HAD IN MIND COULD, IF NECESSARY, INCLUDE FINAL PARA SAYING IF WITHDRAWAL NOT BROUGHT ABOUT, GA WOULD HAVE CONSIDER WHAT KIND OF EFFECTIVE ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN. HE REITERATED, HOWEVER, ISRAELIS MUST BE PERSUADED IN ADVANCE TO ACCEPT HIS FORMULATION AS SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THEIR WITHDRAWAL.


PEARSON SAID PUBLIC OPINION, AND THAT OF PARLIAMENT AND CABINET, HAD SWUNG AROUND CONSIDERABLY SO THAT NOW ISRAEL WAS NO LONGER APPEARING AS "AGGRESSOR" BUT MORE IN ROLE OF "POOR LITTLE INNOCENT VICTIM". AS RESULT CANADA WOULD NOT VOTE FOR SANCTIONS OF ANY KIND. HE MADE POINT IT HARD EXPLAIN WHY SANCTIONS NOT TAKEN AGAINST OTHERS. HE ALSO BELIEVED IT DESIRABLE TRY FIND WAY GET ISRAELIS OUT AND NOT PUSH THEIR BACKS TO WALL WITH SANCTIONS.

MRS. MEIR (ISRAEL) HAD BEEN VERY TOUGH WITH PEARSON. BUT SHE HAD SAID QUESTION OF SHARM EL-SHEIKH COULD BE WORKED OUT PRESUMABLY ON BASIS PROPOSAL MADE BY SECRETARY TO EBA.

PERMANENT

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.



674.84A/2-1257

PA

CLASSIFIED

FILED
MAY 2 1957

LESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED

CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DELGA 722, FEBRUARY 12, 10 PM, FROM NEW

WHICH COULD BE FORMALIZED BY SOME KIND OF U. DECLARATION IN GAZA. HOWEVER, REGARDING GAZA, IT WAS CLEAR ISRAEL HAD NO INTENTION OF GETTING OUT, AT LEAST AS FAR AS CIVIL ADMINISTRATION CONCERNED. PEARSON FELT US PROPOSAL TO EBAN WAS HELPFUL RE SHARM EL-SHEIKH, BUT NOT RE GAZA.

PEARSON REPORTED MEIR HAD ALSO REFUSED SAY IF ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT UNEF ON ISRAELI SIDE OF ARMISTICE LINE IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCE. IN FACT, HE SAID, SHE HAD SAID AT ONE POINT THEY WOULD NOT AGREE. PEARSON WAS INCLINED DOUBT THEY WOULD STICK ON THIS POINT.

PEARSON THEN MENTIONED ONE PROPOSAL MEIR HAD MADE WHICH HE SAID WAS MEANT BE CONSTRUCTIVE. IT WAS THAT UN SEND MISSION TO TAKE LOOK AT GAZA SITUATION, REPORT ON IT AND MAKE WHATEVER RECOMMENDATIONS THEY FELT APPROPRIATE. MRS. MEIR WAS CONVINCED THEY WOULD SEEK ISRAEL'S SIDE OF CASE BUT IF THEY SHOULD RECOMMEND SOMETHING OTHER THAN ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION, PRESUMABLY ISRAEL WOULD ACCEPT SUCH RECOMMENDATION. THIS INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS ACCEPT OUTSIDE RECOMMENDATION WAS IN CONTEXT OF MEIR STATEMENT NO IMPARTIAL BODY COULD FAIL SUPPORT ISRAELI CASE OR IGNORE FACTS.

REFERRING TO UN MISSION, PEARSON SAID HE HAD IN MIND GROUP OF THREE INDIVIDUALS, NOT REPS OF GOVTS. (SUBSEQUENTLY, RAMSBOTHAM (UK) QUERIED US ON US DEMARCHE TO ISRAEL. RAMSBOTHAM SAID UK HAD RECD ACCOUNT FROM PEARSON WHICH INCLUDED REPORT US HAD PROPOSED TO EBAN SENDING OF UN COMMISSION TO GAZA. WE TOLD RAMSBOTHAM OUR FIRST KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH PROPOSAL HAD JUST COME FROM PEARSON, WHO HAD TOLD US IT ORIGINATED WITH MEIR. RAMSBOTHAM ALSO SAID PEARSON REPORTED TO UK THAT US HAD TAKEN POSITION WITH EBAN THAT ISRAEL SHOULD BE LINKED TO WHATEVER UN ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES THERE MIGHT BE IN GAZA. RAMSBOTHAM SAID IN ADDITION PEARSON HAD TOLD UK THAT US WAS OPPOSED SANCTIONS.)

SUMMING UP, PEARSON SAID HE FELT IF FREE PASSAGE COULD BE WORKED OUT ON BASIS US DECLARATION AND IF GAZA COULD BE SOLVED IN WAY DESCRIBED ABOVE, THIS WOULD BE BEST SOLUTION AVAILABLE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. HE SAID HE THOUGHT SYG THINKING ALONG SIMILAR LINES.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DELGA 722, FEBRUARY 12, 10 PM, FROM NEW

ACCORDING PEARSON, LABOUISSE (UNRWA) HAD CONVINCED HIM IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT FOR UN TAKE OVER GAZA. REFUGEES AND VICILIAN RESIDENTS HAVE BEEN MIXED UP AND REFUGEE PROBLEM IN LONG RUN MUST BE ASSIMILATED WITH GENERAL PROBLEM ADMINISTERING GAZA. PEARSON AGREED ONCE UN BECOMES INVOLVED IN OPERATION, IT IS DIFFICULT DISENGAGE ITSELF.

RETURNING TO QUESTION OF US STATEMENT, PEARSON SAID HE WOULD HAVE THOUGHT IT EASIER FOR EGYPT TO REAFFIRM ITS INTENTION NOT INTERFERE WITH FREEDOM PASSAGE AQABA THEN ACCEPT A UNILATERAL STATEMENT.

PEARSON REPORTED ALSO THAT AT ONE POINT IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH MR. SHE INSISTED ON FREEDOM OF PASSAGE THROUGH SUEZ CANAL AS ADDED CONDITION FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. AFTER CONVERSATION, HOWEVER, ANOTHER MEMBER ISRAELI DEL CALLED PEARSON TO SAY HE SHOULD NOT BECOME TOO ALARMED ABOUT THIS.

LODGE

CONFIDENTIAL

**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

06935

1957 FEB 13 PM 6 40

SENT TO: AmEmbassy, LONDON
AmEmbassy, PARIS

5647
3125

674

842/200/1257
L320 5780

For DCJT use only.

Origin
EUR
Info:

Code Room please repeat DELGA 718 February 12, from New York.
(Control No. 7421).

Re situation in Lega.

*Dulles
(1257)*

DULLES

674.842/2-1257

Re:

Dist.
Desired

(Office
Copy)

EUR

SS

IO

Rev

Sec

Drafted by:

EUR:LStaples:bh 2-13-57

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Taylor G. Belcher

Clearances:

S/S-CP
FEB 13 1957 P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

CONFIDENTIAL

674.842/2-1257
OS/J

S
NEA:NE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

CONFIDENTIAL

DATE: February 12, 1957

SUBJECT: Gaza and Aqaba

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
G - Mr. Robert Murphy *Ok'd in the meeting*
NE- Mr. Donald C. Bergus

COPIES TO: S/S (2)
G
NEA (2)
IO
NE

The Israel Ambassador stated that he had transmitted the text of the Aide-Mémoire and had reported yesterday's conversation with the Secretary to the Foreign Minister, who was now in New York. He did not wish to prejudge what must be a Cabinet decision, but he and the Foreign Minister felt this was a serious and constructive step on the part of the United States. The approach regarding Aqaba had been welcomed, and he thought his Government would respond to it affirmatively.

He noted that the United States position on Gaza was obscure and felt that the United States might want to elucidate it. The crux of the issue was who would be in charge of the civil administration upon the entry of the United Nations forces. There were three possible elements: United Nations, Israel and Egypt. There was perhaps a fourth element, local administration. Israel had the negative objective of preventing Egypt's return. Mr. Eban felt that the United Nations would have a basis for excluding Egypt, in that Egypt continued in a state of belligerency towards Israel. Mr. Eban repeated the usual arguments for not sundering the links between Israel and Gaza and not returning a strip of territory so close to the center of Israel to a status of being at war with Israel. Mr. Eban recalled the Secretary's speech of August 26, 1955, and said that Gaza, under Israel civil administration could be a "pilot project" for repatriation to such extent as may be feasible for resettlement. Mr. Shiloah expressed apprehension over the possibility of Gaza becoming a center of subversion if the UNEF tried to administer it.

Mr. Murphy inquired whether Israel had any ideas as to how the proposals which

CONFIDENTIAL

374.841/2-1257

C3/J

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

674.841/2-1257

FILED

13197

DC/R

Serial 50

Rev

Cert

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

which it suggested could be handled at the United Nations in New York. Mr. Eban felt that something could be worked out, keyed to the theme of Egypt's belligerency and the undesirability of returning to Gaza. Mr. Murphy felt that the overriding authority of the United Nations had to be taken into account and noted that the November 2 resolution called for unqualified withdrawal behind the armistice lines. Mr. Eban ventured the thought that, given the establishment of a purely United Nations regime, the regime might wish to call upon Israel to provide certain essential services in the strip. Mr. Shiloah suggested that the United Nations might wish to appoint a Commission to look into the problem of Gaza.

Mr. Eban stated that he had urged his Government to make an early reply to the United States Aide-Mémoire. He felt that such a reply might be forthcoming by Thursday, February 14. He hoped that action in the General Assembly could be deferred meanwhile. Israel still adhered to its demand that Israel shipping should be able to use the Suez Canal. They assumed that United States support for Israel's position on this point continued. Mr. Murphy confirmed that there had been no change in our position. Mr. Eban pointed out that despite some press reports to the contrary, Israel's right of transit through the Suez Canal was not being made a condition of Israel withdrawal. Israel anticipated some type of litigation over Suez and felt that the onus should be on Egypt to prove, if it could, that Israel had no such right. Mr. Shiloah predicted that the Israel Foreign Minister and Ambassador Eban would shortly be summoned to fly back to Israel for discussion on these important matters. The Israel Government would probably feel that such discussions were essential, although Mr. Shiloah felt that a directive to the Embassy here to make a preliminary reply to the Aide-Mémoire would be forthcoming very shortly. Mr. Shiloah suggested that the Department appoint somebody to carry out discussions with the Israelis in Washington as to how Gaza might be handled.

Mr. Eban asked if we considered that further General Assembly action was required. Mr. Murphy expressed the preliminary and personal view that the General Assembly would have to act at an early date. We were open-minded as to the form such action would take. He wondered whether the problems of Gaza and Aqaba were interrelated and tentatively concluded that they were.

It was agreed that the press would be told that this had been a routine meeting in which a number of problems, including matters arising from the Secretary's talk with Mr. Eban of the previous day had been discussed.

CONFIDENTIAL

NE: DCB:ojf
2-13-57

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 12, 1957

SUBJECT: MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Johan A. Nykopp, Embassy of Finland
IO - Francis O. Wilcox
EUR - William T. Nunley
UNP - Elizabeth A. Brown

COPIES TO:

7 PM/R
OLI 2
IO 2 (cc)
UNP 3 (cc)
EUR (cc)
NEA (cc)
L/UNA (cc)

Ambassador Nykopp came in at his request to discuss the prospect of working something out between Israel and Egypt on withdrawal and freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran.

Mr. Wilcox reviewed current developments in some detail, and said, despite uncertainty on several points, we remained generally hopeful. The Arabs either wanted action by Israel or action by the Assembly imposing sanctions. The United States believed that it would be preferable to work things out with the parties rather than return to the Assembly and was seeking this objective. It would be difficult to get any assurances from Egypt pending Israeli withdrawal since from the outset the Arab position has been against negotiations while Israeli troops remain on Egyptian soil. With withdrawal Egyptian cooperation might be expected, and pressure on Egypt to bring matters to a peaceful solution would be great. Mr. Wilcox added that we regarded the Straits as an international waterway where Israel should have the right of navigation.

Ambassador Nykopp indicated his Government generally shared these views, but asked what would be done if Egypt failed to cooperate. Mr. Wilcox replied that we had reasons to expect, and hoped for, Egyptian cooperation. It seemed doubtful whether, once Israeli withdrawal was achieved, Egypt would place itself in defiance of the United Nations.

Ambassador Nykopp inquired whether we believed Egypt would allow UNEF to enter the Straits area if Israel withdrew. Mr. Wilcox said it was his impression this

could

CONFIDENTIAL

GPO 888715

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

could be worked out, although the Secretary General might have some negotiating to do regarding the phasing of withdrawal with UNEF's entry.

Ambassador Nykopp expressed the opinion that international administration of the Gaza Strip would be difficult. Mr. Wilcox agreed, but suggested that civil administrative activities might be supervised in some way by the United Nations; of course Israel would resent complete return of Egyptian civil authority.

The Ambassador thought that provision of a screen between the two by UNEF border patrols might be preferable to UN administration. Mr. Wilcox commented that the two elements might appropriately be combined.

There was some general discussion of the progress in reopening the Suez Canal and arrangements for tolls. Mr. Wilcox indicated our hope that, before the Canal was reopened, some kind of interim toll arrangements could be devised, observing that, should Egypt not operate the Canal with the welfare of the users in mind, the latter would find other ways to cope with this situation. The Ambassador expressed the view that Nasser must see first that he may lose before concurring in suitable toll arrangements.

FW

IO - Francis O. Wilcox

688
IO:UNP:ABrown:lmr 3/13/57

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Channon

RE/A

Please send two copies
of the attached memo to
OLI.

CONFIDENTIAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: February 12, 1957

SUBJECT: 1. U.S. Assurances to Israel
2. UMMIA

PARTICIPANTS: Shimshon Arad, First Secretary, Embassy of Israel
UNP - Samuel DePalma
UNP - David L. Gamon

COPIES TO: RM/R
OLI
IO cc
UNP cc
USUN cc
NEA cc
Amembassy Tel Aviv cc

FEB 18 1957

674.84A/2-1257

CSELK

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

U. S. Assurances to Israel

Mr. Arad explained that he had called to clarify a few questions that had remained in his mind as a result of the Secretary's conversation the previous day with Ambassador Eban and as a result of newspaper articles on the visit. In particular, he said, he wished to find out if the United States contemplated giving effect through "parliamentary procedures" to the assurances the Secretary told Ambassador Eban would be forthcoming once Israel withdrew behind the Armistice line. Mr. DePalma answered that he was not aware that any resolution was envisaged as the next step to give effect to assurances. In answer to a query from Mr. Arad, Mr. DePalma said that, as he understood it, the Secretary had not sought to advance definite ideas with regard to the future of the Gaza Strip beyond what the Secretary General has suggested. Mr. Arad said that either the Secretary or Mr. Murphy had alluded to United States attempts to get other governments to subscribe to the doctrine of freedom of innocent passage through the Strait of Tiran and asked if such attempts would be made within the framework of the U.N. Mr. DePalma answered that he was not aware of what plans there might be on this but ventured the opinion that the United States might logically be expected to encourage other Member States to feel as it does.

Mr. DePalma then said that he was under the impression that Israel still is seeking a public declaration from other governments with regard to what it feels

CONFIDENTIAL

FEB 21 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

feels to be its rights. He expressed his concern that Israel might be approaching the latest United States proposals, as conveyed to Prime Minister Ben Gurion, as merely another step in a series of actions. He voiced his personal apprehension that, should these new proposals become enmeshed in a morass of bargaining, they would lose their real point and value. Mr. Arad assured Mr. DePalma that he was convinced that Ambassador Eban looked upon the United States proposals in the same light as Mr. DePalma and so had reported them to the Israeli Government.

UNRWA

Mr. Arad expressed the hope that any UNRWA resolution proposed during the current General Assembly not contain any reference to repatriation which, he said, would not be a constructive step. He added that the feeling among the members of the Israeli Delegation in New York was that they would make a strong fight against the inclusion of any such reference. Mr. DePalma noted that it was sometimes difficult fully to control consideration of the UNRWA item and that draft resolutions often underwent considerable change before they emerged in Committee.

10:UNP:DLCamón:lar

CONFIDENTIAL

CHARLES E. POTTER
MICHIGAN

RAYMOND C. ANDERSON
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ACTION
is assigned to

NEH

February 12, 1957

Honorable Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hill:

A constituent with whom I am well acquainted, not of the Jewish faith, writes me as quoted below:


"I can't understand why we are getting so tough with Israel; and yet we are so soft spoken with Nasser of Egypt.

"I do think there must be some reason; and I would certainly be happy if you could explain it to me."

If you will let me have your comments upon which to base an appropriate response, it will be most helpful and appreciated.

Many thanks for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,


Charles E. Potter

This letter (and its
enclosures, if any) micro-
filmed for RM/R records

323581

38

Sheet

674.84A/2-1257

674.84A/2-1257
R138

FROM AND TYPE OF DOCUMENT		DATE DUE	
Potter, Charles H.		DATE REC'D	
		2/14/57	
DATE	FILED	NO.	
2/12/57			
SUBJECT			
Israel Egypt question			
TO:	TO:	TO:	TO:
DCB			
DATE	DATE	DATE	DATE
2/14/57			
ANSWERED		NO REPLY NECESSARY	

In reply refer to
SEV 674.844/2-1257

FEB 26 1957

Dear Senator Potter:

I refer to your letter of February 12, 1957 in which you quote the comments of a constituent who asks certain questions about the policy of this Government in the Middle East. I appreciate your courtesy in bringing your constituent's views to our attention.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient.

However

The Honorable
Charles E. Potter,
United States Senate.

674.844/2-1257

However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawal.

I hope that these comments will be of interest to your constituent.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

P:SEV:OBLe:DKP:im

H 2/27/57

Roc

WF-X

LINDLEY G. BECKWORTH
3D DISTRICT, TEXAS
MEMBER-ELECT

7916

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

THE WHITE HOUSE

FEB 13 9 07 AM '57

RECEIVED

2/12/57

FEB 17 1957

The Honorable Dwight D. Eisenhower
The President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

Please note the enclosed wires which have been
sent to me.

Your consideration will be appreciated.

Please return the wires.
Sincerely,

Lindley Beckworth
Lindley Beckworth

LB:mh

174.84N/E-1257

6376 8400/2-1257

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

February 15, 1957

TO - Mr. Davis

There are attached two telegrams opposing sanctions against Israel under cover of a note to the President from Congressman Beckworth. Please prepare for signature in H and clear with P an appropriate reply to Congressman Beckworth.

Copies for S/S are requested by February 21.

J. H. Cunningham
for R. German

S/S-RO

Ext. 3737

Atts. As stated

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

ROUTE SLIP

(To Remain With Correspondence)

TO Mr. Fisher Howe, Director

Executive Secretariat

Department of State

PROMPT HANDLING IS ESSENTIAL.
WHEN DRAFT REPLY IS REQUESTED
THE BASIC CORRESPONDENCE MUST
BE RETURNED. IF ANY DELAY IN
SUBMISSION OF DRAFT REPLY IS
ENCOUNTERED, PLEASE TELEPHONE
OFFICE OF THE STAFF SECRETARY.

Date February 13, 1957

FROM THE STAFF SECRETARY

ACTION:

Comment _____

Draft reply _____

For direct reply XXX

For your information _____

For necessary action _____

For appropriate handling _____

See below _____

Remarks:

Congressman Beckworth sends President two telegrams from
constituents: sanctions against Israel

By direction of the President:

A. J. Goodpaster
A. J. GOODPASTER
Staff Secretary

February 26, 1957

In reply refer to
SEV 674.84A/2-1257

Dear Mr. Beckworth:

I refer to your letter of February 12 in which you quote a telegram you had received from some of your constituents in Tyler, Texas, regarding the question of sanctions against Israel. Thank you for bringing these comments to our attention.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations

develop

The Honorable
Lindley Beckworth,
House of Representatives.

General
Kilgus

674.84A/2-1257

CS/J

674.84A/2-1257

develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

I hope the above information will be of use to you in any reply you may wish to make to your constituents.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

1
P:SEV:JHoward:DKP:cf

2/26/57

H - ROC

WF-X

ACTION
is assigned to



SEV

Washington, D. C.
February 12, 1957

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Please note the wire below; it was sent to me from Tyler, Texas, to-wit:

"DA 084

D Tya 099 Long DL PD Tyler, Tex. 1039 AM
Congressman Lindley Beckworth
House of Representatives, Wash D. C.

We have wired the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, Ambassador Lodge, Speaker Rayburn, and Senator Johnson as follows quote we applaud your efforts to establish peace in the Middle East and are opposed to forcing any conditions which will not serve this ultimate goal. Israel's withdrawal without United Nations guarantees leaves path open for renewal of belligerency. In recognition of growing American sympathies for Israel's fight for survival we would profoundly regret United States voting in favor of sanctions against Israel. Unquote We respectfully ask your intervention with the appropriate authorities in opposing any sanctions or economic measures against the State of Israel."

Your consideration will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

This letter (and its
enclosures, if any) micro-
filmed for RM/R records

Lindley Beckworth

323523

LB:mh



P. S. The signers of the above quoted telegram are:
A. S. Genecov, Sol Roosth, Bennie Roosth, Isadore
Roosth, Dr. Hyman, P. Roosth, Sam Balk, Alfred
Roventer, Hyman Ginsberg, Henry Fleishman, Nate
Ginsberg, and B. F. Barnett.

674.84A/2-1257

A/29

FROM AND TYPE OF DOCUMENT		DATE DUE	
Beckworth, Lindley		DATE REC'D 2/14/57	
DATE 2/12/57	FILED	NO.	
SUBJECT Ltr. fr. group at, Tylene, #### Texas			
TO: DCB	TO:	TO:	TO:
DATE 2/14/57	DATE	DATE	DATE
ANSWERED		NO REPLY NECESSARY	

February 26, 1957

In reply refer to
SEV

Dear Mr. Beckworth:

After consideration at the White House, your letter of February 12 to the President enclosing two telegrams from Mr. Israel Smith, President, Western Foundry Co., Tyler, Texas, and from a group of your constituents, also from Tyler, concerning sanctions against Israel has been sent to the Department for reply. Your courtesy in making the views of your constituents available is appreciated.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such

a way

The Honorable
Lindley Beckworth,
House of Representatives.

Files

374.841/2-1257

674.841/2-1257
C31J

DVR

39

a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

I have returned the two telegrams as you requested.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

1. From Mr. Smith (returned).
2. From Mr. A. S. Genecov and others (returned).

P:SEV:RLAnderson:DKP:bt

H

2/27/57

Roc

WFX

ACTION
is assigned to

7832

*acknowledged
by phone*



Washington, D. C.
2/12/57

Dear ~~Mr~~ *Secretary*:

Please note the wire below; it was sent to me from Tyler, Texas, to-wit:

"DA140

D TYA 160 Long Rd- Wux Tyler, Tex 11 122 MC

Honorable Lindley Beckworth

United States Congress, Washington, D. C.

For eight years Egypt has refused to comply with repeated Resolutions of the United Nations to cease its belligerency. Russia has refused to comply with any request of the United Nations in connection with and justice can sanctions be imposed against the smallest and most vulnerable of Nations? We ask your assistance in seeing that Israel gets fair treatment."

/s/

Israel Smith, President
Western Foundry Co.
Tyler, Texas"

Your consideration will be appreciated.

Sincerely,

L Beckworth

Lindley Beckworth

This letter (and its enclosures, if any) micro-filmed for FM/R records.

LB:mh

DC/R
Anal 39
Rev

323544



674.84A/2-1257

2-12-57
A/39

FORM DS-186

5-19-50

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ROUTING & REFERENCE SLIP

DATE

2/13

DIV. OR OFFICE

UNP

REMARKS:

INITIAL

TO	NAME
1	ADAMS
2	DE PALMA
	OWSLEY
	SISCO
3	<i>Samson (action)</i>
	BANE
	BAKER
	BOCK
	CRAMER
	GOUGH
	LUDLOW
	MARCUS
	SPIERS
	TYLER
	PEARCE

February 26, 1957

In reply refer to:
IO:UNP:674.84A/2-1257

Central
Files
674.84A/2-1257
UNP:674.84A/2-1257
UNP:674.84A/2-1257

Dear Mr. Beckworth:

I have received your letter of February 12, 1957, addressed to the Secretary, acknowledged by telephone on February 15, 1957, quoting the text of a telegram from Mr. Israel Smith, President, Western Foundry Company, expressing his concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United

Nations

The Honorable
Lindley Beckworth,
House of Representatives.

DC/R

Anal 2

Rev

674.84A/2-1257

Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

I trust that the above information will be of assistance in the preparation of your reply to Mr. Smith.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

H-WF-X

In reply refer to
UNP 674.84A/2-1257

February 26, 1957

Dear Mr. Garmatz:

I have received your letter of February 12 addressed to the Secretary, acknowledged by telephone on February 15, 1957, expressing your concern as well as that of a number of your constituents over the possibility that the United States might support a resolution in the United Nations recommending sanctions against Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still

hopeful

The Honorable
Edward A. Garmatz,
House of Representatives.

DC/R	The
Anal	2
Rev	
cc	HHW

674.84A/2-1257
CS/U
674.84A/2-1257

hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

The information and views contained in your letter are appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

H-WF-X

DC/R IO:UNP:RVonPagenhardt:scp
2/26/57

EDWARD A. GARMATZ
3d DISTRICT, MARYLAND

7885

COMMITTEES:
MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

ACTION
is assigned to



Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

February 12, 1957

*action assigned to
phone call
JF*

The Honorable John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am in receipt of a number of communications,
strongly opposing sanctions against Israel in
the United Nations, and requesting that our
Government do everything possible to see that
Israel's borders are protected, and to assure
that the Suez Canal will be open for her shipping.


I am in full accord with these views, and sincerely
hope that you will give them careful consideration,
and instruct the United States delegation in the
United Nations accordingly.

Sincerely,

Edward A. Garmatz, M. C.

674.84A/2-1257

FILED



A/39

674.84A/2-1257

DC/R
Anal 39
Rev 1
Stout

323666

RECORDS

JOHN W. HESELTON
FIRST DISTRICT, MASSACHUSETTS

WASHINGTON ADDRESS:
237 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

7830

MEMBER OF COMMITTEE ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

February 12, 1957

ACTION
is assigned to



*acknowledged by
phone 2/15/57
file*

Honorable John Foster Dulles,
Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I enclose copies of telegrams which I have received recently with reference to resolutions pending before the United Nations. I am also enclosing one of the acknowledgments I have sent. Obviously these acknowledgments are not sufficiently specific.

I shall be glad to have your advice as to any further reply I might make, together with copies of any statements or other material which have been issued by the Department in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

John W. Heselton



Enc 44 *copy*

This letter (and its
enclosures, if any) micro-
film for your records

MAR 11 1957

FILED

A/35

64-10000-1001

323550

DWR

AD-1

Rev. *1*

February 12, 1957

Mrs. Mildred L. Hyman,
Erving, Massachusetts

Dear Mrs. Hyman:

I have received the day letter of the 9th which you and others sent to me from Erving.

I am glad to have the opinions of any of my constituents with reference to action which is pending before the United Nations, together with the increasing amount of factual information and opinions being sent to all of us with reference to this matter.

I am confident the President is making every effort to bring about solutions to these difficult problems which will be just to all concerned and will be in the best interests of our national security and the maintenance of peace in the world.

I shall appreciate it if you will advise those who signed the day letter with you of this acknowledgment.

Sincerely yours,

JWH:MT

February 26, 1957.

In reply refer to
IO:UNP 674.84A/2-1257

Dear Mr. Hesolton:

I have received your letter of February 12, 1957, addressed to the Secretary, acknowledged by telephone on February 15, 1957, transmitting four telegrams from: (1) Mrs. Arline L. Cohn and others; (2) Mrs. Mildred L. Hyman and others; (3) Mrs. Harriet L. Kronick, President, Western New England Region of Hadassah; and (4) Mr. Harbert M. Halpern; expressing their concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only

effective

DC/R

Anal ✓

Rev _____

at MF

The Honorable
John W. Hesolton,
House of Representatives.

THIS DOCUMENT IS RETURNED TO
674.84A/2-1257

CS/R

674.84A/2-1257

effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

The four telegrams in question are returned for your records, copies having been made for the files of the Department.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

IO:UNP:BBock:lmr

2/26/57

H-WF-X

FRANCIS E. WALTER, M. C.
15TH DISTRICT, PENNSYLVANIA

RUTH MISKELL, AD. ASSISTANT
HELEN SUTTON, EXECUTIVE SECY.
SARA BONNER, CLERK
CHARLES BRUCH, CLERK
MARGARET BENTZ, CLERK

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

February 12, 1957

7831
CHAIRMAN
COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN
ACTIVITIES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION

MEMBER
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION
AND NATIONALITY POLICY

U. S. DELEGATE, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN MIGRATION

ACTION
is assigned to

TO
NEH

Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.


Dear Mr. Secretary:

The enclosed telegram from Dr. David Zelson,
336 S. 17th Street, Philadelphia 3, Pennsylvania,
is forwarded for your attention.

Sincerely yours,

Francis E. Walter

FEW:mba
lucut



MAR 3 - 1957

674.84A/2-1257

FILED

This letter (and its
enclosures, if any) micro-
filmed for RM/R records

323546

DC/R
Anal <i>39</i>
Rev <i>1</i>
Cat <i>1</i>

A/39

FEB 26 1957

In reply refer to
IO:UNP: 674.84A/2 - 1257

This Document
Central
Files

Dear Mr. Walter:

I have received your letter of February 12, 1957, addressed to the Secretary, acknowledged by telephone on February 12, 1957, transmitting a telegram from Dr. David Zelson expressing his concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only

The Honorable
Francis E. Walter,
House of Representatives.

674.34A/2-1257

CS/R

674.84A/2-1257

effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

Dr. Zelson's telegram is returned for your records, a copy having been made for the files of the Department.

Sincerely yours,

Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

H-WF-X

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

SECRET

55-L

Action

IO

Info

RMR

SS

G

SP

C

NEA

L

R

P

O

FROM: CAIRO

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 2600, FEBRUARY 13, 8 PM

PRIORITY


SENT DEPARTMENT 2600, REPEATED INFORMATION TEL AVIV 131, USUN PRIORITY 75.

ACCORDING INFORMATION GIVEN EMBASSY BY HEIKAL, NASSER INCENSED BY PUBLIC DISCLOSURE GOE ASSURANCES HAMMERSKJOLD RE. PASSAGE ISRAELI SHIPS AQABA (E.G. UP DISPATCHES NOON TODAY). NASSER CONSIDERS THAT HE HAS BEEN TRAPPED AND TRICKED AS CONDITIONS ATTACHED TO GOE ASSURANCES REGARDING (1) NO PUBLICITY AND (2) NO DISCUSSIONS WITH ISRAELIS PRIOR TO WITHDRAWAL AND NO COMMITMENT BY GOE PRIOR WITHDRAWAL, HAVE BEEN VIOLATED.

EMBASSY OFFICER ATTEMPTED ASSUAGE FEELINGS BY POINTING OUT GOOD REACTION WHICH WOULD BE GENERATED AMONG AMERICAN PUBLIC BUT HEIKAL REMAINED APPREHENSIVE.

HARE

CC



DMS
SECRET FILE

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

SECRET

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

674.84A/2-1357

This Document must be returned to the RM/R Central Files
RM/A

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

31-D

Action

Control: 7699

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 13, 1957
8:23 AM

NEA

Info

FROM: TEL AVIV

TO: Secretary of State

RMR

NO: 952, FEBRUARY 13, 11 AM

SS

NIACT

G

SP

C

L

IO

USUN

P

UOP

O

OLI

OCB

USIA

CIA

DOES DEPARTMENT WISH ME TO TAKE INITIATIVE AND REQUEST MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER TO PRESENT VIEWS CONTAINED "UNCLEARED MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION?" (DEPTEL 778).

FOREIGN OFFICE CONFIRMS TODAY'S NEWS STORIES THAT EXTRAORDINARY MEETING OF CABINET WILL BE HELD TODAY TO DISCUSS "DULLES PROPOSAL." ALTHOUGH BEN GURION'S HEALTH CONTINUES TO IMPROVE ACCORDING TO FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIAL HE NOT YET SUFFICIENTLY RECOVERED TO MAKE TRIP TO JERUSALEM SO TODAY'S MEETING WILL TAKE PLACE AT HIS TEL AVIV RESIDENCE.

JERUSALEM POST REPORTS THAT DETAILS OF DULLES PLAN "WERE DISSEMINATED IN ISRAEL YESTERDAY THROUGH GOOD OFFICES OF NEW YORK TIMES NEWS COLUMNS" AND FURTHER REFERS TO ITS AS "DULLES-NEW YORK TIMES PLAN." CAN DEPARTMENT OFFER ANY GUIDANCE SHOULD BEN GURION RAISE QUESTION REGARDING APPEARANCE NEW YORK TIMES STORY?

LAWSON

NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

1957 FEB 13 PM 12 14

674.84A/2-1357 HBS

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

**OUTGOING
TELEGRAM**

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

07000

1957 FEB 13 PM 7 12

DC/T

for DC/T use only

SENT TO: Embassy, TEL AVIV - PRIORITY 786

Origin

Info

Embtel 952. Please discuss with Primin points contained Deptel 788

If Ben Gurion raises question appearance New York Times story, suggest
you state you uninformed re circumstances.

Dulles
(CW)
"DULLES"

374.844/2-1357

CS/J

674.844/2-1357

Dist.
Desired
(Offices
Only)

Drafted by:

NEA:NE:RSParker:SWRockwell:rej 2-13/57

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

NE - Fraser Wilkins

Clearances:

S/S-CR
FEB 13 1957 P.M.

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

53
Action
NEAControl: 8181
Rec'd: February 13, 1957
5:15 p.m.

Info

FROM: Tel Aviv

RMR TO: Secretary of State

SS NO: 953, February 13, 2 p.m.

G
SP
C
EUR
L
IO
P
UOP
ND

SENT DEPARTMENT 953; REPEATED INFORMATION CAIRO 165, JERUSALEM 71, AMMAN 166, DAMASCUS 118.

IDF FLO informs USARMA one of its vehicles hit mine this morning on main highway southwest of Rafiah in Gaza strip wounding five soldiers.

O
SCA
OLI

Comment: GOI will regard incident as dramatic support its insistence UNEF would be unable control Fedayeen and other anti-Israel operations in Gaza if it alone responsible for border security. Embassy anticipates incident will be exploited in this vein strengthening GOI's resistance to any disposition Gaza strip which does not involve Israel police and civil administration.

OCB
USIA
CIA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

MGG:MAA

LAWSON

674.34A/2-1357

NEA
MESSAGE CENTER

1957 FEB 14 AM 7 52

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

45-48

CONFIDENTIAL

Action

Control: 8367

Rec'd: FEBRUARY 14, 1957
3:23 AM

NEA
Info

FROM: TEL AVIV

RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 957, FEBRUARY 13, 4 P.M.

G

SP

C

PRIORITY

L

IO

P

UOP

O

OLI

FOLLOWING TRANSMITTAL EMBTEL 952 FOREIGN MINISTRY TELEPHONED EMBASSY TO REPORT CABINET'S CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSALS CONTAINED UNITED STATES AIDE-MEMOIRE HAS BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL THURSDAY MORNING.

CCB
USIA
CIA

FYI FOREIGN MINISTRY'S EARLY AND INFORMAL REACTION TO PROPOSALS IS IDENTICAL TO VIEWS GENERALLY EXPRESSED IN TODAY'S PRESS - - THAT UNITED STATES OVERTURE PROBABLY REPRESENTS SIGNIFICANT JUMP IN UNITED STATES APPRECIATION ISRAEL'S PROBLEMS BUT THAT PROPOSALS THEMSELVES DO NOT MEET ISRAEL'S MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS RETRQOMB# AND SECURITY. PRESS ROUNDUP FOLLOWS.

LAWSON

CV

#AS RECEIVED, WILL BE SERVICED ON REQUEST.

674.34A/2-1357

MESSAGE CENTER
NEA

HBS

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

53

Action
NEA

Control: 7968

Rec'd: February 13, 1957
1:55 p.m.

FROM: Amman

Info
RMR

TO: Secretary of State

SS

NO: 931, February 13, 5 p.m.

G

SP

C

EUR

L

IO

P

UOP

O

OLI

SENT DEPARTMENT 931; REPEATED INFORMATION BEIRUT 229, CAIRO 202, DAMASCUS 200, TEL AVIV 110.

With first new surge of anti-US emotion since Suez crisis began, today's press announces US "complete surrender to Jewish demands for guarantees".

Commenting on what may be garbled version of "new US position" on Israeli withdrawal, editorials all papers revolve around themes:

OCB

USIA

CIA

OSD

ARMY

NAVY

AIR

(1) US guarantees everything requested by Israel in spite of announced insistence latter's unconditional withdrawal;

(2) Eisenhower administration has decided surrender Zionist pressure;

(3) US supports literal interpretation tripartite declaration yet permits Israel profit from aggression;

(4) US by defying UN has joined Anglo-French-Israeli ranks; and

(5) UN now forced adopt different course from that followed on Israel's unconditional withdrawal and US to blame.

Comment: Newspapers caught slightly offguard by late arrival this news item. Writers interrupted regularly planned editorials to express almost unbelieving dismay US "subservience Zionist pressure" and sentiment "good intentions some of us harbored for US not in right place". Vehemence first reaction toned down by printing deadlines; perhaps also by spotty news of Egyptian acceptance US position, which if true, may save US from holocaust now on horizon.

Embassy would appreciate any available details relative this new story.

MGG:MAA

MALLORY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PERMANENT

RECORD COPY • This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken •

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

This Document Must Be Returned to

RM/R
Central
FilesMESS
OF
CENTER

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

35-D
Action

CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 8443
Rec'd: February 14, 1967
5:21 a.m.

File
NEA
18/37
Central

NEA
Info
RMR

FROM: USARMA Tel Aviv

TO: Secretary of State

NO: CX-40, DTG 130830Z

BS
SF
EUR
L
IO
P
TOP
OLI

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT ARMY FOR ACSI, STATE DEPARTMENT; INFORMATION
USARMAS BEIRUT, BAGHDAD, DAMASCUS, AMMAN, CGUSAREUR, USCINCEUR,
8604 AAU ASMARA, CINCNELM, CINCLANT, USDOCOSOUTH, USDOCOLAND,
COMSIXTHFLT, COMNAVMIDEASTFOR, CINCUSAFE.

IDF FLO reports 122,000 IDF vehicle struck mine on
main highway SW Rafiah (Gaza Strip area), five
soldiers wounded.

Comment: Usually reliable source states Egyptians
are posting circulars in Gaza Strip calling on
inhabitants to sabotage IDF personnel and installations.

Declassify upon receipt. (Signed Query)

MAM:DT

957
14 AM 10 4
NEA
SAGE CENTER

This Document Must Be Returned to

1557

Confidential File

PERMANENT
RECORD COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY IS PROHIBITED.

This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken.

URGENT
TELEGRAM

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

Department of State

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Classification

06997
1957 FEB 13 PM 7 1

DC/7

SENT TO: CIRCULAR 681

JOINT STATE-USIA MESSAGE

Following for guidance response queries re Washington news stories February 12 that US will support free navigation Gulf Aqaba and UNEF control Gaza.

US position is: We have been exerting strong efforts on behalf implementation GA resolutions arising out of hostilities in Egypt. US stands for unconditional Israel withdrawal from Gaza and area of Straits of Aqaba. At same time US believes that waters of Gulf Aqaba have international character. We understand GOE holds same view since in memo to US Embassy in Cairo January 28, 1950 it said it had occupied Tiran and Senafir Islands at entrance to Gulf Aqaba solely for purpose protecting islands and that "this occupation being in no way conceived in a spirit of obstructing in any way innocent passage through stretch of water separating these two islands from Egyptian coast of Sinai, it follows that this passage, the only practicable one, will remain free as in past, in conformity with international practice and recognized principles of law of nations."

In absence some overriding decision to contrary, as by ICJ, US, on behalf vessels of US registry, believes it is entitled to right of free and innocent passage, which should be generally recognized. This view has been communicated to Israel Government together with reiteration US view

Drafted by: NEA/P:TRFrye:NEA:NE:Shackwell 2/13/57

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: [Signature]

- Edwin M. J. Kretzmann

NEA/P: [Signature]

P - Mr. McCardle, in draft UNP, Mr. Gamon, in draft

USIA - Messrs. Handley and King, in substance

FEB 13 1957 P.M.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Classification

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS
COPY, IF CLASSIFIED, IS
PROHIBITED.

574.64A/2-1357

674.840/2-1357

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Classification

Israel should comply fully repeat fully with UN resolutions.

US position on international character Gulf Aqaba is an affirmation by US of its attitude which requires no endorsement other parties.

On Gaza, we believe Israel should withdraw promptly and unconditionally leaving future of Gaza strip to be worked out through efforts and good offices of UN. Because strip is source potential danger, we think UNEF should move into area and be on boundary between Israel and Gaza strip.

SENT TO:

Missions

Consulates

Amman
Ankara
Athens
Baghdad
Beirut
Cairo
Damascus
Jidda
Kabul
Karachi
Khartoum
London (by pouch) ✓
New Delhi
Madrid
Paris (by pouch) ✓
Rabat
Rome (by pouch) ✓
Tehran
Tel Aviv
Tripoli
Tunis

Algiers

Dulles
mk
DULLES

cur
681

OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

AIR POUCH

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

FROM : The American Embassy, BONN
TO : The Department of State, WASHINGTON
REF : Embassy Telegram No. 3086, February 11

Despatch No. 1358

February 13, 1957

SUBJECT: Federal Government's Attitude Toward Sanctions Against Israel.

As reported in the Embassy's Telegram under reference von WELCK, Director of the Laenderabteilung of the Foreign Office, recently informed the Embassy that should the United Nations vote to take economic sanctions against Israel, the Federal Government would not consider the sanctions as being applicable to reparations payments (Wiedergutmachung) to Israel; and the Government would in any case continue to pay reparations in kind at the agreed rate of 300 million DM's per annum.

In a subsequent discussion, Knocke, head of the Eastern Division of the Laenderabteilung, confirmed what von Welck had said; and stated in explanation of the German view that the Federal Government regarded the payments to Israel as a fixed obligation arising out of past events which occurred long before the present Near Eastern crisis; and that it was felt that it would be wrong to cut the payments off because of Israel's present behavior even though the United Nations should vote economic sanctions against Israel. Knocke further said that German economic relations with Israel, apart from the reparations payments, were on such a small scale that it would be pointless to impose sanctions in this area while continuing the large scale reparations payments.

For the Ambassador:

Elim O'Shaughnessy
Counselor of Embassy

Distribution:

Amb's Office - 1
Mr. Trimble - 1
PA - 5
E/OD - 2
E/EP - 1
Amembassy LONDON - 1
Amembassy TEL AVIV - 1

PA:FOallen:hp

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

674.84A/2-1357 HBS

Returned to

ETL

REC

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

7883

LINDLEY BECKWORTH
3D DISTRICT, TEXAS

ACTION
is assigned to

EC

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

2/13/57

Dear Mr Secretary:

Please note and
return.

I'd like your
Comments on the
various points made.

ack by phone
2/15/57

RAL

Mr. [unclear]

Records
Lindley Beckworth

3205780



38
+
C

EXC. ATT

674.84A/2-1357

674.84A 2-1357

323704

This letter (and its
enclosures if any) micro-
film records

674.84A/
A/38/2-1357

In reply refer to
IO:UNP: 67L.84A/2-1357

February 26, 1957

Dear Mr. Beckworth:

I have received your letter of February 13, 1957, addressed to the Secretary, acknowledged by telephone on February 15, 1957, transmitting a letter, dated February 9, 1957, from Mr. Murray Cohen expressing his concern over the possibility that the United States might support action in the United Nations imposing sanctions on Israel.

As you know, we have been giving this matter a great deal of serious thought and consideration for the last several weeks. However, events have been developing with such rapidity on an hour-to-hour basis that it has been exceedingly difficult to put down in a letter any position which might not be academic or out of date before the letter was delivered. This was one of the reasons, of course, why the President and the Secretary were anxious to meet with the Congressional leadership last week in order to discuss, in terms of latest developments, the many complexities of this problem.

As the Secretary stated at that meeting, there is strong sentiment among many members of the United Nations for economic sanctions. There is reluctance to concede that it is permissible for a nation, even though subjected to grievances, to seek relief by attacking and occupying parts of a neighboring country. It is felt in many quarters that to condone such acts would be to open the door to military action in many other quarters where grievances exist and that the whole fabric of peace would be torn apart.

The President made it clear at that meeting, as he did also in his speech last week, that we would be reluctant to see the situation in the United Nations develop in such a way that sanctions would seem to most of the members of the United Nations to be the only

DC/R

2

Final

REV

Oct

The Honorable

Lindley Beckworth,

House of Representatives.

CS/C

674840/2-1357

674.841/2-1357

effective solution. We have, as was indicated in our Aide-Memoire to the Government of Israel which was released on February 17, given important assurances to Israel that her ultimate interests would be protected. Thus far, Israel apparently has felt that these assurances are not sufficient. However, we are still hopeful that they will prove to be acceptable to Israel and that she will withdraw. The Secretary discussed this matter further with the Israeli Ambassador over the weekend. If Israel does not withdraw, relying on the far-reaching assurances now obtainable, the United Nations may consider that the only alternative consistent with its authority is to continue to press Israel to comply with its repeated resolutions calling for withdrawals.

The letter from Mr. Cohen is returned as requested, a copy having been made for the files of the Department.

Sincerely yours,


Robert C. Hill
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

As stated.

H-WF-X